Chapter 2
Background and description
of the Home Insulation Program
Home insulation before the Energy Efficient Homes Package (EEHP)
2.1
Before the commencement of the EEHP, retrofitting insulation to existing
homes was a minor proportion of the insulation market. According to the
Insulation Council of Australia and New Zealand (ICANZ), before the EEHP the
market for building insulation was:
-
new homes—50 per cent;
- commercial/industrial—40 per cent;
- retrofitting existing homes—10 per cent.[1]
2.2
Glasswool and rockwool comprised about 70 per cent of the Australian market
and involved two local manufacturers: CSR Bradford and Fletchers Insulation.
The rest of the market was made up of other materials including cellulose,
polyester and foils, involving around 30 manufacturers in Australia.[2]
2.3
According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in dwellings with
ceiling insulation in 2008, the material was:
- bulk batts (fibreglass/wool/polyester) 65.8 per cent;
- loose fill 15.2 per cent;
- sisalation/reflective foil 5.2 per cent;
- other 2.0 per cent; and
- 'don't know' 11.9 per cent.[3]
2.4
ICANZ estimated that before the EEHP up to 40 per cent of dwellings
other than apartments, that is up to 2.7 million homes, had no or inadequate
ceiling insulation.[4]
This proportion has been gradually declining as minimum energy efficiency
levels in new homes have been required in the Building Code of Australia since
2003.[5]
ICANZ also estimated that before the EEHP retrofitting of ceiling insulation in
existing homes was approximately 65–70 000 per annum.[6]
2.5
Before the EEHP, retrofitting insulation was largely unregulated, with little
to no control over products, and limited registration or training standards for
installers (applicable only in South Australia).[7]
ICANZ explained this as:
The value of the product being put in was considered a minor
renovation... Having insulation put in your home could often be done for under
$1,000, so it flew under the radar completely.[8]
2.6
However, state and territory workplace and occupational health and
safety laws have applied throughout.[9]
2.7
The EEHP transformed the dynamics of the retrofitting insulation
industry in unprecedented ways, resulting in pressure points and consequences
with which the EEHP and its custodians did not cope.
Summary of the Energy Efficient Homes Package[10]
2.8
The EEHP was announced by the Prime Minister on 3 February 2009.[11]
At $3.9 billion it represented approximately 9 per cent of the government's $42
billion Nation Building and Jobs Plan, which was part of the
government's response to the global recession triggered by the global financial
crisis.[12]
2.9
The government stated that the aims of the EEHP were to:
- generate economic stimulus and support jobs for trades people and
workers employed in the manufacturing, distribution and installation of
residential ceiling insulation and solar hot water systems;
- improve the energy efficiency, comfort and value of homes;
- help households save on their heating and cooling energy bills;
and
- reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
2.10
The program focussed on two ways of improving the energy efficiency of
homes: installing ceiling insulation (the Home Insulation Program), and
replacing electric storage hot water heaters (the Solar Hot Water Rebate).
These were chosen because space heating and cooling and water heating are
typically the two greatest energy uses in Australian homes.[13]
2.11
The EEHP was initially administered by the Department of Environment,
Water, Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA).
2.12
As announced on 3 February 2009, key components of the EEHP were:
- Home Owner Insulation Program (later Home Insulation
Program - HIP):[14]
This was a $2.7 billion program to provide a rebate of up to $1600 for owner-occupiers
to install ceiling insulation in existing homes. It was to run from 3 February
2009 to 31 December 2011 or until the funds were fully allocated. It was
expected to affect 2.2 million homes.
- Low Emission Assistance Plan for Renters (LEAPR): This
provided $612.5 million to increase existing assistance to landlords to
install insulation from $500 to up to $1000 per home. It was to run from 3
February 2009 to 30 June 2011 and was expected to affect an estimate 500
000 rented homes.
- Solar Hot Water Rebate: $507 million was provided to
increase an existing rebate from $1000 to $1600. The previous means test was
removed. It was to run from 3 February 2009 until 30 June 2012.
2.13
The package was not means tested. Householders could claim either
insulation or hot water assistance for one address, but not both.
2.14
The program was demand driven and intended to continue until the
completion date or until program funds were fully allocated. The Home
Insulation Program was expected to be fully expensed by December 2011.
2.15
This report focuses solely on the Home Insulation Program.
Further details of the Home Insulation Program (HIP)
2.16
During 'phase 1' of the program (3 February to 30 June 2009)
householders paid the installer and claimed reimbursement from DEWHA. Phase 1
of the program was intended as an interim measure while the main program
('phase 2') was developed. In this time DEWHA consulted with industry and
state/territory governments, arranged the Medicare payment system, and
developed training materials with the Construction and Property Services
Industry Skills Council.[15]
2.17
The main program (phase 2) commenced five months after phase 1, on 1 July 2009,
when arrangements were changed so that installers were paid directly through
Medicare's claim processing system. As a result, householders paid nothing for
insulation installed under the HIP if the contracted price was less than the $1600
rebate limit.
2.18
From 1 July 2009, installers had to be registered to obtain work under
the program (conditions of registration are described at paragraph 2.25). The
work could be done by a registered installer or by an employee or subcontractor
of a registered installer.
2.19
Apart from the $1600 rebate limit, there was no control over the cost of
the installation and no requirement to seek a second quote.[16]
Installers could advertise their services, for example by local advertising or
telemarketing.
2.20
Householders were responsible for choosing a suitable installer and
insulation type, and then entered a contract with the installer. Householders
were also responsible for ensuring they were satisfied with the service
provided. If satisfied, they signed a Work Order Form, to enable the installer
to be paid through the online payment system.
2.21
The R-value of the insulation materials (the amount of resistance to transfer
of heat) had to comply with standards shown in the program guidelines. The
standards were similar though not identical to the standards in the Building
Code of Australia (BCA).[17]
The required standard varied according to the climate zone:
Table 1—Home Insulation Program: R-value
requirements by climate zone
|
climate zone1
|
1
|
2
below
300m
|
2
300m or more
|
3
|
4
|
5
|
6
|
7
|
8
|
|
minimum R-value2
|
3.0
|
3.0
|
3.0
|
3.0
|
3.5
|
3.5
|
3.5
|
4.0
|
4.0
|
|
direction of heat flow
|
down
|
down
|
down
& up
|
down & up
|
up
|
up
|
up
|
up
|
up
|
|
1
climate zones: as defined in the Building Code of Australia, from 1 hottest
to 8 coldest: see Appendix 5.
2 R-value:
resistance to heat flow. The R-value can be either material R-value, or total
R‑value approach outlined in the Building Code of Australia. If using
the total R‑value approach, the minimum R-value must still meet the
requirements of the table.
|
Source: Department of
Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts, Energy Efficient Homes
Package—Home Insulation Program—Program Guidelines version 5, 1 December 2009.
Changes during the program –
overview
2.22
After the start of the fully developed program on 1 July 2009, the
government made a number of significant changes including:
- On 1 September 2009 the Low Emission Assistance Plan for Renters
(LEAPR) was discontinued because of slow take-up, and landlords and tenants
were 'rolled into' the Home Insulation Program.
- On 2 November 2009 the maximum rebate for insulation was reduced
from $1600 to $1200. This reduced the program's overall budget by
$250 million, from the initial $2.7 billion to $2.45 billion.[18]
- Various changes were made to allegedly reduce opportunities for
fraud and abuse:
- From 1 September 2009 a pricing table was included in the
guidelines, and installers charging above the listed prices without reasonable
grounds were liable to be removed from the installers register.[19]
- From 1 December 2009 new guidelines required householders to
obtain two quotes and a site inspection (the two quote requirement had applied
from 3 February to 30 June 2009 but had been removed with the full program
launch on 1 July 'to allow the market and householders to interact without the
involvement of the department').[20]
- From 1 December 2009 installers were required to agree to the
publication of their names if deregistered for non-compliance.[21]
- From 24 December 2009 materials had to be on the list of Approved
Products maintained by DEWHA. Installers were also required to affix the
product label to a visible and accessible part of the roof cavity, and to the
householder's copy of the work order form, to facilitate auditing.[22]
2.23
In late 2009 and early 2010 further changes were made, supposedly in
response to concerns about electrical safety: see paragraph 2.34.
2.24
The Minister for the Environment, the Hon Peter Garrett MP, ultimately cancelled
the program on 19 February 2010, citing safety concerns and compliance issues,
as discussed further below.
Registration and training
requirements
2.25
From 1 July 2009, installer businesses were required to be registered
with DEWHA. DEWHA claimed that registered installers had to demonstrate minimum
trade related competencies and occupational health and safety training, hold
appropriate insurance and comply with the relevant Australian Standards for
insulation materials and installation.[23]
2.26
DEWHA submitted that the trade related competencies required by the
program could be:
- a trade specific competency: licensed builder, electrician,
carpenter, bricklayer, plasterer, painter or plumber, or equivalent where no
licensing requirements exist; or
- insulation specific competency: a statement of attainment from a
Registered Training Organisation against the BCG03 or CPC08 Training Package
relating to insulation installation; or
- two years' work experience installing insulation.[24]
2.27
Registered installers' employees and subcontractors did not need to have
the trade related competencies, providing installers attested that employees/
subcontractors were supervised by a person who had the competencies and signed
off the Work Order Form. However all persons involved in installation had to
have general occupational health and safety training.[25]
2.28
Later changes included publicising the deregistration of non-compliant
installers from December 2009, and minimum training or skill requirements for
all persons involved in installation (not only supervisors) from 12 February
2010 which transpired just days before the suspension of the entire program.[26]
2.29
However, the committee is not satisfied that the government implemented
any timely and systematic testing of the veracity or integrity of claims made
by installers in their registration forms.
2.30
The committee is concerned that the deregistration process was more ad
hoc than rigorous.
2.31
DEWHA contracted the Construction and Property Services Industry Skills
Council to produce a range of training resources for Register Training
Providers, including a 'pocket book' for installers which was available from 1
August 2009. The pocket book contained information about common installation
hazards including electrical hazards.[27]
Health and safety requirements
2.32
The program's health and safety requirements included:
- mandatory minimum occupational health and safety training for all
personnel involved in installation;
- installers to comply with state/territory occupational health and
safety laws; and
- installation practices to be governed by the relevant Australian
Standards and state/territory regulations for laying thermal insulation and
working around electrical wiring.[28]
2.33
In late October and early November 2009, following a number of serious incidents
including the death by electrocution of an installer on 14 October, DEWHA with
the relevant industry skills councils upgraded the training program. The
installers' Pocket Book was updated, particularly to give more prominence to
the instructions about electrical safety, and copies were sent to all
registered installer businesses and to registered training organisations to
distribute to installers.[29]
Safety concerns and closure of the program
2.34
On 1 November 2009, after the tragic death of an installer, and following
concerns about fires started by overheated downlights, Minister Garrett
announced additional safety and compliance measures including:
- a ban on metal fasteners for foil insulation, from 2 November;
- mandatory installation of covers over downlights and other
ceiling appliances, from 2 November;[30]
- a mandatory risk assessment for each job before work started,
from 1 December (this involved filling in a form which prompted the installer
to look for the listed hazards, and gave advice on how to respond to them); and
- a targeted electrical safety inspection of Queensland homes with
foil insulation installed under the program.[31]
2.35
On 30 November 2009, Minister Garrett announced that training
requirements would apply beyond supervisors, to all personnel involved in installation.
This took effect from 12 February 2010.[32]
2.36
On 9 February 2010, Minister Garrett suspended the use of foil
insulation from the program because of concerns about electrical safety where
foil is not properly installed. On 10 February, Minister Garrett announced that
all houses with foil installed under the program (about 50 000) would be
required to have an electrical safety inspection.[33]
2.37
Finally, on 19 February 2010, Minister Garrett announced the closure of
the Home Insulation Program from that day, because of safety and compliance
concerns.[34]
The announcement came after the death of a fourth installer and the first
hearing of this committee's inquiry into the program.
2.38
At that time the government announced an intention to replace the HIP
with a Renewable Energy Bonus Scheme (REBS) to operate from 1 June 2010. This
was supposedly planned to subsidise solar hot water systems and ceiling
insulation, with more stringent conditions than the HIP.[35]
However, following the advice of Dr Allan Hawke's review of the HIP, the
government announced on 22 April 2010 that the insulation component of REBS would
not proceed:
Dr Hawke has advised the Government that he has “grave
concerns about the wisdom of proceeding with any further government supported
home insulation program.” In his report he notes that “the safety and quality
risks cannot be fully abated and both the Government’s efforts and those of
reputable industry players will be largely deployed on the Government’s
rectification program, which must proceed as soon as possible.”...
It is because of these concerns about the development of an
appropriate risk management framework in regards to safety and compliance
issues that the Government has made the decision that REBS will proceed without
the insulation component.[36]
Actions arising from closure of the Home Insulation Program
2.39
On 10 March 2010, Minister Combet announced a range of supposed rectification
and remediation actions to deal with the closure of the HIP. Further details were
provided on 1 April 2010.[37]
They were stated to be:
- The Foil Insulation Safety Program: the removal of foil
insulation, or installation of safety switches, in the 50 000 homes which
had foil installed. The government expected that this would take about 6 months
after commencement to complete. An initial inspection of around 1000 homes
fitted with foil insulation found that:
- about 3 per cent had electrical safety risks;
- 5 per cent had fire safety risks;
- 20 per cent had pre-existing electrical safety risks not related
to the insulation; and
- 33 per cent involved use of metal staples after they had been prohibited
under the program.[38]
- The Home Insulation Safety Program involves targeted inspections
of at least 150 000 homes which had non-foil insulation installed. These
inspections are targeted at the homes which are most likely to have safety
issues, and will include 'simple remediation work' such as fitting downlight
covers. In addition, any household that has safety concerns can request an
inspection. 15 000 targeted inspections showed that:
- 66 per cent of installations were fully compliant;
- 7.6 per cent had fire safety hazards;
- 16 per cent had other quality issues including non-compliant
insulation product and incomplete installations;
- 0.5 per cent involved potential fraud;
- 9.5 per cent of inspections could not be completed for various
reasons.[39]
2.40
The government appointed an expert panel of industry, employee and
regulatory representatives to advise on the inspections programs, including
Dr Ron Silberberg, ex-Managing Director of the Housing Industry
Association; Mr Peter Tighe, National Secretary of the Electrical Trades
Union; and Mr Tony Arnel, Victoria's Building and Plumbing
Commissioner and chair of the Green Building Council of Australia.[40]
2.41
The funding to meet the government's commitments under the Home
Insulation Safety Program and the Foil Insulation Safety Program will come from
within the existing budget of the Home Insulation Program.[41]
2.42
According to Dr Hawke, there may be very little of the approximately
$1 billion unspent from the HIP's total allocation of $2.45 billion, after
the safety inspections are carried out:
Early indications of the compliance work [being undertaken
under the Foil Insulation Safety Program and the Home Insulation Safety
Program] are that significantly more houses may require inspection and
potential rectification. These demands may leave little available funding for
the Renewable Energy Bonus Scheme (REBS).[42]
2.43
The 2010–11 Budget allocated $66 million for the Foil Insulation Safety
Program and $295 million for the Home Insulation Safety Program in 2010–11, but
also allocated $365 million over 2010–11 and 2011–12 for ongoing costs
associated with the Home Insulation Program, which the committee was told could
be used to meet further rectification costs.[43]
According to the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, to 15 June
2010, 24 624 foil houses and 36 930 non-foil houses have been inspected. About
2000 homes are being inspected per week. It is unclear whether these figures
include or are in addition to auditing and compliance inspections done during
the currency of the HIP, or the targeted inspections which Minister Combet
noted in his 10 March 2010 statement to Parliament (see paragraph 2.39).[44]
2.44
In addition, the government established a number of industry assistance measures
explained as:
-
a $41.2 million Insulation Workers Adjustment Package, consisting
of support to workers to retain their current job, or assistance to find
alternative jobs or training places where suitable employment is not available;[45]
- a $15 million Insulation Industry Assistance Package for firms
with appropriate compliance records to assist in meeting the cost of insulation
stock-holdings;[46]
and
- other assistance to firms by allowing them, on conditions, to
participate in home inspections; and deferral of GST payment obligations.[47]
2.45
The government has advised that to 10 June 2010, 760 applications have
been received under the Insulation Industry Assistance Package; 98 applications
worth $6.1 million have been approved; 44 applications have been rejected;
and 618 applications are being considered.[48]
2.46
The government has appointed KPMG as forensic auditors and moved
additional staff and resources within DCCEE into audit and compliance work.[49]
2.47
After numerous requests from the opposition, the government has asked
the Auditor-General to audit the program as a matter of priority. The
Auditor-General's report is expected by September 2010.[50]
Outcomes of the Home Insulation Program
Installation rates
2.48
Over 1.2 million homes were insulated under the program, at a cost to
government of approximately $1.5 billion in rebates.[51]
This may be compared with an estimated 2.7 million homes which, before the
program, had no or inadequate ceiling insulation, and with the historical rate
of insulation retrofitting of about 65–70 000 per year.[52]
2.49
ICANZ estimated that retrofit ceiling insulation was about 10 per cent
of the market before the HIP, and was about 50 per cent of the market during
the HIP.[53]
2.50
Activity increased enormously in the months after July 2009, when
payments could be made directly to installers through Medicare without the
householder being out of pocket (see Figure 1). For example, in November 2009
alone there were nearly 180 000 claims, or nearly three times as much as the
pre-HIP annual activity.
Figure 1—Home Insulation Program claims, March to
November 2009
Source: DEWHA, submission 19, p. 5. The graphed
figures are: March 3321; April 7917; May 18 175; June 23 642; July 78
375; August 108 169; September 136 838; October 165 104; November (to 23 November)
176 972; total 718 513. Later figures are: November (total) 209 267; December
136 402; January 2010 139 850; February 186 095.[54]
2.51
This unprecedented level of activity, compared with the relatively
stable state of the industry previously, appears to have contributed to the
safety and compliance problems that arose in the second half of 2009.
Environmental outcomes
2.52
At best, the environmental outcomes of the program are uncertain,
particularly given the circumstances and consequences of its closure. According
to DEWHA, when the program was announced in February 2009 preliminary estimates
indicated that the combination of the Home Insulation Program, Low Emissions
Assistance Plan for Renters and the Solar Hot Water Rebate would yield
cumulative greenhouse gas savings of approximately 49.4 million tonnes of
CO2 equivalent (CO2–e) by 2020.
2.53
Subsequent analysis by the Department of Climate Change in December 2009
indicated annual emissions savings in the order of 4.5 million tonnes of CO2–e
in the year 2020.[55]
Given the greatly reduced number of homes that were insulated compared to the
number originally envisaged (ie 1.2 million rather than 2.7 million)[56]
this abatement figure would appear to significantly overestimate the annual
savings, perhaps by as much as 50 per cent.
2.54
DEWHA noted that it was too soon to estimate the effect of the program
on greenhouse gas emissions, but noted that 'ceiling insulation is considered
the most effective form of insulation.'[57]
Dr Allan Hawke in his review of the program commented, 'the precise
quantification of carbon emissions abatement generated from the HIP has been
questioned and there would be value in testing this further.'[58]
2.55
The Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency provided an updated
estimate of greenhouse gas abatement for the Energy Efficiency Homes Package in
March 2010. It estimated that 27 million tonnes CO2–e will be saved
by 2020.[59]
2.56
In any event, evidence put to or able to be sourced by the committee
suggests that any estimate to date of alleged emission savings fails to take
into account homes wrongly insulated or 'de-insulated' as a result of the HIP. As
well, the environmental costs of discarding insulation materials (including
materials that may be dumped in public areas) appear not to have been
considered.
Employment outcomes
2.57
At best, the employment outcomes of the program are hazy. ICANZ
estimated that prior to the EEHP there were around 200 companies retrofitting insulation.
DEWHA submitted that as at 6 December 2009, there were 6313 active installer
companies and estimated that the installer workforce was more than double this.
Officials from the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations
could not provide a more accurate estimate and also indicated they had no
independent means of verifying DEWHA's estimate. ICANZ estimated that the EEHP
has created over 6000 new jobs across Australia.[60]
2.58
DEWHA estimated that over two thirds of program expenditure generated
employment downstream of the manufacturers in distribution, warehousing,
installation and support services. ICANZ estimated that for each manufacturing
job created there have been 20–30 downstream jobs created, although no figures
were provided on the number of manufacturing positions created. DEWHA submitted
that installing insulation is labour intensive, and is an effective stimulus
measure in terms of supporting domestic employment, notwithstanding the use of
a level of imported materials.[61]
2.59
Dr Allan Hawke in his review of the program commented, 'at its peak (in
November 2009), the program had registered over 10,000 installers employing
thousands of largely low-skilled workers...' and that 'an HIP objective was to
support jobs in the insulation industry and this objective was met.'[62]
2.60
However, the early closure of the program has had a range of negative
employment impacts. Minister Combet has acknowledged that:
...the decision to terminate the program prematurely has been
influenced by the conduct of a number of unscrupulous operators. Their
behaviour has resulted in widespread harm to legitimate businesses and the
redundancy of many employees.[63]
Business distress
2.61
There has been significant distress among affected businesses as a
result of the negative consequences of HIP itself, including unjustified
tarnishing of industry reputations from its unexpected closure, as well as the
government's April 2010 decision to renege on its February 2010 promise to
establish a replacement program. In short, the calamities concertinaed. For
example:
I am the owner of a now destroyed insulation manufacturing
and installing business that has been operating for 16 years. I have done only
two jobs since the 19th Feb [2010].... I have spent over $30,000 keeping my
business afloat without income since Feb 19th, while waiting for the announced
new rebate program to begin on June 1st [2010], which didn't happen...
The Insulation Rebate program has left me with a legacy of a non viable
business, no income, a business loan established in May 2008 [9 months
before the program began] against the equity in my family home and now no means
to repay it, expensive but now idle and valueless plant and equipment,
industrial shed rents and truck registrations to pay, future advertising and
vehicle lease commitments, excessive stock levels with no value now etc, etc,
etc... I now have to sell our home of 15 years in order to repay the loan and
will be left with nothing after all of the associated losses have been factored
in. I am 57 years old. I am married and have 3 school age children. Total
immediate losses for me are well in excess of $350,000 plus the loss of my
income... The Workers Adjustment package offered little if nothing in the way of
real assistance...[64]
2.62
There have been complaints about delays in payments from the government,
by both HIP installers as well as inspectors subsequently doing 'rectification'
work under the HISP and FISP programs.[65]
According to media reports in late May 2010, Minister Combet advised that about
100 000 claims had been paid out since the closure of the program, and a
further $50–60 million worth of claims were outstanding but subject to
investigation because they were incomplete of incorrectly completed.[66]
On 27 May 2010, DCCEE advised that there are about 50 000 outstanding invoices
of which almost half relate to compliance activities.[67]
On 15 June 2010, DCCEE advised that about 31 000 claims under the Home
Insulation Program had not been processed. Of these, 6000 were incomplete and
require clarification, and about 25 000 were being withheld for investigation
for possible fraud or non-compliance.[68]
2.63
In relation to FISP inspections, DCCEE has advised that it aims for a 30
day turn around of payment of valid claims. To 25 June 2010 about 19 000 of the
24 000 claims received had been processed and paid, but some delays had
occurred 'due to the volume of claims received, a high proportion of
incorrectly completed claims and extra workload generated from duplicate claims'.[69]
Review of Home Insulation Program by Dr Allan Hawke
2.64
As already touched upon, the government asked former senior public
servant Dr Allan Hawke to conduct an independent review of the design and
administration of the Home Insulation Program.[70]
2.65
On the positive side, Dr Hawke found that:
- there were 'solid achievements' against the program objectives,
including over one million homes insulated, with the prospect of significant
future savings in energy bills;
- for the first time there was a national focus on safety standards
in the industry; and
- the partnership with Medicare was successful.
2.66
On the negative side, Dr Hawke found that:
- despite some safeguards against fraud, no-one foresaw the
possible extent of potential malfeasance;
- program management infrastructure and expertise at DEWHA were not
sufficient to support the at times unanticipated demands made on them;
- a higher level of senior management oversight should have been
assigned;
- given the scale of the program, it demanded more attention from
the Office of the Coordinator General than it received;
- many of the risks of the chosen delivery model could never be
fully mitigated, and remained high throughout delivery of the program; and
-
implementation of the audit and compliance framework lagged
behind.[71]
2.67
As mentioned earlier, after considering the advice of Dr Hawke's review,
the government decided not to proceed with the home insulation component of the
REBS.
Committee comment
2.68
As is demonstrated in the following chapters, the Home Insulation
Program markedly failed to deliver the potential benefits that the government
promised would flow from the program and, as a result of design and
implementation failures, appears to have left the insulation industry worse off
than before the development of the HIP.
2.69
Concerns about the Home Insulation Program relate mostly to:
- whether the program was adequately designed and managed to mitigate
risks identified during the program development phase; and
- whether the responses to the hazards and improprieties that
unfolded were appropriate and effective.
These issues are discussed in the following chapters.
Recommendation 1
2.70 That a Royal Commission be held into the Home Insulation Program to
investigate the development and implementation of the Program, including:
- gross and systematic failures in the development and
implementation of the Program;
- planning and design of the Program, particularly the extent of
consideration given to it by relevant ministers and senior executives;
- the safety and fire risks resulting from the installation of
insulation under the Program;
- the adequacy of ministerial and senior executive oversight and
responsiveness to advice given or developments in implementation;
- the loss of life and injuries to untrained workers contracted
under the Program;
- given the haste, scale, unprecedented and other circumstances of
the implementation of this Program:
- the adequacy of industry product standards and workplace
training;
- the complete failure of workplace training;
- the extent to which pressures to deliver the Program as an
immediate economic stimulus measure were expressed or implied, by whom and how
they impacted appropriate program development and delivery; and
- the warnings received within or by the government in the months
leading up to and following the implementation of the Program.
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