Chapter 1
Introduction
Conduct of the inquiry
1.1
The Senate referred this inquiry to the committee on 29 October 2009.
The inquiry was prompted by concerns about the management and effectiveness of
the Energy Efficient Homes Package program, and in particular by the government's
apparent failure to completely consider and/or address escalating warnings
about risks to safety (including through fires and electrocutions) and to program
compliance (including through fraud and rorting).
1.2
The terms of reference are:
1. The
Federal Government's Energy Efficient Homes Package (ceiling insulation), with
particular reference to:
i. the level of ceiling and wall
insulation in Australian residences, state by state, prior to the announcement
of the Energy Efficient Homes Package and the adequacy of the Building Code to
ensure comprehensive roll out in future.
ii. the administration of the
program from a pricing, probity and efficiency perspective, including:
A. the
basis on which the Government determined the size of the rebate for ceiling
insulation;
B. regulation of quoting and
installation practices;
C. protection against rorting
and abuse of the rebate;
D. the impact of the program in
pushing up insulation prices;
E. the level of imported
insulation to meet demand;
F. ensuring value for money
for taxpayers;
G. waste, inefficiency and
mismanagement within the program;
H. ensuring
the program achieves its stated aims as part of the government's stimulus
package; and
I. the
consultation and advice received from current manufacturers regarding their
ability to meet the projected demand.
iii. an examination of:
A. the
employment and investment in insulation production and manufacturing resulting
from the program;
B. what advice was provided to the Government on safety matters, particularly in
relation to fire and electrocution risks and to what degree the Government
acted on this advice.
C. the
costs and benefits of extending the scheme to include other energy efficiency
products including wall and floor insulation, draft stoppers and window
treatments;
D. the
costs and benefits of changing or extending the scheme to make small and medium
sized businesses eligible for installations;
E. the
extent to which imported insulation products met Australian standards and the
method used to make that determination; and
F. what
advice was provided to the Government on occupational health and safety
matters, particularly in relation to training for installers; including:
i. to what degree the
Government acted on this advice; and
ii. identification and
examination of fires and electrical incidents resulting from the Government's
Home Insulation Program.
iv. an analysis of the effectiveness
of the package as a means to improve the efficiency of homes and reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases, including comparison with alternative policy
measures;
2.
Consideration of measures to reduce or eliminate waste and mismanagement, and
to ensure value for money for the remainder of the program, noting the planned
$2.7 billion to be distributed under the program in total.
3. Other related matters.
1.3
The committee advertised the inquiry in The Australian and on its
website, and wrote to relevant peak bodies inviting submissions. The committee
received 53 submissions (see Appendix 1) and various supplementary
comments (see Appendix 2). The committee held four public hearings
(see Appendix 3) and one in camera (confidential)
hearing.[1]
1.4
The committee acknowledges the contributions of submitters and
witnesses. In particular the committee thanks Mr and Mrs Kevin and
Christine Fuller, parents of installer Matthew Fuller who was electrocuted on
14 October 2009. Mr and Mrs Fuller gave evidence before the committee on
17 March 2010.
1.5
The committee also places on record its profound sympathy to the
families and friends of the other installers tragically killed, as well as
those injured; those Australians suffering loss as a result of house fires; and
the many legitimate businesses and employees who have suffered losses related
to this program.
1.6
Environment Minister, the Hon Peter Garrett MP, ended the Energy
Efficient Homes Package (EEHP) on 19 February 2010 citing safety and compliance
concerns about the ceiling insulation component.[2]
1.7
Some comments in submissions and evidence, which pre-date
19 February 2010, may have been superseded by events, but should be read
as applying to the situation at the time.
1.8
On 8 March 2010, responsibility for energy efficiency programs was
transferred from the Department of Environment, Water, Heritage and the Arts
(DEWHA) to the Department of Climate Change, which was renamed Department of Climate
Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE). References to DEWHA around the time of
changeover should be read as references to DCCEE (as relevant).
1.9
The committee heard evidence from DEHWA (and DCCEE after the transfer of
responsibility) on 22 February, 26 February and 25 March 2010.
1.10
Either during the hearings or shortly afterwards DEWHA/DCCEE took 133 questions
from the committee on notice.[3]
While the committee acknowledges that its agreed response deadlines were
relatively tight, only two per cent of the responses were received by the
respective deadlines set by the committee.[4]
This was not helpful to the work of the committee. As at 6 July 2010, six of
the questions remain unanswered. The longest overdue responses are now 17 weeks
past their deadline.
1.11
By contrast, although there were fewer questions placed on notice, the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Education,
Employment and Workplace Relations responded to questions put on notice to them
in a much more timely fashion.
1.12
Many of the responses received from DEWHA/DCCEE were uninformative. Others
claimed legal professional privilege or Cabinet confidentiality, without
adequate justification. Senator Guy Barnett sought advice from the Clerk
of the Senate on the department's failure to meet the committee's deadlines and
use of claims of legal professional privilege, as a reason for withholding
information. The Clerk's advice was tabled during the hearings of 25 March
2010 and is included at Appendix 4.
1.13
The committee records, in the strongest terms possible, its
dissatisfaction with the inadequate responsiveness of DEWHA and DCCEE in
providing either informative or timely answers to questions taken on notice. This
significantly hampered the committee's ability to conduct this inquiry in a constructive
and effective manner.
1.14
Due to this failure by DEWHA/DCCEE and similar unsatisfactory responses
from the Prime Minister's department, the committee considered ministerial
responses appropriate. Consequently, the committee invited the Prime Minister
and Ministers Garrett, Combet and Arbib to give evidence at a public hearing. Each
of the ministers declined to appear.[5]
In respect of Senator Arbib declining to appear, the committee reports this fact
to the Senate pursuant to Standing Order 177(2).[6]
1.15
Since the last hearing of the inquiry on 25 March 2010 there have been a
number of related developments:
- the government released Dr Allan Hawke's review of the Home
Insulation Program (22 April 2010);
- the government announced that the planned insulation component of
the replacement Renewable Energy Bonus Scheme will not proceed (22 April 2010);[7]
- the government released certain correspondence between the Prime
Minister and Minister Garrett about the Home Insulation Program, which had been
the subject of orders of the Senate relating to production of documents
(27 May 2010);[8]
- the government has progressed various actions arising from the
closure of the Home Insulation Program, including the Home Insulation Safety Program
(HISP) and Foil Insulation Safety Program (FISP); industry assistance measures
for displaced insulation workers and businesses; and fraud and compliance work
including appointment of KPMG as forensic auditors (details are in chapter 2).[9]
1.16
Although these matters could not be the subject of questioning at
hearings, the committee comments on them where appropriate in the report based
on the public record.
1.17
In light of developments of 27 May 2010, the committee repeated its
invitation to then Prime Minister Rudd, Ministers Garrett and Combet and
extended an invitation to then Deputy Prime Minister Gillard to appear before
the committee. Each declined (see correspondence on the committee's website).
Structure of the report
1.18
Chapter 2 of this report describes the Home Insulation Program,
including the various changes during the second half of 2009, and actions
arising from the closure of the program on 19 February 2010.
1.19
Chapter 3 discusses issues arising from the program design and
administration.
1.20
Chapter 4 discusses the main concerns raised in submissions about
program outcomes.
1.21
Chapter 5 discusses related matters to do with the adequacy of the
relevant Australian Standards and the energy efficiency provisions of the
Building Code of Australia.
1.22
Chapter 6 contains concluding comments.
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