Chapter 7 - The triple-bottom line
... Economics play a part; it’s why
that Dollar sign.
And yes, it is the driver of that
Triple Bottom Line.
Farmers need the confidence that they
can make it pay.
They have to get their money back,
there is no other way.
We need a greener attitude to show
the world we care,
To leave this land in better shape
when we’re no longer there.
We need to know what we do now won’t
cause some future pain.
We hold this land in sacred trust -
not for selfish gain.
The Social side’s important, too.
More people need to stay.
Should we just ignore this land –?
Give up and walk away?
With ev’ry salty farm that’s sold to
neighbours down the road,
It’s one more family that has gone –
One less to share the load. ...[480]
7.1
Balancing economic, environmental and social objectives
and outcomes emerged as a key theme in evidence received. During the course of
the inquiry it became evident that there are further and interrelated tensions
inherent in the complex task of salinity management:
-
balancing public and private interests and
investment in salinity management
-
what is best - preventing salinity, reversing
salinity or adapting to salinity?
-
balancing voluntary, persuasive and prescriptive
regulatory/policy measures
7.2
Managing these tensions well will be critical to
achieving the goals of the national programs.
7.3
In this chapter the Committee considers evidence on the
above tensions, and major themes emerging from these tensions: the need for a
mix of approaches to salinity management, the need for greater industry
involvement and private investment in salinity management, and the role that a
streamlined investment framework and the right mix of regulatory and policy
instruments could play in achieving these goals.
Balancing economic, environmental and social objectives
7.4
As noted in Chapter 4, development of regional plans,
which form the basis for salinity management and natural resource management
more broadly, must take into account the social, the economic and the
environmental. Whether a balance between the three is being effectively
achieved was an issue raised during the inquiry.
7.5
The Conservation Council of WA expressed concern that
Australian Government Research is driven by economic factors at the expense of
environmental ones:
... it appears that the emphasis of the Australian Government research
is driven by the ‘$ profit motive’ rather than protection of the nations
ecological wealth and natural capital, with a classic case in point being the
axing of Australian Government funding from wildlife and ecology research but
not from biotechnology research.[481]
7.6
The Committee was concerned to hear that there have
been few studies on the impacts of salinity on biodiversity in the eastern
states.[482] The most comprehensive
work was undertaken in 2001. This national study was commissioned by the
Standing Committee on Conservation for the Australian and New Zealand
Environment Conservation Council (ANZECC). Information on this study provided
to the Committee suggests there are gaps in the data collated. For example,
figures provided for NSW are 'substantial underestimates' as they only cover
forests on freehold land.[483]
7.7
On the other hand, the Committee heard evidence that
attention was focused on biodiversity at the expense of productivity outcomes
in WA. The WA Farmers Federation reported that: 'community concern is being
expressed over a perceived focus on biodiversity outcomes as opposed to
sustainable farming and salinity control outcomes'.[484]
7.8
As discussed in Chapter 4, concerns were raised about
different interests not being heard in the regional decision-making process.
The WA Farmers Federation suggested that an imbalance of stakeholder
representation on regional committees led to an imbalance in areas targeted for
investment, with productivity outcomes losing out:
... in respect to the running of the councils, who is on them and
who is making the decisions, certainly one of the perceptions or the realities
is that there is a balance of people on those committees not necessarily
balanced towards productivity outcomes.[485]
7.9
Evidence suggested that commercial drivers were
integral to the successful management of salinity For example, Mr
De Landgrafft from the WA Farmers Federation
said:
The question of salinity is a complex one and there are a lot of
people who have a few ideas about what the solution might be, but one thing is
for sure, and that is that any real and lasting solution will have to be a commercial
one. Whilst there will be people who will try this and try that and say there
is limited success with it, if the farmers cannot make money out of the
solution, they will continue to walk away from the problem. It has been better
business to walk away from the problem and buy more farmland than to try to
bring back country that has gone down.[486]
7.10
The Avon Catchment Council, WA, similarly acknowledged
that 'economic driver identification' is a lever in encouraging land managers
to address salinity.[487]
7.11
The CRC for Plant-Based Management of Dryland Salinity
observed that the investment planning process needs to be able to balance the economic
effects on farmers and the broader salinity impacts:
To underpin investment planning, CMAs need access to the
capacity to analyse the trade-off between on-farm economic impacts, and
off-farm salinity impacts.[488]
7.12
This view was affirmed in research by Professor
David Pannell,
who further notes that farmers may be forced by economic circumstances to
choose short-term gains over long-term gains. Salinity mitigation may take
years to take effect. It can be hard for farmers to voluntarily change their
land management practices when short-term demands prevail: 'those farmers who
are forced by circumstances to give priority to short-term profits are unable
to adopt preventative measures even if they would eventually be profitable
enough to offset the up-front costs and interest'.[489]
7.13
In SA, Mr Wickes
from the Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation told the
Committee that their programs seek to achieve a balance between 'primary
production and the biodiversity of the region':
We listen to all those communities to try to make the matter
balance. Our aim is to improve the biodiversity as well as protecting the
agricultural land that is available. It has to be seen in a total catchment
context; it cannot be seen as one versus the other.[490]
7.14
Dr David
Masters, CRC for Plant-Based Management of
Dryland Salinity made the point that farming activity and environmental
improvement are not necessarily mutually exclusive. He also argued that
revegetation is not necessarily a cost but may also be viewed as an investment:
I would like to take the opportunity to get a couple of points
across that are the basis for my involvement in salinity management. The first
is that farming is frequently seen as being in conflict with environmental
improvement, particularly with salinity. This is not necessarily the case. The
second is that similarly revegetation of saline areas and introduction of
plants that reduce the risk of salinity have been viewed as a cost and not as
an investment, at least from a farm business perspective. This is also not
necessarily true.[491]
7.15
The Committee also heard that economic considerations
are invariably bound up with social impacts. For example, discussions in WA
suggested that farmers with diminishing tracts of workable land were selling up
their properties. In turn, neighbouring farmers were buying this land to
supplement their own diminishing supply of profitable land – a more cost
effective and immediate option than attempting to remedy saline-affected areas.
This results in larger farms with smaller communities, which has flow-on social
and economic effects - for example, social isolation and a decline of rural
towns and businesses in response to a smaller demand for services.
7.16
Mr Dunne,
a WA landholder, told the Committee that: 'Our population is diminishing so
quickly it is going to be all over soon for some of the small communities'.[492]
7.17
Mr Tallentire,
Director of the Conservation Council of WA also highlighted the impact of
salinity on rural communities:
An area that I do want to quickly touch on is the social cost.
We all know that in the rural regions of Western Australia, and I guess across
the country, we have a significant decline in rural populations, decline in
amenity values in rural areas, and we also see things such as the ‘desperately seeking
Sheila’ phenomenon—the female famine—where people do not want to live in a
desolate landscape. That is as a result of a number of declining environmental
factors, and salinity is certainly amongst those.
When you combine the rural gender imbalance with severe
financial stress that many in the rural sector are facing, and a degraded
environment, you have a cocktail for poor mental health, family breakdown and
sometimes—most tragic of all—suicide. We all know that Australia
has a particularly high youth suicide rate, perhaps one of the worst in the
world, and it is in the rural areas that we see that manifesting itself at the
worst levels. So there is no doubt that there is a linkage between the
environmental, social and economic factors in the regions that are touched by
salinity. We cannot underestimate the role that salinity plays.[493]
7.18
Professor Copeland,
University of Sydney,
told the Committee that addressing salinity requires taking account of social
and political sensitivities as well as developing science solutions:
The benefits are not only in solving the salinity problem per
se. There are social and community and political sensitivities that need to be
taken into consideration. I do not know what sort of group holds the expertise
to do that. Scientists are part of it, but to develop a scientific model is
going to be very much a small part of what needs to be done.[494]
A silver-bullet solution?
7.19
Several witnesses highlighted that there is no 'silver
bullet' solution to salinity and seeking one is flawed. Dr Munday's comments
typified this view. Reflecting on the decision to complete deep drainage in the
Upper South-East region in SA and the deep divisions in the community resulting
from this (discussed in the case study below), Dr Munday said:
I think that it highlights the peril of looking for one silver
bullet to solve this. I am not suggesting that the drain was the silver bullet
but to some extent it was in the upper south-east. That was where everyone
pinned their hopes: the drain would get rid of the floodwater and halt the
rising ground water. That was the big ticket item and that is what people got
really interested in. But we have known for a long time that it is never as
simple as that.[495]
7.20
The most appropriate solution(s) will vary from region
to region, depending on a range of conditions such as soil types, terrain and
climate and the range of assets that are under threat, for example,
biodiversity, agricultural land and infrastructure.
7.21
Mr Leak
from the SA Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation noted that
finding solutions that can produce a range of outcomes and satisfy all parties
is never easy:
It is a difficult balance to find solutions on the ground that
provide biodiversity and environmental outcomes and primary production outcomes
as well. ...we do bring everybody to the table as part of the decision-making
process to try to understand what all the issues are. The role that we have is
to try to bring those into an integrated solution that meets the issues that
are identified for each individual catchment.[496]
7.22
As discussed in Chapter 2, there may be a geographical
dislocation between the cause of salinity and where it takes effect. Further,
implementation of solutions in one area may lead to (positive or negative)
impacts in another area. For example, drainage can have downstream effects. Mr
Wickes' comments on the SA Upper South East
Dryland Salinity Program highlighted this issue:
People in various parts of the catchment have different views
and people want different outcomes and they can have different impacts on each
other. Having worked in the south-east in the other part of the drainage
system, I know there are quite a number of different views and outcomes that
people have and want. It does not matter where you go; you are going to get
that. The particular issue we have at the moment is that we are in two
catchments that have salinity at the top end and some biodiversity and other
outcomes at the bottom end that we need to protect. How you put all that
together to come up with some satisfactory solution is where we are at. That is
why there is a lot of discussion at the moment about those programs.[497]
7.23
Salinity management can involve trade-offs. Part of
managing the salinity problem involves assessing and accepting certain
trade-offs. Reflecting on the Murray-Darling
Basin, Mr
Kendall told the Committee that:
The other issue with
the Murray-Darling Basin is that salinity is very much
about trade-offs. Managing salinity in the upper states—Victoria and New South Wales—may involve, for example, putting drains in
irrigation areas. The drains in irrigation areas will improve local salinity
and are an essential part of managing salinity, but the trade-off is that that
drainage puts more salt into the river. That can increase river salinity levels
and, obviously, for the downstream jurisdiction—South Australia—that is a major issue. Adelaide, with over one million people, relies on
the Murray for a large proportion of its water. The
role of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission is to bring the governments
together, look at those trade-offs and manage salinity within limits.[498]
7.24
In SA
the Committee heard about the trade-offs and tensions involved in managing
salinity. The following case study illustrates the complexity of dealing with a
range of stakeholders with different expectations of salinity management.
Case study - Upper South-East
(USE) Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Program
Background
7.25
The Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood
Management Program (USE Program) in South Australia
was launched in the early 1990s to address the growing problem of salinity in
the region. Key objectives of the program are to control surface water flows to
alleviate the effects of flooding and to lower the watertable that brings salt
to the surface.
7.26
The program consists of three sub-programs:
-
construction of a network of deep drains across
the region to channel away water both on the surface and in the watertable;
-
delivery of initiatives to protect biodiversity,
restore watercourses and maximise the productive potential of the region; and
-
provision of business services (planning,
administration and strategic communications) to ensure the effective delivery
of the program.
7.27
The USE Program is supported by specially enacted
legislation, the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Act 2002.
The Act was created to ensure the efficient implementation of the drainage
network across the region. It grants powers to the South Australian Government
to compulsorily acquire land without payment and levy landholders for the costs
of constructing the drainage network. Immediate costs to landholders are
considered to be offset by the environmental and productivity benefits that can
be expected by reducing salinity.[499]
7.28
The Australian and SA Governments are contributing
$19.15 million each under the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water
Quality to the implementation of the Upper South East Program. This builds on earlier
joint Government investment of $18 million.[500]
7.29
The Act is due to expire on 12 December 2006 which places imperatives on USE
Program administrators to deliver project milestones on schedule.[501]
7.30
The USE Program has achieved the construction of 495
kilometres of drainage, with 165 kilometres still to be installed. A total of
1,250 hectares of land have been revegetated, 6,500 hectares of remnant
vegetation fenced, and more than 2,600 hectares of wetland protected.[502]
Examining the USE Program
7.31
There is widespread community acceptance of many
initiatives within the USE Program, such as revegetating the land to reduce
groundwater recharge and taking action to conserve the wetlands and
biodiversity. The community is divided, however, on the issue of constructing
the remainder of the deep drain network. Principal areas of concern brought to
the Committee's attention are the economic viability of the drainage network as
a primary treatment for salinity in the region and the longer term impact on
the environment of the drainage system.
Photograph
courtesy of Mr Frank and Mrs
Carole Burden: the 'Grand
Canyon' – deep drain, SA
7.32
Local landholder, Mr
Burden, stated in his submission that less
intrusive and more economical options were not adequately explored before
agreeing to the drainage system.[503]
He argued that the USE Program administrators made the assumption that the only
method of reducing the impact of salinity was through the network of drains.[504] Similarly, Mr
Hayward submitted that the 'option to not
dig a drain' was not given sufficient consideration.[505]
7.33
It was asserted that less intrusive and more economical
options are available, such as planting of deep-rooted perennial vegetation
pastures to manage recharge and installing shallow surface drains to relieve
flooding:
We do not require or want a deep drain, as we manage the
existing watercourse via a wide shallow surface water drain [150 mm] which does
not draw down the water table, but does effectively move the surface water down
stream to the wetlands northwest of my property.[506]
7.34
A number of submissions questioned whether the
financial benefits of the drains outweighed costs of construction and long term
maintenance. A landholder cited his property as an example where salinity has
been present for '18,000 years and yet has been highly productive under
salt-tolerant pastures'.[507]
7.35
Concern was raised about the impact of the drainage
system on the natural environment and biodiversity.[508] Mr
Burden stated that the advantages of deep
drains are 'grossly exaggerated' and are restricted to the sides surrounding
the drain.[509] He reported that
evidence of the degradation of sub-soil structure around the drains has already
occurred and is predicted to increase.[510]
Photograph courtesy of Mr
Frank and Mrs
Carole Burden: Parrakie Wetlands, SA
7.36
Another submission referred to a report from the CSIRO,
claiming that there is a 'lack of scientific information on the effects of
drainage on native vegetation, on the fresher perched groundwater lens, and on
salt loads in the catchment'. [511] This may result in damage to the
environment in the longer term, as well as the additional costs to the
community to manage such problems.
7.37
From a different perspective, the Coalition of
Concerned Landholders' (a group of 20 landholders) submission supports the
construction of the remaining deep drains. The Coalition stated that deep
drains have proven to be effective in lowering the water table to the
pre-salinity state, increasing the agricultural productivity of the land and
generating revenue for the community.[512]
7.38
Mr McCarthy,
a technical consultant to the Coalition, informed the Committee that shallow
drains are not considered a viable alternative, referring to instances where
they had been constructed and yet were not successful in returning saline land
to production.[513] The Coalition's
submission also made the claim that shallow drains are ineffective during years
of high rainfall and have limited use in years of average rainfall because very
little water is diverted to wetlands.[514]
7.39
The Coalition does not support the view that planting
native vegetation will reduce the water table, and consequently, salinity
levels. They argued that this will not be successful because the levels of salt
and other chemicals in the soil are too high and growth of some pasture plants
is inhibited in waterlogged soil.[515]
7.40
The Coalition stated that areas once badly affected by
salinity have been regenerated since the installation of deep drains,
demonstrating the success of the drainage network.[516] Drains with a depth of 2.0 metres
'protect flats from dryland salinity and protect flats from groundwater
mounding associated with increased flows and retention of surface water in the
wetlands and watercourses'.[517]
Balancing competing priorities
7.41
Evidence suggests that the drainage network may be
assisting to preserve traditional agricultural production, but potentially
inflicting damage to the environment in ways not presently apparent, such as to
wetlands, soil structure around the drains and biodiversity in areas receiving
water extracted from the land. Further, it would seem that some landholders are
benefiting from deep drains while others are not. However, Mr
Roger Wickes
from the Department for Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation told the
Committee the program aims to balance production and environmental outcomes.[518]
7.42
Several submissions (with one submission
expressing the views of six landholders) expressed dissatisfaction that the
views of the community are not being adequately considered in relation to the
future of the USE Program.[519]
7.43
The administering Department put forward
a different view. Mr Leak
told the Committee: 'we do bring everybody to the table as part of the
decision-making process to try to understand what all the issues are'.[520] This was affirmed by Mr Calvert from
the Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry:
From my contact with
that program ... overall it has an extensive communications component. Where a
recommendation is sought from the board, the actual extent of landholder
consultation is always a critical underpinning of any advice going to the
board.[521]
7.44
It is outside the terms of reference for the Committee
to further investigate and assess the merits of the 'for' and 'against' cases.[522] However, the USE Program clearly
illustrates some difficult tensions in managing salinity:
-
the difficulty of balancing environmental, social
and economic objectives
-
the difficulty of balancing competing interests
-
solutions to salinity may involve trade-offs –
it remains unclear whether the perceived trade-offs or costs (environmental
damage and high economic costs) in installing deep drains in the USE region are
outweighed by the benefits
Achieving Multiple Outcomes
7.45
Some evidence focused on the desirability of achieving
multiple outcomes through NRM activities. Greening Australia
argued:
Projects in the environmental arena that focus on a single
objective are fraught. It would be far more desirable to require projects to
deliver across a range of benefits, especially as these can be readily
achievable. In this context, efforts to mitigate salinity can also have
benefits on water quality, biodiversity and even reducing greenhouse gases by
establishing carbon sinks. If these multiple benefits are actively sought, the
return on investment will be significantly enhanced. Designing for multiple
outcomes can be complex and requires an open-minded, inclusive process. It
needs to be carried out at the regional scale rather than at the scale of individual
patch or property. The desire to achieve multiple benefits, and hence greater
value for money, should be a fundamental principle of the NAP.[523]
7.46
Mr Robert
Vincin submitted that protection of natural
assets – water, soil, vegetation and atmosphere – cannot be considered in
isolation:
[W]ater soil vegetation atmosphere are the core assets of the nation
and planet. These assets are interlinked, insolubly linked, you cannot
interfere with one without interfering the others. Salinity, drought, flood,
devegetation, lack of water, climate change, can only be addressed
collectively.[524]
7.47
In a similar vein, the Conservation Council of WA
stated:
It still appears that many projects and programmes are still
‘single outcome’ focussed rather than looking at ‘multiple outcomes’. For
example, many salinity remediation based projects are not incorporating aspects
such as carbon sequestration for climate change mitigation, biodiversity conservation,
or ‘triple bottom line (ie the ecological and social components), etc. The main
issue of concern still appears to be focussed on profit driven productivity
issues, with an economic rationalist’s ethic, rather than a holistic approach to
achieving landscape change.[525]
7.48
The Conservation Council noted two exceptions to this
'single-outcome focus': the Greening Australia Western Australia's Farm
Forestry Program, and the Integrated Wood Processing Plant at Narrogin, which
is looking at carbon sequestration and salinity mitigation.[526]
7.49
Professor David
Pannell argues, however, that seeking
multiple outcomes is, in some cases, 'counterproductive'. Against the view that
'each dollar does more than one job', Professor
Pannell suggests that investment should be
based on the degree of risk to an asset and the value of that asset so that
limited dollars can be targeted accordingly:
A focus on generating multiple benefits may lead investors away
from protecting some very valuable assets that are only facing a single threat.
Even if there is only a single threat to an asset, it may be that the severity
of that threat is very high – potentially higher than a combination of threats
to another comparable asset. ...If there are several threats requiring attention,
it is highly likely that the asset in question will be especially expensive to
protect. Given that budgets are limited, this greater expense tends to reduce
the attractiveness of a strategy that would effectively protect that asset at
the expense of several other more cheaply protected assets.[527]
7.50
In particular, Professor
Pannell notes that the intervention required
to manage dryland salinity is great and requires a highly focused and resource
intensive effort.[528]
7.51
In short, while in some circumstances aiming for
multiple outcomes is advantageous, doing more than one job is not necessarily
the most efficient use of each dollar.
7.52
Making a different but related point, the Northern
Agricultural Catchments Council submitted that achieving NRM outcomes through
one program was improbable. Reflecting on the NAP the Council stated:
We consider that any expectation of delivery of improved
resources through a single program to be unrealistic. The program has however
served to highlight the importance of its goals, to increase community
involvement in delivery of improved natural resource management, and to begin
the challenging task of integrating whole of community (including agency)
action towards achievement of these goals. These goals underpin on-ground
change and would not have been achieved without the program.[529]
Public good versus private good
7.53
Mr Bradley,
CEO of the Northern Agricultural Catchments Council, told the Committee that
the WA Salinity Investment Framework guidelines emphasise public funds being
used for public good. He explained that:
Any private benefit needs to be measured against private input
as well as the public benefit that comes from that investment. We are having
our investment couched by those guidelines, and it may appear that the output
is biodiversity protection as opposed to sustainable farming practices.[530]
7.54
The Wheatbelt Catchment Alliance, a group of community
advocates for deep drainage, similarly pointed out that WA's Salinity
Investment Framework targets public benefit rather than private gain. They
argued that, following this, the framework places a focus on biodiversity
rather than 'national economic strength'.[531] The Alliance
was critical of this distinction inferring that public benefit and private gain
are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories. Investment that may enhance
private gain might, in turn, enhance 'national economic strength', which could
be viewed as being to the public benefit.
7.55
This view was reiterated by the WA Farmers Federation
who submitted:
There is also a need for Government to communicate a clear
vision that it is prepared to support saving the long-term economic benefits of
agricultural production and its multiplier effect on employment and wealth
creation. This objective tends to be lost in debates of “public good v private
good”. It also tends to be secondary to saving biodiversity and rural
infrastructure when the interdependence and well being of them all should be
obvious.[532]
7.56
The Committee supports the WA Salinity Investment
Framework's emphasis on public funds being used for public goods. The Committee
also supports the investment of public funds for biodiversity outcomes and agricultural productivity outcomes.
However, public investment on private land can only be justified if there is
demonstrable public benefit. Whilst public benefit and private gain are not, as
noted above, necessarily mutually exclusive, there must be real public returns
on any public investment made. In other words, attention must be paid to the
balance of money invested in private land and the amount or degree of public
good achieved.
Accountability for public funds
7.57
The Conservation Council of WA argued that there needs
to be greater accountability by landholders for public funds received for
salinity management:
There has been far too much public funds wasted on ineffectual
programmes, and landholders need to have a greater sense of mutual obligation
(as per legally binding mutual obligation schemes such as Work for-the-Dole)
when they accept public funds for salinity mitigation and rehabilitation. For
example, if a landholder is found to be clearing native vegetation whilst in
receipt of public funds then the landholder should have to repay those public
funds. Private landholders should be held accountable for receipt of tax payer
funded schemes in the same manner as disadvantaged or marginalised sectors of
society such as the unemployed.[533]
7.58
At a public hearing in Perth,
Mr Tallentire,
CEO of the Conservation Council, expanded on the above concerns:
What we have found disappointing is when it has been suggested
that, in return for receiving large amounts of public money for some Landcare
works, some land-holders —and particularly, again, their peak bodies—have
declined to want to protect that revegetation work with conservation covenants
or some sort of guarantee that in years to come there would not be a subsequent
application for a land clearing permit. That has been quite disappointing and
that is what we mean by the idea of mutual obligation.[534]
7.59
Mr Tallentire
told the Committee this issue has been widely publicly reported in the past few
years. His colleague, Ms Anna-Marie
Penna, confirmed these concerns based on
anecdotal evidence:
When I was working as a conservation covenanting officer, I did
hear a number of different reports of people saying, ‘So-and-so conducted reveg
here but when the new landowner bought it they cleared it so that they could
put in vineyards,’ or something like that. I do not have any hard-core
information but I have certainly heard a lot of anecdotal stories. When I was
working in the conservation covenanting program, one thing we did do was to
encourage land-holders to incorporate part of their reveg as part of the
conservation covenant, particularly where it formed linkages between the
remnant vegetation that was being covenanted to protect the corridors et
cetera. Another aspect to that mutual obligation is that land-holders should
not be in receipt of public moneys for revegetation or drainage mitigation or
whatever if they are also found to be clearing native vegetation, which we know
is a primary cause of salinity. It is double dipping. It is immoral, in a way.[535]
7.60
Ms Penna
told the Committee there appeared to be little follow up on the actions of
those allocated public funds, and no penalties imposed for landholders known to
be in receipt of public funds who were also engaged in land-clearing.[536]
7.61
As noted in Chapter 3, the Committee was concerned to
hear that there are insufficient controls in place (or the will to enforce
those controls) to adequately regulate land-clearing. While the Committee
appreciates that many landholders are genuinely committed to sustainable land
management practices, more rigorous accountability requirements and more
effective regulation would bring inappropriate land management practices under
control.
Preventing salinity, reversing salinity or adapting to salinity?
7.62
Salinity management can take three forms: actions to
prevent further salinity, actions to reverse or reduce existing saline areas,
and actions to adapt land management practices to a saline environment.
7.63
The Committee heard evidence on the need to, in some
circumstances, adapt to saline land conditions. At the same time, evidence was
received arguing that salinity should be reversed to restore the land and
enable the continuation of existing farm practices.
Adapting to salinity - saline land as an asset
7.64
In WA Mr Michael
Lloyd and Ms
Sally Phelan
from the Saltland Pastures Association,[537]
emphasised the need to view saline land as an asset and not necessarily a
'curse'. In their submission they argued that it will not be possible to
prevent or control all salinity and, therefore, the concept of adapting to
salinity must be encouraged.[538]
Acknowledging that different areas will require different responses, they
pointed out that in some circumstance working with saline land is the best
approach. Ms Phelan
told the Committee:
[T]he Saltland Pastures Association perspective is that we need
to adapt to saline land in order for agriculture to remain profitable and in
order to keep communities intact.[539]
7.65
The main objective of the Saltland Pastures Association
is to facilitate the revegetation of one million hectares of salt-affected land
in WA over a 10-year period with saltland pastures. This will be achieved by
encouraging and assisting farmers to adopt saltland pastures through the
provision of on-ground planning and support. The possibility of an incentive
payment scheme is also being discussed with regional NRM groups.[540]
7.66
Mr Lloyd
highlighted the importance of the triple-bottom line. He outlined the economic,
environmental and social benefits of working with saltbush:
The big benefit from saltland pastures economically is the
ability to be able to provide out-of-season feed, with the green feed in the
autumn, which is very much lacking in Western Australia.
The high protein in the saltbush itself is balanced by the high levels of
energy and carbohydrate in the understorey that we saw yesterday. Another
factor that has only come out recently is the high levels of vitamin E in the
saltbush leaf, which means that sheep, which traditionally in Western Australia
have a deficiency in vitamin E in the autumn, when they are grazed on saltbush
can overcome that deficiency and are much healthier.
On the environmental side, we see the lowering of watertables and
the reduction of salt at the surface as being a very important factor, not just
for the farm itself to be able to grow better salt-sensitive annual plants but
the export of salt from the farm into the waterways is reduced considerably.
There is less erosion—both wind and water—on saltland pastures, and we have
noticed this at home. ... we are reducing the amount of waterlogging and
increasing environmental benefits.[541]
Regarding the triple bottom line, the other leg of it is the
social side. As we develop more opportunities for farmers with salt land, more
people can stay on the land. Farmers’ sons and daughters will not have to leave
the land to get a job: there will be plenty of opportunities for them on the
farm with the increased productivity. We may even slow the drift from the farms
to the cities with people having more of a social life and improving the social
structure of the local communities.[542]
7.67
The Committee inspected a property where saltland
pastures were being trialled during its tour of the Great Southern region in
WA. Meeting with local farmers and scientists, the Committee heard about the
benefits of saltland pastures and also the need for continued research into
breeding of better adapted plants and more reliable methods for establishing
saltland pastures.
7.68
The need for further research was highlighted by Mr
McMillan, Director of Policy at the WA
Farmers Federation:
saltbush is fine and it is natural, but it does not really carry
a lot of livestock. At the end of the day, we need the research and development
and we need to use all of the technology available.[543]
7.69
Dr Masters
from the CRC for Plant-Based Management of Dryland Salinity told the Committee
about the work the CRC was undertaking:
Importantly, I think that through that project we have been able
to demonstrate that there are profitable options for revegetation of saline
land to be used for grazing livestock but, also importantly, some of the
returns from these are still a little bit marginal and there is a bit of a lack
of confidence from primary producers in adopting some of these technologies
because of the risks of failure, which is one of the things that is a key
outcome of what we are addressing. The second thing that is coming out of there
is that we have been able to demonstrate through some strategic revegetation
that we can actually stabilise the watertable in some part of the landscape.
This is really important because it means that we should be able to prevent the
increase in salinisation. Both of those things have been done in a profitable,
producer-driven business framework.
There are some new complementary activities that are going on
within the CRC that I think have the ability to transform saline land well past
what we are looking at the minute. They involve things like: the generation of
new salt-tolerant plants, which is already well down the track; the development
of new animal management systems, understanding how animals behave in those
sorts of grazing environments; and cheaper establishment costs, making it much
cheaper and less risky for people to put plants in the ground. That is an
example of the saline land activities we are involved in.[544]
7.70
The Central West CMA in NSW also argued that there is a
need to adapt to some areas of saline land:
Areas of catchments will remain saline, focus needs to be placed
on using saline resources.[545]
7.71
The Committee's attention was drawn to a major program
underway that focuses on saline land as an asset: Sustainable Grazing on Saline
Land (SGSL). SGSL is a subprogram of 'Land, Water & Wool', which is a joint
program of Australian Wool Innovation, Meat and Livestock Australia and Land
and Water Australia.
SGSL is being undertaken by the CRC for Plant-based Management of Dryland
Salinity and involves testing and demonstrating land use systems for
salt-affected landscapes.[546]
Controlling and reversing salinity
7.72
Mr John
Dunne from the Wheatbelt
Catchment Alliance presented an alternate view arguing that salinity can and
should be controlled and reversed. The Wheatbelt Catchment Alliance is
comprised of land managers in the Wheatbelt of WA. Members are pro-drainage
advocates who have formed the Alliance
in order to 'present a united front to funding and regulatory bodies at both
State and Federal level'.[547] Mr
Dunne told the Committee that salinity could
be reversed through engineering solutions and asked for the opportunity to
prove the best method:
... basically the CRC for Plant-Based Management of Dryland
Salinity is plant based management; it is an adaptation of our farming
operations to salinity. It is not fixing it; it is putting up with it.
We believe that salinity can be controlled, we believe it can be
reversed and it can be done safely. We really need to set up a cooperative
research centre for engineering solutions. I would not try to divert the attention
of the CRC from plant based solutions and say, ‘Well, look, we can easily tack
that onto them.’ Let us have them in competition. Let us have some engineering
solutions. They might cooperate in terms of sites for trialling these
alternatives, and then we can make some judgments on which is the best method.[548]
7.73
On Mr Dunne's
invitation, the Committee visited agricultural land where an engineering
solution (drainage) had been implemented, during its site inspection of WA's
Great Southern Region. The Committee was able to witness the positive impacts
that the drains were having on local land and vegetation and hear, first hand,
about the impacts of salinity and its mitigation through drainage on farmers'
lives and livelihood.
Photograph:
Gents-Trayning deep drainage site, WA
7.74
The Committee appreciates that in some cases,
engineering solutions -including deep drainage - may be the most appropriate
solution. The Committee further supports more research into engineering
solutions and their downstream impacts. However, the more common view presented
to the Committee was that a multi-pronged approach to salinity management –
adapting, preventing and reversing – was seen as the most economically viable
and practical approach. Evidence pointed to the conclusion that there is not a
'silver bullet solution' or 'best method', rather a mix of plant-based and
engineering solutions is required.
7.75
Further, engineering solutions are expensive to install
and expensive to maintain. The Committee believes that all solutions or
approaches to salinity management should be subjected to a robust cost-benefit
analysis. As discussed above, this should include consideration of the balance
between public investment and private benefit.
Encouraging industry involvement
7.76
The issue of industry involvement in salinity
management takes three forms:
-
engaging existing industries in salinity
mitigation advocacy and practice
-
increasing private investment in salinity
research and mitigation
-
developing new landscape-scale industries
7.77
Encouraging private sector involvement in salinity
management was a prominent theme in the House of Representatives Report. At the
regional level, the need for regional bodies to engage with industry was
highlighted in the following recommendation:
... that the Australian
Government encourage catchment management organisations to introduce industry
development planning into their natural resource management planning and
funding prioritisation process.[549]
7.78
As discussed in Chapter 4, some regional organisations
highlighted the importance of industry involvement and the need for regional
bodies to strengthen links with industry.
7.79
In the Government's response to the House of
Representatives Report it was noted that the three national programs – the NAP,
NHT and the NLP – and the primary industry research and development
corporations are all designed to encourage industry/regional body
collaboration. In particular, it was noted that the Sustainable Industry
Initiative component of the NLP has led to partnerships with major
resource-based industries. The partnerships link business and industry
priorities with regional planning processes. [550]
Engaging existing industries in salinity mitigation advocacy and practice
7.80
Industry can be a major contributor to salinity. In
their submission, the Hunter-Central Rivers CMA explained that
'land-disturbance industries' such as coal mining and power generation are a
significant factor in the problem of salinity in the Hunter region and more
needs to be done to understand and remedy the impacts of this:
The national economic worth of production from these
land-disturbance industries is very significant, but there is little long-term
federal investment in understanding the future impacts on the environment and Hunter
rural industries.[551]
7.81
Ms Sharon
Vernon from the
Hunter-Central Rivers CMA noted that while the problem was significant,
industry in the region had made a contribution to managing the salinity problem
through the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme:
Under the Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme, which I think is
unique in Australia,
the catchment management authority runs an operation subcommittee which is set
up under the New South Wales Protection of the Environment Operations Act.
Under that scheme the salt level of the river is monitored by the Department of
Natural Resources and on high flows mining and power generation industries are
allowed to discharge their saline water into the river and they pay. They have
credits to be able to do that. The operation of that scheme costs something
like $0.5 million a year, which the industry is paying for. They can buy and
use those credits. They have recently had the first auction. It was over $500
for one credit unit. I am not sure what the credit unit is, but it is a significant
cost to them to run that scheme. They are doing their bit to try to reduce
their impact on salinity levels in the river.[552]
7.82
Mr Tallentire
from the Conservation Council of WA argued that agribusiness should be making a
more substantial contribution to managing salinity:
... funding for salinity has traditionally been seen as the
preserve of government type programs—sell-offs of Telstra. We would like to
present to you the need for greater involvement on the part of agribusiness. We
often talk about having industry involvement, but there really is a very
significant need for agribusiness—the section that makes the money out of the
rural areas—to be contributing towards fixing the problem. ... It is the
agribusiness chain that creams off the profits that are made from the ecosystem
that we are exploiting for our agricultural activity.[553]
7.83
The Committee notes that the Australian Government is
currently piloting market-based instruments (discussed in more detail below)
under its National Market-based Instruments Pilots Program, as a means of
encouraging sustainable management of natural resources in Australia.[554] Some of the pilot projects underway
deal specifically with industry contributions to the problem of salinity and
its management. For example, the Green Offsets for Sustainable Regional
Development pilot seeks to manage salt loads in the Murray-Darling
Basin through offsets. Some
industries in the region contribute substantially to the salt load in the
catchment. These industries offset their emissions by investing in activities
that reduce saline discharge from diffuse sources.[555]
Increasing private investment in salinity research and mitigation
7.84
Focusing on research and development, the House of
Representatives Report recommended that the Australian government explore ways
to facilitate private sector investment in research and development for
commercial measures to manage salinity and other NRM issues.[556] A related recommendation advised
that the Australian and state/territory governments work together to ensure that
tendering processes enable industry to fairly compete with publicly funded
bodies for public research funds.[557]
7.85
In their submission the Departments of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry, and Environment and Heritage explained that the
Australian Government uses a range of incentive measures to encourage private
sector investment in salinity and NRM research and development. These measures
include levies, the R&D tax concession and the landcare operations tax
concession.[558] In the Government's
response to the House of Representatives Report, it was further noted that the
Cooperative Research Centre model provides an important mechanism for linking
researchers to industry.[559]
Developing new landscape-scale industries
7.86
As discussed in Chapter 5, one of the major research
gaps identified by witnesses was the development of profitable landscape-scale
solutions. The Committee heard that there is a need for profitable solutions
that can be rolled out over a large enough area to make an impact. In
conjunction with this is the need for support of development of new
landscape-scale industries.
7.87
The Government's response to the House of
Representatives Report identified a range of commercial activities that also
produce environmental benefits. It was noted that substantial funding has been
injected into oil mallee projects under the NHT.[560] The oil mallee project in WA (the
Integrated Wood Processing Demonstration Plant) was also raised by several
witnesses as an innovative venture and is discussed below.
7.88
For these, or other, commercially and environmentally
viable activities to be developed into sustainable industries will require
substantial support and commitment from Government. In a report commissioned by
the Australian Conservation Foundation and the Joint Venture Agroforestry
Program, Fuelling Landscape Repair,
which considers the role a bioenergy industry could play in curtailing land
degradation and climate change, the need for government backing was
highlighted. [561]
7.89
In an accompanying press release it was pointed out that
government backing will include access to measures that other competing
industries currently enjoy (or the removal of these measures) – notably,
subsidies.[562]
An example of industry innovation - the Integrated Wood Processing (IWP)
Demonstration Plant
7.90
Mr Andrew
Campbell, Executive Director of Land and
Water Australia,
pointed to the Integrated Wood Processing (IWP) Demonstration Plant in WA as an
exciting trial of an industry-involved approach to salinity management which,
it is hoped, will also produce environmentally and economically attractive
products:
I would like to draw the committee’s attention to the fact that
that the integrated wood processing plant at Narrogin is about to commence its
wet commissioning process, its trial process. That is one of the most
significant developments in salinity management in Australia.
Wheat belt landholders have planted more than 10,000 hectares of oil mallees to
go into a plant which will produce bioenergy, high-quality natural essential
oils and activated carbon. The plant will provide its own energy to run itself
from the eucalyptus oil biomass. It is the first time in the world that these
three processes have been brought together in the one plant and it is being
trialled at the moment, funded by Western Power to date, which is terrific.[563]
7.91
Mr Campbell
went on to tell the Committee:
I think we all should be watching this experiment extremely
closely from a broader public policy point of view, not just an energy point of
view. Western Power is not a dryland salinity agency or a land management
agency; it is an energy utility and it is interested in seeing how the plant
goes from an energy point of view. That is perfectly rational but it will be a
tragedy for the land-holders who have established 10,000 hectares of oil
mallees and for broader salinity management options if that plant is not
evaluated across the whole triple bottom line and not just its energy
production. The next three or four months are going to be critical in that
process, after 10 or 15 years work.[564]
Photograph: the Integrated Wood Processing
Demonstration Plant, Narrogin, WA
7.92
The IWP Demonstration Plant project at Narrogin,
WA, addresses two environmental concerns,
farmland salinity and global warming. The plant is trialling the co-production
of renewable energy, activated carbon and eucalyptus oil from locally planted
mallees.
7.93
The deep roots of the salt-tolerant mallee trees soak
up groundwater, thereby preventing the water table from rising and, in turn,
controlling salinity. Mallees store food and energy in their underground roots
or lignotubers. When above-ground branches are removed, the trees are able to
re-grow because of this food storage system. This means the mallees can be
repeatedly harvested (every second year) without the need to replant.
7.94
The IWP plant converts the mallee wood into charcoal,
which is then triggered to convert it to activated carbon. The activated carbon
is used in air and liquid purification. High quality eucalyptus oil is
distilled from the leaves, with the depleted leaves used to produce fuel for
the plant's boiler. The oil will be used in the pharmaceutical market and, it
is planned, as an environmentally-friendly industrial solvent. The heat from
both the wood conversion and the oil extraction processes are used to generate
electricity. The electricity produced is an alternative to fossil fuel and is
carbon dioxide neutral.
7.95
The project is funded by the Australian Greenhouse
Office, the Department of Industry Science and Resources, the Department of
Transport and Regional Services and the NAP.
In addition, the following organisations have contributed to the
project: Western Power, Enecon Pty Ltd, the CSIRO, the WA Department of
Conservation and Land Management (CALM), the Oil Mallee Company of Australia,
the Oil Mallee Association, Murdoch University,
Curtin University
and the Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation.[565]
7.96
The aim of the project is to prove the viability of the
technology, the harvest and delivery systems and the potential markets for the
products. In summary, the desired outcomes of the project are:
-
a stable cash crop for farmers
-
control of salinity
-
a profitable renewable energy source
-
three products (oil, renewable energy and
activated carbon) from one plant ensuring the commercial viability of the
operation
7.97
The Committee was fortunate enough to visit the oil
mallee power plant in Narrogin as part of its inspection of salinity problems
and solutions in the Great Southern Region of WA. The Committee looks forward
to hearing the outcomes of this important trial and encourages the Australian
and state and territory governments to continue their support of such
innovative projects.
Securing large-scale private investment
7.98
Whilst acknowledging that some projects under the NAP
and the NHT2 have increased business contributions, the Australian Conservation
Foundation submitted that a lot more needs to be done to encourage broad-scale
private sector investment in NRM:
Unlike other areas of public policy, such as health and
education, precious little effort has been made mobilising and motivating the
private sector to deliver environmental benefits. The absence of an institutional
framework for leveraging large-scale private investment in commercially viable
and environmentally beneficial ventures remains a gaping hole in the national
NRM programmes.
Although some NAP/NHT2 projects have undoubtedly resulted in
business investment in NRM-related activities, and a few regional communities
have been successful in raising philanthropic funds for environmental works,
these have been opportunistic rather than strategic, and generally small-scale.
Furthermore, the vast bulk of private investment in rural Australia
is aimed at more or less traditional agricultural and infrastructure
developments. Arguably, most of these have at least as many, if not more,
environmental costs as benefits, and substantially fail to address problems
like dryland salinity, river system decline and biodiversity loss. Most public
investments in agriculture give little more than lip-service to sustainability.[566]
7.99
Mr Kevin Goss, CEO of
the CRC for Plant-Based Management of Dryland Salinity, told the Committee that
he envisaged the future successful management of salinity as involving a mix of
landholder, industry and public investment, on a 70%, 20%, 10 % breakdown
respectively:
My prediction is that in the successful program, about 70 per
cent of the positive result will come because farmers have invested in that out
of their farm businesses. About 20 per cent of that positive outcome will come
because new industries have been attracted into the rural and regional areas of
Australia,
because they have opportunities and they have invested in things that
contribute to salinity. You had a window on that yesterday, when you went to
Narrogin and saw the oil mallee venture.
What that says to me is that about 10 per cent of the outcome
will come from public moneys. The inference is quite clear—that it is in the
astute use of public moneys to get the 90 per cent result. That is clearly a
policy challenge. We are quite happy to take that a little further, but perhaps
I will just underline the point by saying that there is work on market base
instruments. You will hear about that. There is work on payments for ecosystem
services.[567]
7.100
Mr Goss
went on to explain that in order to attract industry and landholder investment
the best use of the 10% of public funds needs to be carefully thought through:
I would like to make an additional point which goes back to my
70 per cent, 20 per cent, 10 per cent scenario. The question is, ‘Where is the
best use of the 10 per cent public fund component and where is the best use of
the total investment?’ It seems an obvious point for me to make: the public
funds have to take care of those very high value assets that society holds
dear, such as biodiversity, water quality and water supply catchments et
cetera. It is a very important priority for public funds.
On the other hand, there needs to be enough leverage from the
public investment through research and development and astute approaches to
bring in private investment which is going to do so much more for farmland and
for those things that are very much in a commercial interest. It is how you
balance that that becomes quite important. From our perspective, we do not see
it as a trade-off. We see that biodiversity is very important and it is in fact
part of our CRC. Our focus is on doing no further damage to biodiversity, not
inadvertently introducing some of these perennial plants that become weedy. So
we have measures to deal with that. We know that we can predict with confidence
in the future the biodiversity implications of what farmers do on their farm.
That is our contribution. But by focusing, as Alex
says, on the profitability part of the story, it is our reasonable assumption
that what farmers will do on their farm out of self-interest will largely take care
of the threat to farmland.
7.101
The Australian Conservation Foundation praised the
Market-Based Instruments Pilots Program (discussed below), which is currently
being run by the Australian Government to encourage changed land-use practices.
However, the ACF argued that it could be taken further:
The $10M Market-Based Instruments (MBI) Pilots Program
established under the NAP is a good, albeit tentative first step towards
understanding and developing the role of such policy tools in NRM.
ACF applauds the NRMMC decision to trial a range of different
MBIs, but believes that, at least along two particular lines of private sector
engagement, there are good arguments to move beyond the trial stage to the next
step.[568]
7.102
The ACF put forward a recommendation that a national
policy framework be established to drive large-scale private investment in a range
of sustainable and profitable NRM ventures:
That CoAG establishes a national policy package to leverage
large-scale private sector investment in new, more sustainable and profitable
land-uses and farming systems, specifically by:
The establishment of statutory investment companies as
tax-preferred investment vehicles to raise access to private capital for
accredited commercial-environmental ventures;
An integrated package of taxation offsets and concessions
tailored to make environmental investments more attractive, with the aim of
revenue neutrality;
Nationally agreed accreditation criteria of plans for
commercial-environmental ventures to ensure consistency with national and
regional NRM priorities;
Seed funding to be made available for innovative commercial
ventures that yield verifiable environmental benefits;
An Environmental Enterprise Fund to administer these programmes
and concessions.[569]
7.103
Mr Watts
from the Australian Conservation Foundation re-emphasised the need for
large-scale private investment in new commercial ventures at a public hearing
in Canberra.[570]
7.104
In a report by the Allen Consulting Group, Repairing the Country: Leveraging Private
Investment – Summary Report, it was noted that whilst there is a range of
instruments in use to encourage land-use change, little attention has been
given to accessing capital markets - 'the largest pool of investment funds
available'.[571]
7.105
Further research into profitable solutions and,
correspondingly, the development of new industries are required if the salinity
problem is to be effectively managed. For this to be achieved, substantial
private investment is needed to supplement limited public funds. The Committee
supports a greater focus on achieving large-scale private sector investment.
Balancing voluntary and prescriptive regulatory/policy measures
7.106
How to best regulate salinity management, and natural
resource management more broadly, was an issue that was brought to the
Committee's attention. Concerns were raised about the regulatory will of local
government to use planning powers to control land-clearing and to contribute to
effective natural resource management more broadly, and of state government to
enforce compliance with native vegetation legislation (discussed in Chapters 3
and 6).
7.107
As noted above, there is also a tension between
balancing public and private interests. One of the challenges is ensuring that
arrangements provide a sufficient, secure regulatory environment that
encourages salinity and broader environmental management but does not increase
financial uncertainty for, or place an unfair financial burden on, private
landholders or unnecessarily inhibit local industries.
7.108
At the same time, the Committee has heard that greater
industry involvement in salinity management and the capacity to attract
large-scale private investment will be instrumental to successful salinity
management - as will government support for the development of new industries.
This will require having appropriate regulatory and policy mechanisms in place
so that industry involvement is encouraged and new industries are not
disadvantaged by competitors.
7.109
In order to meet these challenges, it is a matter of
getting the right balance between voluntary and prescriptive measures, and
penalty and incentive-based mechanisms.
Getting the right mix of regulatory/policy measures
7.110
Professor Copeland
from the Centre for Salinity Assessment and Management, University
of Sydney, drew the Committee's
attention to a paper by Professor Pannell,
which deals with regulation within the context of environmental protection in
rural areas.[572] The paper, Voluntary versus Regulatory Approaches to
Protecting the Environment in Rural Areas, addresses the issue of
regulation and voluntarism.[573] In
summary, Professor Pannell
argues that appropriate mechanisms for land management regulation should be
carefully determined on the basis of 'scientific understanding' and
'socioeconomic considerations'. His arguments are set out in more detail below.
7.111
There are a number of factors inhibiting voluntary
regulation within the context of land management:
-
lack of profitable options – in some cases,
actions to mitigate salinity are unprofitable
-
long time scales – positive effects of changed
practices might not be realised for many years and farmers may be compelled to
prioritise short-term profits over long-term gain
-
uncertainty – the value of proposed land
management changes may be uncertain
-
problems with trialling the options – in some
cases, trials need to be conducted on a large-scale for observable results.
Farmers may not be in a position to invest in large-scale trialling
-
off-farm impacts – the source of salinity may
not be where the impacts are felt. Therefore there is no incentive for the
farmer at the source to take action and a reduced incentive for the farmer
affected to take action, who may feel the burden should rest with someone else.[574]
Types of regulatory/policy instruments
7.112
There is a range of regulatory instruments or tools,
for example: legislation, codes of conduct, standards, registration, licensing,
accreditation and performance management systems.
7.113
Within the context of land management, Professor
Pannell outlines six policy mechanisms that
can be said to influence or control land management practices. While not all of
these mechanisms would conventionally be classed as regulatory tools – namely,
education and technology development – they can all be seen as forms of
intervention that aim to shape and delimit land management practices:
-
education, persuasion, peer pressure, technology
transfer – for example, extension services
-
accreditation
-
beneficiary-pays policy instruments – for
example, subsidies and grants
-
technology development
-
property-rights-based approaches – for example,
tradeable permits
-
polluter-pays policy instruments – for example,
taxes on activities that negatively impact on the land[575]
7.114
The best policy instrument(s), Professor
Pannell argues, will differ according to the
problem presented, and the environmental, economic and social circumstances in
which the problem presents. In some cases, voluntary measures will be adequate.
In other cases, enforceable measures are required. Or a problem may be
addressed through a mix of measures. Different policy responses will be
required for four different types of salinity impacts: recharge areas with
impacts on waterways, recharge areas with impacts on land-based assets (biodiversity
and infrastructure), recharge areas with impacts on agricultural land, flood
risk and remnant vegetation on farms, and salt-affected agricultural land. In
turn, the selection of policy tools should be based on a range of biophysical
and socio-economic factors – for example, the responsiveness of groundwaters to
interventions and the farm-level economics of perennial plant-based options.[576]
Market-based instruments (MBIs)
7.115
Alongside conventional regulatory measures, the
Australian and state/territory governments are currently piloting market-based
instruments (MBIs) through the National Market-Based Instruments Pilots
Program, which falls under the NAP. The NRM Ministerial Council announced the
funding of 10 pilot projects in April 2003.
7.116
MBIs are tools that are seen to complement (in some
situations, effectively replace) traditional or prescriptive regulatory
mechanisms and persuasive measures. The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Forestry and the Department of the Environment and Heritage explained that:
Market Based Instruments are tools that use a range of market
like approaches to positively influence the behaviour of people to improve
landuse management. They are able to achieve landuse management change by altering
market prices, setting a cap or altering quantities of a particular good and improving
the way a market works. [577]
7.117
MBIs aim to 'correct market failure'. Market failure
arises as a result of: insufficient information, for example costs are hard to
assess; lack of incentives for individuals to protect a public good such as
biodiversity; and externalities - individuals/organisations/industries do not
carry all the costs and benefits of their actions because the impacts of these
actions are felt by another user.[578]
7.118
Three types of MBIs are identified:
-
priced-based MBIs – 'correct price signals to
encourage a change in behaviour, leading to the adoption of more sustainable
practices.' They include auctions, grants, rebates, subsidies and taxes.[579]
-
quantity-based MBIs – remedy market failures by
allowing for flexible compliance with NRM requirements. They include cap and
trade, and offsets.[580]
-
market friction MBIs – improve an existing
market by facilitating private investment and/or providing more information to
the market. They include mechanisms to reduce uncertainty and risk, for example
insurance, approaches to leverage private investment, and product
differentiation.[581]
7.119
In SA, the Committee was provided with an example of a
quantity-based MBI. Mr Cole
from the Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity told the Committee about
the salinity zoning policy, which has been developed to ensure that SA's
salinity management accords with the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement. Salinity
zoning uses a system of salinity credits and debits to offset the salinity impacts
from irrigation developments:
Typically, an irrigation developer will approach our licensing
people and indicate an intention to develop a parcel of land, and a particular
volume of water will be transferred. We will use that underlying model to calculate
the salinity debit that would derive. The South Australian government then has
an obligation within the Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council arena to
offset that debit, and within the state the irrigator has an obligation to the
state to offset that debit. There are a range of strategies that could be
applied to that. Some of those are still developmental, but the primary pool of
credits has been generated by actions such as the rehabilitation of poor
infrastructure in irrigation districts, improved irrigation practice by
irrigators themselves, and salt interception schemes.[582]
Streamlining salinity investment processes
7.120
The Committee heard evidence of the need to streamline
investment processes. The CRC for Plant-Based Management of Dryland Salinity
argued that resources need to be targeted more effectively:
Many of the issues associated with national programs are to do
with their administration and pre-occupation with 'getting dollars on the
ground'. Our analysis has identified situations where viable salinity
management options are not available - that further investment in R&D or no
action may be a better option than incentives or regulation. We will further
develop and refine for CMA use an investment decision tool.[583]
7.121
At a public hearing in Perth,
Mr Kevin
Goss, CEO of the CRC,
expanded on this point noting that little effort was being made to ensure
cost-effective investment and that development of new technologies was hampered
as a result:
We are not observing a very strong effort on salinity management
actions being made less costly with a real focus on innovation and competition
to get the cost of actions down. The unfortunate consequence of grants programs
is that they tend to freeze in time the technologies of the day.[584]
7.122
The CRC argued vigorously for a more streamlined,
targeted and systematic approach, to be achieved through a sound
decision-making framework.[585]
7.123
Professor Les
Copeland from the Centre for Salinity
Assessment and Management, University
of Sydney, concurred with this view
arguing there needs to be a sound basis for decision-making:
I think you have got to have a basis for making decisions.
Clearly the magnitude of the problem is far greater than the available
resources that can be brought to bear. I think we have to recognise that we
have got to do the best with what we have got. That means putting into priority
where those resources are going to provide the most value, targeting problems
that can make a difference, perhaps recognising that there may be areas that
are beyond the scope of what can be managed, and we do not really have a good
framework to do that.[586]
7.124
The CSIRO submitted that a 'triage approach' is
required:
There is a need for a triage approach to salinity management for
both public and private investment – some major assets (water resources,
biodiversity areas of international significance, urban areas, etc.) can
justify the major intervention required to protect them while other areas need
to be managed to minimise the adverse impacts and maintain ecological function.
Any remaining areas will require management that adapts to the more saline
conditions. We need to be able to provide spatially explicit information to determine
most appropriate responses. Without a robust investment prioritisation
framework, there is a risk of widespread inappropriate intervention (method and
scale).[587]
7.125
However, not all witnesses agreed that investment needs
to be more targeted. Dr Bruce
Munday expressed concern
about the over-targeting of resources arguing that it can inhibit widespread
cultural change:
Sometimes I am concerned about the recommendations to target
investment. Clearly, investment must be targeted, but the derisory reference to
the ‘vegemite approach’ to public investment and so forth concerns me ...I think
it is very short-sighted to put all your eggs in that basket. If we funded
sport or the arts in that way, we would fund only elite sports people or elite
artists. We need to change the culture so that the whole community accepts the
responsibility for managing our natural resources, of which managing salinity,
ground water, is just one. So there does need to be encouragement for local
groups to become involved.
The emphasis should not just be on the money part; it is the
capacity building that was alluded to before—all those sorts of things. If they
miss out because they are not in the target, we will all miss out. Changing the
culture is more important than anything in terms of the way in which the nation
manages its natural resources.[588]
Risk management for investment planning
7.126
Professor Copeland
from the Centre for Salinity Assessment and Management told the Committee that
greater attention to risk analysis is required:
In terms of the science, more work should be done on risk
analysis. Are we targeting the areas where most benefit could be gained? This
is a fairly new area of science, particularly in natural resource management,
and one that I believe should develop.[589]
7.127
The report, Salinity
Mapping Methods in the Australian Context, similarly highlights the
importance of a risk management approach to salinity management. A risk
assessment framework is proposed, which takes into account the following
features:
-
the identification of the asset(s) at risk (e.g.
water quality, crops, infrastructure, biodiversity)
-
the probable timing of the risk impact
-
the likelihood of the risk occurring
-
an assessment of the social, economic and
environmental impacts on the asset(s) if the risk occurs[590]
7.128
The next step is to work out the risk management
options. That is, actions that could be undertaken to protect the asset and a
cost-benefit analysis of each action, taking into consideration the value of
the asset(s).[591] It should be noted
that 'no action' may be the most viable option if the costs outweigh the
benefits.
7.129
As discussed in Chapter 5, an updated assessment of
salinity hazards and risks will be critical to sound investment planning. Mr
Goss from the CRC for Plant-Based Management
of Dryland Salinity explained to the Committee that an updated assessment is
required to undertake cost-benefit analyses :
The issue—and I think this is one that speaks to the
recommendations coming out of the House of Representatives report—is that there
is no indication to us that there is a program to update the assessment of
risks and hazards associated with salinity and to give us the basis for ongoing
estimation of the benefits and costs in handling the problem.[592]
Salinity investment framework 3 (SIF3)[593]
7.130
SIF3 was developed by Professor
David Pannell
and Dr Anna
Ridley from the CRC for Plant-Based
Management of Dryland Salinity. It is a decision-making framework for the
selection of appropriate salinity investment options for a broad range of
biophysical and socio-economic circumstances across Australia.
The framework is based on research across the fields of biology, hydrogeology,
resource economics, farming systems, social science and policy mechanism
design. The framework is currently being field-tested in collaboration with two
regional bodies: North Central CMA (Victoria)
and South Coast Regional Initiative Planning Team (WA).[594] SIF3 has been developed to support a
more considered, robust approach to salinity investment.
7.131
Mr Alex
Campbell, Chair of the CRC for Plant-Based
Management of Dryland Salinity, told the Committee that:
SIF helps a region to decide how they can make the best
investment for a multitude of outcomes that they are seeking to achieve.[595]
7.132
Mr Kevin
Goss, CEO of the CRC for
Plant-Based Management of Dryland Salinity, provided further detail to the
Committee on the Salinity Investment Framework 3 (SIF3):
Our observation, and in fact our analysis, is that there is
still more to be done here. We need a reality check. If we run the policy
instruments or options that are normally considered in an area like salinity,
and that includes extension, incentives, penalties, engineering, regulation and
so on, then we have to be confident that the options themselves can be adopted
by those we are expecting to adopt it—that is, that it makes economic sense to
do so, it is not causing other unintended consequences, and so on.
What we have attempted to do is, firstly,
to understand what farmers and catchment management bodies and state agencies
have before them that are realistic at the moment, and what still needs a lot
more work in terms of research and development to get to that point in the
future, and then to look region by region at, on the back of that assessment,
whether it makes sense to go down the regulatory path, to go down the
incentives and financial assistance path, or to go cautiously in that area and
put more into technology development and research and development.
In brief, it looks at what is at risk in terms of the value of
the asset. It then looks at the salinity threat: is it high or is it low? It
then looks at the responsiveness of the ground water if you put perennials into
the system. And then you look at the economics of the options that you have
available. Once you start to play that out, you end up with this very complex
matrix which informs a lot more precisely what a catchment management authority
might do.[596]
7.133
In the development of SIF3, 57 discrete circumstances
were identified. Each was differentiated by a combination of the type and
(financial and non-financial) value of asset at risk, the hydrological
conditions, social and economic factors and the cost of management options. The
strengths and limits of different responses to these varying salinity
situations were assessed, and recommended or guiding responses identified.
7.134
The framework considers four different categories of
salinity impacts:
-
water resources
-
high-value terrestrial assets such as built
infrastructure (roads, buildings, pipes, communications infrastructure) and
biodiversity
-
dispersed assets such as agricultural land
-
salt-affected land
7.135
Responses to salinity are organised into the following
broad categories:
-
extension – technology transfer and education
-
incentives – financial incentives such as
subsidies and MBIs, which are used to encourage land management practices
-
penalties – negative incentives to discourage
certain damaging practices
-
engineering approaches
-
plant-based R&D for profitable farming
systems
-
other R&D – e.g. research into the
performance and design of engineering solutions
-
no action – no response is selected when the
costs of intervention outweigh the benefits[597]
7.136
Resonating with the discussions on regulation and risk
management above, the rationale underpinning SIF3 is: how the problem of
salinity (and other land management challenges) is best influenced and
controlled should be based on solid scientific information, a risk and
cost-benefit analysis, and an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of
each policy mechanism.
7.137
Asked to respond to the concern expressed by the WA
Farmers Federation that there is too much focus on biodiversity (discussed
above), Mr Campbell, Chair of the CRC for Plant-Based Management of Dryland
Salinity told the Committee that SIF3 would be an important tool for
objectively weighing up different interests:
From their lobbying point of view, that would be their focus,
and I would not speak against that proposition. But this is where the Salinity
Investment Framework III starts giving an almost independent umpire overview as
to what is a good investment mix through the National Action Plan or any other
source of funding that you would have. I hope that once SIF3 has been field
tested, as Kevin explained earlier, and we can start demonstrating that process
to them, it will give them more comfort as to how a mix of investment can
properly address all of the issues that you try and cover: profitability, farm
landscape, protecting your environmental assets, protecting your infrastructure
assets—roads, towns et cetera. Getting the balance of investment I think has to
be the true focus.[598]
7.138
The Committee was particularly impressed by SIF3, which
appears to offer a sound framework for making informed, objective and
transparent investment decisions in a systematic way. Further, the Committee
was encouraged to hear that the relevant Australian Government departments have
held discussions with Professor Pannell
about SIF3 and view the framework as potentially useful.[599] The Committee will watch for the
outcomes of the testing phase with great interest.
Conclusion
7.139
In this chapter the Committee has canvassed significant
tensions and challenges involved in salinity management: the challenge of
balancing the environmental, the economic and the social, and public and
private interests; the necessity of a tiered approach to salinity management:
prevention, reversal and adaptation; and the importance of employing the right
regulatory and policy measures to effectively tackle salinity and encourage
industry engagement.
7.140
Evidence presented to the Committee on the Upper-South
East Dryland Salinity Program in SA demonstrates the enormous difficulty that
decision-makers face in balancing competing interests and achieving economic
and environmental outcomes. It also highlights both the importance, and the
challenge, of bringing all community stakeholders to the table.
7.141
Several conclusions can be drawn from the evidence
discussed:
-
there is no one right way to approach salinity.
In some cases cure will be the aim. In other circumstances adapting to saline
conditions will be the most viable option;
-
there is no one solution or response to
salinity. The most appropriate solution(s) will be determined by a range of
factors including: topography, groundwater flow systems, soil condition,
demographic circumstances and economic conditions;
-
balancing competing interests and accepting
trade-offs will be an ongoing dimension of salinity management; and
-
salinity management options must take into
account the triple-bottom-line.
7.142
The Committee has heard compelling evidence that a more
rigorous and systematic approach to salinity investment is required. This would
involve a comprehensive risk management approach that takes into account a
broad range of bio-physical, social and economic factors. Regulatory and policy
instruments would be tailored to specific situations. Such a framework would
provide an objective basis from which to assess competing interests and target
limited resources. It would assist in managing the tensions outlined above.
7.143
Securing greater industry involvement in salinity and
the capacity to attract large-scale private investment also emerged as
significant themes. The Committee believes more attention must be directed to
these issues.
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