Chapter 8
THE GREENHOUSE CHALLENGE (Part b)
Accountability
8.86 The Greenhouse Challenge Program verification framework can only
be effective to the extent that the results of verification carry some
consequence for a Program participant. If a company is shown to be making
progress in emissions-savings, then the full benefits of success should
naturally accrue to it. By the same token, if a company is unable to
demonstrate that they have made a genuine attempt to abide by the spirit
of the Program, then a penalty of sufficient weight should be imposed.
Mechanisms of accountability ensure that members continue to behave
responsibly and are rewarded fairly. They are also fundamental to the
practice of sound public administration.
8.87 An important way in which the Greenhouse Challenge Program promotes
accountable behaviour by its members is by emphasising the importance
of credible publicity about achievements under the Program. The following
paragraphs discuss the role of public relations in the Program and whether
it is used as an effective instrument for ensuring that the claims made
by participants are credible.
The Role of Public Relations
8.88 The Greenhouse Challenge Program offers companies and industry
associations an effective vehicle for publicising their commitment to
environmentally-sensitive business practices. The Program encourages
companies to highlight their association with the Program by using a
Greenhouse Challenge logo as part of their business promotions. A Greenhouse
Challenge Program newsletter published by the AGO and a well-developed
internet site also help to profile the businesses and environmental
practices of Program members. Approximately $260,000 was dedicated by
the AGO toward Greenhouse Challenge public relations/communications
in 1999 to 2000. [1]
8.89 As well as gaining recognition for individual actions toward abatement,
participants also benefit from sharing in the successes of the Program
as a whole. For many companies, participation in the Greenhouse Challenge
Program helps to reassure the public that companies are playing their
part in a national effort toward managing global warming. Many businesses
are beginning to recognise the role of `corporate citizenship' in creating
a sustainable basis for future business and in generating shareholder
value. [2]
8.90 As members of the Greenhouse Challenge Program, companies receive
the Government's endorsement to showcase their commitment to current
best practice in the management of greenhouse gases. Endorsement by
the Government of a company's environmental achievements can play a
potentially valuable role in influencing public perceptions and share
prices.
8.91 A question raised by the evidence presented to the Committee was
whether a company's decision to join the Greenhouse Challenge Program
was primarily motivated by the public relations benefit, rather than
a genuine commitment to emissions reduction. The 1996 Wilkenfeld Report
suggested that:
[t]he primary motivation for GCP participation would most likely
be seen in terms of the opportunity to demonstrate corporate responsibility
and the greenhouse reduction value of existing projects. [3]
8.92 The 1999 Harris evaluation of the Greenhouse Challenge Program
reported that `approximately 20 per cent of surveyed participants stated
that one of the reasons for joining the Program was to promote a `clean
and green' image'. [4]
8.93 In the light of the value of positive publicity to participants,
the Program has the option of using the public relations incentive as
a penalty for non-compliance. The Draft Guidelines for Verification
suggest that companies that do not achieve their targets could be penalised
by:
… the removal of the enterprise's public profile and progress
report summary from the Program literature and the AGO website…
to stem possible damage to the Program's credibility. [5]
8.94 Companies are also likely to be aware that withdrawing from a
relatively high profile program such as the Greenhouse Challenge Program
could lead to public questioning about their performance in emissions
reduction. The public relations penalty may be high enough to encourage
a company to increase its efforts toward achieving its agreed level
of emissions abatement.
The case of Coca-Cola Amatil
8.95 Evidence given to the Committee by Greenpeace Australia suggests
that there is some potential for the public relations effort of the
Greenhouse Challenge Program to displace a primary focus on verifiable
emissions abatement. Greenpeace cited Coca-Cola Amatil (CCA) as an example
of a company which has actively promoted its `Challenge credentials',
but is accused of having misled the public about the nature of its contribution
to the `Green Games' in Sydney 2000.
8.96 According to the AGO, CCA has been a member of the Greenhouse
Challenge Program since December 1999. Its Cooperative Agreement covers
soft drink production facilities around Australia and its Action Plan
for 2000 is expected to achieve a 4 per cent reduction in emissions
(approximately 7,000 tonnes CO2-e). [6]
8.97 An advertorial featuring the CCA appeared in The Australian
in May 2000, endorsed by Senator Chris Ellison, Special Minister
of State. [7] The advertorial was published
as part of a series designed to profile the actions of Greenhouse Challenge
members contributing to the Olympic Games. The series is funded by the
AGO. The AGO stated the purpose of the series in an explanatory note
to the Committee:
In response to the increased interest in environmental issues generated
by the Olympic Games, Greenhouse Challenge has worked with SOCOG to
increase membership of Greenhouse Challenge through the network of
Olympic sponsors. To link climate change concerns with other environmental
issues in the Olympic context, the actions of Challenge members contributing
to the Olympic Games have been included in a series of advertorials
placed in The Australian, running monthly from October 1999
to September 2000.
…..
In the case of the Olympics, the Green Games theme offered an excellent
opportunity for the Challenge to promote the greenhouse gas reduction
actions that specific SOCOG sponsors were undertaking as a means of
encouraging similar actions from industry.
8.98 The AGO further explained that:
The Greenhouse Challenge does not advertise on behalf of members.
While the AGO encourages organisations to join Greenhouse Challenge
and to take as many actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as
they are willing, the specific actions and achievements of members
are not generally advertised.
8.99 The advertorial in this instance appears to have been funded by
the AGO on the basis of CCA's contribution to the Olympics. It describes
this contribution in the following terms:
As a leading manufacturer of soft drinks, Coca-Cola Amatil is supporting
the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games through supplying soft drinks to athletes,
volunteers and spectators at the Games. [8]
8.100 The main focus of the advertorial is CCA's use of efficient lighting
systems at its production facilities, the basis of its Cooperative Agreement
under the Greenhouse Challenge Program. The advertorial appears to suggest
that the soft drinks supplied by CCA are manufactured at sites using
efficient lighting systems
8.101 The AGO has explained that CCA is a separate company to Coca-Cola.
[9] CCA does, however, appear to be responsible
for the distribution of soft drink at the Olympics within the terms
of Coca-Cola's contract with the International Olympic Committee to
act as the official supplier of soft drink at the Sydney Olympics. The
advertorial asserts that: `The Coca-Cola company is a Team Millennium
Olympic Partner'. [10]
8.102 The advertorial clearly implies a close corporate relationship
between CCA, the Greenhouse Challenge member, and Coca-Cola, an official
corporate sponsor of the Olympics. This may have led readers of The
Australian to believe that the environmental contribution of Coca-Cola
to the Olympics is endorsed by the Program.
8.103 According to a paper published by Greenpeace Australia, the main
contribution of Coca-Cola to the Olympics lies in the supply of refrigeration
units. Coca-Cola planned to use 1,800 units, only 100 of which are considered
to be environmentally-friendly. About 1,700 fridges will use a cooling
system which uses the synthetic gas, HFC. [11]
HFCs have a extremely high global warming potential (GWP) of 33,000
times 1 unit of CO2. [12]
8.104 In the Committee's view, the basis of CCA's Cooperative Agreement
under the Greenhouse Challenge - lighting systems - is only indirectly
linked to its contribution to the Sydney Olympics. Of greater concern
than this is the suggestion that the environmental practices of Coca-Cola
are endorsed by the Greenhouse Challenge or the AGO.
8.105 The Committee believes that it is reasonable for the AGO to have
pursued a specific and limited strategy of public relations to capture
broader industry interest in the Greenhouse Challenge Program in the
context of the Olympics. The Committee is concerned, however, that the
AGO has in this instance failed to demonstrate transparency and accountability
in the management of the Program's relationship with industry. The Committee's
main concerns are that:
- the advertorial does not make the corporate relationship between
CCA and Coca-Cola clear, and, that it seeks to create the impression
that CCA activities under the Program are related to Coca-Cola's general
environmental practices;
- the Greenhouse Challenge Program resources have been used to promote
a company (CCA and Coca-Cola) whose record of actual emissions
abatement is, at best, unclear;
- that the advertorial does not make clear that it has been funded
by the AGO or provide the rationale for advertising sponsorship;
- the advertorial does not make clear that its purpose is to attract
new members to the Program. The incentive for a prospective member
to do so is implied - official endorsement of a company's `green credentials'-
even if the verification of actual achievements remain outstanding;
and
- that the scope for Program arrangements with industry members to
be independently scrutinised is generally limited.
8.106 Greenpeace Australia argued that this:
… point(s) out the great flaws of… the Greenhouse Challenge…
because someone like Coca-Cola was able to join the Program, get taxpayer
funded advertising in national newspapers, yet continues with this
global policy of using HFC refrigerants when clear and economic alternatives
exist. [13]
8.107 The AGO's sponsorship of CCA highlights the potential for the
Greenhouse Challenge Program to be undermined by a lack of transparency
about the terms of the Government's relationship with Program members.
Recommendation 90
The Committee recommends that the terms of advertising for the Greenhouse
Challenge Program be made clear in each advertisement.
Recommendation 91
The Committee recommends that advertising of the Greenhouse Challenge
Program featuring one or more of its members, be funded through a contribution
by all Program members to a consolidated advertising fund.
Foundations for the Future
8.108 Engaging industry in emissions reduction is necessarily a long
term strategy which will continue to evolve as new knowledge emerges
about the nature of climate change and as the international framework
develops to manage the implications of this for national economies.
This section considers the role of the Greenhouse Challenge Program
as a catalyst for broadening industry awareness of greenhouse issues
and for developing the capacity of Australian industry to prepare their
response to the challenge of global warming.
Increased awareness of greenhouse issues
8.109 An important emphasis of the Greenhouse Challenge Program is
fostering awareness of the role that management culture and processes
can play in a company's overall strategy for emissions abatement. Both
the Wilkenfeld and the Harris Reports identified changes in a company's
strategic planning, management structure, systems, attitudes and priority-setting
as factors which could significantly influence energy efficiency and
greenhouse emissions among Program participants. [14]
The Harris Report claimed that two-thirds of the organisations surveyed
reported positive management and cultural changes, `with the most important
changes relating to processes and practices shaping the way that decisions
are made'. [15]
8.110 As well as raising industry awareness about the benefits of greater
energy efficiency, the Greenhouse Challenge Program offers companies
a `conduit into the Commonwealth greenhouse policy environment'. [16]
In evidence to the Committee, Wesfarmers described itself as a `relatively
small chemicals company on a world-scale' which sees a key benefit of
the Program as the opportunity to gain access to current debates on
greenhouse policy:
Even if you do not agree with everything the Australian Greenhouse
Office does, at the very least you have got the ability to access
information and find out where the debate is going. [17]
8.111 The Greenhouse Challenge Program has deliberately sought to influence
the top level of decision-making in participating companies and associations.
It has done this by requiring CEOs to sign off on Cooperative Agreements
and by giving CEOs access to high level decision-makers in Government.
The Government's agreement with the Cement Industry Federation (CIF)
`was signed by the chairman of the CIF management committee and the
then three relevant government ministers'. [18]
Wesfarmers joined in 1997 signing an agreement with the AGO in the presence
of 4 Government ministers. [19]
8.112 Many witnesses attested to the success of the Greenhouse Challenge
Program in enhancing CEO understanding of the role of industry in national
emissions abatement. This appears to have significantly contributed
to the commitment of managers and staff throughout those companies to
develop and manage effective greenhouse strategies. High level promotion
of the Program by CEOs appears to have been a catalyst for the development
of a range of specific, practical measures aimed at increasing energy
efficiency and reducing emissions.
8.113 The Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN) explained that:
… in most cases Greenhouse Challenge played a role by requiring
companies to formally focus on their emissions inventory and what
opportunities existed to do something about that and by requiring
CEOs, or top management, to sign off on agreements. [20]
8.114 The Minerals Council of Australia similarly recognised that the
educative role of the Greenhouse Challenge Program could accelerate
the introduction of efficiency measures by its members:
… a very significant Program in turning around the attitudes
of a lot of people in the industry in embarking on the challenge of
looking at energy efficiency… [it] really served as a process
of alerting people, as a process whereby senior officers in companies
recognised that in the interests of their shareholders it was a win-win
and they should take this pathway. I think it is fair to say that
some of those investments have been accelerated as a result of the
Greenhouse Challenge and the net benefits are very significant. [21]
8.115 MIM Holdings Ltd, a member of the Minerals Council, stated that
the Greenhouse Challenge Program had influenced the company to implement:
… environmental initiatives at all levels of the company, ensuring
that all employees are trained in environmental awareness programs
and inductions. All employees are also accountable for their environmental
performance. [22]
8.116 Normandy Mining Services, a Greenhouse Challenge participant
since 1998, outlined to the Committee its initiatives:
Each site has an energy efficiency management plan. It also has an
energy management greenhouse coordinator who reports monthly to corporate
management on energy use and greenhouse emissions. Each site undergoes
a regular assessment… on a lot of risk areas and those include
energy management and greenhouse emissions. [23]
8.117 The Greenhouse Challenge Program appears to have successfully
influenced a number of business leaders to embrace emissions reduction
strategies. The Harris evaluation of the Greenhouse Challenge indicated
that over half the surveyed participants believed the Program had played
an important role in stimulating abatement action. Dr Clive Hamilton,
however, suggested an alternative conclusion: `nearly half said the
Program played no role in stimulating abatement action'. [24]
Increased technical expertise
8.118 The emphasis of the Greenhouse Challenge Program on increasing
awareness about greenhouse issues among senior managers may have led
to greater company investment in new technical approaches to improving
energy efficiency:
Some of these things certainly would make good economic sense to
do. But I think what has happened is that the greenhouse debate, and
particularly the debate surrounding Kyoto and the signatures of the
various countries at Kyoto, has drawn more attention to that area
of our business… [it] has made us focus more on that area and
find we do have some control, we can do things more efficiently…
. [25]
8.119 The Cement Industry Federation (CIF) explained to the Committee
that it had developed a Greenhouse Energy Management System (GEMS) which
allowed its member companies to systematically identify opportunities
for greenhouse abatement and develop plans for action. [26]
As a result CIF members have:
… introduced changes to their business practices to include
GEMS evaluations in management decision-making. Operating practices
have changed and options and actions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions
have been identified. [27]
8.120 A number of industry representatives referred to the benefits
of industry and government working together to build expertise in resolving
problems in the implementation and monitoring of emissions abatement.
The AIGN in its submission argued that industry experiences with implementing
various abatement strategies could make a valuable contribution to the
development of government policy:
Expertise is being built on how to identify, monitor, manage and
report greenhouse gas emissions at the level of individual organisations.
Within participating organisations, decision-making frameworks and
processes are being developed to address emission reduction options.
Within government, a more detailed understanding of the emissions
profiles is emerging along with a greater understanding of how more
efficient and effective policies and measures can be developed. [28]
8.121 Woodside Energy Ltd also emphasised the importance of `learning
by doing':
The Greenhouse Challenge has industry workbooks that have refined
the NGGI methodology and sufficient feedback mechanisms exist in the
various Inventory processes to ensure a process of continuous improvement.
[29]
8.122 The knowledge gained through the Greenhouse Challenge Program
provides industry with an effective platform for influencing high-level
development of greenhouse policy and the features of any future regulatory
framework.
8.123 The CIF explained that the Greenhouse Challenge Program had prompted
the development of modelling capable of providing `a richer analysis
of sectoral behaviour and opportunities for greenhouse gas abatement'.
[30] This would offer policy-makers and legislators
a better understanding of the need for and impacts of specific policy
measures:
Since greenhouse issues are impacting in so many areas in such a
diverse number of ways, sectoral and enterprise impacts must be better
understood if the real drivers for change are to be harnessed and
if the real, rather than preconceived, challenges are to be addressed.
[31]
8.124 Sectoral information could prevent decisions which `turn out
to be unnecessary, with far reaching cost and competitiveness implications
for Australian industry, and indirectly, for the Australian community'.
[32] Sectoral information would also allow
the Government to assign responsibility for abatement more clearly and
apply pressure more selectively.
8.125 Greenpeace Australia alluded to the strategic use to which sectoral
information could be put by the Government:
Without a national strategic vision which can be used to identify
sector by sector and mechanism by mechanism what we are going to do,
then we will continue to see a business as usual approach. [33]
8.126 Many companies would also see the development of greater expertise
in measuring, monitoring and reporting as a logical way of preparing
for the possible introduction of an emissions trading system. The Australia
Institute pointed to the value of the Greenhouse Challenge in preparing
for a future emissions trading framework:
The introduction of a cap-and-trade emission permit system will make
the GCP redundant for all firms that have legislated emission caps.
A baseline-and-credit trading system would probably draw heavily on
information in GCP agreements in order to establish baselines for
major polluters. The targets in the agreements themselves would be
redundant, although the actions specified in the agreements would
provide a guide to some of the activities that may generate credits.
[34]
8.127 The Committee believes the Greenhouse Challenge should be viewed
as a useful transitional mechanism to a national emissions trading system.
It should increasingly incorporate features which assist in the identification
and costing of abatement options available to firms. This would also
require a greater focus on the calculation of baselines and BAU forecasts,
and the development of sound reporting mechanisms.
Recommendation 92
The Committee recommends that the Greenhouse Challenge Program give
greater attention to the development of sectoral analysis and reporting.
This should be consistent with international reporting guidelines.
Recommendation 93
The Committee recommends that the Greenhouse Challenge Program be
reviewed with a view to structure the Program as a transitional strategy
to build industry capacity for a future emissions trading scheme.
Limitations of the Greenhouse Challenge Program
8.128 The effectiveness of the Greenhouse Challenge Program needs to
be reviewed against the background of the Government's broader environmental
philosophies and policies and their effect on business investment decisions.
The introduction of international or domestic emissions trading, for
example, would render the current Program framework obsolete.
8.129 The uncertainty surrounding the future features of an emissions
trading system could inhibit managers from making decisions which result
in emissions reduction because, perversely, this course of action could
undermine competitiveness in the future. In this example, the objectives
of the Greenhouse Challenge Program are directly undermined by the anticipated
need to achieve the same objectives in the future (see `credit for early
action' below).
8.130 This section of the chapter examines whether the current Greenhouse
Challenge framework is capable of capturing the full potential of industry
to reduce emissions in view of uncertainties about the future direction
of Australia's policy response to global warming. In particular, this
section will examine the limitations which arise from the voluntary
nature of the Program and its current emphasis on `no regrets' measures.
Investment Strategies
8.131 A number of witnesses indicated that uncertainties in the future
direction of government policy tended to inhibit strategic planning
and investment for emissions abatement. Both industry and environmental
representatives agreed that significant reductions in industry emissions
would mostly likely require investment in large-scale capital projects.
The Australian Aluminium Council, for example, emphasised that: `the
investment and lead times for development of new technology and replacement
of existing plant are substantial'. [35]
8.132 The Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia (PPMFA)
stated in its submission that: `many potential `no regrets' and `low
regrets' measures have yet to be exploited' and that `this should be
done before other measures of a more mandatory measure are considered'.
In evidence to the Committee, however, the PPMFA acknowledged that further
emissions reduction would be difficult to achieve under a `no regrets'
framework:
… industry has probably taken most of the so-called `no regrets'
measures that are available to it. So, to reduce its emissions, it
has taken the measures that it could take which made economic sense;
it has really taken most of these… .
If you wanted to look at substantial further emissions, you would
be looking at very significant capital upgrades… major new investment
in new plant and equipment that would be more energy-efficient, for
example. So it is really a quantum leap up the next level of performance
that may be possible to be achieved. [36]
8.133 The voluntary nature of the Greenhouse Challenge Program and
its current approach of `no regrets' are unlikely to prompt industry
to invest beyond standard efficiency improvements. Great Southern Energy
explained in its submission that:
… there is a limit to what individual companies can achieve
in such a framework. Large emission reduction measures involving significant
costs are not likely to be implemented with a `no regrets' approach.
The magnitude of the Kyoto target would indicate that mandatory programs
with legally binding targets are now required that go beyond `no regrets'.
Major emission reduction programs require legally binding targets
for commercial certainty. [37]
and
… you need certainty in this whole process if we are going to
achieve the result in the time frames that appear to be required.
[38]
8.134 Greenpeace Australia similarly argued:
Emission reduction measures requiring significant capital investment
are not implemented in a voluntary approach. [39]
8.135 The Committee concludes that the current `no regrets' framework
does not influence the market to reward investment in abatement beyond
BAU.
The case of Pacific Power
8.136 The importance of a national policy approach to greenhouse abatement
capable of aligning economic and environmental incentives was highlighted
to the Committee by Pacific Power, a major investor in both coal and
the generation of renewable energy.
8.137 In evidence to the Committee, Pacific Power explained how the
current electricity market favoured the generation of electricity from
coal over gas. The low cost of conventionally produced electricity as
a result of market deregulation directly undermined the production of
less emissions-intensive energy. Pacific Power stated that its contribution
to the Greenhouse Challenge Program was no longer feasible in light
of the disincentives at work in a market in which companies compete
to deliver cheap electricity at the expense of environmental outcomes:
In particular regard to the Greenhouse Challenge, Pacific Power,
considered at the start of the Program that a gas-fired combined cycle
plant would be commercially viable by around the year 2000. To this
end, preliminary design and detailed environmental studies were carried
out for a 400 MW plant at Wollongong and Development Consent was gained.
That particular plant would have produced electricity with approximately
1,300,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions each year less than the
equivalent amount of electricity from NSW coal-fired plant. This was
the principal initiative in Pacific Power's Greenhouse Challenge agreement.
Due to current conditions in the electricity market, and the introduction
of new coal-fired plants in Queensland, this plant is unlikely to
proceed for several years. [40]
8.138 Current standards in contractual arrangements also meant that
it was generally more economical to generate potentially surplus electricity
by using back-up systems than to face hefty fines when demand cannot
be met: `Generators operate in modes that optimise their own commercial
performance, but to the detriment of the environmental outcome'. [41]
According to Pacific Power, investment in greenhouse friendly energy
production, `… could be justified on environmental grounds only
if the mix of policies were in place to create the market conditions
that would enable the sale of the output'. [42]
8.139 The example of Pacific Power highlights the need to ensure that
Australia's greenhouse policies are developed and implemented within
a `whole-of-government' framework that minimises, as far as possible,
tensions between Australia's commercial and environmental interests.
In Pacific Power's view:
The inadequacy of the current mix of measures is highlighted by the
fact that millions of dollars are being invested in coal-fired generation
in Queensland whereas, current market conditions preclude the development
of gas-fired generation. [43]
8.140 A submission by Mr Peter Kinrade of the University of Melbourne,
commented on the negative effects of the current contradications in
government policy-making. Drawing on work by the Allen Consulting Group,
he writes:
We still have the situation where different jurisdictions are adopting
often inconsistent and conflicting greenhouse-related policies and
objectives. Even within the Commonwealth there is little indication
that the greenhouse implications of other major policies and reforms
are considered. For example, the greenhouse implications of the national
energy market reforms have been largely overlooked, leading to a situation
where the reforms are likely to lead to a net increase in greenhouse
gas emissions, at least in the short-to medium-term. [44]
8.141 In the Committee's view, Government expenditure on the Greenhouse
Challenge Program and similar incentives is wasted, if the operations
of the market render its objectives unviable. This is very much the
case in the national electricity market.
Credit for Early Action
8.142 A number of industry representatives expressed concern to the
Committee about the lack of Government assurance that industry would
not be penalised for taking early action. Their concern stems
from the possibility that future governments could impose greater demands
on industry to increase its contribution to national emissions savings.
If participants in the Greenhouse Challenge introduce measures which
result in emissions savings in the short-to medium-term, they may be
less well placed in the future to make further significant gains.
8.143 This means that under an emissions trading system or a less well-developed
system with limited mandatory features, companies which have already
implemented efficiency measures may find it more difficult to generate
tradeable credits. The Business Council of Australia expressed a common
concern:
What those companies are becoming concerned about is that at the
point where the Government says, `More yet is needed by everyone',
and those who are not contributing are going to be forced to contribute,
then those who have made the satisfactory contribution to date are
going to be hit with a double whammy, to be asked to do yet more when
they have in fact gone a long way down the track. [45]
8.144 The AIGN proposed to the Committee that any achievements recorded
under the Greenhouse Challenge Program should be the basis of estimating
the extent of early credit. [46] The CIF
similarly advocated `that any verifiable action to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions since 1990 should be fully recognised under any future
emissions reduction policy'. [47] The AIGN
suggested that the lack of assurance by Government may inhibit some
companies from either participating or extending their existing plans.
There was, however, insufficient evidence presented to the Committee
to determine whether this in fact deterred companies from joining the
Program. [48]
8.145 The Sydney Futures Exchange suggested that establishing a mechanism
for `protecting baselines' could ensure that emitters who take early
action are not disadvantaged. This involves the Government and companies
agreeing on a baseline level of company emissions that is net of any
greenhouse abatement activity. The Exchange provided an international
example of how this might work in a voluntary context:
Canadian Government and industry are currently moving to incorporate
baseline protection into their voluntary action program. Under their
approach companies apply for emissions reductions that have occurred
since Jan 1, 1990 to be registered for the purposes of baseline protection.
Eligible emissions must be real, measurable and verifiable. [49]
8.146 A number of witnesses stated that uncertainties in the ratification
and rules of the Kyoto Protocol made decision-making about domestic
abatement difficult. The current lack of clarity about international
flexibility mechanisms (such as the Clean Development Mechanism) meant
that industry was unsure about whether to invest in domestic abatement
measures or to initiate projects overseas which might generate carbon
credits in the future. If international agreement is reached on flexibility
mechanisms at CoP 6 (the 6th Conference of the Parties) in November
2000, the Greenhouse Challenge Program would need to consider the possibility
of business choosing to pursue abatement measures outside Australia.
8.147 Credit for early action was a significant area of concern for
witnesses, and is discussed in more detail in chapter 9. Discussion
particularly focused on how early action would be recognised after the
introduction of mandatory emissions reduction measures such as emissions
trading. While the Committee considers that proposals for the reward
of early action may be problematic, it would be relatively easy to design
an emissions trading system so that companies were not penalised
for early action vis-à-vis companies who had failed to take early
action.
Recommendation 94
The Committee recommends that a future emissions trading system
be designed to ensure that companies are not penalised for early emissions
abatement activity.
Australian Democrats Recommendation 11
The Australian Democrats recommend that the Government explore mechanisms
for protecting the baseline of each Greenhouse Challenge Program member,
on the basis that such baselines record reductions that are independently
verified.
No Regrets and Beyond
8.148 With some exceptions, measures under NGS are premissed on `no
regrets' as a basis for industry action on greenhouse gas emissions.
An article published in 1994 by former ABARE Director, Mr Brian Fisher,
states that `regrets' policies directly target the greenhouse problem
and so involve costs to national income. By contrast `no regrets' policies
involve indirect greenhouse measures. These are policies which `improve,
or at least do not reduce, national income while at the same time lead
to complementary reductions in greenhouse gas emissions'. [50]
8.149 Advocates of this approach argue that those measures with the
lowest net costs or highest net benefits should be undertaken before
more costly measures. In the context of the Greenhouse Challenge Program
the `no-regrets' principle implies that companies are not required to
undertake measures which will impact on normal business development
interests. Woodside Energy Ltd referred to The Third Draft of the
NGS which defines `no regrets', in broad terms, as:
Measures which have financial, social and environmental benefits
to the community at large, in addition to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, and which, over time, are sufficient to outweigh the direct
and indirect cost associated with such measures. [51]
8.150 This definition does not necessarily exclude measures which result
in a direct or immediate financial penalty for a given company. The
financial costs of reducing emissions may be adequately balanced by
other benefits which contribute to the social good.
8.151 It was clear from evidence presented to the Committee that industry
would like greater assurance from Government that the future profitability
of companies would not be undermined by the adoption of `beyond no regrets'
measures. The AIGN stated:
We expect that there are likely to be a range of measures, both regulatory
and potentially market mechanisms. So what we are really looking for
at a broad level is a clear commitment from Government to say, as
we move forward in all of this, that companies which have tried to
do the right thing through programs such as the Greenhouse Challenge
have a documented track record there and will not be disadvantaged
compared with those who have not done that. [52]
8.152 Great Southern Energy expressed a common view that: `Major emissions
reduction programs that go beyond a `no regrets' approach require certainty,
a long timeframe and flexibility'. [53] Wesfarmers
CSBP Ltd highlighted the current lack of recognition for early action
as an impediment to progress beyond no regrets: `… without assurance
that reductions will be credited when policy is developed, further progress
beyond `no regrets' may be limited'. [54]
Are Voluntary Measures Enough?
8.153 It is clear that industry saw the Greenhouse Challenge Program
as a viable alternative to proposals for the introduction of a carbon
tax in 1994-95. [55] The Harris Report notes:
In the belief that it was possible to demonstrate that voluntary
action by the private sector could produce significant results in
emissions abatement, Australian industry approached the then Commonwealth
Government with a proposal for a voluntary greenhouse abatement program.
[56]
8.154 A number of witnesses believed that industry enthusiasm for the
Greenhouse Challenge Program stemmed from a concern that more restrictive
greenhouse policies would be introduced. A submission provided by the
Australia Institute quotes a coal industry newsletter as evidence that
industry was primarily concerned with avoiding the imposition of stricter
measures:
The release of Australia's Greenhouse Challenge Evaluation Report
has demonstrated the value of voluntary action, and provided industry
with an argument against mandatory measures to curb greenhouse gas
emissions. [57]
8.155 The Australia Institute further claimed that:
Industry has frequently used the existence of the Program to deflect
demands to take more serious action to cut emissions. It has also
been of value to the Government; while appearing to act on the issue
it has not alienated industry. It has also provided it with ammunition
with which to respond to the sustained attacks on Australia abroad.
[58]
8.156 The Australia Institute suggests that the Greenhouse Challenge
Program has arguably done more harm than good by `blunting public demands
for more effective action'. [59]
8.157 National Inventory figures released in July 2000 indicate that
Australia faces a greater challenge in meeting the Kyoto target of 108
per cent than originally anticipated. Australia in 1998 exceeded our
international commitment by 16.9 per cent, excluding emissions from
land clearing. Given that this trend is likely to continue, the question
arises whether the current contribution of industry to emissions reduction
will be sufficient to meeting our overall national target. The scope
for flexibility and cost-effectiveness in Australia's response to meeting
the Kyoto target will clearly reduce as the binding period of 2008 to
2012 draws closer. As was put to the Committee by Australia's Ambassador
for the Environment: `That is when you actually have to do things that
will make you comply'. [60]
8.158 The AGO recognises that the current balance of voluntary and
regulatory measures may need to be adjusted as the challenge of meeting
Australia's obligations becomes clearer. [61]
The introduction of mandatory targets for the use of renewable energy
in the generation of electricity and the proposal for a `greenhouse
trigger' are examples of the Government's efforts to reign in Australia's
escalating national emissions profile:
The fact that, prior to Kyoto, Government negotiated and put in place,
with the support of industry, a broader range of measures beyond just
Greenhouse Challenge, indicates that Government did not believe, and
neither did industry at that point, that a target that came out of
Kyoto could necessarily be met by voluntary action alone… . We
now have a range of activities that include voluntary action and regulatory
action, where it makes sense, and mandated targets for example in
renewable energy. [62]
8.159 The Australian Conservation Foundation argued for greater intervention
by Government in the management of emissions, a position that goes beyond
the Government's current preference for market-based solutions:
… you have to have a carrot and stick approach from the national
Government and you have to have leadership. At the moment the AGO
focuses on the carrot approach - the incentives. Without the ability
to mandate targets, without legislative mechanisms much more thoroughly
developed at the Commonwealth level, there is a limit to what you
can achieve through voluntary initiatives. That is where the attention
is needed. The role of the AGO could be deepened and could be far
more effective at delivering incentives where they are needed…
perhaps it would have a role to play particularly in monitoring and
evaluating and informing to help with legislative initiatives…
. [63]
8.160 Whilst the Greenhouse Challenge Program has gone some way toward
harnessing the potential for industry to significantly reduce the national
emissions profile, it may not in itself be sufficient to delivering
the outcomes sought by the Government. Pacific Power summed up this
viewpoint:
The Greenhouse Challenge seems to have been effective in reducing
emissions on a `no-regrets' basis. However a review of the forecast
emissions reductions by organisations signed up for the greenhouse
challenge fall far short of Australia's Kyoto target. Additional mechanisms,
well beyond those likely to result from Greenhouse Challenge, will
be needed if Australia ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. [64]
8.161 Pacific Power also argued that `it is also unreasonable to expect
volunteers to carry the burden of emissions reduction'. [65]
A number of witnesses argued that binding targets and a regulatory framework
to ensure compliance with those targets are necessary for going beyond
what purely voluntary measures can achieve. Greenpeace highlighted a
common concern with the Government's current approach: `… our main
concern with the voluntary approach that is put forward is that it is
not underpinned by any hard place, by any real hard targets'. [66]
8.162 From an international perspective there are, in the main, two
attitudes that Australia can adopt on `beyond regrets' measures. The
first body of opinion argues that we should not undertake unilateral
measures which carry a cost to our economy before other countries agree
also to abide by the same rules. The critics of this approach argue
that Australia's reputation on environment issues has already been considerably
damaged by Australia's argument of `special circumstances' at Kyoto.
The likelihood that Australia will not meet the Kyoto target may reinforce
the view that Australia is unwilling to adopt the necessary measures
to effectively manage the challenge of climate change.
Options for the Future
Comprehensiveness and burden-sharing
8.163 Industry emissions make up a significant proportion of Australia's
national emissions. Around half of Australia's emissions however, issue
from non-industry sources. A number of industry representations to the
Committee argued that managing Australia's emissions profile would therefore
mean drawing in other parts of the Australian economy. The following
comments by Western Australia Minerals and Energy were typical:
… the greenhouse issue is an important issue for the whole community…
. Certainly, everyone will feel the impact of response measures, particularly
if they cause economic upheaval… response measures must be undertaken
across the whole community. [67]
Measures confined to just a few sectors, typically comprising relatively
small numbers of comparatively large emitters, will fall short of
the success policy-makers would wish for them. [68]
8.164 To date, the Greenhouse Challenge Program has primarily focused
on capturing major emitters. The AIGN asserted that the Program had:
… excellent coverage in some key areas including 100 per cent
coverage of aluminium and cement production, 98 per cent of oil and
gas extraction and electricity generation and distribution and 91
per cent of coal mining. [69]
8.165 The Minerals Council stated that:
… 78 per cent of emissions from mining (including 91 per cent
from coal mining) are covered by companies participating in the Greenhouse
Challenge. On the minerals processing side, 89 per cent of emissions
from machinery and metals manufacturing is covered by the Challenge
with 100 per cent coverage from aluminium and iron and steel. [70]
8.166 The Australian Coal Association stated that,`at present 75 per
cent of black coal produced is covered by companies which are participants
in the Greenhouse Challenge'. [71]
8.167 A number of the current participants of the Greenhouse Challenge
Program expressed the view that they had already made a significant
contribution to emissions savings and that further demands for abatement
should be extended to other parts of society.
8.168 The Australian Aluminium Council argued that it had a limited
capacity to make further savings and that more effort should be made
to engage other parts of the community in emissions reduction:
There is a tendency so far for Governments to focus mainly on the
energy producers and energy-intensive users, because these are visible
and relatively easy to deal with. However it is important to understand
that very significant emissions are related to other sectors such
as the commercial business sector, the household and service sectors,
the transport sector (especially motor vehicles), and the agricultural
sector. Australia's abatement strategies must focus on the full range
of possibilities and it is in these other sectors that many of the
most effective actions may rest. [72]
8.169 The Pulp and Paper Manufacturers Federation of Australia (PPMFA)
similarly argued that it should not be required to deliver significant
emissions savings beyond its achievement to date:
We consider that we have already performed very well in reducing
our emissions. The same cannot be said for many other areas of the
economy… before focussing on an industry that already has a good
record in reducing its emissions, there are many other sectors of
the economy where the focus should be put where there are relatively
low measures that could be taken which would substantially reduce
Australia's emissions. [73]
8.170 In the main, industry bodies saw the promotion of energy efficiency
by all users as a necessary step before considering the introduction
of more stringent measures for industry. Industry representatives offered
a number of suggestions on how this should be done:
- extending the coverage of the Greenhouse Challenge Program to untapped
sectors, such as transport and agriculture; [74]
- where appropriate, negotiated agreements with companies and sectors;
[75]
- tailoring greenhouse response measures to target sectors; [76]
- increasing the number of businesses registered with the Program;
[77]
- better management of land clearance and the pursuit of forestry
and land rehabilitation programs that have economic and/or environmental
benefits as well as greenhouse abatement; [78]
- increasing the contribution of government services to national emissions
savings; [79]
- increasing coverage of energy-intensive manufacturing; [80]
- increasing the focus on end user efficiency, eg buildings, transport,
potential for long term changes to urban design and transport modes;
[81] and
- extending the Program to cover small-to medium-size businesses.
[82]
8.171 The 1996 Wilkenfeld Report notes that:
… it is not the largest emitters but the second rank (say 20
to 500 Kt per annum) where the greatest untapped potential lies, and
where the GCP is more likely to prompt actions that would not otherwise
have been taken. [83]
8.172 The Committee broadly supports the integration of these recommendations
into the framework of the Greenhouse Challenge Program, as far as is
practicable. However, the Committee notes that the practice of this
large industry sector in pointing to other energy users could be said
to be an attempt to distract from its own obligations.
8.173 The current costs of verification make it prohibitive for Government
to extend the coverage of the Greenhouse Challenge Program. Incorporating
the vast number of small emitters in Australia (small business, farmers,
householder, motorists) on a voluntary basis is administratively burdensome
and unlikely to result in significant or sustained savings. The Committee
also recognizes that that it would be unreasonable to require small
emitters to fund the verification of their assessments and concludes
that this factor and the `no regrets' framework of the Program does
not provide a suitable mechanism for capturing the broader community
of smaller emitters.
Recommendation 95
The Committee recommends that the Australian Greenhouse Office assess
whether proposals to extend the Greenhouse Challenge Program would be
more effectively dealt with other programs or by legislation.
Taking the Lead
Industry
8.174 The primary benefit of the Greenhouse Challenge Program is the
scope it provides for industry to play an active - even leading role
in contributing to Australia's commitment to greenhouse gas reduction.
The Program provides a platform for continuing dialogue and cooperation
between government, industry and the community on the development of
practical strategies for emissions abatement. From the point of view
of industry the effectiveness of the Program is affected by a range
of uncertainties:
- the likely costs to business of compliance with government imposed
targets;
- the design features of a domestic or international future emissions
trading system and the timing of their introduction;
- the Government's likely approach to giving businesses credit for
early action;
- options available to business for reducing the domestic cost burden
through the use of international flexibility mechanisms (with or without
a trading system); and
- the effects of the interaction of a number of Government policies
on the environment, new industries, regionalism, employment and our
international relations.
8.175 In the light of these uncertainties, industry representatives,
in general, expressed a clear preference for the Greenhouse Challenge
Program to remain a Program based on voluntary measures.
8.176 Many witnesses saw scope to build on the current framework and
insights gained from the Greenhouse Challenge Program. The main advantage
cited by industry of refining the existing framework lay in avoiding
the need for the complex legislation and management changes that would
accompany the introduction of an emissions trading system. The following
view put by the Business Council of Australia was common:
… the voluntary Greenhouse Challenge Program provides an institutional
framework and basis which could, we believe, be further enhanced and
expanded to achieve the Government's objectives in this instance.
[84]
8.177 The Cement Industry Federation (CIF) suggested that Greenhouse
Challenge agreements provide a framework for considering the concept
of negotiated, legally binding agreements between Government and each
industry/sector:
The basic elements of a negotiated agreement - inventory, abatement
actions and forecasts are already part of each Greenhouse Challenge
agreement, as is the process for annual reporting of achievements,
and independent verification of results. The main additional step
would be to negotiate the target to be achieved by the industry/sector
by an agreed date (the means of reaching the agreement a matter for
the industry or sector). [85]
8.178 Energetics Pty Ltd brought to the Committee's attention the implementation
of a Voluntary Energy Efficiency Programme (VEEP) by the European chemical
industry since 1992. The Program commits its members to significant
and quantified improvements in specific energy consumption. Energetics
considered this approach `a logical extension to the existing Greenhouse
Challenge'. [86]
8.179 In response to a question by the Committee about the desirability
of introducing mandatory components to voluntary agreements, the PPMFA
said:
That is certainly worth exploring. If we are looking at the next
generation of greenhouse challenge type agreements, to use the Government's
phrase of `mutual obligation'. I think you can have a situation where
more is required of industry. Potentially industry or sectors or individuals
could be required to meet a specific target… . You could have
penalties for not meeting that target. [87]
8.180 A number of witnesses however, argued that as a purely voluntary
scheme, the Greenhouse Challenge Program has a limited capacity to influence
industry toward climate change actions:
- George Wilkenfeld and Associates:
Australia can meet its commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, but
only if far more vigorous and effective action is taken than currently
envisaged. [88]
- The Australia Institute:
… there must be penalties. It goes without saying. I believe
large segments of industry often prefer a mandatory approach because
it actually levels the playing field. If you look at the international
evidence on voluntary agreements, the essential conclusion is that
they do not really have much impact… they conclude that they
are not very effective at achieving their objectives. [89]
- Greenpeace Australia:
We are not suggesting that the GCP should be abolished. It clearly
has a role to play as part of Australia's greenhouse policy response.
However, given the shortcomings in the Program, it must not be used,
as it is by industry and government, to deny the necessity of more
substantial efforts to reduce emissions, including mandatory measures.
Furthermore, until the GCP can be made more rigorous, and genuine
emission reductions can be adequately measured, the Program should
not be used as a tax-payer funded exercise to improve the corporate
image for greenhouse polluting companies. [90]
8.181 The Committee believes that the present voluntary arrangements
do not encourage industry to adopt systematic and comprehensive approaches
to emissions reduction which go beyond `no regrets'. Voluntary participation
means that taking the lead in abatement is largely unrewarded by the
market. This has resulted in a minimum level of action by a relatively
small number of emitters, undertaken largely in the interests of avoiding
current market or Government penalties.
Government
8.182 The Committee emphasises that the Government has a critical leadership
role to play in establishing and enforcing a regulatory framework for
long term, sustainable emissions abatement. Many witnesses to the inquiry
urged the Government to acknowledge that the current regime of voluntary
abatement will not support Australia's long term interests:
- Australian Conservation Foundation:
… a lot of what we are putting in front of you today actually
requires Government leadership, legislation and policy changes that
the Greenhouse Office is not responsible for… . One of our
challenges is finding a point of receptivity and a policy dialogue
at the national level where one can adequately put forward these
perspectives and really form a view that does include mandated action
on how we tackle greenhouse in Australia. [91]
- Friends of the Earth (Victoria):
Voluntary measures have a place but they do not actually replace
having a regulatory framework. That needs to come at a Commonwealth
level. [92]
- Australian Conservation Foundation:
I think the central issue is the capacity for national leadership
and coordination through legislation. [93]
- The Australia Institute:
When you have something as important and urgent as reducing Australia's
greenhouse emissions, the past evidence in Australia and the international
evidence strongly suggest that mandatory measures are required. [94]
8.183 The Committee believes that the Greenhouse Challenge Program
partnership model does not appropriately balance the Government's desired
outcomes with the capacity of industry, as a whole, to reduce its emissions.
Under the current framework of the Program the risk of not achieving
a significant and sustained level of abatement is borne mainly by Government.
The voluntary nature of the Program means that Government is reluctant
to impose penalties if agreed targets are not achieved, recognising
that this may deter prospective participants from joining. Ultimately,
the consequences of not sharing the burden of abatement equitably across
all of industry at an early stage in our abatement effort could impose
a severe penalty on the Australian economy in the future.
Conclusions
8.184 The Committee is of the view that, in the absence of an established
domestic or international emissions trading system, the Greenhouse Challenge
Program can play a valuable role in encouraging industry to adopt emissions
abatement strategies.
8.185 The Committee is not convinced that the administration of the
Greenhouse Challenge Program conforms to acceptable standards of transparency.
The Committee recognises that the voluntary nature of the Program may
have resulted in minimal conditions being imposed on participants. However,
the Committee firmly believes that the Program must demonstrate complete
integrity in setting emissions reduction targets and reporting of industry
achievements.
8.186 The current emphasis of the Greenhouse Challenge Program on voluntary
participation and compliance affords industry considerable flexibility
in deciding how and when it will reduce emissions. The Committee recognises
the value of undertaking least cost measures in the immediate to short
term, but emphasises the need for industry to prepare for `beyond no
regrets' measures and to implement all cost-effective emissions reduction
measures.
8.187 In the Committee's view, the Government has a critical role to
play in establishing an integrated national framework - with an appropriate
balance of voluntary and mandatory features - capable of promoting the
long term interests of the Australian community as a whole. This means
managing Australia's transition to a new forms of economic wealth based
on principles of environmental sustainability.
Footnotes
[1] Email to the Committee from Linda Powell,
Executive Manager, Partnerships Group, Australian Greenhouse Office,
26 July 2000.
[2] `… new currents in society influence
the degree to which business is accepted as a respected and relevant
player in the development of public policy. At the level of individual
corporations there is an impact on the so-called licence to operate,
taking that term to mean a company having a sufficient level of community
support to enable it to continue operations, let alone to realise its
full potential' (Campbell Anderson, President of the Business Council
of Australia, The Changing Nature of Public Policy, www.bca.com.au/docs/eng/speech.html,
p 7).
[3] Wilkenfeld Report, 1996, p 20.
[4] Greenhouse Challenge, Evaluation Report,
1999, p 59.
[5] Greenhouse Challenge Independent Verification
Program, 2nd Discussion Paper (Draft), April 1999, p 42.
[6] Email to the Committee from Linda Powell,
Executive Manager, Partnerships Group, Australian Greenhouse Office,
3 August 2000.
[7] See advertisement at appendix 7 of this
report.
[8] `Coca-Cola Amatil Taking up the Challenge',
The Australian, 25 May 2000, p 19.
[9] Email to the Committee from Linda Powell,
Executive Manager, Partnerships Group, Australian Greenhouse Office,
3 August 2000.
[10] `Coca-Cola Amatil Taking up the Challenge',
The Australian, 25 May 2000, p 19.
[11] Coca-Cola: Ice Cold Coke - Boiling
Hot Planet, http//www.greenpeace.org.au, p 5.
[12] Senator Bob Brown, Proof Committee
Hansard, 22 June 2000, p 718.
[13] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June, p 678.
[14] Wilkenfeld Report, 1996, p 26; and Harris
Report, p 42.
[15] Greenhouse Challenge, Evaluation
Report, 1999, p 42.
[16] Australian Greenhouse Office, Submission
169, p 1691.
[17] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 523.
[18] David Cusack, Chairman, Greenhouse Gas
Working Group, Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from the Australian
Cement Industry, http://www.engaust.com.au/other/CIA0699-2.html.
[19] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 520.
[20] AIGN, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
20 March 2000, p 139.
[21] Minerals Council of Australia, Official
Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 70.
[22] Cooperative Agreement, A Report on
the Greenhouse Challenge 1998-99, Tabled document, 10 March 2000,
p 5.
[23] Normandy Mining Services Pty Ltd, Proof
Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 April 2000, p 477.
[24] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
10 March 2000, p 56.
[25] Western Australia Chamber of Minerals
and Energy, Proof Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 April 2000, p
475.
[26] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1424; see also David Cusack, Chairman, Greenhouse Gas Working
Group, Mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions from the Australian
cement industry, http://www.engausyt.com.au/other/CIA0699-2.html.
[27] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1424.
[28] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network
(AIGN), Submission 113, p 923.
[29] Woodside Energy Ltd, Submission 129,
p 1312.
[30] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1424.
[31] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1424.
[32] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1424.
[33] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 681.
[34] Dr Clive Hamilton, Submission 79d, p
2305.
[35] Australian Aluminium Council, Submission
167, p 1671.
[36] Proof Committee Hansard, 23 June
2000, p 778.
[37] Great Southern Energy, Submission 150,
p 1559.
[38] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 689.
[39] Greenpeace quoting experts in energy
reform (Lovins, Moskovitch), Submission 183, p 1937.
[40] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 804.
[41] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 806.
[42] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 804.
[43] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 802.
[44] Mr Peter Kinrade of the University of
Melbourne, Submission 164, p 1651.
[45] Official Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
21 March 2000, p 181.
[46] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne
20 March 2000, p. 138.
[47] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra,
23 June 2000, p 712.
[48] `The expansion of participation and
extension of the action plans would be greatly enhanced by a clear commitment
from Government that organisations will not be disadvantaged for taking
voluntary actions now relative to those not taking such actions' (Mr
John Maxwell Eyles, Executive Director, AIGN, Proof Committee Hansard,
Melbourne, 20 March 2000, p 137).
[49] Sydney Futures Exchange, Submission
161, p 1623.
[50] Mr Brian Fisher, Executive Director,
ABARE, `The Development of International Climate Change Policy', Australian
Commodities, vol 1, March 1994, p 51.
[51] Woodside Energy Ltd, Submission 129,
p 1306.
[52] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network
(AIGN), Submission 113, p 138.
[53] Great Southern Energy, Submission 150,
p 1560.
[54] Wesfarmers CSBP Ltd, Submission 103,
p 845.
[55] David Cusack, Chairman of the Greenhouse
Gas Working Group of the CIF, stated in a 1999 paper that `Industry
was not in favour of such a measure because of the potential adverse
effects on business competitiveness.'
[56] Greenhouse Challenge, Evaluation
Report, 1999, p 11.
[57] Dr Clive Hamilton, Submission 79d, p
2301, quoting Ecoal, a quarterly newsletter of the World Coal
Institute, Vol 32, December 1999.
[58] Dr Clive Hamilton, Submission 79d, p
2306.
[59] Dr Clive Hamilton, Submission 79d, p
2298.
[60] Ambassador Ralph Hillman, Proof Committee
Hansard, Canberra, 9 March 2000, p 15.
[61] `A key matter for on-going attention
is whether our current package of policies and measures will in fact
lead to the required net reduction in emissions by 2008 to 2012' (Ms
Gwen Andrews, Chief Executive Officer, AGO, Proof Committee Hansard,
Canberra, 9 March 2000, p 4).
[62] Ms Gwen Andrews, Chief Executive Officer,
AGO, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 9 March 2000, p 17.
[63] Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF),
Official Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 21 March 2000, p 195.
[64] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 804.
[65] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 803.
[66] Greenpeace Australia, Proof Committee
Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2000, p 676.
[67] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 473.
[68] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth,
17 April 2000, p 473.
[69] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network,
Submission 113, p 923.
[70] Cooperative Agreement, A Report on
the Greenhouse Challenge 1998-99, Tabled document, p 3.
[71] Australian Coal Association, Submission
140, p 1462.
[72] Australian Aluminium Council, Submission
167, p 1671.
[73] Proof Committee Hansard, 23 June
2000, p 778.
[74] The Minerals Council, Proof Committee
Hansard, Canberra 10 March 2000, p 70.
[75] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network,
Submission 113, p 914.
[76] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1424.
[77] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1424.
[78] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network,
Submission 113, p 915.
[79] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network,
Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 20 March 2000, p 137.
[80] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network,
Submission 113, p 932.
[81] Australian Industry Greenhouse Network,
Submission 113, p 932.
[82] Australian Aluminium Council, Submission
167, p 1674.
[83] Wilkenfeld Report, 1996, p 25.
[84] Official Committee Hansard, 21
March 2000, p 176.
[85] Cement Industry Federation (CIF), Submission
135, p 1432.
[86] Energetics Pty Ltd, Submission 143,
p 1493.
[87] Proof Committee Hansard, 23 June
2000, p 706.
[88] George Wilkenfeld and Associates, Submission
85, p 659.
[89] Dr Clive Hamilton, Proof Committee
Hansard, 10 March 2000, p 65.
[90] Greenpeace Australia, Submission 183a,
p 2422-23.
[91] Official Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
21 March 2000, p 198.
[92] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
20 March 2000, p 167.
[93] Official Committee Hansard, Melbourne,
21 March 2000, p 195.
[94] Dr Clive Hamilton, Proof Committee
Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 65.
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