6. Entry fees: equity arguments
`Free entry is a subsidy by poorer nongoing taxpayers to richer goers'
6.1 Supporters of user charges argued that free entry is a subsidy by
poorer nongoers to richer goers. In full the argument consists of a claim
that visitors to museums, art galleries and national parks tend to be
the better off people; a value judgment that the transfer from poorer
nongoing taxpayers to richer visitors (through the public subsidy of museums,
galleries and national parks) is unfair; and a conclusion that the unfairness
can and should be remedied by making the visitors pay. We will consider
each part in turn. [1]
Socio-economic profile of visitors to museums and galleries
6.2 It is a commonplace that museum and gallery visitors are drawn disproportionately
from the educated professional classes who have the `cultural capital'
(basically, education) to benefit from what they offer (the phenomenon
is stronger for art galleries than for history museums). [2]
There is a close correlation between low tendency to visit and low education
and (as a predictable complement) low occupational status. All submissions
regarded this as regrettable and stressed the need for access and equity
programs to broaden the appeal of museums and galleries, quite apart from
the particular matter of user pays policies. [3]
6.3 To what extent visitors are also the `better-off people', an important
point in the terms of the present argument, is less certain. The correlation
between tendency to visit and income exists, but is weaker -
`Bourdieu and Darbel [in their `now classic' 1969 study, For the Love
of Art] found...that level of educational attainment and occupational
status had a more direct bearing on museum and gallery attendance than
level of income. This is not to say that income had no role in such matters.
Its role, however, was an indirect one, mediated through the part it plays
in helping secure the forms and levels of education and professional status
associated with, in particular, art gallery usage.' [4]
6.4 In other words, education is the main predictor of propensity to
visit; to the extent that income does not correlate perfectly with education
(not all highly educated people are rich and not all rich people are highly
educated), income will also not correlate perfectly with propensity to
visit. [5]
6.5 In a recent South Australian survey the income profile of a group
of museum and gallery goers was little different from that of a group
of nongoers (except that an above average proportion of art gallery visitors
reported annual household incomes over $60,000). [6]
Similarly, an Australia Council survey of domestic tourists' cultural
activities found that the tendency to visit museums and art galleries
while travelling away from home differs predictably depending on level
of education, but does not differ so much depending on level of income.
[7] A recent Australia Council survey of Aboriginal
& Torres Strait Islanders and people of non-English-speaking background
found that `...the demographic and other differences between [a survey
sample of] visitors and non-visitors [to the Powerhouse Museum, Sydney]
were not great. Differences in income, education, exposure to museums
and other typical distinguishing characteristics did not adequately explain
the decision to visit or not to visit. The experience of having visited
the museum appeared to be, in itself, a distinguishing factor...' [8]
6.6 Little is known about the socio-economic profile of visitors to special
exhibitions and whether this differs significantly from that of visitors
to permanent collections. [9]
6.7 To turn to the whole population (as distinct from visitors): [10]
it has been suggested that, in relation to visiting museums, there are
three types of people: frequent visitors, perhaps 15 per cent of the population;
a middle group of occasional visitors, perhaps 40 per cent; and hardly
ever visitors, perhaps 45 per cent. [11] Frequent
visitors probably answer to the stereotyped educated élite (more
or less); hardly ever visitors are committed nongoers; the middle group
of occasional/potential visitors are, implicitly, the main target of museums'
access and equity programs. In their demographic profile the middle group
is far closer to the non-visitors (lower educational and occupational
status) than to the frequent visitors (as in the Powerhouse Museum survey
mentioned just above) - a point which has important implications for access
and equity programs. [12]
Socio-economic profile of visitors to national parks
6.8 The Committee discovered practically no information on the socio-economic
profile of national park visitors. We suspect that that there is less
interest in the question in national parks than in museums, probably partly
because national parks have less of the cachet of social improvement,
causing fewer concerns about access and equity; partly because national
park visitation has grown strongly in the last decade: managers' attention
is probably focussed more on coping with people who do visit than on asking
why some people don't. [13]
6.9 A commonsense theoretical view is that because of the expense of
a national park holiday poorer people are probably excluded anyway:
`...in many situations given the costs associated with travelling to
many environmental or cultural heritage sites (eg Great Barrier Reef,
Uluru), low income earners may not be able to visit them at all.' (Treasury,
submission 20 p175)
6.10 On the other hand, a visit to Uluru or the Great Barrier Reef is
a very different thing from a daytrip to a popular national park on the
city limits. It may well be that the latter is a much more typical national
park `holiday' than the former; [14] and one
would expect the income profile of these visitors to be lower. [15]
As well, a camping holiday is a relatively cheap form of overnight stay.
A recent South Australian survey seems to confirm that visiting national
parks is more evenly spread across educational groups than visiting museums
and galleries:
`...those with only primary education reported that they were more likely
than the more highly educated groups not to take part in all
cultural activities - `high' or `low' - except for visiting friends, eating
out, church attendances, picnicking, visiting national parks and watching
television.' [16]
6.11 The Australia Council survey of domestic tourists' cultural activities
mentioned in paragraph 6.5 had similar results for national park visits
as for museum/ gallery visits: tendency to visit is positively correlated
with level of education, and also positively correlated with level of
income - but not so strongly. [17]
6.12 Professor Bennett surmises that the socio-economic profile of national
park visitors is more `average' than that of museum/gallery visitors:
`I cannot recall any surveys done, for example, of the social profile
of visitors to national parks but I do know that, if you look at the social
profile of visitors to botanical gardens, they are spread much more broadly.
There is much greater cross-class - if you like, a general community -
participation in those institutions. I would expect the same is true of
national parks... it would be difficult to identify any systemic barriers
to access [of the kind that exist in relation to museums and galleries]...'
(Prof. T Bennett, evidence 21 May 1997 p80)
6.13 But, considering the `travel cost' argument just mentioned, it is
likely that the socio-economic profile of visitors varies much more from
one national park to another than from one museum or gallery to another.
Is it `unfair' for poorer nongoers to subsidise richer goers?
6.14 The Committee considers that the claimed disproportionate presence
of better-off people is, in the case of museums and galleries, generally
true but the extent of the disproportion uncertain; in the case of national
parks, unproven one way or the other on average. But if it is true,
is it `unfair'?
6.15 We note first that using some people's taxes to subsidise other
people's benefits is not `unfair' in principle: it is a large part of
the business of government in any civilised compassionate society. Healthy
people's taxes subsidise sick people's hospital care; childless people's
taxes subsidise the education of other people's children. [18]
An equity problem is perceived only if there is a systematic transfer
of benefits from less advantaged to more advantaged people. [19]
6.16 Assuming for the moment that this is the case, is it `unfair'? The
committee does not wish to pass judgment on this; we only point out that
the there are imponderable ethical issues involved and the answer is not
as obvious as is implied by the supporters of user charges who put this
argument. How important are the sums of money involved? Is it fair to
ask everyone to contribute perhaps a few dollars a year to national institutions
that exist primarily for their community/ non-use benefits, even if this
incidentally provides a windfall gain to better-off direct users? How
do we discount the `unfairness' to allow for the fact that there is wide
public acceptance of the value of public subsidy to cultural institutions
and nature conservation even among people who are not direct users? [20]
How do we discount for the fact that they are widely seen as `merit goods'
(that is, society wishes to encourage their consumption)? [21]
`Culture and heritage is not necessarily a short term consumable where
the customer can have a complete and comprehensive understanding of the
product's utility prior to use.' (Australia Council, submission 35 p288)
`There is little doubt that merit good considerations have probably been
the most significant single explanation of government involvement in the
arts in all the countries we are dealing with. If the motivations of politicians
can be inferred from their public pronouncements, it is clear that most
of them believe that the existence of the arts is essential to civilized
life.' (Throsby C D & Withers G A, The Economics of the Performing
Arts, Melbourne 1979 p192-3)
6.17 How do we value the fact that among the better-off visitors there
are some poorer visitors, who may disproportionately value free
entry, who may be gaining disproportionate benefit, and who may be disproportionately
discouraged by entry fees? A favourite story in museum circles is the
story of the poor working class child who is awakened and set on the path
to self-fulfilment and high achievement by dropping in to the free public
museum. Perhaps in reality these lives are few, but they do exist - how
much are they worth?
6.18 And if, even now, we accept that the situation is `unfair', is imposing
user charges a good response? This is the question of practical importance.
The socio-economic profile of visitors we have described is a static situation;
introducing user charges makes the situation dynamic. What other results
would the change cause? Could the side-effects be damaging? This brings
us to the main argument put against the `unfair subsidy' argument: that
user charges will disproportionately discourage poorer or otherwise disadvantaged
people - the very people who (at least in the case of museums and galleries)
are the targets of access and equity programs. We will describe this argument
before commenting further.
...versus `fees disproportionately discourage poorer people'
6.19 A number of submissions argued that entry fees would disproportionately
discourage poorer and disadvantaged people. Some put the argument in context
of general opposition to user charges; others merely to press for suitable
concessions. Some referred to particular groups who would be relatively
disadvantaged:
`National park entry fees would certainly reduce their utilisation by
families, individuals and social groups who have limited financial capacity.'
(National Parks Association of Queensland Inc., submission 24 p206)
`Since Indigenous people are the most economically disadvantaged group
of Australians, a charge would have more of a deterrent effect for them
than for non-Indigenous Australians - surely an inequitable and unjustified
outcome.' (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, submission
52 p460)
6.20 The implication here is that because `limited financial capacity'
is systematically associated with other social disadvantages (relating
to education, ethnicity, etc.), anything that tends to exclude the poor
from the use of public services is in effect an unfair `double whammy'
for these people. Obviously, as discussed in chapter
3, poorer people are excluded from many things in our society. The
piquancy of the complaint here is that these are public services,
supposedly provided for all. [22]
6.21 The question is, what is the elasticity of demand broken down by
socio-economic groupings? When a charge is introduced and visitation drops,
are poorer people the first to drop out? Or are the now-absent ones a
cross-section of society similar to continuing visitors?
Elasticity of demand for museums/galleries by socio-economic profile
6.22 Making allowance for the uncertainties, on balance there seems to
be strong evidence that museum entry fees (probably even `modest' fees)
significantly discourage visitors (see chapter 5).
But there seems to be very little hard information on the equity question:
what type of people the discouraged ones are.
`What is not clear, however, is who stops using museums and galleries
when admission charges are applied.' (Australian Key Centre for Cultural
and Media Policy, submission 8 p83) [23]
6.23 It has been suggested that, in relation to visiting museums, there
are three types of people: frequent visitors, perhaps 15 per cent of the
population; a middle group of occasional/potential visitors, perhaps 40
per cent; and hardly ever visitors, perhaps 45 per cent. Significantly,
in their socio-economic profile the middle group is far closer to the
non-visitors (lower educational and occupational status) than to the frequent
visitors (see paragraph 6.7).
6.24 An obvious inference is that the first group has a low elasticity
of demand (they are committed goers), the third group has a low elasticity
of demand (they would never go anyway), while the waverers in the middle
are likely to have a higher elasticity, and so are likely to be more affected
by fees than the committed goers. Since the middle group has lower socio-economic
status than the committed goers, the reasoning supports the intuitive
suggestion, made in several submissions, that in response to entry fees
poorer people would probably drop out disproportionately:
`Admission charges do however probably compound the bias in the socio-economic/
educational profile of museums visitors towards upper levels.' (Australian
Museum, submission 30 p241)
6.25 An implicitly contrary view (if one assumes that repeat visitors
tend to be the better off people) is that `A more likely explanation for
the kinds of declining figures reported... is that those who already regularly
visit museums and galleries do so less frequently when charges are introduced,
perhaps partly because of a revaluation of the marginal value of repeat
visits but also because frequent users are the most likely to oppose,
and so also to resent, the introduction of admission charges.' [24]
6.26 A 1991 Australia Council survey of art gallery visitors found that
`those from poorer households were more likely to report that admission
charges would discourage them from visiting art galleries: 54 per cent
against a sample average of 44 per cent.' [25]
A 1995 Australia Council study of older people and the arts (including
museums and art gallery visitation) found that older people greatly value
participating in the arts, but find cost a significant barrier: `Young
people can replace the money they spend, but we [retirees] can't.' [26]
6.27 A 1996 Australia Council study of barriers to museum visitation
among non-English-speakers and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people
found that `cost (entry fee, especially for large families)' figured most
prominently. [27] The Australia Museum comments
generally: `There can be no doubt that admission charges result in a decline
in family visits.' [28] This is a particular
matter of concern if we consider that positive early experience of museums
is probably a significant predictor of propensity to visit throughout
life:
`The experience of having visited the museum appeared to be, in itself,
a distinguishing factor.... Once people had visited they were generally
positive about the experience, visited again and sometimes took others
to visit.' [29]
6.28 The National Campaign for the Arts Australia Ltd compared recent
Australian research on the demographic profile of nongoers with Canadian
research showing that cost is a relatively important `leisure motivation'
for that type of people:
`According to an Ontario report involving the Ontario gallery, museum,
science centre and zoo, attendance cost was an important factor to single
income and families with children, to recent immigrants, to older people
(50+), and those with lower attained education levels. Cost remains an
important factor to the reluctant museum visitor, raising issues of fairness
and equity.' [30]
6.29 Anecdotal evidence from the National Gallery of Victoria, which
removed its general entrance fee on 1 July 1996, was:
`The attendant staff who man the floors of the gallery commented within
a week or two weeks of the charge going, “We have people in this
building who do not know what to do in an art gallery...” It means
that we are going to a different audience with what seems like a simple
gesture.' (J Payne, National Gallery of Victoria, evidence 15 September
1997 p402) [31]
6.30 Similarly in the case of the Powerhouse Museum, Sydney:
`It is almost worth this inquiry going to the Powerhouse on the day of
free admission, because the number of people that you see in that museum
and the range of Australians that you see - I would almost say to you
that the language that is most frequently spoken is not English on those
days - are people who would obviously not otherwise go to that museum.
It is extraordinary.' (Dr S Wallace, Museums Australia, evidence 16 September
1997 p486)
6.31 These observations tend to support the other comments above suggesting
that middle group of occasional/potential visitors - the main focus of
attempts to increase visitation through access an equity programs - are
sensitive to price, and that for them entry fees are a disincentive additional
to other cultural barriers.
`I think that the experience in Australia and overseas is that [entry
fees] would result in a significant decline in attendances. I believe
that that decline would be registered in the very areas where we are making
enormous efforts to increase patronage by developing specific programs...'
(Dr C Turner, Queensland Art Gallery, evidence 21 May 1997 p126)
`We believe it is clear from the evidence we have reviewed that the widespread
introduction of museum charges in Australia would, at present, reduce
the rate at which museums and art galleries are used by present users
while, at the same time, making them marginally less accessible to non-users
by adding an economic [dis]incentive to the existing cultural disincentives
which disincline non-users to visit...' (Australian Key Centre for Cultural
and Media Policy, submission 8 p87)
Elasticity of demand for national parks by socio-economic profile
6.32 The Committee has no information on elasticity of demand by socio-economic
profile for national parks. The first intuitive answer would be, `of course
poorer people will be the first to drop out in response to charges - it's
more likely that they can't afford it.' This is in effect the `last straw'
argument put in some submissions. But this is not necessarily valid. Elasticity
of demand for a good depends both on price relative to buyer's income
and on availability of substitutes. [32] In
the case of a national park holiday, the entry fee is likely to be a small
proportion of total costs, diluting any `can we afford it?' effect. A
camping holiday, being a relatively cheap holiday, may be more attractive
to poorer people (hence their demand less elastic) because of lack
of substitutes at that price level (with provisos that national parks
may differ greatly one from another in these matters, as just noted).
We do not know. In cases where elasticity of demand is low anyway - when
`modest' fees are charged, hardly anyone drops out - the question becomes
unimportant.
Comparison of museums/galleries and national parks
6.33 On elasticity of demand, the comparison of national parks and museums/galleries
is perplexing. The socio-economic profile of national park visitors is
probably more average than that of museum visitors (less educated/ professional/
high income bias), yet demand for national parks, to judge from the evidence
we have described, is probably less elastic, at least in some cases.
This is inconsistent with the intuitive view that in response to charges
poorer people would be likely to drop out first.
6.34 Part of the explanation may be that elasticity of demand depends
not only on price compared with income, but also on the availability of
substitutes. The national parks with low elasticity are likely to be those
with rare or unique attractions. Similarly, there may be few substitutes
for a museum as a free day out indoors (the scenario of the `wet
Sunday afternoon' visitors); but a charging museum is competing in a quite
different market.
6.35 Part of the explanation may lie in different attitudes to the benefits
of a national park visit versus a museum/gallery visit. Perhaps the image
of national parks is more to do with `mere' recreation, seen as a simple
private benefit which most people are willing to pay for; [33]
perhaps the image of museums is more to do with education and cultural
enrichment - a complex, perhaps inseparable mixture of private and community
benefits which more people see as the right of all. [34]
It may be that any charge for museums has a disproportionately
negative effect on people who, in light of these value-laden and emotionally
charged concepts, may resent paying anything for what they regard
as a public facility. [35]
`Museums have traditionally been seen both by policy makers and the public
as a “good thing” of benefit to all citizens. Charging at the
door emphasises a changed relation between the public and the museum -
from one of citizen to one of customer.' (National Museum of Australia,
submission 42 p360)
6.36 This would explain why it is sometimes said anecdotally that if
you are going to charge at all, you might as well make it $10 rather than
$2. By implication, even at $2 some damage is done: the museum's image
has changed, and it is trying to compete in a different market where there
are more substitutes. This would account for the loss of visitors being
relatively high at the change in price from nothing to something, and
lower thereafter (see paragraph 5.69).
Are entry fees a wise response to any perceived inequity?
6.37 This brings us back to the question raised in paragraph 6.18: even
if we accept that free entry is an unfair subsidy from nongoing taxpayers
to goers (or in the stronger form, an unfair subsidy from poorer nongoers
to better-off goers) - and the Committee does not necessarily accept this
- it does not necessarily mean that entry fees are a wise response.
`It [Department of Finance, 1989] drew the conclusion that museums were
institutions which were used, in the main, by only some members of the
population, so that in effect public monies were subsidising the interests
of the narrower rather than the broader community. While the research
reported above supports this conclusion, its policy implications are far
from clear.' [36]
6.38 What other results would entry fees cause? Could there be damaging
side-effects? Could alternative approaches be more positive?
6.39 The answers to these questions depend crucially on what the elasticity
of demand really is; how many visitors a charge drives away; accordingly,
how great is the deadweight loss of welfare; to what extent the discouraged
visitors are the poorer people who (at least in the case of museums and
galleries) already labour under other cultural barriers to access.
...in national parks
6.40 In the case of national parks, the Committee's evidence was inconclusive.
The safest statement is that the position probably varies greatly from
one national park to another, depending on how strong the attractions
of the particular site are, and how many substitutes there are. This suggests
that pricing policies should be flexible: some national parks with rare
attractions and inelastic demand (such as the Snowy Mountains, for snow)
may support high entry fees, while a similar charge in a more `ordinary'
national park (in terms of its attractions for public recreation) could
drive many visitors away.
...in museums and art galleries
6.41 In the case of museums and galleries, according to the predominant
evidence given to the Committee, demand in response to price changes may
be quite elastic and accordingly the effects of entry fees may be very
damaging on both efficiency and equity grounds.
6.42 Visitor numbers will probably drop significantly, causing a deadweight
loss of welfare to the community as a whole (since the operating cost
of the institution does not drop correspondingly). Visitors' socio-economic
profile will probably become even more élitist, going against access
and equity goals. Older people on fixed incomes will be particularly discouraged,
which is especially regrettable because they particularly recognise the
importance of active cultural participation for their quality of life
(and this problem will increase with the current greying of the population).
Families will be particularly discouraged, with very serious implications
for losing the early positive museum experiences of the next generation
of potential visitors. These last two points have particular significance
in light of demographic changes:
`...art museums, like other cultural institutions, benefited from a demographic
windfall during the 1960s and 1970s that will not be repeated. Individuals
with almost all of the characteristics associated with museum attendance
- relative youth, college educations, white-collar occupations - became
far more numerous than they had been before. During the past decade real
incomes and educational attainment have stopped growing, the baby-boom
generation has reached middle age, and labour force growth has shifted
to low-income service occupations... Art museums can no longer count on
steadily increasing demand for their services.' [37]
6.43 In the longer term, the place may lose the sympathetic image as
a community cultural facility which it needs in order to attract public
subsidy, private sponsorship and volunteer input. [38]
`At the broader access and equity level, admission charges have the effect
of excluding sections of the community from access to cultural and information
services.' (Government of South Australia, submission 38 p319)
`Entry fees usually account for no more than about 10 per cent of the
income of most publicly funded museums. The real cost of entry fees is
the effective exclusion of two thirds of the visitors. To maintain entry
fees makes a mockery of often much touted efforts to increase the inclusiveness
of museums and to sweep away barriers to participation in their programs.'
(P Filmer-Sankey, Newcastle Regional Museum, submission 56 p589)
6.44 This is not a sensible outcome. Where it has occurred the Committee
suspects that it may result from pressures from government for greater
cost recovery with too little regard for the negative side-effects. It
is particularly inappropriate since, for all these detriments, fee revenue
cannot usually hope to be more than a small percentage of total costs
(as all submissions to the inquiry admitted); the museum will still require
a large public subsidy; and because costs do not decrease in proportion
to decreased visitation, the public subsidy for each remaining visitor
will probably increase, frustrating the goal of reducing the `unfair'
subsidy. [39]
6.45 All these detriments arise quite predictably because these institutions
are primarily `public goods' which, according to orthodox economic theory,
should be funded by general taxation. The policy push to shift the burden
onto direct users, whatever its merits in principle, in this case
is misguided. It damages the standing of the museum as a community cultural
institution, and it leads to a loss of community welfare (through reduced
visitation) which the Committee regards as regrettable. We stress again
that, despite the confusing moral connotations of `public good', in economic
theory a `public good' is simply something supplied collectively to counteract
market failure - even though, depending on the case, the benefits of it
may be completely private to individual recipients. Thus the fact that
a `public good' conveys private benefits is not, by itself, a sound reason
for imposing user charges.
6.46 Finally we comment on the argument that entry fees (to be exact,
being forced to rely on entry fees for a certain proportion of income)
will focus the minds of managers on `customer service'. [40]
The implication may be either that user charges revenue will finance `customer-focussed'
programs that will attract more visitors; or (if they don't attract more
visitors) in any case quality matters more than quantity.
6.47 This of course raises the debate over exactly what `greater customer
focus' means and whether it is a good or bad thing - whether it means
making museums and galleries more relevant, or takes them away from their
core functions of education and cultural enrichment as societal goals.
The Committee will not buy into that argument here: we comment only that
either way, the proof of the pudding is in the visitor numbers. To judge
from the evidence quoted above, it seems that `customer focus' has not
been able to prevent a serious loss of customers where entry fees are
imposed. A museum cannot provide a quality experience to people who have
turned away at the door.
Alternatives
6.48 What alternatives are possible? First and foremost, we may reject
the formulation of the problem - that for some reason publicly funded
institutions `ought' to achieve an arbitrary amount of cost recovery through
user charges.
`...there is power in public goods - the museum is an excellent example,
and the Treasury Gardens over the back here. The public love those things
in a way that politicians do not understand until they try to shut them
down. Also, for most of this century the idea of public goods was easily
accepted by all sides of politics in that they are important... It is
only in the last 15 years with this push towards economic efficiency that
the whole issue of user pays has come up.' (F Grey, evidence 15 September
1997 p434)
6.49 The philosophical position that users should pay for private benefits,
simply because they should (by analogy with private markets) is
inappropriate. These places are public facilities which are maintained
for public purposes to do with conservation, education and cultural enrichment.
With them, as a matter of public policy, the goal of the widest possible
public access is fundamental - they are not free (as private enterprise
is) to pursue élite niche markets if that happens to be most profitable.
Cost recovery policies must be secondary. If the total benefits in relation
to given fixed costs are greatest when funded entirely through general
taxation, then it makes most sense to fund them entirely through general
taxation.
6.50 Secondly, if we perceive an upper class bias in the socio-economic
profile of visitors, we may take constructive steps to remedy it - the
foundation of which is free entry:
`The position adopted by the Department of Finance [1989] was to advocate
the introduction of museum charges to reduce the level of public subsidisation
to private benefits. An equally cogent response, however, is to urge the
need for the public funding of compensatory programs intended - in a variety
of ways - to make museums more accessible to a wider cross-section of
the community.' [41]
6.51 Access and equity generally is a staple concern of museum professionals,
and the Committee affirms its fundamental importance, though we will not
consider it further in this report. We make only one comment. The argument
that focuses on free entry as an `unfair' subsidy from poorer nongoing
taxpayers to better-off goers makes an implicit value judgment that the
most important differences between people are unequal resources of money
income. But money income is not the only way we can describe welfare,
and a dichotomy between rich and poor is not the only way we can categorise
people's differences. The more important dichotomy (in context of this
discussion of museums and galleries) is the dichotomy between people with
and without the `cultural capital' (basically, education) that makes them
feel comfortable visiting museums. If we focus on this dichotomy,
it is obvious that exacting fees from better-off goers does nothing to
remedy the unequal distribution of cultural capital. Constructive access
and equity programs might. [42]
6.52 Thirdly, if we wish to reduce the level of public subsidy per visitor,
we may search for means of doing so which do not jeopardise the
core goal of wide public access. Given the predominance of fixed costs
in museums and galleries, the most obvious way of reducing the subsidy
per visitor is to increase visitation:
`When we had an entry fee, we took almost exactly $2.00 per head from
an ordinary annual visitation of 50,000. Now we are taking $0.61c from
each visitor via the shop, cafe, donation boxes and other income sources,
but we are earning this from nearly four time as many people. Our cost
per visitor has fallen from between $12 and $17 a head to an estimated
$3.50 for this year.' (P Filmer-Sankey, Newcastle Regional Museum, submission
56 p589) [43]
6.53 Another obvious way is to exploit increased visitation by charging
for `value-added' services, which the Committee (with most submissions,
even from those opposed to entry fees) accepts; and to exploit the favourable
public image of a free-entry community cultural institution to promote
volunteer input and private sponsorship.
`...the [Western Australian] Museum feels that implementing a general
admission charge could seriously limit other avenues of funding.... the
Museum recognises that entrepreneurial activities can and do generate
an increasing percentage of museum budgets. However, in applying any model
of “user pays”, the Museum believes that the long term cultural
investment represented by museums should not be endangered. In this respect,
the modified model of a mix of free and pay-to-enter spaces is preferred...'
(Government of Western Australia, submission 53 p464)
`The philosophy is about getting the community into the gallery and then
looking at different ways of generating revenue other than a straight
entry fee.' (R Sue See, Queensland Art Gallery, evidence 21 May 1997 p122)
`Consequently [the Australia] Council would argue for a sophisticated
approach to considering the constellation of uses and users of assets
and a creative and innovative approach to developing and exploiting a
wide suite of income sources...The starting point for this approach should
be base admission without charge. The opportunity of Australians young,
old in city and country to learn and delight in our rich cultural and
heritage resources should be limited at the gateway to these assets.'
(Australia Council, submission 35 p289)
6.54 `Basic access' and `value-added services' are discussed further
from paragraph 7.3, and volunteerism and sponsorship from paragraph 7.81.
Footnotes
[1] One can also argue that direct users `ought'
to contribute more without any reference to rich or poor, but simply from
a general `user pays' philosophy. This may be called equity between users
and non-users: it is the implicit foundation of the `users should pay
for private benefits' argument. The argument is intrinsically weak in
relation to non-rival public goods, because of the marginal cost pricing
rule (see paragraph 5.18), so it is usually put with the rich/poor equity
angle to buttress it.
[2] Australian Key Centre for Cultural and Media
Policy, submission 8 p81. Bennett T & Frow J, Art Galleries: Who
Goes?:a study of visitors to three Australian art galleries, with international
comparisons, Australia Council 1991, p53.
[3] Professor Bennett comments that little is
known about the extent to which such programs are successful - that is,
whether the profile of museum visitors is becoming more `average'
over time, as hoped: `The attempts of my co-researcher, Robin Trotter,
in a recent inquiry to ascertain how many Australian museums had regular
mechanisms for statistically measuring the success of their access policies
in terms of altered visitor profiles drew pretty much of a blank.' Bennett
T, `Consuming culture, measuring access and audience development', Culture
and Policy vol 8 no. 1, 1997, p17 (attachment to submission 8)
[4] Bennett T, `That those who run may read:
museums and barriers to access', Evaluation and Visitor Research in
Museums Towards 2000, conference papers, Powerhouse Museum, March
1995, p12. Bourdieu P & Darbel A, The Love of Art: European art
museums and their public, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991 (first published
in French 1969)
[5] `When this class [the `dominant class']
is broken down into its components, however, marked differences between
its `intellectual' and its managerial/industrial wings become apparent...In
some key measures of cultural capital... the group of secondary and tertiary
teachers scores many hundreds of per cent more than the groups of employers.'
Bennett T & Frow J, Art Galleries: Who Goes?:a study of visitors
to three Australian art galleries, with international comparisons,
Australia Council 1991, p54; see also p52.
[6] Bennett T, The Reluctant Museum Visitor:
a study of non-goers to history museums and art galleries, Australia
Council 1994, p11
[7] Spring J, Culture on Holiday: a survey
of Australian domestic tourists' cultural participation December 1990
- April 1991, Australia Council, no date [1991], pp17,21. A tourist
is defined as a person spending at least one night away from home at a
minimum distance of 40km.
[8] Robertson H & Migliorino P, Open
Up - guidelines for cultural diversity visitor studies, Australia
Council 1996, p34
[9] Prof. T Bennett, evidence 21 May 1997 p80
[10] The distinction is important. Frequent
visitors will count more strongly in statistics about visitation than
in statistics about the whole population's propensity to visit. This is
relevant, for example, to the argument that free entry is an `unfair'
subsidy to a small élite of frequent visitors. A small élite
of frequent visitors may exist, and yet the institution's main use may
still be in the form of occasional visits by the mass of people. Free
entry for the masses gives a windfall gain to the élite because
of the practical impossibility of discriminatory pricing.
[11] Hood M G, `Audience research tells us
why visitors come to museums - and why they don't come', Evaluation
and Visitor Research in Museums Towards 2000, conference papers, Powerhouse
Museum, March 1995, p3ff
[12] An alternative formulation is: `The first
audience is the committed museum visitor... Then we have the visitor who
can be kicked across the portals with encouragement but could also go
to sporting events... There is a third group of visitors who, if they
knew a bit more about it, would come...' Dr S Wallace (Museums Australia),
evidence 16 September 1997 p488. The second and third group described
thus are probably both part of Hood's middle group. Bennett and Frow describe
six groups of art gallery goers and four (three) groups of museum (gallery)
nongoers. Mapping these onto Hood's categories is a point of interest.
Bennett T & Frow J, Art Galleries: Who Goes?:a study of visitors
to three Australian art galleries, with international comparisons,
Australia Council 1991; Bennett T, The Reluctant Museum Visitor: a
study of non-goers to history museums and art galleries, Australia
Council 1994.
[13] For example, visits to Victorian national
parks and other parks have grown from 3.4 million per year to 10.2 million
per year from 1977 to 1993. Hall C M & McArthur S, Heritage Management
in Australia and New Zealand: the human dimension, OUP, Melbourne
1996, p133
[14] The question requires a breakdown of individual
national park visitation figures correlated to the characteristics of
individual national parks.
[15] The hypothesis that poorer people are
excluded from visiting Uluru by travel costs has the logical complement
that poorer people are not so much excluded from visiting less distant
places.
[16] Bennett T, The Reluctant Museum Visitor:
a study of non-goers to history museums and art galleries, Australia
Council 1994, p37. Australian Bureau of Statistics data on cultural expenditure
broken down by household income do not particularly corroborate
this, but the actual figures for `national park and zoo fees' are so small
as to be statistically unreliable. As well, of course, expenditure on
`national park fees' does not account for visits to places where entry
is free. Department of Communications and the Arts & Australian Bureau
of Statistics, Cultural Trends in Australia No. 4 - Australians' expenditure
on culture, 1996, p43
[17] Spring J, Culture on Holiday: a survey
of Australian domestic tourists' cultural participation December 1990
- April 1991, Australia Council, no date [1991], pp17,21.
[18] Arguably this is a sufficient answer to
the claim that `users should pay for private benefits' as a matter of
equity between users and non-users. That is, equity between users and
non-users, as a general principle, is simply not on the agenda
in a society which taxes and spends communally, since any taxing
and spending must create such `inequities'.`Users should pay for private
benefits' relies on an implicit judgment that in the particular case
ethical considerations or community benefits are not strong enough to
make the community want to subsidise associated private benefits.
[19] The rich/poor dichotomy is the main one
and was the only one raised in submissions to this inquiry, but other
dichotomies may raise equity problems depending on one's point of view.
For example, we hear arguments over whether it is `fair' for some States
to subsidise other States through differential Commonwealth general revenue
grants; whether it is `fair' for country people to subsidise city people's
public services (or vice versa); and so on.
[20] See paragraph 4.35, footnote 16.
[21] Merit goods are conceptually distinct
from public goods, though they may overlap in practice. Public goods,
however great the demand for them, are undersupplied in private markets
because of non-rivalry or non-excludability. Merit goods are undersupplied
in private markets because (in society's view) individuals' private
demand is deficient: some people don't know their own best interests.
The two categories are easily confused or may overlap in practice since
deficient demand for a public good because of free-rider problems
may have the same appearance as deficient demand for a merit good because
of imperfect knowledge; individuals may not see external benefits
arising from their consumption of a public good.
[22] `...it is surely untenable that the rich
should have more of the stock of public goods than the poor, yet this
is exactly the priority in resource allocation that Willingness To Pay
[theory] would assume.' Hamilton-Smith E, `Challenging the Willingness
To Pay model,' Valuing Natural Areas: applications and problems of
the contingent valuation method, ed. Lockwood M & De Lacy T, conference
papers Charles Sturt University June 1992, p150
[23] See also Prof. T Bennett, evidence 21
May 1997 p83
[24] Australian Key Centre for Cultural and
Media Policy, submission 8 p83-4. Most statistics, though they may misleadingly
refer to `visitors', are actually counts of `visits' - that is, turns
of the turnstile. To discover the incidence of repeat visits requires
surveying visitors to ask when they last visited.
[25] Bennett T & Frow J, Art Galleries:
Who Goes - a study of visitors to three Australian art galleries, with
international comparisons, Australia Council 1991, p28, appendix 2
table 13. T Bennett's 1994 study of non-visitors to museums and
art galleries did not ask a comparable question: Bennett T, The Reluctant
Museum Visitor: a study of non-goers to history museums and art galleries,
Australia Council 1994
[26] A focus group participant quoted in Australian
Pensioners and Superannuants Federation, Older Australians and the
Arts, Australia Council 1995, p41
[27] Robertson H & Migliorino P, Open
Up - guidelines for cultural diversity visitor studies, Australia
Council 1996, p35; pers. comm. G Miltenyi (EMD Workforce Development)
[28] Australian Museum, submisssion 30 p241
[29] Robertson H & Migliorino P, Open
Up - guidelines for cultural diversity visitor studies, Australia
Council 1996, p35. The comment is made in respect of non-English-speakers
and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders.
[30] National Campaign for the Arts Australia
Ltd, submission 37 p315. Bennett T, The Reluctant Museum Visitor: a
study of non-goers to history museums and art galleries, Australia
Council 1994. Art Gallery of Ontario, Royal Ontario Museum, Ontario Science
Centre, Metropolitan Toronto Zoo, Audience Research Consortium - summary
report, September 1993.
[31] `It seems clear that the removal of the
admission charge has broadened the appeal of the National Gallery [of
Victoria] beyond the traditional gallery-going groups, and has encouraged
increased attendance from those who were previously infrequent or non-visitors.'
Stewart-Hunter D, National Gallery of Victoria: omnibus poll and visitor
study: summary report, 1997, p6
[32] If matches go up from $1 to $2, it is
unlikely to change people's buying habits - demand for that good is inelastic
at that price. If cars go up from $20,000 to $40,000, it is very likely
to change people's buying habits.
[33] For example, The Friends of South Australia's
Archives, submission 10 p98
[34] In other words, in terms of the categorisation
in paragraph 4.37, the variable community benefits associated with people's
use would be regarded as less in the case of national parks.
[35] The suggestion is made in respect of national
parks in paragraph 5.13.
[36] Australian Key Centre for Cultural and
Media Policy, submission 8 p86. Department of Finance, What Price Heritage:
the museums review and the measurement of museum performance, Canberra
1989
[37] DiMaggio P J in Feldstein M ed., The
Economics of Art Museums, University of Chicago Press 1991, p49. The
comment is about the USA but there is no reason to think Australia is
significantly different.
[38] Sponsorship and volunteer input are discussed
from paragraph 7.81.
[39] The last point depends critically on the
exact balance between cost recovery and lost visitors. A fee aiming to
recoup 10 per cent of costs (based on initial free-entry visitor numbers),
if it drives away more than 10 per cent of visitors, or a fee aiming to
recoup 20 per cent of costs, if it drives away more than 17 per cent of
visitors, increases the subsidy for each remaining visitor (assuming costs
are constant). A fee is most counterproductive where even a small proportion
of cost recovery quickly strikes the limits of people's willingness to
pay. See the case study from paragraph 5.32.
[40] Australian Museum, submission 30 p240
[41] Australian Key Centre for Cultural and
Media Policy, submission 8 p86. Department of Finance, What Price Heritage:
the museums review and the measurement of museum performance, Canberra
1989
[42] If `possesssion of cultural capital' is
regarded as a fundamental good, the broader education system is also implicated.
`There are real limitations on the kinds of inroads, if you like, that
museums and art galleries can make in access terms so long as an education
system operates in a way that, whether unintentionally or by design, stratifies
the population culturally... What art galleries and museums can do so
far as opening up access to their own resources is very much dependent
upon the policies that are pursued in the education domain.' Prof T Bennett,
evidence 21 May 1997 p77
[43] Comparisons of subsidy per visitor between
different institutions are not useful, because of their different circumstances
(such as big or small collections or research activities). Comparisons
within the same place over time, other costs unchanged, are relevant,
pace G Morris (evidence 15 September 1997 p416).
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