Energy Use and Supply         (Part a)

Report of the Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee
The Heat Is On: Australia's Greenhouse Future
Table of Contents

Chapter 5

Energy Use and Supply         (Part a)

… learning about energy efficiency should be as necessary in our society as the capability to swim, ride a bicycle, drive an automobile or operate an automatic teller machine. [1]

Introduction

5.1 Emissions from the production and consumption of energy are the primary source of Australia's greenhouse gas emissions and emissions growth. [2] Overall, emissions from the energy sector (including transport) accounted for 79.6 per cent (362.9 Mt) of total national net CO2-e emissions in 1998. This represents a 62.4 Mt CO2-e (21.1 per cent) increase between 1990 and 1998, of which a quarter occurred in 1997. [3]

5.2 The energy sector of the NGGI is made up of stationary sources, fugitive emissions and transport. Stationary energy is the focus of this chapter and includes emissions from energy generation, energy used in manufacturing and construction, as well as the commercial and residential use of energy.

5.3 Stationary energy was the major contributor to emissions in 1998, at 56.8 per cent of total national emissions. Between 1990 and 1998, emissions in this sector increased by 24.3 per cent and, in the period 1997 to 1998 alone, increased by 7.6 per cent. [4]

5.4 This increase far exceeds the rate of increase of other sectors. Most of the increase in emissions in stationary energy is attributable to the generation of electricity, which has recorded an increase of 30.6 per cent since 1990 and 10.3 per cent since 1997. [5] This is a disturbing trend, and it is clear that constraining energy emissions will be a difficult task in Australia's abatement effort.

5.5 In 1998, the National Greenhouse Strategy (NGS) predicted that, without abatement action, energy emissions will increase by a further 64 Mt CO2-e by 2010, and that assuming the effects of all current policies (including market reforms and the Greenhouse Challenge Program), emissions will increase by a further 28 per cent by 2010 - 20 per cent more than the overall increase allowed under Australia's Kyoto target. [6]

5.6 Even these predictions, made two years before the 1998 Inventory was completed, may be too conservative. The Electricity Supply Association of Australia has predicted that demand will rise by at least 53 per cent over 1990 levels by 2010, resulting in an emissions increase of 41 per cent by 2010. Pacific Power told the Committee that, if emissions were not constrained, the electricity industry would reach 150 per cent of 1990 emissions levels by 2010. [7]

5.7 Electricity emissions alone are responsible for half the increase predicted by the NGS between 1990 and 1998. Since the introduction of the National Electricity Market the emissions intensity of electricity generation has also increased. Given this and increasing consumption, it is possible that annual increases in the order of 15 Mt a year after 1997 will be the norm until at least 2010. This would see the 64 Mt increase predicted by the NGS exceeded by 2001, and an increase of 135 Mt, or 80 per cent of 1990 levels, by 2010. The only policies currently in place to address this are the mandatory 2 per cent renewables measure, which may reduce emissions by between 4 and 5.5 Mt by 2010, and efficiency standards for fossil fuel generation, which may reduce emissions by 4 Mt by 2010. [8] However, these reductions are small in comparison to projected increases.

5.8 Australia's high energy emissions are a legacy of two main factors: the high dependence on cheap domestic sources of fossil fuel, especially coal, and recent energy market reforms which have seen electricity generation based on the highest carbon-content fuels become the most price-competitive in the new deregulated market.

5.9 Since 1995, national energy markets have been subject to widespread microeconomic reform, which, while primarily designed to create greater competition and reduce costs, was also expected to deliver greenhouse benefits in addition to those flowing to consumers. However, the reforms have had many perverse outcomes including a dramatic increase in greenhouse emissions.

5.10 In theory, micro-economic reform is intended to open energy markets to greater competition, breaking down the market power of incumbents and thus creating opportunities for alternative fuels and technologies. However, the Committee heard much evidence that the new NEM discriminates against gas as a fuel and against the entry of new players and more sustainable technologies. It has also had the perverse effect of making the most emissions-intensive fuel source - brown coal - the most price competitive.

5.11 During its inquiry, the Committee canvassed the views of a large range of energy players: consultants, generators, distributors and retailers, cogenerators, renewable energy generators, regulators and government officials. While offering a variety of views, they all agreed on the high emissions outcomes of current energy market changes and the importance of this sector both to the economy and to Australia's ability to meet its current and future commitments under the UNFCCC. Common themes which emerged from evidence were:

5.12 Witnesses also proposed and discussed a number of solutions and policies, although there was a diversity of opinion on the best options. Suggestions included:

5.13 A range of existing local, state and Commonwealth programs also received comment, including, efficiency standards for power generation, licence conditions, renewable energy development and commercialisation programs, gas market reform, and energy efficiency and demand management.

Background to the Reform Process

5.14 Energy market reform began after the 1993 Hilmer National Competition Policy Review and a 1991 decision by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to improve competition in the energy sector. In 1995 the Competition Policy Reform Act established a new Part (IIIA) of the Trade Practices Act which provided a right of access to `essential facilities' including national monopoly infrastructure such as electricity transmission and gas pipelines. In 1991 COAG agreed to replace distinct state electricity markets with a national electricity market (the NEM) and to separate monopoly and contestable elements. While Western Australia could not be interconnected to the NEM it also resolved to pursue reform.

Electricity

5.15 The basic principles underlying electricity market reform were that:

5.16 There were four key elements of electricity reform:

5.17 The rules for the operation of, and participation in, the NEM are contained in the National Electricity Code (NEC), which is developed, monitored and enforced by the National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA). The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) operates the physical market for electricity. [10]

5.18 The NEM incorporates state-owned and private sector utilities alike. Victoria privatised its electricity industry during the early 1990s for approximately $30 billion. Prior to the sale the State Electricity Commission of Victoria (SECV) was broken into ten separate retail, distribution and generation businesses and sold separately. These include the grid operator Powernet Victoria, the distributors CitiPower, Solaris, United Energy, Eastern Energy and Powercor, and the generators Loy Yang Power, Hazelwood Power, Yallourn Energy, Ecogen Energy and Hydro Victoria. In December 1999, South Australia began its privatisation program with the sale of the distribution and retail businesses of ETSA to the Hong Kong-based Hutchison Whampoa for $3.5 billion. [11]

5.19 NSW has not yet privatised its electricity industry but has undertaken extensive corporatisation and industry restructuring along the lines of other states and territories. During the 1990s, the NSW Electricity Commission was restructured into separate transmission, generation and retail businesses. Transgrid operates the wholesale market, transmission and system control; generation is split between Pacific Power, Delta Electricity and Macquarie Generation, and distribution between MetNorth Energy, Integral, Northpower, Advance, Australian Inland and Great Southern Energy. [12]

5.20 In sum, there are now some 12 major generation companies producing electricity for the wholesale market, plus a few smaller independent generators and other producers associated with large minerals projects. Within Victoria and NSW alone there are 43 retailers. [13] This situation, along with the bidding rules for the NEM, has produced intense price competition which has forced very large falls in prices - to below marginal cost in some circumstances. The existence of fixed price (or `vesting') contracts between some generators and customers/retailers continues to limit the free operation of the NEM and has also kept prices low. These price levels have increased the proportion of electricity produced by the most greenhouse intensive generators (those using brown coal or lignite) and is acting as a barrier to entry for more sustainable energy technologies.

Gas

5.21 The reform of natural gas markets will also bear on the extent to which gas can achieve greater prominence as a fuel for electricity generation. To date this has been very limited, due to both the perverse impact of electricity reform and the higher prices of gas in current markets. While gas reforms are expected to lead to increased competition and lower prices, in the absence of mechanisms which price emissions, its use in electricity generation is likely to remain limited.

5.22 Gas market reform aims to introduce greater competition into a structure in which `natural monopolies' over pipelines and distribution have historically been in place, and production has been limited to single joint-ventures extracting gas from a single basin controlled by state government. COAG resolved in 1994 to promote retail competition and to develop an integrated national gas market by allowing third party access to pipelines, with the hope that this would stimulate further investment in exploration and development. These principles have been placed into a national access regime, set in state law, although efforts to promote greater competition at the production end are ongoing. Central to this is the development of an interconnected pipeline network. Since 1994 there has also been a substantial disaggregation of gas businesses, and some privatisations, creating competing transmission, distribution and retailing businesses. [14]

The Emissions Impacts of Electricity Reform

Price competition in the NEM

5.23 Pacific Power explained how the electricity market reforms were producing negative greenhouse outcomes:

5.24 The Electricity Supply Association of Australia (ESAA) confirmed this diagnosis:

5.25 The Australia Institute's Dr Clive Hamilton suggested that the NEM has created intense competitive pressures which were driving prices down:

Barriers to gas and renewable sources

5.26 A significant impact of the NEM has been increased barriers to entry for the less emissions-intensive gas-fired generation and renewables. Dr Hamilton explained that:

5.27 Pacific Power explained that even though the long-run costs of coal-fired and gas-fired generation were similar, market pressures were working against gas:

5.28 Pacific Power has had first-hand experience of this market discrimination against gas, having had to defer a major gas investment that was to have been their major initiative in the Greenhouse Challenge Program:

5.29 The market ascendancy of coal may also be placing large gas augmentation and supply projects, such as the planned PNG pipeline, in some doubt. Chevron Services Australia, which is developing the PNG gas project, has opposed the licence applications for new coal-fired power stations at Millmerran and Kogan Creek in Queensland, and stated in its submission that:

5.30 AGL, which will build, own and operate the pipeline from PNG, was also concerned about the potential impact of new coal power developments in Queensland on that project:

5.31 The impact of energy market reforms on the greenhouse emissions from the sector has also been the subject of two reports commissioned by the Commonwealth Government: an Allen Consulting study commissioned by the Department of Industry Science and Resources, delivered in March 1999; and a McLennan Maganasik (MMA) study commissioned by the AGO, delivered in June 2000. MMA also carried out modelling for the first Allens Report.

5.32 The Allen study echoed the analysis above, and added that:

5.33 Other witnesses also pointed out the historical legacy of tax biases towards fossil fuels. The renewable energy expert Carrie Sonneborn told the Committee:

Oversupply of coal-fired generation

5.34 The 2000 MMA Report listed the current oversupply, which was unlikely to be absorbed before 2005:

5.35 This assessment was echoed by the Industry Commission. The construction of much of this excess capacity occurred during the 1980s in the eastern states in anticipation of a surge in demand which did not materialise. Allens estimated that there is 31.6 percent of plant in reserve in NSW. [26] As a result, not only is gas finding it difficult to compete on price terms with coal, but the excess capacity means that new gas-fired capacity would be unable to compete with the recommissioning of mothballed plant. Allens suggested that such plant could also be recommissioned by incumbents to repel new entrants. [27]

5.36 The Industry Commission thought that electricity prices would fall to around $25 MWh after the introduction of competition. However, a range of factors combined to push prices much lower - to under $15 MWh in 1997, and between $20-25 MWh currently. These, say Allens, were `well below the entry price of gas or coal-fired thermal generation'. Despite much higher prices being achieved during summer periods of very high demand (`needle peaks'), Allens argues that oversupply has reduced the impact this would have on base-load prices:

5.37 The commissioning of the new coal-fired power stations in Queensland will also delay the absorption of this oversupply - hence the concerns of the gas industry about the viability of the PNG gas project and pipeline. Over the next ten years approximately 2,280 MW of new coal-fired generation will enter the NEM from Queensland, through investments at Callide C (840MW), Millmerran (840MW), Redbank (150MW) and Tarong North (450MW). [29]

Fixed price contracts - The Aluminium Case

5.38 `Vesting contracts' have also been a factor in the low prices and are acting as a barrier to new entrants. They were implemented by all states with the aim of giving existing generators and retailers some certainty on the price of a portion of energy. Vesting contracts are expected to be wound back as electricity markets become fully contestable, by about 2001, but the AGO fears they could be replaced with bilateral contracts which fix the price of large tranches of supply outside the NEM price pool. Allens also argued that vesting contracts were a significant factor in the dramatic price falls when competition was introduced:

5.39 Fixed price contracts that are set very low can also enhance price pressures and may work as a disincentive to industries to reduce emissions. Some of these contracts have been made with large individual electricity consumers as investment incentives. Such contracts are held by a range of industrial users, with one particular large energy-using sector being aluminium. The Australia Institute told the Committee that:

5.40 Aluminium smelting accounts for 14 per cent of all electricity consumed in Australia and for 16 per cent of the greenhouse emissions from electricity. The Australia Institute argued that the subsidisation of electricity prices for smelters `provides a perverse incentive to consume electricity' and that `Australia's greenhouse gas emissions are substantially higher than they would be if smelters had to pay the market price'. [32]

5.41 The Australian Aluminium Council denied that its industry was substantially subsidised:

5.42 While it declined to provide the Committee with the prices paid by smelters, the Council rejected the claims of the Australia Institute:

5.43 The Council did intimate that smelters had been able to secure highly competitive prices in relation to other users:

5.44 The Aluminium Council said that its metals sector had reduced emissions by 2.4 Mt CO2-e between 1990 and 1998 and that the Oceania region had the most efficient energy usage per tonne of product. However, it also said that, apart from using electricity efficiently, it had little influence over emissions from electricity generation and strongly opposed mandatory measures to cut emissions, even though it was unlikely that the energy sector could otherwise achieve the reductions needed to meet Australia's obligations under the Kyoto Protocol:

5.45 In view of their large volume of exports, the Committee sympathises with the Council's concerns about remaining competitive with suppliers from non-Annex I countries. The Committee also notes that the industry is also a large employer and contributes to export earnings. However, reducing the greenhouse intensity of supply - a goal the Council supports - requires moving the bulk of electricity generation to lower emissions fuel sources. Actions taken at the industry level will have little impact if outweighed by increasing emissions intensity of generation in the NEM, as has occurred in recent years.

5.46 It is unacceptable for an industry which is such a disproportionately large energy user, with approximately 6 per cent of total national emissions, to be quarantined from an abatement effort that should be spread equitably across the community. In the Committee's view this emphasises the need to develop a least cost approach to abatement that spreads costs efficiently and equitably, while rewarding investment in emissions reduction.

Recommendation 25

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth and the states and territories seek greater transparency from large electricity consumers about the prices they pay for electricity if those prices are fixed outside the pool.

Recommendation 26

The Committee recommends that state and Commonwealth governments seek to publicly disclose details of any arrangements under which public monies are effectively subsidising large industrial users through the provision of low electricity prices.

Privatisation

5.47 It was also put to the Committee that privatisation has been a factor discriminating against investment in cleaner technologies. Dr Clive Hamilton clearly believed privatisation was a factor in the increasing greenhouse intensity of the NEM:

5.48 The Allens' Report cited the example of the brown coal-fired Hazelwood power station in Victoria, which `was a plant that was nearing the end of its operational life in public ownership but which private owners have given a new lease of life and expanded capacity'. Allens argues that this has increased the current oversupply in the NEM, and adds to a context in which operators are being forced to `squeeze the best out of their plant'. [38]

5.49 The Director of the NGO, Environment Victoria, Ms Esther Abram, told the Committee that the privatisation of the State Electricity Commission of Victoria was accompanied by the imposition of a price cap:

5.50 The emissions implications of privatisation are of particular importance when the prices paid for assets are very high. In Victoria for instance, the electricity industry was sold at historically high prices, some $30 billon in total. Commentators have remarked that the $3.5 billion paid by Hutchison Whampoa in the recent sale of South Australia's ETSA Utilities (distribution) and ETSA Power (retail), which together form a large section of the State's power business, were much lower than the prices paid in Victoria for similar assets. [40]

5.51 With the bulk of Victorian capacity in brown coal generation and buyers seeking to recover costs in a hyper-competitive market, it is easy to see how privatisation there has worsened the greenhouse emissions outcomes from market reform. It may also be arguable that privatisation misdirects investment from new (potentially cleaner and more efficient) generation capital into old.

Recommendation 27

The Committee recommends that the states ensure that any future privatisation plans are the subject of full and open public debate and take account of the potential greenhouse implications of the sales. Prices should reflect a future market which is likely to be constrained by mandatory pressures to reduce emissions.

Recommendation 28

The Committee recommends that a national strategy be developed to reduce the emission intensity of, and constrain the growth in overall emissions levels, from the electricity generation sector. Such a strategy should include national emission intensity standards for electricity generators.

Recommendation 29

The Committee recommends that the states and territories agree to set mandatory targets to progressively increase the total proportion of electricity generated from efficient power plants and low greenhouse intensity fuels.

The Assumptions Behind Reform

5.52 A number of witnesses commented that the electricity market reform process was based on a narrow economic objective of reducing electricity prices, and had thus failed to take account of the potential environmental costs of reform. The National Competition Council (NCC), which is the national advisory body on competition policy reform, told the Committee that:

5.53 The Council told the Committee that there was no reference in its energy reform charter to greenhouse and that their `roles are tightly constrained and we are also constrained from conducting any work that is not on our work program as agreed by all governments. So yes, we would be constrained from conducting that work [relating to greenhouse]; it would go beyond our current mandate'. [42]

5.54 The NCC has an ongoing role in energy market reform, as part of the broader National Competition Policy (NCP) reform process, through its assessment of `satisfactory progress against NCP obligations', which must be achieved to release the payment of Commonwealth funds for the implementation of NCP reforms. The NCC states that `where governments don't invest in reforms in the public interest, reductions in NCP payments may be recommended… The Council only recommends reductions in NCP payments as a last resort where no path to dealing with outstanding issues can be agreed'. [43]

5.55 The constraint on the Council's work in energy reform contrasted with its work on water reform. Its Executive Director, Mr Ed Willett, said that environmental considerations such as dryland salinity were a part of its mandate in that area:

5.56 The Committee notes the inclusion of crucial environmental considerations in water management and policy reform, and supports the inclusion of similar environmental costs and considerations into the process of energy market reform and the structure and operations of the national energy markets.

Recommendation 30

The Committee recommends that the Council of Australian Governments designate the reduction of harm to the environment as a goal of ongoing energy market reform, with a specific requirement for the reduction of the greenhouse intensity of power generation.

Recommendation 31

The Committee recommends that the National Competition Council incorporate benchmarks for the reduction of the greenhouse intensity of power generation into its assessment of governments' progress on national competition policy reforms.

Gas - A Transitional Fuel?

5.57 The Australian Gas Association, which commissioned a study on the comparative emissions intensity of gas and coal, told the Committee that:

5.58 The large gas producer, Woodside Energy, asserted that liquefied natural gas (LNG) also has emission benefits if it displaced coal:

5.59 AGL claimed that if the PNG gas project and pipeline were to proceed it would save 88 Mt CO2 within ten years:

5.60 Woodside Energy asserted that `a key plank of Australia's greenhouse policy must include measures to advantage penetration of natural gas into key international and domestic markets'. [48] They were echoed by the Australia Institute's Dr Clive Hamilton, who argued for long term thinking towards achieving a transformation in Australia's energy economy:

5.61 Dr Hamilton argued that gas would have an important role to play in such a transition:

5.62 Pacific Power, which has investments in coal and renewables, acknowledged the potential contribution of gas but were more sceptical of its value:

5.63 Pacific Power argued that it is of long term importance to create a market and regulatory climate conducive to the growth of renewables, and that unless gas is able to displace coal generation, it merely reduces the growth in emissions rather than achieving outright reductions. However, with current rates of emissions growth, the Committee supports the use of gas alongside policies to promote the uptake and development of renewables.

Cogeneration and Transmission Pricing

5.64 The Committee also heard that current energy market conditions and rules unfairly disadvantaged lower emissions forms of generation such as cogeneration and embedded generation.

5.65 Cogeneration is achieved through the harnessing of the energy produced by other industrial processes such as sugar milling, chemicals, refining, and pulp and paper, and in 1996-97 made up 4.5 per cent of Australia's electricity generation. Embedded generation is defined in the National Electricity Code (NEC) as that which is connected to an electricity distribution network rather than a transmission network. They are generally located close to their site of consumption and are often linked with industrial processes. They range in size from very small to 250 MW, and can reduce greenhouse emissions through reduced network transmission losses and because embedded generators are often less emissions-intensive than other fossil fuel sources such as coal. The extent of emissions savings depends on the particular plant type, energy source, and location in relation to the site of power consumption. [52]

5.66 According to the Australian EcoGeneration Association (AEA), cogeneration can produce electricity at a much lower greenhouse intensity than conventional fossil fuel generation:

5.67 Where cogeneration uses renewable sources such as biomass, the output is treated as entirely renewable. Origin Energy, which operates Australia's largest cogeneration facility at Osborne in South Australia, and a total of 375 MW nationwide, claimed that:

5.68 The AEA told the Committee that, in 1998, there were some 130 cogeneration projects in Australia, with a capacity of about 2,100 MWh and a production of 9,500 GWh a year. By 2000, capacity had risen to 2203 MW and accounted for 5.6 per cent of total generation. This compares poorly with international trends, exceeding only Ireland, Greece, Japan, France and the UK, while trailing the US (7 per cent), Germany (10 per cent), the Netherlands (40 per cent) and Denmark (50 per cent). [55]

5.69 They also said that while there was substantial scope for cogeneration to be expanded, current market conditions had effectively stalled progress:

5.70 The AEA said no major cogeneration projects had been committed in the eastern states over the past three years. However, they said that if pool prices moved over $35 MWh, `you would see quite a lot of movement in our sector. The difficulty is that coal is coming in at $30'. [57]

5.71 As a long term solution to these price imbalances the AEA recommended the early trial of a domestic system of emissions trading. They recommended that it be a `cap and trade' system with the majority of permits auctioned. Revenues could then be returned to the economy in the form of reduced business taxes on employment and investment. [58]

5.72 Another barrier to cogeneration, said the AEA, was the transmission pricing arrangements in the NEC which unfairly advantage large scale generation that is far from its site of consumption. They said that `we feel this is probably the single most important barrier or issue that faces cogeneration': [59]

5.73 Their concerns have been echoed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC):

5.74 The AEA complained that these distortions were also a factor in the viability of large new coal-fired power stations in Queensland at the expense of less emissions-intensive forms of generation:

5.75 The Commonwealth Government's submission to the National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) review of transmission pricing arrangements supported this analysis:

5.76 These distortions were also discussed in the report by Allen Consulting on the greenhouse implications of energy market reform. They argued that, while these issues raise enormous technical complexities (for instance truly cost-reflective pricing may require information currently beyond technical capacities), it was accepted that the ways in which the NEC deals with transmission pricing and embedded generation are problematic. The ACCC has found that current transmission pricing practices are inefficient, and the NECA has undertaken to involve the ACCC in an ongoing review of transmission pricing arrangements. [64]

5.77 The AEA was very critical of NECA's efforts to date:

5.78 The removal of these distortions in transmission pricing is Commonwealth Government policy. The NGS sets a timetable `to identify and address any structural, legislative barriers to cogeneration' by June 2000, and to establish `efficient and equitable locational signals, unbundling of transmission charges, pass through of net benefit/cost embedded projects which deliver network cost reductions/increases' by June 2001. [66]

5.79 The AGO's Philip Harrington stated that:

5.80 NECA's recommendations to the ACCC fell short of the Commonwealth's preferred changes. The Department of Industry, Science and Resources (DISR) argued to NECA in 1999 that:

Recommendation 32

The Committee recommends that the Government, the National Electricity Code Administrator and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission work closely with the cogeneration industry to ensure that transmission pricing regimes truly reflect the costs and distance of transmission and contain no biases against embedded generation and cogeneration.

(Chapter 5 - Part b)

(Chapter 5 - Part c)

 

Footnotes

[1] Laurie Virr and Paul Hanley, Submission 199, p 1014.

[2] `The national inventory accounts for emissions at the point of production, not consumption', Australian Greenhouse Office, NGGI, Fact Sheet 2, July 2000, p 4.

[3] Australian Greenhouse Office, NGGI, Fact Sheet 3, July 2000, p 1.

[4] Australian Greenhouse Office, National Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1998, p A-3.

[5] Australian Greenhouse Office, NGGI, Fact Sheet 2, July 2000, p 4.

[6] Australian Greenhouse Office, The National Greenhouse Strategy: Strategic Framework for Advancing Australia's Greenhouse Response, 1998, pp 98-99.

[7] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 800; and Dr Robert Lang, Proof Committee Hansard, 22 March 2000, p 351.

[8] Combined Explanatory Memorandum, Renewable Energy (Electricity) Bill 2000/Renewable Energy (Electricity) (Charge) Bill 2000, p 20; Mr Philip Harrington, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 22 June 2000, p 696.

[9] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, pp 8-9; and Ann Rann, Electricity Energy Restructuring: A Chronology, Australian Parliamentary Library Background Paper 21, 1997-98.

[10] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 10.

[11] Ann Rann, Electricity Energy Restructuring: A Chronology, Australian Parliamentary Library Background Paper 21, 1997-8, pp 23-26; and Mark Skulley, `SA sells power for $3.5 billion', The Australian Financial Review, 13 December 1999.

[12] Ann Rann, Electricity Energy Restructuring: A Chronology, Australian Parliamentary Library Background Paper 21, 1997-8, pp 9-11.

[13] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 11.

[14] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, pp 12-13.

[15] Dr Robert Lang, Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney, 22 March 2000, p 351.

[16] Dr Harry Schaap, Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney, 22 March 2000, p 335.

[17] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 60.

[18] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 60.

[19] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 800.

[20] Pacific Power, Submission 98, p 804.

[21] Chevron Services Australia, Submission 123, p 1188.

[22] Mrs Leith Wood, Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney, 23 March 2000, p 400.

[23] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, pp 24-49.

[24] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 April 2000, p 538.

[25] McLennan Maganasik Associates, Greenhouse Gas Emission Projections: Australian Electricity Generation and Natural Gas Combustion, Report to Australian Greenhouse Office, 5 June 2000, p 16.

[26] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, pp 27-28.

[27] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 29.

[28] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 30.

[29] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2069.

[30] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 30.

[31] The Australia Institute, Submission 79b, p 595.

[32] The Australia Institute, Submission 79b, pp 605-06, 610.

[33] Mr David Coutts, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 45.

[34] Mr David Coutts, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 48.

[35] Mr David Coutts, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 48.

[36] Mr David Coutts, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 46.

[37] Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p 60.

[38] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 32.

[39] Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 20 March 2000, p 161.

[40] Mark Skulley, `SA sells power for $3.5 billion', The Australian Financial Review, 13 December 1999.

[41] Mr Ed Willett, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2000, p 834.

[42] Mr Ed Willett, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2000, p 833.

[43] National Competition Council, Submission 221, p 2851.

[44] Mr Ed Willett, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 23 June 2000, p 833.

[45] Mr William Nagle, Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney, 23 March 2000, p 390.

[46] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 April 2000, p 485.

[47] Mrs Leith Wood, Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney, 23 March 2000, p 390.

[48] Proof Committee Hansard, Perth, 17 April 2000, p 485.

[49] Dr Clive Hamilton, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, pp 62-64.

[50] Dr Clive Hamilton, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2000, p pp 62-64.

[51] Dr Robert Lang, Proof Committee Hansard, Sydney, 22 March 2000, pp 350-51.

[52] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 43.

[53] Mr Ric Brazzale, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 21 March 2000, p 219.

[54] Mr Andrew Stock, Proof Committee Hansard, Brisbane, 26 May 2000, p 617.

[55] Mr Ric Brazzale, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 21 March 2000, p 217; and Who's who in Australian Cogeneration 2000, Melbourne: Australian EcoGeneration Association, 2000, pp 14, 19.

[56] Mr Ric Brazzale, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 21 March 2000, p 217.

[57] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2069; and Mr Ric Brazzale, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 21 March 2000, p 217.

[58] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2061.

[59] Mr Ric Brazzale, Proof Committee Hansard, Melbourne, 21 March 2000, p 222.

[60] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2070.

[61] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2070.

[62] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2070.

[63] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2070.

[64] Allen Consulting and McLennan Magasanik Associates, Energy Market Reform and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions: A Report to the Department of Industry, Science and Resources, March 1999, p 39.

[65] Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission 196, p 2072.

[66] Australian Greenhouse Office, The National Greenhouse Strategy: Strategic Framework for Advancing Australia's Greenhouse Response, 1998, pp 42-43.

[67] Mr Philip Harrington, Proof Committee Hansard, Canberra, 22 June 2000, p 690.

[68] Cited in Australian EcoGeneration Association, Submission to the ACCC on NECA Network Pricing Code Changes, October 1999, p 5.