Chapter 2 - The selection criteria - who should be on the board?
We need to ensure that the Board serves as a barrier against
the inevitable attempts of the occupants of the corridors of political,
bureaucratic and commercial power to muzzle and use and weaken the ABC.[1]
Introduction
2.1
The terms of reference implicitly seek a Board
that is independent and representative. This implies to some extent that the
current board is neither of these things. Certainly, based on the submissions
received by the Committee, there is a strong public perception that the Board
has been politicised, and to a lesser extent, that its membership is not
suitably representative. The Chair considers that this perception in itself,
leads to the inevitable conclusion that the Board is not representative, and
therefore this undermines public confidence in the Board and its efforts to
uphold its legal obligations. It further raises questions for the way the
Executive appoints members to other Boards and the role the Parliament should
have in overseeing these appointments.
2.2
This chapter examines these issues: the extent
to which the ABC Board is or is not politicised, and what sort of
qualifications Board appointees should or should not have. In doing so, it
answers the question of who should be appointed to the Board and what qualities
they must have to be independent and representative.
An independent ABC Board?
2.3
The overwhelming view of submissions received by
the inquiry was that the ABC has become politicised, has lost its independence,
and accordingly, has lost the confidence of the public. Several submissions
give a flavour of this. Mr Neville and Ms Duxbury wrote that:
The ABC ... is under attack in many ways, not the least being
political interference in its budgets and running.
... the present system of appointments to the ABC Board is clearly
unsatisfactory, in that it allows any government, so intentioned, to stack the
board with its allies.[2]
2.4
The Friends of the ABC group in the Hunter
region wrote:
‘political appointments’ to the Board have been a feature of
successive governments from both sides of Australian politics and that this has
worked to the detriment of the ABC.[3]
2.5
According to Mr Fraser:
Both sides of politics have used the appointment of ABC Board
members as a means to intimidate and influence the direction of the ABC. This
has directly and indirectly politicised our national broadcaster.[4]
2.6
And as Professor Morgan elaborated:
Both sides of politics have been notorious in their abuse of
appointments to the boards of public institutions, such as the ABC and the
universities. They have used these appointments to bestow political patronage
and reward political loyalists, the provisions of section 12 (5) of the ABC Act
notwithstanding. This is not to deny the exemplary public service given by
most of those appointees. Rather, it is to observe that many of them have had
to overcome unfortunate perceptions to do so.
David Hill was known widely in the community as ‘Wran’s
revenge’, following his appointment as ABC Chairman by the Hawke Labor
Government and his subsequent extraordinary translation to the position of
Managing Director. Donald McDonald, whose credentials are otherwise impeccable
under s12(5), has been unnecessarily compromised by his personal friendship
(and declared political support) for the present Prime Minister.[5]
2.7
Many submissions criticised the political and
conservative background of current members of the Board,[6] and in particular, the friendship between
the Prime Minister, Mr Howard, and Mr McDonald, the current chair of the ABC
Board.[7]
In particular, various submissions criticised Mr McDonald for comments viewed
as a public endorsement of the Prime Minister.[8]
2.8
Submissions were also critical of the role of
the Managing Director, Mr Jonathan Shier.[9]
Many submissions expressed considerable concern that the Managing Director may
have been appointed on the basis of political affiliation rather than merit.
This was particularly highlighted when the Managing Director delayed the
broadcast recently of the investigative current affairs program Four Corners,
entitled “Party Ticks”, an expose, in part, of the federal Liberal Party. Even
if the delay was for sound editorial reasons, the submissions did not reflect
this.
2.9
Many submissions criticised the failure of the
ABC Board to secure adequate funding for the ABC as well as additional funding
for the introduction of digital broadcasting.[10]
There was also criticism of the failure to protest at funding cuts; staff
losses;[11]
repeats of programs; increased advertising of ABC programs;[12] and the closure of the ABC
archives department.[13]
These general criticisms were perceived by many as evidence of a Board,
comprising government sympathisers, who do not have the best interests of the
ABC at heart.
2.10
Many of the management decisions of the Managing
Director have been interpreted as being direct attacks by a political appointee
with a brief to destroy the ABC. According to one submission:
A very effective way of destroying ‘ABC culture’ ie its
intellectual capital, is to appoint somebody, obviously crass and incompetent
and stand by and ‘watch him destroy the credibility of the ABC through
managerial chaos and plummeting morale’.[14]
2.11
Similar comments were made by the Community and
Public Sector Union (CPSU):
Widespread doubts have also arisen about whether members of the
Board have acted in the best interests of the national broadcaster or have
simply served their political interests.[15]
2.12
As evidence of this, submissions point to the
sale of the Cox Peninsula transmitter;[16]
decline in the hours of Australian content;[17]
removal of programs such as Quantum and Backchat;[18] termination of library and
research staff and disbanding of the science unit;[19] cuts to current affairs and
news budgets.[20]
2.13
It is a matter of public record that four of the
current nine members of the Board have had at least some degree of political
involvement with the Liberal Party. Mr Jonathan Shier, the Managing Director,
is a former president of the Victorian Young Liberals and a former adviser to a
federal Liberal minister. Mr Michael Kroger is a former president of the
Victorian Liberal Party. Mr Ross McLean was the federal Liberal member for
Perth between 1975-1983, and Mrs Leith Boully was a member of the Northern
Territory Young Country Liberal Party about 20 years ago.[21]
Lack of
responsiveness to public concerns
2.14
Another aspect of the politicisation issue is
the criticism that the ABC Board is not responsive to the public concerns
raised in relation to many of the above issues. According to this view, the
ABC is a public institution of which the Australian public are the shareholders
who are entitled, if not to a say in the running of the Corporation, then at
least to have the Corporation operate in an open and transparent manner, and
have Board members operate in this way too. To the extent that these public
concerns are ignored, the Board is seen to be loyal to the government, or at
least sympathetic to government policy interests, in spite of their
responsibility to upholding the public interest. Mr Burnside comments:
the Board of the ABC has been conspicuously silent in the
growing public debate about what is widely seen as the destruction of the ABC.
How can that [ the Board’s silence] be so? Board members of a
company in private enterprise, faced with sustained shareholder
dissatisfaction, would swiftly react to address shareholder concerns. The true
stakeholders of the ABC are the Australian public.[22]
Historical
views
2.15
The general view of submissions to the Committee
suggests that the habit of appointing political sympathisers to the Board is as
old as the ABC itself. Mr Dempster, a former staff-elected Director of the ABC
Board, comments:
The need for this inquiry does not follow just on recent
negative perceptions arising from the activities of current ABC directors. It
arises because of a pattern of behaviour by executive government over almost
the entirely of the ABC’s existence since 1932. In short, that behaviour can
be characterised as the application of the party political ‘stack’ of the Board
from time to time.[23]
2.16
And later:
The history shows that it is almost impossible for incumbent
governments to put the ABC’s clear need for non‑controversial
appointments of directors with a demonstrated commitment to independent public
broadcasting ahead of their party political interest to send ‘signals of
influence’ by the appointment of directors with links, connections or
associations with their own party. Both the Liberal and Labor parties do not
seem to be able to restrain themselves from applying political patronage to the
task of selecting ABC directors. To those of us working at the ABC under this
pathetic two‑party indulgence it has become wearisome, to say the least.[24]
2.17
Professor Ken Inglis, author of a history of the
Australian Broadcasting Commission, gave this perspective:
At the end of Labor’s 13 years in office Alan Ramsey of The
Sydney Morning Herald made what seems to me a judicious review of its
appointees’ politics. Of 26 Board members, including chairmen, ‘12 came from
overt political backgrounds, among them a former Labor premier, a former
Liberal senator, a former Liberal Cabinet minister, four trade union activists,
four advisers to various State Labor administrations, and Labor’s former
opinion pollster, Rod Cameron.’ In short, ‘less than half Labor’s ABC
appointments over the years have had obvious party political connections, while
two of them came from among the ranks of its political opponents’. (12 June
1996).
Most of the directors appointed since the Howard government took
office have been formally or informally identifiable as supporters of the
coalition.[25]
2.18
Equally, the Chair notes the finding of the Our
ABC report that in 1995, six of the nine board members had an ALP
background.[26]
This accords with evidence from the Friends of the ABC and others that all
governments, no matter what persuasion, have attempted to influence the
operation of the ABC through appointments to the ABC Board.
2.19
Overall though, Professor Inglis concludes that
‘political’ appointments are generally becoming more common:
[I]n the narrow sense of party political appointments of people
known to be close to or sympathetic to the government of the day, I think
there is more of that now than there has been at any time between 1983 and
1995.[27]
Disapproval
by all major parties
2.20
Submissions to the Committee have stressed that
the politicians themselves have been very critical of the system of
appointments. According to the Friends of the ABC:
It appears that just about everyone disagrees with the current
system, except for the party in power at the time.[28]
2.21
In their submission, the Friends of the ABC
quote senior members of both the major parties condemning political
appointments. Senator Alston, current Minister for Communications, told the
Senate in 1994:
(It will be) a great disappointment to all those who are looking
to the Government to ... make appointments to the Board on the basis of merit
and to boost the community standing and reputation of the ABC. This blatant
board stacking exercise endangers the independence and integrity of the ABC and
has the potential to do grave danger to Australia’s international reputation.[29]
2.22
Similarly in 1996:
‘In recent years appointments to the Board of the ABC have
become little more than Labor’s vehicle for patronage and political game
playing’, Senator Alston said. ‘I can give you a solemn promise that there
will be no more stacking of the ABC Board under a coalition government’.[30]
2.23
These comments are mirrored by those of Senator
Alston’s Labor counterpart, Mr Stephen Smith:
Such has been the sustained financial and political attack on
the ABC by the government that, regrettably, a perception is now afoot in the
community that the Managing Director of the ABC, Mr Shier, and, to a lesser
extent, the board, are now nothing but the advertent or inadvertent agents of
the government. This is a fatal perception to be afoot, and this perception has
arisen as a direct result of the conduct and the actions of the government.[31]
2.24
The CPSU conclude that:
All major political parties have objected to the practice of the
government of the day stacking the ABC Board. ...
The consistent position taken by the two major political parties
is that the appointments made by the other side have been political but their
own appointments have been merit based.[32]
2.25
Senator Vicki Bourne, in her Second Reading
Speech to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Amendment Bill 1999 details
the Democrats’ concerns about the practice of using appointments to the ABC
Board as political patronage.
Arguments for independence
2.26
Six main arguments have been advanced in support
of an independent ABC and Board.
1. Special
role of the ABC
2.27
First, submissions have argued that the ABC
occupies a special place in Australian society as an impartial forum for
reporting and debate:
The ABC is Australia’s most important cultural institution.
Its national radio and television coverage and its freedom from commercial
pressures place it in a unique position compared to other broadcasters. There
is abundant evidence that in times of national or local crisis, Australians
turn to the ABC for authoritative, reliable and unsensationalised coverage.[33]
2.28
The Council of Australian Postgraduate
Associations explain that:
An independent, adequately funded and politically unbiased
national broadcaster is one of the most important means by which public debate
and discussion can take place in Australia without fear or favour.[34]
2.29
However, a public broadcaster that fulfils its
role is bound to periodically incur the displeasure of the political figures
who are subject to criticism, or who wish to control the public debate:
Such a powerful tool of mass communication is a temptation for
any government wishing to push its agenda, curtail the independence of the
national broadcaster or limit public debate.[35]
2.30
According to Professor Richards:
The citizens of Australia cannot expect political appointees to
behave in ways inimical to the government that appointed them, nor to
prioritise those qualities for which we have an ABC and which we need from it.
In this situation, inevitably political commentary will be suppressed, and
budgetary savings and popular ratings will be prioritised.[36]
2.31
This view is supported by the CPSU:
The ABC is required by its enabling legislation to carry out its
functions independently and with integrity. On occasions this requires it to
report critically on the activities of the government of the day. However, the
organisation is dependent on that government for its funding and the Board, a
body charged with protecting the independence of the broadcaster, is appointed
by the government of the day. It is easy to see why this model creates
tension. The organisation’s dependence on direct funding means that its
independence is potentially threatened by a government angered over the way the
national broadcaster reports on its activities. Its independence is also
potentially threatened by governments stacking the Board to tame the watchdog
charged with protecting the organisation’s independence.[37]
2.32
In this context, Professor Mark Armstrong, a
former Chair of the ABC Board, argues that:
In Australia, we carefully protect the independence of sporting
umpires and referees. But we have not learned how to extend the principle to
the real world public life. Any efficient democracy prevents governments (the
players, in sporting terms) from appointing the referees to institutions such
as the ABC Board, the Australian Broadcasting Authority, the Electoral
Commission, the Auditor-General and the Ombudsman. Those office-holders are
above politics. They have a duty to ensure that the rules of the game are
administered fairly, even when the politicians want to gain an advantage for
their own team.[38]
2. Limits
to the power of the government of the day
2.33
A second argument centres on the concept that
there are limits to the rights of a democratically elected government to see
its wishes enforced. Often, governments are elected only on the basis of a
bare majority of voters, and this does not of itself entitle it to rule
contrary to the public interest. Professor Morgan argues:
I noticed at the weekend an article in The Australian
speculating on the first few days of a possible Beazley government – just a
throwaway line – Mr Beazley having promised to govern for all
Australians. That has become something of a mantra, but the
50 per cent plus one victor in an election or in a political issue
very often then tyrannises the 50 per cent minus one who failed. The
notions that we hear from time to time at all levels of politics in this
country, ‘We won the election, we know best’, is not appropriate to the
operation of a public service broadcaster.[39]
2.34
There is consequently an expectation that the
ABC will operate in the public interest in accordance with the democratic
wishes of the wider public. This point is reinforced by the fact that the ABC
itself is a creation of the Australian Parliament, to which it is obliged to
report annually in relation to a range of matters,[40] and also to the Senate during
the Senate Estimates hearings.
3. Public
expectation of independence
2.35
It is also clear that the public has a strong
expectation that the ABC will be independent and will act in the public
interest as required of it under the ABC Act. This was evident in the findings
of the 1981 Dix report:
Our investigations confirm the view that Australians feel
strongly about the independence of the ABC. They want the organisation to be
independent, and to be seen to be independent from outside interference,
political and otherwise. ...
Many people see the system of selection of Commissioners by the
government of the day as leaving the ABC open to political pressure.[41]
2.36
The same expectation surfaced in the Mansfield
review of 1997:
It is clear that the Australian community as a whole expects the
ABC to be fair, unbiased and balanced it its reporting and presentation of
news, current affairs and information.[42]
2.37
It was also a sentiment reiterated in the
majority of the more than 700 submissions received by this inquiry. According
to one representative example of these submissions:
Fundamental to this confidence is the perceived independence of
the broadcaster from the government of the day. And fundamental to this
perceived independence is that the board of directors should comprise people,
who as well as possessing collectively the attributes set out in the ABC Act,
are recognised by the public as free from narrow political allegiances or
considerations, and able to put the best interests of the organisation and its
audiences first. In a phrase sometimes used to refer to those at the helm of
the BBC, they should ideally be drawn from ‘the great and the good’ of our
society, and should be firmly committed to the concept of public,
non-commercial broadcasting.[43]
4. Actual
or perceived politicisation makes the Board’s job harder
2.38
A further argument is that where there is a
perception that members of the Board are not politically impartial, it makes it
very difficult for them to carry out their responsibilities, even where they
are acting in good faith. As Professor Morgan explained:
At the moment you have the system where the chair is at least
perceived – if not in fact, then in perception – as the appointee of the prime
minister of the day. There is evidence that Mr McDonald has argued
various ABC cases to government, probably against the will or the preference of
the executive, but again he pushes it uphill because he is perceived to be the
Prime Minister’s appointee.[44]
2.39
A practical example of this problem is given by
Mr Dempster, who notes the case of the Managing Director’s decision to delay
the screening of the Four Corners program ‘Party Tricks’. Given the perception
of the Liberal party affiliation of both Mr McDonald and Mr Shier, it was
inevitable that however justifiable the decision may have been, it could only
be seen as an attempt to protect Liberal party friends from political attack.
As Mr Dempster notes:
Editorial management advised by internal and external lawyers
approved the program for broadcast. The MD [Managing Director], informed of
its sensitivity, bounced it from the television schedule while further external
legal advice was sought. The Chairman, already laden with political baggage ...
found it difficult to be believed in his public protestations that the MD’s
actions were motivated solely by his instinct to protect the ABC from costly
defamation action. Instead of sober internal discussion about how best to
protect the ABC there was intense distrust. Again the ABC
was unnecessarily controversialised.[45]
5. Perceptions
and damage to the public trust in the ABC
2.40
A closely related point is that if the ABC is to
be effective, it must have the trust of the public. To gain that trust, the
ABC must be seen to be independent and at arms length from the government of
the day, or any political party. A key point that emerges is the importance of
public perception in achieving this credibility. No matter how independent the
ABC may actually be, it may still be perceived as a creature of
the government with a leadership appointed by the government from among the
ranks of its friends and supporters. As the Council of Australian Postgraduate
Associations argue:
Like the dispensation of justice,
though, independence must not only be maintained, but must be seen to be
maintained, if credibility is to be preserved. Even the best appointment, made
under legitimate but opaque circumstances, becomes subject to public suspicion,
and must result in the erosion of public confidence in the operation of the
ABC.[46]
2.41
This point is also emphasised by the Friends of
the ABC,[47]
and the CPSU:
The first thing I would like to say is that the most valuable
asset of the ABC is its reputation. It is the thing that it trades on and
probably makes sure that it is held in such high regard in the community.
The starting point, I think, for our discussion is that the
reputation of the ABC can be tarnished in a number of ways. It can be
tarnished by bad news gathering, biased reporting, but it can equally be
tarnished when there is a perception, real or otherwise, that the people
charged with maintaining the independence of the organisation are basically there
because they are political hacks. To the extent that is either true or not
true does not really matter beyond a point; it is the perception of political
interference in appointments to the Board that does the ABC, the Board and its
audiences a disservice.[48]
6. Damages
ABC funding
2.42
Finally, the Friends of the ABC argue that that
politicisation of the Board is damaging because it threatens funding:
Board appointees who act in the interest of a government which
appointed them may be less assertive in seeking government funds. Governments
who take office with a board in place which the government perceives to be
comprised principally of supporters of another party are less likely to grant
the level of funds required ... .[49]
Conclusions and recommendation
2.43
Three conclusions can be drawn from this
evidence.
2.44
First, it is clear that since the inception of
the ABC, in its incarnations as both Commission and Corporation, the party in
government has made appointments to the Board that are generally sympathetic to
the views of the governing party. The extent to which party affiliation has
been a dominant selection criterion seems to have varied over time, as noted by
Professor Inglis, but it certainly seems to have been a consistent theme. This
is not to say though, that appointees to the Board have been either incompetent
or ineffective in serving the interests of the ABC or the public. As Professor
Inglis told the inquiry, there are examples of the Board developing its own
allegiances:
Commissioners and Board members with evident political
preferences have not always behaved as instruments of the party to which they
owed their appointment. They might well develop around the table an allegiance
to the ABC itself, a sense of trusteeship, stronger than any commitment to the
government responsible for putting them there. In 1967 a Commission full of
Menzies and Holt appointees resisted a minister who cut the budget, which he
was entitled to do, and ordered that half the cut was to be applied to the
always troublesome area of current affairs television, which he was not. The
chairman, Sir Robert Madgwick, flew with a team to Canberra to tell him so.
The government, not the Commission and management, buckled.[50]
2.45
And elsewhere:
I only have hearsay evidence about what goes on now. I mention
in the paper that more than one Board member has told me that, at Board
meetings, the differences between people who are nominally on the same side of
politics sometimes seem at least as substantial as those of a party political
character.[51]
2.46
Second, from the large number of submissions and
the complaints they contain, it is also abundantly clear that there is a strong
public perception that the Board is not independent.
2.47
Third, it is vital to the credibility of the ABC
as the national public broadcaster, that both the Board and the Corporation be
independent in fact and perception. The ABC functions as a key element in the
working of effective democracy in Australia, and in its role of independent
commentator, every effort must be made to strengthen its independence.
Although the government has a legitimate role in allocating budgets (subject to
Parliamentary approval) and determining media policy overall, Australians have
consistently resisted any government attempt to control or influence the ABC.[52] The ABC is a statutory
authority, and its independence, from the Minister and the government of the
day, is proscribed in the ABC Act. Regulation governing the ABC is to be found
in the ABC Act, (which includes the ABC Charter), rather than in other pieces
of legislation. The ABC is required to report against its requirements to meet
these regulations, in both its Annual Report and through Estimates and other
Senate Committees. Further, the ABC Act makes specific the role of the ABC
Board and management in determining the degree to which ABC programs and
services will take other regulatory requirements into consideration.
2.48
This does not necessarily mean that those who
have had an active political past should be excluded from appointment to the
ABC Board. A number of submissions supported this proposition.[53] However, the Chair agrees
with the view of Mr Thomson representing the CPSU:
I have a strongly held view that people who have a vision about
where Australian society should go are quite likely to be drawn into political
life and are probably the very kind of people who are needed on boards like the
ABC.[54]
2.49
The Friends of the ABC support this view
stating:
In a well-balanced ABC Board, there is certainly room for two or
three directors with close political affiliations. There is a problem only when
the affiliation is with only one political party, or when a large number of the
directors are affiliated.[55]
2.50
In the view of the Chair, the answer to the
problem of politicisation is not to remove those with ‘political baggage’.[56] Rather, the focus should be
on how appointments are made, so that appointees are seen to be chosen on the
basis of their skills rather than their political affiliations. This implies a
method of appointment that is characterised by the principles of merit and
transparency, which are the subject of chapter 3.
Recommendation 1
The Chair recommends that
the method of Board appointments be altered to embrace a system characterised
by the principles of merit and transparency, in order to deal with the
widespread public perception that appointments to the ABC Board are made on the
basis of political affiliation rather than on merit alone.
A representative ABC Board
2.51
The question ‘who should be appointed to the
Board’, implies that members of the Board are appropriately representative of
the broader Australian community.
2.52
It should be noted that ‘representativeness’ is
not currently a criterion for appointment under the ABC Act, which specifies
that a person shall not be appointed as a Director unless:
he or she appears to the Governor-General to be suitable for
appointment because of having had experience in connection with the provision
of broadcasting services or in communications or management, because of having
expertise in financial or technical matters, or because of having cultural or
other interests relevant to the oversight of a public organisation engaged in
the provision of broadcasting services.[57]
2.53
The criteria are therefore quite general.
Appointees must meet one of more of three broad criteria, emphasising:
experience in broadcasting and communications; managerial expertise; or
cultural background.
2.54
The concept of ‘representativeness’ is also
complex. Submissions argued for representation on the Board from a wide
range of groups, as discussed in more detail below.
2.55
A good starting point is to examine the
membership of the current Board, and the extent to which it might be considered
‘representative’.
Background and skills of the current Board
2.56
The current Board comprises:
- Mr Donald McDonald, Chairman of the Board, who lives in Sydney
and has worked in arts administration including involvement with Sydney Theatre
Company, Musica Viva, and the Australian Opera.
- Mr Jonathan Shier, Managing Director, comes from a background
principally in commercial broadcast and pay television, and lives in Sydney.
- Mr Ian Henschke, staff-elected Director, has worked in radio and
television as a reporter, producer and presenter and lives in Adelaide.
- Mr Michael Kroger has a principally commercial background in
management, banking and finance, as well as considerable political involvement
with the Liberal Party and is from Melbourne.
- Professor Judith Sloan has worked in academia and is a director
of a number of corporations and is from South Australia.
- Mr Ross McLean has experience in politics, and is involved with
the WA Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and several companies. Mr McLean is
from Western Australia.
- Mr John Gallagher QC has a practice in civil, criminal and
commercial law, particularly in planning, heritage and the environment.
- Mrs Leith Boully has a background in business management and
government and community advisory bodies especially in relation to
environmental management. She is from regional Queensland.
- Mr Maurice Newman has worked mainly in stockbroking and
investment banking and also lives in Sydney.
2.57
How then does this Board compare with the
expectations of representativeness expressed to the Committee?
Separate state and territory representation
2.58
A popular view was that membership of the Board
should be structured around members chosen to represent the states and
territories in addition to varying numbers of Commonwealth appointees. The
1995 ‘Our ABC’ Report recommended:
The Committee recommends that, given the paramount importance of
ensuring that the ABC remains a truly national broadcaster, the ABC Act should
be amended to provide that it is highly desirable that a majority of the states
are represented on the ABC Board at all times.[58]
2.59
This model does not require a member from each Australian
state or territory, and cannot given that the (currently) fixed number of Board
members precludes this. However, it has been convention that the government of
the day has chosen members from a majority of states or territories. The Chair
also notes that this model has also been adopted to some extent by the BBC,
which has National Governors representing Wales, Scotland, and Northern Island,
within an overall membership of 12 governors.[59]
2.60
This practice is reflected in the current Board,
which includes members from NSW, Queensland, Victoria, South Australian and
Western Australia, although none from the Northern Territory, the ACT, or
Tasmania.
Community representation
2.61
Another view is that the Board membership is
dominated by business and corporate interests and should have greater
representation of other categories:
Why is there a need for so many people associated with the
stockmarket, business, finance, banking, insurance, and several members with
commerce degrees? Surely only one person with these education and business
experiences is required. Where are the representatives of user groups (IT IS
OUR ABC), the education sector, science research, academia, rural
organisations, Aborigines and so on?
And what about women? Two out of eight is not good enough.[60]
2.62
The Council of Australian Postgraduate
Associations expressed a similar view:
[C]onsiderable efforts should be made to ensure that the typical
over-representation of rich, connected white blokes in suits is diminished
somewhat, and that other significant groups in the life of the nation are
afforded representation. Groups such as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples, recent immigrants, gay and lesbian people, youth, retirees, the
unemployed, people from rural Australia, and those from the outer suburbs are
hardly conspicuous in their participation in the management of public
institutions, yet their experiences of life are profoundly affected by them. ...
The majority ownership of a telecommunications company, the
possession of board seats on a handful of prominent companies, and the
inheritance of a significant family fortune are hardly guarantors of the sort
of public-mindedness that the stewardship of the national broadcaster requires.[61]
Staff representation
2.63
Another aspect of representativeness is that of
the staff-elected director. The current position was created by a 1985
amendment, but has a longer history, tracing its origins to a staff-elected
commissioner introduced by the Whitlam government without legislation in 1975,
but subsequently abolished by the Fraser government.[62]
2.64
The Committee heard evidence supporting the
important function of this position. According to Mr Cassidy, representing the
Friends of the ABC, staff-elected positions are important because they are the
only way in which people with actual broadcasting experience have got onto the
Board (with the sole exception of Robert Redmond, the founder of ‘Four
Corners’).[63]
They therefore offer a particular practical insight into issues that is of real
assistance to the Board:
the ABC Board generally meet once a month, maybe 11 times a
year, for one day at a time. They receive briefing papers from the management,
but they are pretty rushed and hurried meetings. It was the slogan of the very
first staff-elected member of the Board, Marius Webb, that, ‘The Board only
knows what it’s told. Make sure that the right person tells it’. One of the
problems that the ABC Board has in governance is that it relies very much on
being informed by the chief executive. ... One of the values, however, of the
staff elected member is that all of those staff-elected members have been
program makers and all of them have been distinguished program makers, and they
have brought something to the Board – I think an insight – which many of those
other Board members have not had. That is the value of it. It is not there to
privilege the ABC staff, it is there to aid the good management of the ABC.[64]
2.65
The importance of this role has led to calls by
some submissions to increase the number of staff-elected directors to two.[65]
2.66
Conversely, the Committee has heard evidence
from Mr Gordon-Smith that having a staff-elected director is inappropriate as
it creates a conflict of interest between the role of representing staff
members to the Board, and being part of the Board. Accordingly,
he recommends the abolition of the position:
one of those submissions talks about ... the burden of being able
to communicate back to the staff more generally and to play an almost
representative role in communicating the decisions of the Board and in
canvassing issues that might come up at board level with staff more broadly.
That imposes an almost insuperable conflict of interest on the person in that
role and makes it really difficult for them to participate in that group in a way
that really one wishes a director to do that; namely, as part of that team with
the interests of the corporation as a whole at the top of their mind.[66]
Recommendation 2
The Chair
strongly recommends the retention of the
staff-elected director.
Balancing representation with other attributes
2.67
It is also important to balance
‘representativeness’ with the need to ensure that appointees to the Board have
appropriate skills and attributes. The ABC is a large and complex organisation
that must navigate a path during a period of great change in the
telecommunications and broadcasting sector. To do this successfully, members
of the Board must have considerable technical and business skills.
2.68
At the same time, submissions emphasised the
importance of selecting members who have a strong commitment to the concept and
values of public broadcasting including independence and a public interest
ethos. As Forster argues:
Success in areas of life like banking law, commerce, economics
and an allegiance to a major political party do not equip people to be
guardians of the public broadcaster.
An understanding of and belief in public broadcasting must be
the overriding criteria for appointment to the ABC Board.[67]
2.69
This does not imply that an appointee must have
experience of public broadcasting. Rather:
they need to be able to demonstrate that they abide by the
principles of public broadcasting, that they are there to defend the national
broadcaster, and that that’s something they believe in.[68]
2.70
The CPSU also recommended the adoption of
general criteria addressing personal attributes, such as those developed in the
UK by the Nolan Committee on Standards in Public Life. Appointees are required
to demonstrate their commitment to the seven principles of public life:
selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and
leadership.[69]
2.71
The Chair is mindful that the Board must try to
find a balance between three not necessarily complementing skill sets:
community representativeness, business skills, and public broadcasting
expertise. As Professor Armstrong explained:
the Board wrestles with a dual role. It must do the hard
planning, financial and monitoring work of a typical board in the public or
private sector, as well as dealing with the creative, community and programming
issues of a unique cultural institution. Cabinets often select people who
would be well suited to the Council role, but are not ideal directors for the
board of a major public enterprise.[70]
2.72
There are inevitable dilemmas. As Ms Appleton
argues in relation to seeking a high level of community representation:
Any such approach can be no better than tokenistic and is likely
to result in an unwieldy group with wildly differing capabilities, as
historical experience with the ABC’s former Commission, when
‘representativeness’ was an objective, proved. [71]
2.73
Finding the balance has previously led to
criticism of the composition of the Board. Professor Inglis described the
attempt by the then Minister, Mr Duffy, to appoint a more representative Board
in accordance with the recommendations of the Dix Review:
The Age had welcomed the new Board as a group which ‘had
the chance to rejuvenate Aunty’. Three years later, the paper judged the first
Board differently. ‘The Government’s mistake’, it declared, ‘was to appoint
people who were representative of community interests, when they should have
been chosen primarily for their knowledge of broadcasting and for their
managerial experience’. The paper was not alone in thinking that the first
group of Directors had not displayed conspicuous expertise.[72]
2.74
The overall view of submissions received by this
inquiry is that the current mix of skills is inadequate,[73] which was also the view
reached by the Senate Select Committee in the ‘Our ABC’ Report.[74]
Role of the National Advisory Council
2.75
The Chair notes that several submissions
discussed the independence of the National Advisory Council in the same manner
as the Board.
2.76
The Council is created by the Act to ‘either on
its own initiative or at the request of the Board, to furnish advice to the
Board on matters relating to broadcasting programs and television programs of
the Corporation’.[75]
The 12 members meet three times a year, and are appointed by the Board[76] following a publicly
advertised nomination process. Members reflect a diversity of backgrounds, age
and expertise.[77]
2.77
Various submissions suggested that greater use
could be made of the Council:
The ABC Advisory Council can provide a more effective role on
behalf of the Australian community by having direct representation on the
Board. ... The Advisory Council already plays a consultative and communicative
role with the Australian public. The effectiveness of this role would be
enhanced by providing the Council to have its members relaying community
feedback to the Board.[78]
2.78
This is supported by Professor Armstrong, a
former Chairman of the ABC Board:
[T]he ABC Act envisages a much more powerful National Advisory
Council (NAC), to address program and community issues. But the ABC itself has
downgraded the Council over 15 years; and this has undermined a pillar of
accountability planned by the Dix Report in 1981.[79]
2.79
The Chair upholds the current role and function
of the National Advisory Council, as proscribed in the ABC Act. The National
Advisory Council provides advice to the Board on issues of community standards,
programming and content, but should not be used as a vehicle to correct the
flaws of the Board, or be used to respond to issues if the Board fails to do
so. Under the ABC Act, the statutory function of the NAC is clear, and Board
members should be aware of their obligations to consult with the NAC on a
regular and ongoing basis.
Conclusions
2.80
In considering the extent to which the ABC Board
is representative, the Chair concludes that the current Board membership is generally
geographically representative. However, it is less so in relation to other
criteria such as gender, ethnicity, age or community background, and rather
reflects a focus on skills relating to management and technical expertise. The
Chair notes the high level of community concern, as reflected in the
submissions, that the Board members have largely been chosen on the basis of
their perceived political affiliation rather than on the basis of merit and a
lack of a demonstrated commitment to public sector broadcasting.
2.81
In selecting board members, the Chair recommends
there must be a balance between various possible criteria such as community or
cultural background, managerial expertise and most importantly, knowledge of
and commitment to public broadcasting.
2.82
The Chair recommends that three principles
should influence the final judgement of Board membership.
- Firstly, the need to ensure members are drawn from a variety of
social, economic or cultural backgrounds, and have a demonstrated commitment to
public sector broadcasting.
- Secondly, members must be competent in the governance task of a
large and complex organisation, with particular reference to public sector, or
independent or other statutory authorities.
- Thirdly, the critical factor is the mix of skills and talent on
the Board as a whole, and how it forms a unified ‘team’ rather than a focus on
individual skills.[80]
2.83
On these principles, the current criteria set
out in section 12 of the Act are appropriate in that they provide for a wide
range of appointments. Again, according to these principles, the Chair does
not favour creating categories of membership or representation on the Board,
along state lines, or membership of particular groups. This point was made in
the Government Response to the Our ABC Report:
The Act sets out general abilities which nominees must possess
to be appointed by the Governor-General. ...
The Government considers that any attempt to further codify
specific skills or background could allow insufficient flexibility for appointments
to the Board that ensure the Board operates effectively in the rapidly changing
broadcasting, communications and corporate environment.[81]
2.84
The Chair agrees that amending the ABC Act to
prescribe particular requirements would unduly restrict the flexibility of the
system of appointments, and in relation to state representation, the current
informal system is delivering a satisfactory result.
2.85
Although noting the comments of Mr Gordon-Smith
in relation to the staff-elected Director, the Chair considers that this
position offers substantial advantages for the Board itself that outweigh the
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, the position of staff-elected
Director should remain, although the Chair does not accept the need for a
second such representative.
2.86
To the extent that the current Board reflects a
bias towards expertise in governance and more technical matters, the Chair
considers that this is appropriate given the nature of the task.
2.87
The Chair does however, consider that any
appointees should have a fundamental commitment to the principle of public
broadcasting. The Chair firmly believes that every effort should be made to
address the concept during the selection process.
2.88
The Chair also considers that improvements could
be made in the way ideas and information flows to and from the Board. The
Chair agrees that the National Advisory Council should be encouraged by the
Board to provide it with more regular advice than currently seems to be
practiced.
2.89
In order for this to occur, the Chair recommends
that the Board appoint one of its members to be a formal National Advisory
Council liaison officer. Further, the Board may invite the Chair of the
National Advisory Council to report directly to it at any of its Board meetings
as required or necessary. The National Advisory Council may also invite any
members of the Board to any of its consultative forums, or meetings, as
required or necessary.
2.90
The meetings or consultative forums of the
National Advisory Council should coincide with that of the Board to ensure that
its discussions and findings were relevant to current Board deliberations. The
Chair recommends that the Council should meet four times each year, prior to
each Board meeting.
Recommendation 3
The Chair recommends that
appointees to the ABC Board should have a demonstrated commitment to the
principles of public broadcasting.
Recommendation 4
The Chair recommends, in
relation to the ABC National Advisory Council:
- that the Board appoint a member to perform a National Advisory
Council liaison function.
- that the ABC Advisory Council shall meet four times per year, at
times which reflect the schedule of the ABC Board.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page