Chapter 2
Key issues
2.1
The majority of submissions supported the Bill's objective to protect
vulnerable workers and uphold the integrity of the skilled migration scheme.
However, some submitters expressed concerns about the following measures:
-
the application of penalties to sponsors (and other third
parties) and visa holders:
-
definitions; and
-
appropriateness of powers.
2.2
In his second reading speech, the Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection, the Hon Peter Dutton MP (Minister), noted that:
'Payment for visas' conduct is not currently unlawful. This
conduct is unacceptable to the government and the Australian people because it
undermines the genuine purposes for which visas are intended to be granted.
This bill will strengthen the integrity of Australia's migration program by
allowing action to be taken where 'payment for visas' conduct has occurred.
'Payment for visas' conduct may occur through an employer
offering to sponsor a visa applicant in return for a payment or benefit. It may
occur before the applicant applies for a visa or during the visa holder's stay
in Australia. Evidence obtained through monitoring sponsors indicates that the
sponsor and applicant are complicit in the majority of 'payment for visas'
activity. Employers may also exploit an employee by requiring payment in return
for an ongoing sponsorship.
A strong response is required to ensure that this practice,
which has continued under successive governments, does not continue.[1]
Sponsors and visa holders
2.3
Many submitters were supportive of the policy objective to prevent
'payment for visas'. The Migration Institute of Australia (MIA) noted that 'the
criminal and civil penalties specified in this Bill send a clear message to
those who engage in exploitative behaviour and undermine Australian workplace
and migration law'.[2]
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) agreed 'that the practice of
"payment for visas" needs to be stopped'.[3]
Similarly, the Ai Group submitted that 'this practice [of payment for visas] is
unacceptable and undermines the integrity of the skilled migration system'.[4]
2.4
Many of the concerns that submitters raised with the current system
relate to the extent to which some visa holders are being exploited by
employers and other third parties. Some cases 'have involved employers seeking
payments of up to $50 000 or more'.[5]
The MIA provided further examples of exploitation:
Over the years the MIA has heard anecdotal reports of payment
for visa models, from, at the most basic level, requiring the visa applicant to
pay the sponsor's costs for 457 sponsorship, up to payments of $250,000 per
year which included an amount to [be] 'recycled' back as a high income salary
that allowed the visa holder to bypass the English language requirement.[6]
2.5
In other cases, the committee heard that 'employers have charged migrant
workers large sums of money for enrolment in what are presented as legitimate
"courses" to secure work or student visas or gain skills'.[7]
Penalising visa holders
2.6
All submitters agreed that sponsors and other third parties should be
punished in the event that the provisions of this Bill are contravened. For
example, the ACTU stated in its submission that:
We support the Bill insofar as it makes it unlawful for
employers and other third party agents to solicit and receive payments from
overseas workers in return for sponsorship and other visa outcomes. This is a
long overdue law reform that addresses a known problem and it is something the
ACTU has been calling for, for some time.[8]
2.7
However, submitters suggested that the proposed penalties outlined in
the Bill, including the cancellation of visas, disproportionately impacts on
vulnerable visa applicants and holders. The ACTU highlighted that in many
cases, employers, rather than applicants, are chiefly responsible for engaging
in 'payment for visas' conduct:
The Bill appears to rest on the mistaken assumption that
employers, agents and workers are all equally responsible for, and complicit,
in the practice of payment for visas, when all the available evidence suggests it
is virtually always the employer/agent who is pressuring the worker in these
cases.[9]
Vulnerability of visa holders
2.8
Submitters raised concerns about the vulnerable position of visa holders
relative to an employer or migration agent. The Federation of Ethnic
Communities' Councils of Australia (FECCA) submitted that:
Temporary visa holders are among the most vulnerable in the
workplace and tend to be concentrated in the sectors of the job market which
create a potential for exploitation. Lack of knowledge about the Australian
workplace relations scheme, including their workplace rights and entitlements,
lack of support networks, social isolation, and language barriers all
contribute to this vulnerability.[10]
2.9
In its submission, the Law Institute of Victoria (LIV) noted that
'migrant workers [are] a vulnerable group already subject to exploitation and
poor treatment in the Australian workforce'.[11]
Similarly, Ernst and Young observed that 'temporary visa holders are vulnerable
to exploitative employers and can be coerced into breaches of the law which
cements the exploitative situation'. Ernst and Young attributed the
vulnerability of visa applicants or holders to exploitation to them having:
...limited knowledge of Australian law and business culture and
com[ing] from cultures where it may common practice to provide a
"benefit" of some kind in return for job placement or other services.[12]
2.10
Submitters noted that 457 visa holders, due to their reliance on their
employers for the continuation of their visas, are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.[13]
Associate Professor Joo-Cheong Tham of the University of Melbourne School of
Law highlighted that the final report of the then government's 2008 Integrity
Review into 457 Visas found that:
Despite the views of some employers and employer
organisations, Subclass 457 visa holders are different from other employees in
Australian workplaces. They are the only group of employees whose ability to
remain in Australia is largely dependent upon their employment and to a large
extent, their employer. It is for these reasons that visa holders are
vulnerable and are open to exploitation.[14]
2.11
The ACTU highlighted that the experience of exploitation is common among
temporary visa holders:
A recurring theme with these cases is the vulnerable
situation the temporary visa holders were in, whether that was influenced by
their desire to stay in Australia or achieve permanent residency, the fear of
retribution if they spoke out, their lack of knowledge of their workplace
rights, their poor English, the spectre of a debt hanging over them, or a
combination of all these factors. In many cases, it is their direct employer
who is taking advantage of them, but in others it is an agent of some
description based in Australia or the home country of the visa holder. In some
cases, employers and agents are acting together in organised scams which are
more akin to labour trafficking and even slavery. In all cases, workers are
left disillusioned with their experience of working in Australia.[15]
2.12
Some submitters suggested that the Minister be granted greater
discretion to consider the extent of a visa applicant or holders' vulnerability
when determining civil penalties or visa cancellations.[16]
Civil penalty provisions
2.13
As a result of this vulnerability, some submitters argued that it would
be disproportionate to apply the same penalties to visa holders as those applied
to employers and other third parties. Further, employers and other third
parties are aware of Australian law and custom and, in the majority of cases, are
the ones who primarily facilitate and financially benefit from the 'payment for
visas' and as such should be held to a higher standard than visa holders and
applicants. LIV suggested that the penalties proposed in the Bill may act as a
disincentive for visa holders to report exploitative actions by employers:
It is paradoxicial [sic] that this Bill seeks to protect
migrant workers from exploitation and at the same time includes severe penalties
for migrant workers who may be at risk of exploitation. The LIV is concerned
that the high penalties contained in this Bill may have the practical effect of
deterring migrant workers in exploitative situations from coming forward, for
fear that they may have their visa cancelled or be subject to civil penalties.[17]
2.14
These submitters recommended amendments to the Bill that would ensure
that the proposed penalties would not apply to visa holders.[18]
For example, Associate Professor Tham suggested that 'the Bill should be
amended so that no penalties—including criminal offences, civil penalties and
the prospect of visa cancellation—are imposed on visa holders'.[19]
2.15
The department noted that it 'takes a tiered approach to unlawful
conduct, with stronger responses and more serious outcomes reserved for more
serious conduct' meaning that penalties would be applied in a manner befitting
the magnitude of the infringement. The department further clarified that all
allegations of 'payment for visas' conduct would be subject to an investigation
by appropriately delegated Australian Border Force Officers.[20]
Cancellation of visas
2.16
Submitters raised concerns about the provisions allowing the Minister to
cancel visas of visa holders found to be engaging in 'payment for visa'
conduct. In particular, the Law Institute of Victoria expressed concern that
the cancellation may apply whether or not a sponsorship event actually
happened.[21]
2.17
Submitters also argued this provision presents an 'unacceptable risk' to
victims of human trafficking.[22]
A joint submission from the Salvation Army, Uniting Church, National Union of
Workers and Harris Wake argued that the provision may act as a disincentive for
reporting human trafficking, forced labour or slavery:
With the threat of cancellation of a visa, it is likely to
have the perverse outcome of assisting those engaged in human trafficking and
egregious workplace exploitation by further deterring victims of such crimes
from reporting the crimes against them if they have been offered a sponsorship
related event.[23]
2.18
These submitters suggested that the Minister should not be granted the
authority to cancel the visa of a person who is subject to human trafficking,
or where an investigation is underway into such allegations.[24]
2.19
In its submission, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection
(the department) clarified that that:
[C]onsistent with other cancellation powers in the Act, the
visa holder would be afforded procedural fairness during the cancellation
process. In considering whether to exercise the discretion to cancel, the
Minister or delegate would consider a range of factors including the visa
holder's complicity in the 'payment for visas' conduct, the extent of the
'payment for visas' conduct, and whether a benefit was obtained as a result of
the 'payment for visas' conduct. Other considerations would include the
strength of the visa holder's ties to Australia and contribution to the
Australian community, as well as Australia’s international obligations such as
the best interest of children, family unit and non-refoulement obligations.[25]
2.20
The department further clarified that all visa cancellation decisions would
be subject to review:
A person whose visa is cancelled by a delegate would have the
ability to seek merits review of that decision. Where the cancellation decision
is made by a Minister, the person would be able to seek judicial review.[26]
Consultation and transition
arrangements
2.21
The MIA highlighted that the changes proposed in this Bill need to be
effectively communicated to vulnerable visa holders, particularly those from
non-English speaking backgrounds:
Applicants from non-English speaking backgrounds may be among
the most vulnerable to this exploitation. The MIA recommends that widespread
media campaigns be conducted to inform potential sponsors and visa applicants
to inform them of their obligations and rights. The MIA also recommends that
the information be provided in common community languages.[27]
2.22
The MIA noted that the provision of widespread media campaigns using a
range of common community languages would empower visa holders to know when
they are being taken advantage of and to report it.[28]
2.23
The committee agrees that the department should instigate a consultation
process with current and potential visa holders, employer groups and the
migration advice profession to ensure that these changes are well understood.
Definitions
2.24
Submitters expressed concern that the definitions set out in proposed
section 245AQ were either too broad, or too narrow, including:
-
what constitutes a benefit;
-
what is considered a sponsorship related event; and
-
executive officers.
Benefits and advantages
2.25
Ernst and Young submitted that the definition of 'benefit' in the Bill
was 'unnecessarily broad' and that 'in particular the term "an
advantage" may be broadly interpreted by immigration department officers,
tribunals and courts'. Ernst and Young suggested that the provision of benefits
that would 'ordinarily arise out of lawful employment' should be excluded from
this definition or in the form of policy guidance.[29]
2.26
The MIA also expressed concern 'that the difference between receiving a
benefit from a sponsorship related event and paying for professional migration
advice' is not clearly distinguished in the Bill.[30]
The Ai Group also highlighted the Bill's unintentional capture of legitimate
work related benefits such as advancing salary or wages to assist a visa holder
with relocation and establishment costs prior to commencement of employment.[31]
2.27
Ernst and Young argued that greater clarity is required as to what is
considered a reasonable amount:
The Bill places the evidentiary burden on a defendant to
prove that a "benefit" is a payment of a reasonable amount for a
professional service, that is, at market rates. The question that arises is how
and by whom it will be determined that the service was provided at market
rates. Fees for immigration services, for instance, vary significantly across
the market which encompasses a wide range of providers from sole traders to
global law firms. Commercial in confidence information regarding fees charged
by competitors may not be available to a defendant and is unlikely to be
available to a delegate of the Minister. There is therefore scope for a
delegate to erroneously find that a fee charged for a legitimate professional
service is not "a reasonable amount"...
Clear policy guidelines must also be developed to direct
delegates to take into account a wide variation in fees for legitimate
professional services.[32]
2.28
Similarly, Ai Group expressed concern that some legitimate payments from
visa holders to sponsors may be defined as 'benefits', such as reimbursements
to the sponsor of an advanced payment on the visa holder's salary to help pay
for accommodation or other living expenses.[33]
2.29
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the Bill provides for a specific
defence for persons receiving a benefit payment under proposed section 245AR
and 245AS of the Bill. This provision allows a defence for what might be
contested as a reasonable amount for professional services. In its submission,
the department noted:
Legitimate business practices would not constitute conduct
that involves asking for or receiving a benefit to enter into a "payment
for visas" arrangement. Therefore, it is not considered that the new
offence and civil penalty provision would apply to professional services such
as the provision of immigration assistance or recruitment advice, or to
benefits received by an employer by way of business profits or other routine
business benefits that flow from employing or engaging a person.[34]
Sponsorship-related event
2.30
Concerns were also raised about whether the definition of sponsorship
related events is sufficiently broad enough to capture all types of 'payment
for visas' activities that are likely to occur. The ACTU highlighted examples
which the Bill may not capture, such as:
...the potential for employers to seek a benefit in return for
providing a working holiday visa holder the 88 days' work that can lead to a
second year working holiday visa extension.[35]
2.31
The ACTU further expressed concern that other related 'events', such as
advertising of positions with the 'lure' of migration outcomes may not be
included in the definition:
We would also like to see a ban on job ads that target
positions for overseas workers with the lure of various migration outcomes; for
example, job ads that advertise only for working holiday visa holders or that
use the inducement of a second year working holiday visa.[36]
Executive officers
2.32
The ACTU argued that the definition of 'executive officer' should be
broadened beyond the definition set out in section 245AQ 'as directors, CEOs,
CFOs and secretaries' of corporations. The ACTU asserted that 'there is a case
for extending this liability to others with relevant authority outside these
confined categories'.[37]
2.33
The department advised that the Bill reflects best practice corporate
governance which provides for directors, CEOs, CFOs and secretaries of
corporations to be the ones ultimately responsible for the culture and actions
undertaken within a company.[38]
Appropriateness of powers
2.34
Proposed sections 245AR and 245AS of the Bill define the offence of
'offering to provide or providing a benefit' and 'asking for or receiving a
benefit in return for the occurrence of a sponsorship-related event'. In both
sections, a person is deemed to have contravened these sections even 'if the
sponsorship-related event does not occur'. In both cases the 'request for, or
offer to provide 'payment for visas' is deemed to be an offence.[39]
2.35
The Queensland Council for Civil Liberties (QCCL) submitted that these
sections 'make the presumption that the person is guilty and has the burden of
proving his/her own innocence'. QCCL notes that the reversal of the onus of
proof in these sections of the Bill is in violation of Article 11 of the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights that protects the presumption of
innocence until proven guilty in a court of law.[40]
2.36
The Explanatory Memorandum explains that the reversal of the onus of proof
is a 'necessary' measure: :
It is necessary to reverse the onus of the burden of proof in
relation to this matter because the information as to whether the benefit
constitutes a reasonable fee for a professional service is uniquely within the
knowledge of the defendant. The applicant for a civil penalty order would still
be required to prove that the benefit was asked for or received in return for
the occurrence of a sponsorship-related event.[41]
Committee view
2.37
Most submissions to this inquiry supported the findings of the 2014
independent review that 'payment for visas' is an area of migration policy
requiring reform.[42]
The committee recognises that by designating 'payment for visas' as an unlawful
action, this Bill would help to reduce the exploitation of visa applicants and
holders. The Bill's range of criminal and civil penalties for 'payments for
visas' would also be a useful disincentive to those who consider engaging in
these activities.
2.38
It is the committee's view that whilst this Bill is tough on those who
participate in 'payment for visas' activities, it has a number of review
mechanisms to ensure that vulnerable visa holders would not be
disproportionately affected. The committee is confident that the range of
penalties available to the department ensures that penalties are applied in
proportion to the alleged offence. The department should ensure that the
changes proposed in this Bill are communicated through a consultation process
with current and potential visa holders, employer and employee groups and the
migration advice profession.
Recommendation 1
2.39
The committee recommends that a comprehensive consultation process is
established and implemented with current and potential visa holders, employer
groups and the migration advice profession to ensure that the changes proposed
in this Bill are well understood.
2.40
The committee notes that the reversal of the onus of proof in this Bill
only relates to determining a professional fee; the onus for proving that a
benefit was asked for or received (or offered to provide or provided) still
rests with the department and the Minister. The Statement of Compatibility with
Human Rights notes that 'in most cases, professional services would not
constitute [payment for visas] conduct'. It is also noted that the reversal of
the onus of proof has been included 'as a safety net to cover unusual
circumstances that might arise in the course of work legitimately undertaken by
migration agents or recruitment agents that might inadvertently constitute'
payment for visas conduct.[43]
2.41
The committee is satisfied that this Bill achieves the right balance
with regard to definitions for 'benefit', 'sponsorship related event', and
'executive officers'. The definitions are sufficiently broad to capture the
broad spectrum of activities that constitute 'payment for visas' whilst
providing opportunities for review for those who deem their actions to be
legal. These review mechanisms provide migration and recruitment agents, and
visa applicants and holders opportunities to provide information that may
assist the department in determining the legality of their actions. The
committee therefore recommends that the Bill be passed.
Recommendation 2
2.42
The committee recommends that the Bill be passed.
Senator the Hon Ian
Macdonald
Chair
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