Chapter 3 - Key Issues–ACLEI
3.1
This chapter considers the main issues and
concerns raised in the course of the committee's inquiry in relation to the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 (LEIC Bill) and the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006
(Consequential Amendments Bill):
-
the need for the proposed integrity commission;
-
ACLEI's jurisdiction;
-
powers and proceedings of ACLEI;
-
relations and communications with other
agencies;
-
accountability and reporting; and
-
the definition of 'corruption issue'.
Rationale
3.2
In his second reading speech, the
Attorney-General stated that the LEIC Bill would
establish a body to detect and investigate corruption in the AFP and ACC
'should it arise'.[39] The known
incidence of corrupt behaviour in the AFP and the ACC is infrequent, however
the establishment of ACLEI is expected to send a powerful message to members of
the public, as well as AFP and ACC staff that corrupt behaviour will not be
tolerated.
3.3
The objects of the LEIC Bill
are listed in clause 3.
- The objects of this Act are:
- to facilitate:
- the detection of
corrupt conduct in law enforcement agencies; and
- the investigation
of corruption issues that related to law enforcement agencies; and
- to enable
criminal offences to be prosecuted, and civil penalty proceedings to be
brought, following those investigations; and
- to prevent
corrupt conduct in law enforcement agencies; and
- to maintain and
improve the integrity of staff members of law enforcement agencies.
Integrity systems in Australia
3.4
In assessing the need for an integrity
commission, it is important to place it in the wider context of integrity
systems in the Commonwealth government.
3.5
According to Dr A.J. Brown,
the creation of a new Commonwealth anti-corruption body would be 'the most
significant reform to the framework of the Commonwealth's core integrity
institutions in over 20 years'.[40]
3.6
The key investigation and review bodies at the
Commonwealth level currently include the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Australian
National Audit Office (ANAO), Australian Public Service Commission, the AFP,
the ACC and the integrity mechanisms of the Commonwealth Parliament.[41] In particular, the activities of the Commonwealth
Ombudsman focus on the actions and decisions of Australian Government agencies –
that is, ensuring 'administrative integrity'. The ANAO has responsibility for
providing assurance to the Parliament on 'financial integrity' issues through
its role to independently audit public sector administrative performance and
accountability regimes. Dr Brown
noted that achieving an effective balance between the roles of multiple
integrity agencies can be a complex task.[42]
3.7
An identified gap in the Commonwealth's capacity
to proactively address corruption issues and the ensuing need to establish 'a
regime of rigorous external examination' gave rise to the decision to set up an
anti-corruption body.[43] This decision
followed the establishment of bodies at the State level after various Royal
Commissions into allegations of corruption identified similar gaps in their
integrity systems. For the most part, these bodies have the power to
investigate misconduct and corruption in the public sector and are also
empowered to investigate organised crime.
Wood Royal Commission
3.8
The Royal Commission into NSW Police Service
(1994-1997) – known as the Wood Royal Commission – had broad terms of
reference, focusing on the investigation of corruption within the Service.
3.9
The Wood Royal Commission found that forms of
corruption were occurring on a regular basis. Justice Wood
argued that for some the nature of police work was in itself corrupting.[44] He observed the powers given to police
– such as carrying arms and the use force – were very substantial powers that
could be exercised 'in circumstances where the opportunities for temptation and
corruption' were high.[45]
3.10
In addressing the problem, the Wood Royal
Commission examined the existing framework for the detection of corruption.
This was a critical issue given there was already an 'elaborate structure' in
place in NSW designed to detect and punish corruption.[46] The structure referred to included the
internal investigation functions of the NSW Police Service, the Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and the NSW Ombudsman.
3.11
Justice Wood
recognised the value of the work undertaken by the ICAC and the NSW Ombudsman
on specific matters, but argued that their ability to fight corruption was
limited. One limiting factor was the Ombudsman's inability to deploy coercive
powers or to undertake proactive investigations, and the former reluctance of
the ICAC to employ electronic surveillance and other similar techniques.[47] It was argued that greater success in
detecting corruption could be had through 'extensive use of coercive powers'
and 'wide-based proactive inquiries, and electronic and physical surveillance'.[48]
The role of the Australian Federal
Police and the Commonwealth Ombudsman
3.12
A further issue is the extent to which the
creation of an integrity commission would duplicate the existing roles of the
AFP or Commonwealth Ombudsman.
3.13
Some gaps in the capacity of both agencies to
address the full spectrum of corruption issues were identified in the course of
this inquiry and it was also argued, particularly by Dr Brown,
that neither organisation is able to fulfil the objects of the LEIC Bill
as stated at clause 3.[49] It is
accepted that this is largely due to the nature and powers of the respective
organisations.
3.14
The AFP is currently the Commonwealth's primary
corruption investigator. In evidence, Commissioner Mick
Keelty noted:
Part of the core business of the AFP – our remit – is to
investigate and apply the fraud control policy of the Commonwealth to other
Commonwealth agencies.[50]
3.15
Nevertheless, the usefulness of this role is
limited in that the Commonwealth's fraud control guidelines have defined
'corruption' only as a subset of the term 'fraud'.[51] Dr Brown
argued that the AFP 'is restricted to its primary brief of criminal
investigation' and he stressed that many 'grey areas' existed as a result of
non-criminal forms of corruption that were not being appropriately detected and
rectified.[52]
3.16
From the AFP's perspective, the establishment of
a body such as ACLEI is positive for two reasons: it would act as a deterrent
for people considering engaging in corrupt activity; and it would increase the
public's confidence in the AFP as an organisation.[53]
3.17
Similarly, the Commonwealth Ombudsman is a generalist
body that is more reactive – it is limited in its capacity to conduct in-depth
investigations and it relies heavily on complaints as information sources.
Corruption prevention and integrity enhancement is generally a secondary activity;
though it must be acknowledged that this limitation lies in the nature of the
office rather than any shortcomings in the Ombudsman, who will provide support
for ACLEI, similar to the role provided by the NSW Ombudsman and the ICAC for
the NSW Police Integrity Commission (PIC).[54]
In particular, the Ombudsman's investigative powers are limited by the lack of
access to the suite of special investigative powers discussed in the section
below.
3.18
In supporting this view, Dr Brown
argued that 'corruption is different to maladministration, as dealt with by the
[O]mbudsman'.[55] He also argued that
the Commonwealth Ombudsman 'should not be the chief agency responsible for
investigating corruption allegations'.[56]
Corruption prevention role
3.19
Dr Brown
questioned whether the corruption prevention (or 'corruption hardening') role
set out in the objects section of the Bill is
adequately reflected in the Bill's wider
provisions.
3.20
The Bill clearly
envisages that in addition to its detection and investigation roles, ACLEI will
have a corruption prevention role.[57]
As Dr Brown
argued:
This objective ... is frequently identified as distinguishing the
mandates of the newer anti-corruption bodies from the complaint-handling work
of the older integrity bodies, especially Ombudsman's offices.[58]
3.21
In evidence, Dr Brown argued that a major
issue was whether ACLEI could realise its object of being proactive in dealing
with the detection and the prevention of corruption rather than just with the
investigation of corruption, particularly because since, in his view, there is
currently an inconsistency between the objects of the LEIC Bill (clause 3)
and the functions of the Integrity Commissioner (clause 15).
The question is: why include them [detection and prevention] in
the objects of the [Bill] if in fact you are not
attempting to achieve them through the body of the legislation.[59]
3.22
Dr Brown
stressed the importance of integrity bodies – such as ACLEI – being proactive
in addition to relying on referrals from external sources to identify matters
for investigation.[60]
Committee view
3.23
Commonwealth bodies are no more immune to
corruption than their State counterparts and the potential for corruption
provides strong justification for the establishment of an anti-corruption body
as a pre-emptive measure (rather than waiting for the circumstances that demand
it). The committee believes that ACLEI's formation provides the mechanisms for
ensuring earlier detection of corruption, as well as appropriate avenues for
prevention and investigation – a role that cannot be performed by the AFP or
the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
3.24
As such, the committee strongly endorses the
purpose of the Bill and the associated
objectives of the proposed commission.
3.25
The committee is also mindful that the Bill
has a strong emphasis on ACLEI's investigation and prosecution functions which
may perhaps constrain activities that are aimed at prevention measures.[61] Consistent with the objective of
paragraph 3(1)(c), the Commission once operational should keep in mind the
corruption prevention aspect of their role and allocate appropriate resources
to this function.
Jurisdiction
3.26
The LEIC Bill
establishes ACLEI as an independent body designed to prevent, detect and investigate
corruption in the AFP and ACC. These two bodies play a key role in Commonwealth
law enforcement and it was argued that a regime of 'rigorous external
examination' would ensure continuing confidence in their integrity.[62] As foreshadowed by the Attorney-General,
other Commonwealth law enforcement agencies may be brought within ACLEI's
jurisdiction by regulation.[63]
3.27
In announcing that the Commonwealth would
establish an independent anti-corruption body, the Minister for Justice and
Customs said:
While no evidence exists of systemic corruption within the
Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian Federal
Police (AFP) or other Commonwealth law enforcement agencies, the Government has
decided there should be an independent body with the powers of a Royal
Commission to address corruption at the Federal level should it arise.[64]
3.28
As a representative from the Attorney-General's
Department explained to the committee:
The government has decided that the ACLEI will initially look at
the AFP and the ACC. But they have provided the capacity to expand its
functions or its oversight arrangements to cover other agencies involved in law
enforcement operations at a later date, and to do that by regulation, which is
obviously quite a simple means.[65]
3.29
Two issues emerge from this proposal: first, the
limited jurisdiction of the proposed commission, albeit temporarily, to two
agencies; and second, the limitation of the jurisdiction to law enforcement
agencies, rather than creating a jurisdiction over Commonwealth agencies generally.
A wider law enforcement
jurisdiction
3.30
The LEIC Bill provides that other Commonwealth
law enforcement agencies would, if prescribed by regulation, fall within
paragraph (d) of the definition of 'law enforcement agency'
(clause 5). However, as currently drafted, the definition of 'law
enforcement agency' is limited so that many agencies with investigative arms or
law enforcement functions are excluded.
3.31
No rationale has been advanced for this
potential expansion of jurisdiction by stages via regulation. Dr Brown
accepted that although the AFP and ACC possessed powers and corruption risks
that require additional scrutiny, no logical reason is provided to justify the
exclusion of other agencies with law enforcement functions from ACLEI's
oversight.[66]
It would certainly be an improvement...to identify a broader range
of agencies[.] What that range of agencies would be would obviously need to be
open to more debate.[67]
3.32
Since the Bill explicitly envisages ACLEI having
jurisdiction over a wider range of law enforcement agencies, it is arguable
that this jurisdiction should be granted from the beginning. Several factors
support this view.
3.33
First, the breadth of agencies that possess and
operationally deploy powers that have traditionally been characterised as
police powers, has grown substantially in the past decade. Examples of such
agencies include the Australian Customs Service, the Australian Taxation Office
(ATO) and the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (DIMA).
3.34
These agencies have some or all of: the powers
of arrest or detention; access to search warrants; telecommunication
interception warrants; stored communications warrants; controlled operations;
and controlled deliveries. As Dr Brown
stated:
... the investigation and enforcement functions of the Australian
Customs Service, Australian Taxation Office and Commonwealth Department of
Immigration are at least as extensive and sensitive, certainly in their direct
impacts on businesses and communities.[68]
3.35
Commissioner Keelty
also acknowledged:
There is a gap here – and I do not want to name agencies – if
you look at the powers, such as access to search warrants, access to the use of
firearms and access to detention.[69]
3.36
Second, the growing access by the wider
community of law enforcement agencies to law enforcement intelligence and
information networks arguably increases the scope for corrupt activities
through improper access and use of this information. These networks contain a
substantial range of information covering individuals, companies, relationships,
and the results of investigations and intelligence operations.
3.37
Finally, the cost effectiveness of ACLEI's
limited oversight role was also raised by Dr Brown and the Police
Federation of Australia,[70] who
suggested that an agency with such a limited jurisdiction may never gain the
'critical mass' of expertise or activity to properly fulfil its role or justify
its costs.
A general jurisdiction over all
Commonwealth bodies
3.38
The second issue is whether it would be
preferable to create a Commonwealth integrity commission with general
jurisdiction over all Commonwealth agencies rather than jurisdiction limited to
law enforcement agencies.
3.39
The Attorney-General's Department maintained
that such a broader jurisdiction is not necessary, because the AFP has
responsibility for investigating corruption in Commonwealth agencies, while other
means of oversight are in place for the relevant agencies to address non-corruption
issues.[71] As such, the AGD suggests
that there is no 'accountability gap' for a more broadly focused Commission to
address.
3.40
However, as discussed in the preceding section,
there are limits to the effective jurisdiction of the AFP in relation to
broader corruption or integrity issues that fall short of criminal behaviour.[72] This lacuna may not be adequately
addressed by relying on agencies' internal investigations or the Ombudsman. Dr Brown
argued:
The Commonwealth Ombudsman has dabbled in major corruption
investigations, but with mixed success, especially given the constant pressures
on its resources from other more consumer-based complaint handling roles.[73]
3.41
Several reasons were advanced in support of giving
the Commission a broader mandate to uncover corruption across the entire
Commonwealth public sector.[74]
3.42
As Dr Brown
argued, 'Commonwealth administration is no more inherently immune from
corruption risks than equivalent types of officialdom elsewhere'.[75] As such, he strongly supported the
establishment of an anti-corruption commission with jurisdiction over all
public officials, not just police. He cited NSW as a variation on this theme,
having supplemented the ICAC with the PIC.[76]
3.43
In relation to the proposed jurisdictional model,
Dr Brown
stated:
The limited jurisdiction of the Commonwealth body [ACLEI] will
leave the Commonwealth framework in much the same shape as the current
Victorian framework, which was one that the Government was specifically
criticising when trying to take this initiative in June 2004. [77]
3.44
Second, Commissioner Keelty
pointed to the danger of a 'displacement factor' arising as a direct consequence
of a limited jurisdiction:
If you have an oversight or governance regime in a particular
place then you need to expect that if you tighten it up in one area
displacement may create a problem for you in another area.[78]
3.45
Third, a body with general jurisdiction avoids
the potential for pointless jurisdictional disputes between investigative
agencies. Dr Brown
cautioned that any attempt to 'bifurcate' between 'law enforcement' functions
and non-law enforcement functions of agencies could become operationally
problematic. He maintained that some agencies might use the 'law enforcement'
distinction to avoid scrutiny of a corruption matter even when the Government
feels it desirable to initiate an inquiry.[79]
As a general principle, any 'greyness' in the jurisdiction of the Commission is
likely to introduce an undesirable layer of political discretion into the
decision to investigate allegations, and undermine the perceived integrity and
independence of the Commission.
Committee view
3.46
The committee strongly believes that the
establishment of ACLEI is a positive opportunity for dealing with allegations
of corruption and improving the integrity of the law enforcement system. ACLEI
is the first body of its kind at the Commonwealth level and the committee
expects that ACLEI will work collaboratively with the AFP, the ACC and the
Commonwealth Ombudsman to oversee a comprehensive anti-corruption regime.
3.47
The committee acknowledges that the proposed
legislation envisages a broader anti-corruption role for ACLEI in the future,
and that it may be one of the Bill's strengths
in that it allows for other Commonwealth agencies with law enforcement
functions to be added to ACLEI's jurisdiction. While unstated in evidence, this
may have operational advantages for the Commission, allowing a more gradual
widening of its jurisdiction in line with its developing expertise, experience,
capabilities and resources.
3.48
Nevertheless, the committee considers that there
is a strong rationale for ensuring that a wider group of law enforcement agencies
are brought within its jurisdiction, including Customs, the ATO and DIMA. In
the committee's view, it would be useful for the government to give a public
indication of the proposed timetable for this process.
3.49
It is also the view of the committee that it is
undesirable that the jurisdiction of the proposed ACLEI be determined by
regulation rather than legislation. While it is accepted that the regulatory
mechanism proposed by the Bill would be faster
and more convenient to the government than affecting change by legislation, the
committee considers that the matter of jurisdiction is fundamental to the
nature of ACLEI. As such, it is a matter that should properly be dealt with by
legislation.
Recommendation 1
3.50
The committee recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended such that changes to
the agencies subject to the Commission's jurisdiction are made by legislation,
rather than regulation, as is currently provided for in paragraph (d) of the
definition of law enforcement agency.
3.51
The committee also considers that a Commonwealth
integrity commission of general jurisdiction is needed, and there is an
accountability gap that would be closed by such a body. While the committee
considers that ACLEI – as currently proposed – needs to be created,
consideration should also be given to developing such a commission in the
longer term.
Powers and proceedings of ACLEI
3.52
This section examines the mechanisms and powers
available to ACLEI to deal with complaints and investigation.
3.53
The Integrity Commissioner has a broad general
discretion granted by clause 26 to deal with a corruption issue by
investigating it him/herself, or referring the issue to a law enforcement
agency. Where a matter is referred, the Commissioner may also choose to
'manage' or 'oversee' the investigation.
3.54
If the Commission is to conduct the
investigation itself, it has a suite of investigative powers closely analogous
to those of a Royal Commission, or the ACC. These include the authority to
apply for search warrants, telephone intercept warrants and warrants
authorising the use of surveillance devices. ACLEI will also be able to
undertake controlled operations.
3.55
The Integrity Commissioner will be required to
keep records for inspection and report by the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The
committee notes that this is consistent with the requirements which apply to
the AFP and the ACC.
3.56
The 'Royal Commission' powers also include the
use of coercive powers to require attendance at a hearing, and compel the
answering of questions and production of documents. This power overrides the
privilege against self-incrimination, subject to limitations on the use of the
material so acquired (clause 96).
3.57
Such investigations may also be done by means of
a public or private inquiry (clause 82).
3.58
In relation to coercive powers, the committee
notes that the availability of such powers was crucial to the success of the
Wood Royal Commission. Justice Wood
particularly refers to the importance of the power to compel witnesses to give
evidence and produce documents, and to enter relevant premises to inspect and
copy documents.[80]
3.59
Mr Allan Kearney, the Director of
Intelligence and Executive Services at the NSW Police Integrity Commission, supported
this view, telling the committee that coercive powers to investigate corrupt
police officers were essential because of the inherently difficult nature of
the work. [81]
Corrupt police officers are aware of the strategies that are
available to you, having probably used them themselves on many occasions
beforehand. They are very difficult people to investigate. I think that any
reasonable power that can be made available to an agency involved in this kind
of work can and should be coercive.[82]
3.60
The committee supports the use of coercive
powers to detect corruption, particularly in light of the fact that ACLEI will
be required to investigate officers in law enforcement agencies who are
experienced in investigative practices and, by implication, the ways to avoid
detection.
3.61
However, several aspects of the powers and
proceedings proposed for the Commission are commented upon below.
Powers of 'authorised officers'
3.62
The LEIC Bill
enables 'authorised officers'[83] with
'suitable qualifications or experience'[84]
to invoke the powers of arrest and search in order to perform their duties in
relation to the investigation of corruption issues.[85] The powers are the same as those given
to 'constables' – persons defined under the Crimes
Act 1914 to be special members of the AFP or members of the police force or
police service of a State or Territory.[86]
3.63
The Explanatory Memorandum indicates that these
powers are proposed because, for obvious reasons, the Commissioner will often
not be able to use serving police officers to perform duties in relation to
corruption investigations involving other police. As noted by the NSW Wood
Royal Commission, there are always dangers associated with allowing police to investigate
other police, particularly where the prevailing culture militates against it.[87]
3.64
The granting of such powers of arrest caused
concern to the Police Federation of Australia, which argued that the power
should be exclusive to sworn police constables.[88] In response, a representative from the
Attorney-General's Department noted the importance of ensuring that the Integrity
Commissioner is assisted by people who are demonstrably independent of any
police force. However, it was stressed that such people would be:[89]
for example, ex-police or possibly police drawn from a foreign
police force. Very occasionally ... they might be someone who had a slightly
different background but clearly had the requisite skills to perform police
type duties.[90]
3.65
The committee appreciates the reservations
expressed by the Police Federation of Australia concerning non-serving police
officers accessing these powers, but it considers that ACLEI 'authorised
officers' require such powers to effectively assist the Integrity Commissioner
investigate police corruption issues.
3.66
The committee also accepts that the conditions
set out in clause 140 for the appointment of authorised officers and the
assurances given by the Attorney-General's Department in evidence are
sufficient to ensure that only those who are suitably qualified will be
appointed.
Power not to investigate
3.67
A second matter is that while clause 26
provides that the Integrity Commissioner 'may' investigate or refer a matter,
it is silent on whether the Commissioner may determine that the matter does not
require investigation or referral.[91]
This may have the unfortunate practical result of limiting ACLEI’s capacity to optimally
manage its caseload and prioritise its resources.
3.68
In evidence to the committee, Dr Brown
elaborated on this and explained the importance of establishing ACLEI as a body
able to 'devote its resources strategically to the important cases by having a
clear discretion not to investigate a range of matters based on particular criteria'.[92] Dr Brown
suggested that this could easily be rectified by including provisions similar
to those in the Ombudsman Act 1976.[93]
3.69
Section 6 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 gives the Commonwealth Ombudsman a discretion
not to investigate if the Ombudsman is satisfied that the complainant was aware
of the action more than twelve months before notifying the Ombudsman. Further
he or she may decide not to investigate if Ombudsman considers:
-
the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or was
not made in good faith; or
-
the complainant does not have a sufficient
interest in the subject matter of the complaint; or
-
an investigation, or further investigation, of
the action is not warranted having regard to all the circumstances.
3.70
The committee agrees with these views, and
acknowledges that there will be occasions when ACLEI would be wasting resources
pursuing a complaint. A certain number of malicious, unfounded or groundless
complaints are to be expected, and the inclusion of an explicit discretion not
to investigate would support the efficiency of ACLEI.
Recommendation 2
3.71
The committee recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended to provide the Integrity
Commissioner with discretion not to investigate or refer a complaint where he
or she considers the complaint to be frivolous:
-
the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or was
not made in good faith; or
-
the complainant does not have a sufficient
interest in the subject matter of the complaint; or
-
an investigation, or further investigation, of
the action is not warranted having regard to all the circumstances.
Whistleblower protection
3.72
Paragraph 22(2)(c) of the LEIC Bill
could create the opposite problem. This provision relieves agencies from
referring corruption matters if they believe that they are not made in good
faith.
3.73
This provision may inadvertently serve to
discourage whistleblowers. In his submission, Dr Brown
observed that the use of such terms as 'in good faith' at the State level has
proved 'highly problematic':
This term can only function to confuse agencies and informants
as to reporting requirements, and act as a disincentive to report corruption by
internal witnesses (whistleblowers) who have, or may appear to have, mixed
motives for making the report. Many whistleblowers fall into this category,
providing true and significant information about the misconduct of
others even though they may be doing so out of motives of revenge,
self-enhancement or a desire to embarrass or damage the organisation.[94]
3.74
This factor could work to neutralise other
provisions in the Bill that serve to protect
whistleblowers. Clause 220 of the LEIC Bill
makes it an offence to cause, or threaten detriment to another person on the
ground that a person has referred, or may refer to the Integrity Commissioner
or the Minister an allegation or information that raises a corruption issue.
The clause also covers those who have produced documents or things to ACLEI.
The offence attracts a maximum penalty of two years gaol.
3.75
Clause 81 provides that 'a person who gives
information, or produces a document or thing to the Integrity Commissioner in
response to a request under section 75 or 76 has the same protection as a
witness in proceedings in the High Court'. The Explanatory Memorandum
indicates, by way of example, that this could mean a witness will receive
protection against 'threatening behaviour, intimidation, injury and violence'.[95] These are based on offences contained
in Part III of the Crimes Act 1914.
3.76
It is essential that the informants to ACLEI
must be adequately protected. Such informants may face considerable personal
risk in revealing information about corrupt conduct and failure to ensure the
person giving information is protected from retribution, becomes a disincentive
to such people and thereby defeats the purpose of the LEIC Bill.
3.77
For this reason, the committee agrees with Dr Brown's
suggestion that the words 'in good faith' be removed from the Bill.
3.78
The committee also considers that the existing protections
for whistleblowers could be further enhanced by the inclusion of a provision
such as that contained in section 51 of the Police Integrity Act 1996 (NSW),
which provides:
51 Protection of
witnesses and persons assisting Commission
(1) Arrangements for
protection:
If it appears to the Commissioner that, because a person is
assisting the Commission, the safety of the person or any other person may be
prejudiced or the person or any other person may be subject to intimidation or
harassment, the Commissioner may make such arrangements as are necessary:
(a) to
protect the safety of any such person, or
(b) to
protect any such person from intimidation or harassment.
Recommendation 3
3.79
The committee recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended to remove the phrase
'in good faith' from proposed paragraph 22(2)(c).
Recommendation 4
3.80
The committee further recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended to insert a provision
to improve protection for informants, such that where it appears to the
Integrity Commissioner that a person's safety may be prejudiced or that person
may be subject to intimidation or harassment, he or she may make such
arrangements as are necessary to protect the safety of any such person, or to
protect any such person from intimidation or harassment.
3.81
It has also been noted that the LEIC Bill
contains no sanction against giving false or misleading information. Inclusion
of such a sanction would deter dishonest informants from abusing the process,
without the potentially counterproductive results of the 'in good faith' provisions
discussed above.[96]
3.82
The committee accepts this argument and considers
that the creation of an offence of giving false and misleading information
would provide an additional deterrent to those contemplating giving such
information.
Recommendation 5
3.83
The committee recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended to provide an offence
of giving false or misleading information to ACLEI, with an appropriate maximum
penalty.
Hearings procedures
3.84
Under Division 2 of the LEIC Bill,
the Integrity Commissioner may hold hearings in private or in public. Certain
evidence must be given in private. Clause 89 also includes provision for a
party to apply to have the evidence given in private.
3.85
The procedure for conducting such proceedings is
not specified, and the committee notes that this uncertainty was a cause of
complaint to the PJC on the ACC during their inquiry into the operation of the
similar provisions under the ACC Act. In the interests of procedural fairness
to persons called before Commission, it is desirable that the nature of
proceedings, the rules of procedure to be adopted, and the rights of witnesses
and their counsel, be clearly set out.
Recommendation 6
3.86
The committee recommends that a practice and
procedure manual be developed by ACLEI as soon as possible after it commences
operation.
External agencies and communication
3.87
As is evident from the preceding discussion, the
proposed commission will operate in a complex matrix of both law enforcement
agencies and other integrity agencies, at both Commonwealth and state or
territory level.
3.88
For the wider integrity system to function
effectively, it is important that these relationships are productive and the
rights and responsibilities of each element clearly determined. Several issues warrant
comment in this respect.
Australian Federal Police and
Australian Crime Commission
3.89
It is expected that ACLEI's relationship with
the AFP and ACC will be a positive one. Mr Alastair
Milroy, Chief Executive Officer of the ACC stated
that ACLEI would provide the impetus for review and change of some existing ACC
processes and programs, particularly those aimed at prevention.[97] Commissioner Keelty
stated he did not envisage a large change to the AFP's existing integrity
framework as a result of ACLEI, except for the fact that an external body would
refer matters that might otherwise not have come to the AFP's attention.[98]
3.90
As mentioned by Commissioner Keelty, when
addressing corruption issues, ACLEI may refer a corruption issue to the AFP or
ACC for investigation, and may manage or oversee an investigation being
conducted by them (clause 26). In making this decision, ACLEI must
consider the rights and obligations of the AFP and the ACC to investigate the
issue themselves. This, in addition to the other range of factors listed in the
LEIC Bill ensures that, within available
resources, ACLEI effectively investigates serious and systemic corruption and,
so far as possible, refers other matters to an agency in a position to
investigate them effectively.[99]
State bodies
3.91
A number of issues were raised by the PIC in
relation to the functions of ACLEI and its interaction with State bodies. Of
particular concern, were the notification and consultation mechanisms available
to the PIC and ACLEI in relation to ACLEI investigations involving NSW police
officers.[100]
3.92
The PIC argued the notification provisions in
the LEIC Bill were too narrow as they only
require ACLEI to notify a State agency when an allegation of corruption is raised
in relation to a State officer seconded to a Commonwealth law enforcement
agency.[101] On the basis of
consistency of treatment, the PIC argued that the Bill
should be extended to include occasions where a non-seconded State officer is
involved in corruption with staff members of a Commonwealth law enforcement
agency and even where no Commonwealth officer is involved at all.[102] Mr Kearney
from the PIC maintained that such an obligation would overcome the potential
for insufficient information sharing that could lead to: different treatment
for seconded and non-seconded officers; missed opportunities for investigation;
or parallel investigations by ACLEI and the relevant State agency.[103]
3.93
The PIC was also concerned that any ACLEI
investigation report, or information or intelligence received involving a State
officer, should be communicated to an interested State agency.[104] As currently drafted, the LEIC Bill
limits ACLEI's ability to disseminate information to a person or authority able
to prosecute or commence civil penalty proceedings.[105] The PIC argued that the Bill
should allow ACLEI to communicate 'less probative' information – for example,
intelligence on inappropriate relationships involving a police officer and a
criminal – as it could lead to 'quite significant investigations'.[106] Mr Kearney suggested the
insertion of a 'catch-all' provision similar to subsection 18(3) of the Police Integrity Commission Act 1996 Act
to enable dissemination of information where considered appropriate by ACLEI.[107]
3.94
The proposed obligation of Commonwealth law
enforcement agencies to notify ACLEI of relevant matters – regardless of the
source of the intelligence – was another area of concern.[108] The PIC argued that information
disclosed to a Commonwealth law enforcement agency (for example, during a joint
investigation) might be passed on without regard to the appropriateness of that
disclosure. The PIC's primary concern was that an ongoing investigation may be
prejudiced as a consequence of the disclosure by the Commonwealth agency to
ACLEI.[109]
3.95
Mr Kearney
also argued that ACLEI's power to require information or documents from the PIC
and similar State agencies should be limited.
The bill, as it is presently worded, appears to require the
commission [PIC] to release potentially the most critical information—and this
information may well have been obtained under our own compulsive
powers—regardless of our secrecy provision and the potential for impact on
current investigations.[110]
3.96
The PIC would prefer to see this area subject to
more 'cooperative arrangements'.[111]
3.97
In response to the PIC’s comments, a
representative from the Attorney-General's Department stated that ACLEI:
... would tend to always have regard for the view of the other
integrity agencies in these sorts of arrangements. There is obviously a need to
make sure that in any investigation ACLEI does not interfere with ongoing
investigations and does not corrupt the work of other agencies. I think there
needs to be a very close working relationship between the likes of ACLEI and
state bodies.[112]
3.98
The Attorney-General's Department acknowledged
that the relationships ACLEI builds with others will ultimately depend on the
way in which the Integrity Commissioner operates in practice. The Department
stated that ACLEI has the flexibility under the LEIC Bill
to adopt whatever approach to investigation 'seems sensible in the
circumstances of each case'.[113] The
conduct of two parallel investigations, for example, would not normally be an
appropriate way to proceed.
3.99
The Department noted that it was considering the
comments of the Police Integrity Commission in relation to the need to ensure
that the LEIC Bill allows sufficient exchange of
information to avoid unintentional duplication of investigations.[114]
Commonwealth Ombudsman
3.100
The Commonwealth Ombudsman also raised two
issues pertaining to information sharing between it and ACLEI. The first
related to the proposed amendment to section 6 of the Ombudsman Act 1976 by the Consequential Amendments Bill to enable the
Commonwealth Ombudsman to transfer matters to ACLEI.[115] Whether the Ombudsman may or must do
so depended on the Ombudsman being satisfied that the matter raises a
'corruption issue' or 'a significant corruption issue'. Dr Vivienne Thom,
Deputy Ombudsman, Commonwealth Ombudsman, argued that the Consequential
Amendments Bill should be amended to ensure that corruption issues that become
apparent through not only complaint investigations, but also own motion
investigations by the Ombudsman, may be referred to ACLEI.[116]
3.101
The second issue concerned the need for greater clarity
in relation to ACLEI's obligations to notify the Commonwealth Ombudsman of
information relating to a matter referred by the Ombudsman.[117] Dr Thom
argued that the Bill, as currently drafted,
would require the Ombudsman to mount an investigation to seek the information.[118]
3.102
In relation to this second concern, the
Attorney-General's Department noted that the Consequential Amendments Bill was
not intended to leave the Ombudsman in a position where it could not receive information
without initiating an investigation of its own. As such, this matter would be
considered for possible amendments.[119]
Committee view
3.103
The establishment of a body at the Commonwealth
level adds another layer to the existing integrity framework in Australia.
This will require consideration of how these integrity agencies will interact
and coordinate their activities to ensure the coherent operation of the system.
3.104
The committee believes that the relationships
ACLEI has with other Commonwealth, State and Territory bodies are of great
importance and that the proposed legislation should not curtail the dissemination
of information to or from ACLEI. While the LEIC Bill plays an important part in
shaping and governing ACLEI's relationships, the committee notes that ACLEI and
other relevant bodies will need to deal with each other professionally and
cooperatively to ensure the smooth flow of relevant information.
3.105
The committee is also aware that the
confidentiality of information obtained from other agencies should be
maintained so as not to jeopardise other operations. The committee considers
that suitable frameworks should be established to maintain that confidentiality
while adhering to the processes established under the LEIC Bill.
Recommendation 7
3.106
The committee recommends that amendments are
made to the Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments)
Bill 2006 to ensure that a corruption issue that becomes apparent through an
own motion investigation undertaken by the Commonwealth Ombudsman can be
referred to ACLEI.
Recommendation 8
3.107
The committee recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2006 be
amended to provide greater clarity in relation to ACLEI's obligations to notify
the Commonwealth Ombudsman of information relating to a matter referred by the
Ombudsman.
Accountability and reporting
3.108
The LEIC Bill
provides several accountability mechanisms for the Commission itself, including
reporting to government and to Parliament.
3.109
The LEIC Bill
provides that ACLEI must report to the government, and the Parliament through
the Minister: clauses 54-59 (reporting an investigation); 73-74 (reporting
on a public inquiry to the Minister); 169-173 (reports of special investigation
to Minister); and 201-206 (public reporting: annual reports).
3.110
Under clause 203 a report is to be provided
to Parliament on all public inquiries and all investigations that involved
public hearings. In other words, subject to the excision of sensitive material,
outcomes of all public hearings will be forwarded to Parliament.[120] If an investigation has been
conducted without public hearings, there is no obligation on the Minister to
table a report in Parliament, but the Minister may do so. According to the
Attorney-General's Department, the LEIC Bill
provides for investigations to be conducted either in public or in private in
accordance with judgements as to the balance of public interest, and makes
consequential provision about publication of reports.[121]
3.111
ACLEI must provide an annual report to the
Minister to be laid before Parliament (clause 213). It is proposed that
ACLEI's activities will also be overseen by a Parliamentary Joint Committee
(PJC) (Part 14) and that the Commonwealth Ombudsman will report on
controlled operations.
3.112
Part 12 of the LEIC Bill
provides for the Minister to authorise a special external investigation into
allegations of corruption within the Commission itself. There are several
options available for the Minister, including allowing the Integrity
Commissioner to investigate the matter.
3.113
Several issues arise in relation to the
oversight processes:
-
The independence of the Commission from
government.
-
The jurisdiction of the proposed Parliamentary
Joint Committee.
-
Legislative review.
An independent relationship with
government
3.114
Dr Brown
was concerned that the reporting regime was narrow, and that it limited ACLEI's
independence to reporting only via the government and Parliament. He noted that
even in cases where the Minister must table the report within 15 sitting
days of receipt, in a period of parliamentary recess, the report's release may
occur long after the relevant time has passed.[122]
3.115
His solution to this was to allow ACLEI to
publish its views:
on any matter at any time where it considers it to be in the
public interest to do so, provided it satisfies normal requirements of natural
justice and not releasing sensitive or dangerous information. This power would
also enable the release of interim reports or other statements that facilitate
the work of the Commission, without any concern as to whether the Commission
has power to do so.[123]
3.116
Dr Brown
noted that section 35A of the Ombudsman
Act 1976 is an example of a provision which has been effective. This
section allows the Commonwealth Ombudsman to disclose information or make a
statement about investigations if he or she considers it is in the interest of
any Department, prescribed authority or person, or is in the public interest.
There are limitations on this, but the section does allow the Commonwealth Ombudsman
to speak independently about the results of his or her inquiries, without
having to go through the Minister or the Parliament first.
3.117
The key issue is whether or not ACLEI's
accountability to the Parliament would be compromised by the ability of the Integrity
Commissioner to report or comment without going through the Minister and the
Parliament. The committee notes that the Police Integrity Commissioner in NSW
is not able to comment publicly on matters which have not been first reported
to the Minister and the Parliament.
3.118
It could also be argued that the Office of the Commonwealth
Ombudsman is an entirely different construct from the integrity body such as
the one contemplated – part of the Ombudsman's credibility lies in its
responsibilities regarding reporting.
3.119
At this time the committee does not accept this suggestion.
3.120
Related to the issue of reporting is the release
of information by the Minister under Part 11 of the LEIC Bill.
Under this part, the Attorney-General may determine whether particular
information will be released by the Integrity Commissioner, and may also
certify that the disclosure of particular information would be contrary to the
public interest. In determining this, the Minister may issue the certificate because
the information would:
prejudice the security, defence or international relations of
the Commonwealth, prejudice the proper performance of the ACC, an
investigation, inquiry, fair trial, a person’s life or physical safety or
disclose the identity of a confidential source.[124]
3.121
Other provisions prohibit the communication of
information certified under clause 149 between agencies, and to the
Integrity Commissioner.
3.122
The Police Federation of Australia proposed a
reporting process to apply when the Minister issues a certificate under clause 149,
in order to ensure openness and accountability.[125]
3.123
The Attorney-General's Department stated that the
basis on which the Attorney-General could certify information under
clause 149 was substantially similar to the scheme established under
section 70 of the Privacy Act 1988;
although it was wider than the list of matters for which such a certificate
could be issued under subsection 9(3) of the Ombudsman Act 1976.[126]
3.124
When questioned about the proposition that the
Attorney-General provide more detailed reasons for the issue of a certificate,
the Department stated:
[this] would tend to nullify the utility of the scheme by
requiring disclosure of matters which might reveal some of the information the
certificate was intended to keep out of the public domain.[127]
Committee view
3.125
The committee agrees that this proposal is one
which could enhance the accountability regime of ACLEI, and considers that should
be a matter on which the Minister reports annually to Parliament.
3.126
While the committee accepts providing detailed
reasons for the issuing of each clause 149 certificate may be impractical,
it remains important for the transparency of the overall system that certain
information is available to the Parliament on the operation of the proposed
section. It should be possible, without prejudicing security, to publish a
report that includes, for example, the number of times clause 149
certificates have been issued by the Minister; the number of documents exempted
by the certificate, and from which agency the information derives. Such
generalised information would give an indication of the extent to which the
power is being used and the amounts of information being excluded from the
Commissioner's inquiries.
Recommendation 9
3.127
The committee recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended to require the Minister
to provide a report to Parliament on the proposed section 149 certificates
he or she has provided in the previous financial year.
Parliamentary Joint Committee
3.128
The duties and powers for the proposed Parliamentary
Joint Committee set out in Part 14 of the Bill, appear closely similar to those
of the existing Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime
Commission (the PJC on the ACC) and expressly preclude the committee from
investigating an ACLEI corruption issue, reconsidering the Integrity
Commissioner’s decisions or making recommendations in relation to a particular
corruption issue.
3.129
The committee notes that the Review of the Australian Crime Commission
Act 2002 conducted by the PJC on the ACC identified the importance of
parliamentary scrutiny and accountability, and in particular, differentiating
between parliamentary and executive accountability.[128]
3.130
The desirability of having such parliamentary
oversight is accepted and endorsed. However, it is legitimate to consider
whether it is necessary to create a second PJC that is so similar to the
existing committee tasked with scrutinising the AC. In the context, the
committee notes that the PJC on the ACC considered this issue in detail in its
review, and recommended an expansion of its jurisdiction to cover all Commonwealth
Law Enforcement agencies including the ACLEI.[129]
3.131
The representative from the Attorney General's
Department did not consider this to be a practical option. The Department
argued that it was appropriate to establish a new PJC to oversee ACLEI to
ensure consistency with the previous practice to establish a specialised
committee to oversee the use of special coercive powers.[130] It was not considered appropriate to
give this task to the existing PJC on the ACC because 'while it will have
similar powers, ACLEI has a different function from the ACC'.[131]
3.132
The Department acknowledged that a 'degree of
duplication' with the roles of existing committees with law enforcement interests
(including the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee itself) was
unavoidable, but that this ought not to be the primary consideration for the
decision.[132]
3.133
The Department pointed out that:
ACLEI has a different function from the ACC and will deal with
agencies that are not subject to oversight by the PJC-ACC. At the outset the
ACC will account for just over 10% of the total number of people within the
Integrity Commissioner’s jurisdiction.[133]
3.134
The Department further argues that a broader
jurisdiction would tend to distract the PJC on the ACC from its focus on the
operation of the ACC and the challenges posed by organised crime.
3.135
In reality however, a focus on the 'challenges
of organised crime' precludes a sole focus on the ACC. All issues of organised
crime are investigated jointly by combinations of Commonwealth law enforcement
agencies, and thus, in each inquiry conducted by the PJC on the ACC, it was
necessary to consult with not only the ACC but the AFP, Customs and others.
3.136
To suggest that it is 'inappropriate' for a
committee to have oversight of both the ACLEI and the ACC implies some conflict
in the two roles – an argument that is unsubstantiated and suggests a
misunderstanding of the role of parliamentary scrutiny in an overall
accountability framework.
3.137
Consideration of this issue requires an
understanding of the particular strengths and weaknesses of parliamentary
scrutiny. As the Review of the ACC Act identified, the PJC is most effective in
four key areas.
-
First, providing scrutiny of financial
expenditure (through the examination of the Annual Reports).
-
Second, enable the development of parliamentary
expertise on law enforcement powers and activities, crucial to effective
legislative activity.
-
Third, providing a forum for public debate in an
otherwise (necessarily) rather secretive and opaque area of government
operations.
-
Finally, by a combination of all these, the
parliamentary committee is best placed to take an overall systems-view of the accountability
framework, and the powers and jurisdictions of the various agencies that
comprise that framework. Importantly, this operates outside of the operational
focus of executive government and its agencies.[134]
3.138
However, neither the PJC on the ACC nor the
proposed PJC on the ACLEI are able to investigate particular matters – both by
reason of legislative limits, and because they lack the skills and resources to
conduct investigations. It is for these reasons that the PJC on the ACC supported
the need for an investigative agency such as the ACLEI.
3.139
As noted above, in recognition of its dual focus
on both law enforcement and integrity issues the PJC on the ACC recommended the
broadening its jurisdiction to include the ACC, the ACLEI, and the AFP. This
approach was considered to be the best way to maximise the effectiveness of the
strengths of parliamentary oversight in assessing the integrity of the overall
system, and the expertise of the parliamentarians who are members of the
committee.
3.140
Conversely, creating separate committees
duplicates accountability mechanisms, requires extra parliamentary resources
and fails to capitalise on the synergies of knowledge across these similar
areas.
3.141
The committee agrees with this analysis and
endorses the recommendation to create a single PJC for Commonwealth Law
Enforcement with jurisdiction over both the ACLEI and the law enforcement
agencies that are subject to ACLEI’s oversight.
Recommendation 10
3.142
The committee recommends that Part 14 of the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended to provide the existing
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission with
jurisdiction to scrutinise the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement
Integrity and those Commonwealth law enforcement agencies subject to its
oversight.
Review provisions
3.143
The committee notes that the LEIC Bill
makes no provision for a review of the legislation. The establishment of the
proposed Commission is a significant development in the Commonwealth's overall
integrity framework and, as this report has suggested, there are several
significant aspects of the Commission's jurisdiction, powers, proceedings and
relationships that need to be resolved over the first couple of years of
operation. As such, the committee considers it important that a review of
legislation be carried out after the first few years of operation of the Act.
3.144
In this respect, the committee notes that a requirement
for an independent review of the legislation was contained in the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002.[135] Where this review is performed by
the parliamentary committee charged with the supervision of the Commission, a dual
purpose is served by both conducting the review and providing the committee
with a forum for developing its own expertise in the provisions and operation
of the Act.
Recommendation 11
3.145
The committee recommends that the Law
Enforcement Integrity Commissioner Bill 2006 be amended to provide for a review
three years from the date of commencement of the Act.
Definition of 'corruption issue'
3.146
The expression 'corruption issue' is defined in
clause 7 of the LEIC Bill. A corruption
issue exists where a staff member of a 'law enforcement agency':
- has, or may have,
engaged in corrupt conduct; or
- is, or, may be,
engaging in corrupt conduct; or
- will, or may at
any time in the future, engage in corrupt conduct.
3.147
As
discussed earlier, a 'law enforcement agency' is defined as the AFP, ACC,
former NCA, or any other Commonwealth government agency that has a law
enforcement function and is prescribed by regulation.[136]
3.148
'Engaged in corrupt conduct' is defined broadly
in clause 6 as abuse of office as a staff member of the agency; conduct that
perverts the course of justice; or conduct that involves, or is engaged in for
the purpose of, corruption of any other kind.
3.149
Dr Brown
claimed that the definition of a 'corruption issue' 'focuses squarely on the
fact that official corruption can really take the form of any kind of abuse of
official office or public trust'.[137]
3.150
Given that ACLEI's focus is the detection,
prevention and investigation of corruption, Dr Brown
strongly supported this broad definition of corruption used in the LEIC Bill.[138] In evidence, he stated:
There has been an unfortunate trend around Australia
in many jurisdictions for definitions of corrupt conduct or improper conduct to
become more technical, more convoluted, more narrow and more difficult to
administer and to then be used to hamper the jurisdiction of the bodies
involved... .[139]
3.151
Mr James
Torr, Chief Executive Officer, Australian
Federal Police Association and Delegate, National Council, Police Federation of
Australia, argued that the Bill should contain
examples to provide practical guidance to people as to what would constitute
corruption. Mr Torr
did however accept that this approach could be problematic because what
constitutes 'corruption' will depend on the factual context presented at any
given time.[140]
3.152
An alternate definition of corruption – the one
used by the ICAC in NSW – was put forward as a preferable approach by the
Police Federation of Australia as it contains a more exhaustive standard.[141] 'Corruption' is defined at sections 7
and 8 of the Independent Commission
Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW). Generally speaking, the Act defines
corrupt conduct as a variety of conducts relating to the adverse or dishonest
use of a person's official functions or misusing information that they have
gained in the course of their official functions.[142]
3.153
In acknowledging the two definitional
approaches, a representative from the Attorney-General's Department explained
that there is a policy of following the existing definitions of corruption used
in Commonwealth legislation so as to ensure 'uniformity'.[143] Thus, substantially the same
definition of corruption should be used as in legislation dealing with
forfeiture of superannuation benefits by people convicted of corruption
offences, namely the Crimes
(Superannuation Benefits) Act 1989 and Part
VA of the AFP Act.[144]
As 'downstream' consequences of a conclusion by the Integrity
Commissioner that a person had engaged in corrupt conduct would potentially
include conviction for a 'corruption offence' and forfeiture of superannuation
benefits, it was considered important that the definitions at both stages
should be consistent.[145]
3.154
The Department did not see any clear advantage
in adopting the 'complex definition' used in the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988 (NSW).[146]
3.155
In commenting on the scope of the definition of
'corruption issue', the Attorney-General's Department stated:
I do not think ultimately it would be either more or less
rigorous [than the ICAC definition]. It just goes into less fine detail.[147]
Committee view
3.156
The
community expects the AFP and the ACC to perform their duties with honesty and
in the best interests of the public and the Commonwealth. Corrupt conduct
involves a breach of public trust and leads to inequality, wasted resources and
wasted public money.
3.157
The committee supports the use of a broad
definition of 'corruption' as proposed by the Bill.
Though some have argued that the definition is too broad, the use of a narrower
definition may limit the conduct, activities and issues that trigger the
application of the proposed legislation (though the committee notes that no
evidence presented to the inquiry suggests that state legislative standards –
such as the ICAC definition – have constrained the activities of state bodies
in any way). The committee believes that ACLEI should not be limited by
definitional issues in the exercise of its power and resources.
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