Labour market testing requirements and the use of labour agreements
4.1
The committee heard a range of views about the effectiveness of the current
labour market testing arrangements that are required in most instances when
employers seek to employ overseas workers on a Temporary Skills Shortage (TSS)
visa. The committee also received considerable evidence about the use of the
labour agreement stream of the TSS visa.
4.2
This chapter discusses this evidence and examines whether these measures
are achieving their intended outcomes.
Overview of labour market testing requirements
4.3
Employers seeking to nominate a worker for a TSS visa are required to
undertake labour market testing (LMT) to demonstrate that no suitably qualified
and experienced Australian is readily available to fill the nominated position.
4.4
The joint submission from the Department of Home Affairs, Department of
Jobs and Small Business, and Department of Education and Training (Joint
Departmental Submission) explained that, to meet the labour market testing
requirement, standard business sponsors must provide evidence when submitting
the online nomination application 'to demonstrate that they have tested the
local labour market within the four months prior to nominating a skilled
overseas worker for a TSS visa, over at least four weeks'.[1] Additional requirements include that:
- advertisements must be in English and specify skill and/or
experience requirements;
- the position salary must also be specified in the advertisement
for positions with salaries less than AUD $94,600; and
- LMT must include at least two advertisements using the methods of
a national recruitment website, national print media/radio or business website
of accredited sponsors.
4.5
A number of these requirements came into effect in August 2018, as a
result of successful amendments moved by the Opposition during the passage of
the Migration Amendment (Skilling Australians Fund) Act 2018 through the parliament.[2]
4.6
Recruitment practices undertaken by sponsors must also satisfy
Australian workplace, equal opportunity and non-discrimination laws:
That is, job vacancies including those lodged on company
websites and with labour hire firms, should be available to Australian jobs
seekers and should not target applications from persons holding particular visa
types or from specific foreign countries.[3]
4.7
The current LMT settings for the TSS visa are outlined in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1 Labour Market Testing Settings for the TSS visa[4]
Duration of LMT |
• Minimum of four weeks
• Applications must be accepted for four weeks |
Period of LMT |
• Four months immediately prior to lodgement
• Four months since redundancies |
Method of advertising |
• At least two advertisements required
• Recruitment website with national reach (including Linkedln
recruitment platform)
• Business website of accredited sponsors
• Print media/radio with national reach |
Information required in the advertisement |
• Position title/description
• Salary/salary range (if lower than $96,400)
• Company/recruitment agency (company name need not be disclosed if
using a recruitment agency)
• Skills or experience requirements
• Must be in English |
Evidence requirements |
• Copy of advertisements
• For positions subject to alternative requirements—a submission
explaining why an Australian worker is not available |
Positions subject to alternative requirements |
• Where a new nomination is required for an existing visa holder
because of a change in business structure or pay
• Internationally recognised record of exceptional achievement in a
profession or field, e.g. sport, academia and research, top-talent chef
• Intra-corporate transferees
• Positions with annual earnings of $250,000 or more
• Key medical occupations |
Exemption to LMT requirement |
• Exemption where international trade obligation applies |
4.8
As noted above, these current settings are a result of changes
implemented in August 2018, designed to strengthen LMT obligations. The Joint
Departmental Submission stated that the LMT settings 'are informed by the
approach taken by Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand
and feedback from stakeholders'. It noted further that the LMT settings 'seek
to strike a balance between prioritising Australian workers and recognising
industry recruitment practices'.[5]
4.9
The Department of Home Affairs noted that between 1 July 2018 and
28 February 2019, 1952 TSS visa nominations were refused for not
meeting the LMT criteria. This represented 39.5 per cent of total nomination
refusals in that period, and five per cent of total TSS nomination lodgements
in that period.[6]
4.10
Exemptions to the LMT requirements apply in some specific circumstances,
namely:
- where LMT would be inconsistent with Australia's international
trade obligations under the World Trade Organisation General Agreement on Trade
in Services;
- where LMT is precluded under Free Trade Agreements to which
Australia is a party; and
- where a TSS visa is applied for under a Minister of Religion
Labour Agreement.[7]
4.11
Submitters and witnesses expressed a considerable range of views on the
effectiveness of the strengthened labour market testing requirements introduced
in August 2018.
Arguments in support of maintaining or extending labour market testing
4.12
Various organisations expressed strong support for the ongoing use of
labour market testing arrangements to ensure the integrity of the temporary
skilled visa program. For example, the Australian Council of Trade Unions
stated:
In our submission, a legal requirement for labour market
testing to occur is a logical extension of the principle that the priority
should always be to employ Australians first. Without genuine labour market
testing, it is entirely unclear how the Government and the community, not to
mention affected workers, can be assured that Australian workers are in fact
being given priority.
Whether it is young people looking for their first job or
older workers looking get back into the workforce or change careers, they
deserve an assurance that they will have priority access to local jobs before
they can use temporary workers from overseas. That is why the labour market
testing requirements currently in place under the TSS visa program are so
important to ensure that employers have a legal obligation to employ
Australians first.[8]
4.13
To ensure a genuine skills shortage exists and that TSS workers are not
viewed as a cheap alternative workforce to Australian workers, proponents of
LMT argued that labour market testing provides some assurance that employers
have made 'all reasonable efforts to find a suitably qualified Australian for
the position' prior to accessing workers from overseas.[9]
4.14
Stakeholders calling for a further strengthening of labour market testing
argued that in some circumstances employers are circumventing the intent of LMT requirements,
including by:
- offering unreasonably poor wages and conditions in local
advertising in order to access cheaper labour through temporary skilled
migrants;
- setting unrealistic and unwarranted skills and experience
requirements for vacant positions, with the effect of excluding otherwise
suitable Australian applicants;
- failing to develop their own local workforce and then using LMT
advertising merely as a 'tick box' exercise, with no real intention of hiring
Australian workers; and
- employers not considering applications received by Australian
workers during the LMT process.[10]
Ensuring that there has been a
genuine attempt to source local labour
4.15
The committee heard that the LMT system should be structured to ensure
that employers are making genuine attempts to source local labour before
resorting to seeking workers on temporary skilled visas.
4.16
The Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union (AMIEU) expressed concern
that employers are undertaking labour market testing disingenuously, by
offering unreasonably poor wages and conditions in local advertisements in
order to access cheaper labour through temporary skilled migrants.[11] For example,
employers might inflate their employment standards for local applicants to an
artificially high level so they can assert they have attempted but failed to
find local labour and there is no independent process to assess whether such
rejections were based on genuine concerns.[12] The AMIEU submitted further:
It is not enough to say that there are constant adverts for
workers in local agencies or media... Employers should be able to demonstrate to
an audit process that the reasons for rejecting applicants [were] based on
genuine concerns.[13]
Case studies where genuine attempts
to source local labour have been made
4.17
The committee heard several case studies of where, in the same industry
in a regional area, some businesses had made genuine attempts to source and
train local labour and were successfully utilising a local workforce, while
other businesses in the same region were relying on temporary skilled visa
workers.
4.18
Mr Ian McLauchlan, Assistant Secretary of the AMIEU's Queensland branch,
told the committee at its Mackay public hearing that in the meat industry in
regional Queensland, some companies have invested sufficiently in local
advertising and training to source a domestic labour supply, while other
companies who do not make this investment are reliant on temporary skilled
workers.[14] Mr McLauchlan gave several case studies, including the following:
In late 2016-17, at a little plant up near Mareeba locals
could not get a job. We did a campaign up there and went to the media. We had a
meeting on plant and got 225 local applicants that wanted to work, so that blew
up the argument that the company was saying that they couldn't get locals. We
have now got locals employed in that plant that are spending their money in the
local community, and I think there are at the moment about 10 visa workers on
that plant.[15]
4.19
Similarly, Mr Jason Lund, Mackay Organiser for the Australian
Manufacturing Workers' Union, told the committee of a regional company who, in
consultation with the union, had decided to upskill local employees rather than
advertising for temporary visa workers to fill those roles.[16]
Advertising with appropriate wages
and conditions
4.20
The AMIEU argued that wages and conditions should form part of the LMT advertising
process, to ensure that advertisements reflect the fair market value of labour
when assessing whether a genuine attempt to obtain labour was made. This would
mean that advertisements offering default award wages, or offering inflexible or
unfriendly work conditions (such as work shifts longer than eight hours per day
or constant weekend shifts), could be rejected as a genuine attempt to fill
skill shortages if the local market would otherwise demand better wages and
conditions.[17]
4.21
Mr Damian Kyloh, Associate Director of Economic and Social Policy for
the ACTU, argued that in many instances employers should be addressing
recruitment difficulties by offering increased wages and conditions rather than
resorting to the skilled visa system. My Kyloh cited a study undertaken by
academics at the University of Sydney Business School, which surveyed employers
using the temporary skilled visa system:
They have actually gone and asked employers who use the TSS
visa system: what are your options for and what are your preferences for
filling those recruitment difficulties? Less than one per cent said they would
actually increase wages to deal with the problem and only 11 per cent said they
were prepared to train existing staff. So there is strong empirical evidence
which, I think, goes to the fundamental problem of our visa system—that
employers are not training existing staff or raising wages to fill where they
have recruitment difficulties. The evidence also speaks to the difference
between a recruitment difficulty and a genuine skills shortage. Employers, at
the moment, where they have a small recruitment difficulty, are going first to
the visa system rather than training workers and raising wages. The empirical
evidence and the theory behind this says there is really only a genuine skills
shortage once you raise wages and then you can still not source the labour.
That is not what is happening at the moment, so I think that empirical evidence
is really important.[18]
Recommended changes to general LMT
requirements
4.22
The ACTU and other submitters made specific recommendations about how
the LMT regime could be strengthened. The ACTU recommended that 'more rigorous
evidentiary requirements for labour market testing be incorporated into
legislation and associated program guidelines' in order to ensure that the
intent of the legislation is achieved and Australian employment opportunities
are protected.[19] This could include:
- a mandatory requirement for all jobs to be genuinely advertised
as part of labour market testing obligations;
- a crackdown on job advertisements that set unrealistic and
unwarranted skills and experience requirements for vacant positions, with the
effect of excluding otherwise suitable Australian applicants;
- a ban on job advertisements that target only overseas workers or
specified visa class workers to the exclusion of Australian citizens and
permanent residents;
- making information and data on the TSS occupations list and the
operation of LMT provisions publicly accessible on at least a quarterly basis.[20]
Arguments in favour of reducing labour market testing requirements
4.23
Contrastingly, some submitters and witnesses argued that labour market
testing requirements should either be abolished entirely, or curtailed in order
to address practical concerns. Concerns raised by these stakeholders included
that the current labour market testing requirements:
- create unnecessary red tape for businesses;
- are ineffective in achieving the stated outcome of protecting
Australian jobs; and
- are impractical due to the prescriptive restrictions on
timeframes for undertaking labour market testing and the way in which it must
be conducted.
4.24
The Law Council of Australia described the current LMT requirements as
cumbersome, inflexible, and creating a negative impact in certain
circumstances.[21]
Concerns that labour market testing
creates unnecessary red tape for business
4.25
Various submitters raised concerns about the administrative burden
placed on businesses from LMT. The Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(ACCI) expressed its support for either abolishing LMT for TSS visas, or easing
it for high‑wage occupations and renewals, and described LMT as an additional
layer on top of the 'enormous application costs and ballooning delays' that businesses
must navigate. It argued that LMT severely restricts businesses' ability to respond
flexibly to their workforce needs.[22]
4.26
The ACCI commented further that the debate about LMT 'has become an
ideological battle that ignores the evidence', arguing that it 'adds little
value' and significantly increases the red tape burden.[23]
4.27
Dr Gavin Lind, General Manager, Workforce and Innovation, Minerals
Council of Australia, told the committee:
Given the high cost of sponsorship, the additional burden of
the Skilling Australians Fund levy, resourcing imposts and restrictions on
industry in seeking skilled migrants to step into hard-to-fill critical
positions, the use of temporary skilled migrants is seen as a last resort to
respond to meeting industry skills needs. When industry seeks to employ skilled
migrants, that action is undertaken with confidence that all other options have
been exhausted. Labour market testing continues to be an unnecessary and
ineffective administrative requirement that will become more acute during
periods of high demand for skills and really should be abolished.[24]
Proposals to waive labour market
testing requirements in certain circumstances
4.28
The Minerals Council submitted that if LMT requirements are not
abolished entirely, they should be limited to specific industries or concern:
Given the fact that use of the temporary skills visa system
clearly responds to economic cycle in our industry, combined with the lack of
reported abuses in our sector, there is a clear case for lifting labour market
testing requirements in relation to occupations common in our industry. It
would be far more appropriate for Government to "manage by exception"
in terms of applying labour market testing to "problem" sectors or
occupations or dealing with abuses via other means.[25]
4.29
Restaurant & Catering Australia expressed a similar view, recommending
that LMT requirements should be waived for TSS visas 'where there is clear and
demonstrated shortage across an occupation [or] industry over an extended
period of time, such as exists in the hospitality sector'.[26]
Labour market testing for
occupations on the medium to long term skills list
4.30
Tourism Accommodation Australia (TAA) argued that labour market testing
should not be required for occupations that are listed on the Medium and Long
Term Skills Shortage List (MLTSSL), as they are occupations for which there is
already a well-documented skills shortage:
Given that the composition of occupations on the MLTSSL is
based on empirical data demonstrating both prevailing and long-term skills
shortages, TAA believes labour market testing is redundant and should not be
required for these occupations. If the settings are correctly put in place and
data is regularly supplied on shortages, labour market testing should not pose
a further delay to equipping the accommodation sector with the workers it
needs.[27]
4.31
The Minerals Council agreed with this view, arguing that occupations in
the mining sector, requiring both professional and trades skills, are projected
to remain in shortages into the medium term. A reversal of the LMT policy would
be 'one less obstacle to combatting these skills shortages'.[28]
Labour market testing requirements
for visa renewals
4.32
ACCI and other submitters argued that labour market testing should not
be required for visa renewals, particularly where visa workers are staying with
their current employer; rather, labour market testing should only be required
at the time of the initial visa application of the worker.[29]
4.33
The Law Council of Australia, which expressed support for waiving LMT
requirements for all visa renewal applications in which the nominee is already
employed by the sponsor, stated that in these situations, an employer is
expected to test the local labour market before nominating any incumbent TSS
visa holder for a further visa. In such a situation, the current policy creates
a number of problems, including unnecessary work and expense for the business
with no recruitment outcome.[30] The Law Council argued further that advertising in these circumstances exposes
a business to claims of false advertising and potential legal action under employment
law.[31]
Requirements around the form of
advertising required for labour market testing
4.34
Some submitters expressed concern that the forms of advertising required
under the LMT guidelines are overly prescriptive and do not match with how many
industries conduct recruitment activities. For example, the Motor Trades
Association of Australia submitted:
The issue of labour market testing requirement is a
significant concern for MTAA and members and their business constituents as LMT
requirements include methodologies that have largely been abandoned by most
industries in the automotive sector.
It is the experience of retail motor traders that these forms
of recruitment involving formal advertising in print and online do not work for
the automotive sector; instead labour is sourced from Group Training
Organisations (for apprentices) or through word-of-mouth (for qualified
labour). Therefore the LMT used is of little use for automotive employer
sponsors and negatively impacts the ability of retail motor traders to
undertake the employer nomination process.[32]
4.35
The National Farmers Federation (NFF) argued that the LMT advertising
requirements are 'fundamentally flawed' as they fail to provide an accurate
representation of local demand for agricultural jobs. It stated that labour
market testing is a 'generally onerous process for farmers for little
return...especially given labour shortages are a known problem for their industry
and arguably shouldn't need to be proven'.[33]
4.36
The Migration Institute of Australia submitted that the requirement for
advertisements to have a national reach does not reflect the reality that the
Australian workforce is largely immobile, and cannot simply 'pack up families
and homes and relocate'.[34] Such advertising requirements are therefore 'unlikely to have any significant
impact on reducing the reliance on overseas skilled workers or reducing genuine
temporary skilled shortages'.[35]
Concerns around timeframes required
for undertaking labour market testing
4.37
The committee heard concerns from stakeholders in the higher education,
technology and medical research sectors that the maximum time period allowable between
completing labour market testing and visa nomination (currently set at four
months) is too short.[36]
4.38
These submitters argued that when undertaking recruitment for highly
qualified research, academic and professional positions in a competitive global
market, lead times associated with recruitment processes are often in the order
of six to nine months. In these circumstances, the LMT requirement of having
completed advertising process within the preceding four months before lodging a
visa nomination is unworkable and can lead to perverse outcomes.[37] Such outcomes have included, for example, universities being forced to
re-advertise high level positions due to LMT timeframe requirements, when a successful
candidate had already been identified.[38]
4.39
It was recommended by these stakeholders that the required timeframes
for LMT advertising be increased to six or nine months, or alternately that LMT
requirements be waived for certain high level occupations in these industries.[39]
Interpretation of changes made to
labour market testing requirements in 2017
4.40
Australian Pork Limited (APL), the national representative body for
Australian pork producers, expressed concern that the approach of labour market
testing assessors within the Department of Home Affairs has changed since 2017:
Although the changes to the labour market testing (LMT)
regime introduced in 2017 were not too extensive or unreasonable on paper, APL
members applying for TSS visa nominations have noticed a marked difference in
the attitudes of assessing officials.
Arbitrary and subjective judgements on applicants LMT
processes are being employed to block access to much-needed skilled workers.
For example, one producer was told—even though he had fulfilled all the LMT requirements
on the application—the assessor did not feel the producer had carried out the LMT
in good faith. The decision was not based on any failure to complete any step
of the LMT process, just the assessing official's gut feeling. This is not an
isolated experience.[40]
Waivers of labour market testing requirements because of international trade
agreements
4.41
As noted earlier in this chapter, exemptions to LMT requirements apply
in circumstances where:
- LMT would be inconsistent with Australia's international trade
obligations under the World Trade Organisation General Agreement on Trade in
Services; or
- LMT is precluded under Free Trade Agreements to which Australia
is a party.
4.42
The ACTU argued that the current waivers of labour market testing
requirements because of international trade agreements should be abolished
because these arrangements create loopholes that undermine local jobs and
create a class of vulnerable low paid foreign workers.[41] The ACTU commented
specifically on the recently signed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP11):
In recent months with the ratification of the TPP11 the
Australian Government has yet again entered into a free trade agreement where
it has removed the obligation on employers to conduct labour market testing
before temporary overseas workers fill Australian jobs. Australian and overseas
companies will be able to employ unlimited numbers of workers from 6 additional
TPP member countries in hundreds of occupations across nursing, engineering and
the trades without any obligation to provide evidence of genuine efforts to
first recruit Australian workers. In doing so, Australia has agreed to the
worst deal of any TPP country in terms of what it has given up in relation to
migration safeguards. The Government should not support an agreement that
removes this basic protection in support of Australian jobs.[42]
4.43
The Electrical Trades Union (ETU) submitted that free trade agreements
create loopholes for skills assessments, as labour movement chapters in free
trade agreements exclude foreign workers from the usual visa application
processes. This is highlighted by the 'temporary entry of business persons'
provisions of trade agreements, which has seen the 'creation of a visa class
that avoids any checks and balances relating to skills and specifically exempts
the workers from Australian wages and conditions'.[43]
4.44
The ACTU made specific recommendations in this area, as follows:
- Labour market testing should apply to all occupations under the
TSS visa program. Existing exemptions because of international trade agreements
should be removed.
- There should be no further waivers of labour market testing in
trade agreements entered into by Australia. Any review of labour market
testing, rules should be the subject of proper consultation with unions and
other stakeholders including consultation through a new independent, tripartite
Ministerial Advisory Council on Skilled Migration (MACSM).
- Where Australian Governments nevertheless continue to make
commitments on the 'movement of natural persons' in free trade agreements that
provide exemptions from domestic labour market testing laws, those commitments
should not be extended to the category of 'contractual service suppliers' given
the expansive meaning given to that term across professional, technical and
trade occupations.
- The Migration Regulations should be amended as necessary to make
clear that labour market testing applies not only to 'standard business
sponsors' under the standard TSS (457) visa program, but applies also to all
positions nominated by 'approved sponsors' under any labour agreement,
Enterprise Migration Agreement (EMA) or Designated Area Migration Agreement
(DAMA).[44]
Arguments supporting LMT waivers in
trade agreements
4.45
Conversely, ACCI argued that fears over LMT waivers in international
trade agreements are unfounded, claiming there is a lack of evidence suggesting
any negative impacts.[45] To the contrary, ACCI submitted that available evidence did not support claims
that waivers will threaten Australian jobs:
In the year before ChAFTA [China-Australia Free Trade
Agreement], there were 3,520 primary applications granted for Chinese workers
under the 457-visa program. In 2017–18, only 1,700 Chinese worker applications
for temporary skilled visas were granted—less than half. Exemptions from LMT do
not result in hordes of foreigners gaining access to our labour market.[46]
Use of labour agreements in the temporary skilled visa system
4.46
The committee heard a considerable range of evidence on the utilisation
of the labour agreement stream of the TSS visa subclass.[47]
4.47
A labour agreement is a formal agreement between an Australian employer
and the Australian Government and is used by employers to recruit foreign
workers on a permanent or temporary basis. As explained in the Joint
Departmental Submission:
[Labour agreements] enable approved Australian businesses
facing unique labour shortages with an option to sponsor skilled overseas
workers when there is a demonstrated need that cannot be met in the Australian
labour market and standard skilled visa programs are not available. ... [The
Labour Agreement] program provides an important flexible solution to support
Australian businesses where required and where associated risks can be managed—with
[labour agreements] considered on a case-by-case basis to maintain the
integrity of the program.[48]
4.48
As at 30 September 2018, there were 346 labour agreements in effect,
which is an increase from 313 labour agreements in effect at the same point in
2017.[49]
4.49
There are five main types of labour agreements available, as outlined
below.
Company-specific agreements
4.50
Company-specific agreements are developed directly between the
Department of Home Affairs and an employer, and are considered where a genuine
skills or labour shortage exists for an occupation not covered by an industry
labour agreement, or relevant project or designated area migration agreement.
The terms are company-specific and considered on a case-by-case basis.[50]
Global talent scheme (GTS)
4.51
The Joint Departmental Submission stated that agreements under the
Global Talent Scheme:
...are for businesses, including Australian start-ups, seeking
to fill a small number of niche highly-skilled roles, where their needs cannot
be met under existing skilled entry programs. Compared to traditional labour
agreements, the GTS provides fast processing and flexible concessions for
approved participants via an Established Business stream and a start-up stream.[51]
4.52
The Global Talent Scheme was announced in March 2018, and scheduled to
commence on 1 July 2018 as a one-year pilot program. However, the advisory
panel with the function of assessing applications under the start-up stream was
not established until 23 October 2018. At 31 January 2019, only
8 visas had been granted under the established business scheme and no
visas had been issued under the start-up stream.[52]
Industry agreements
4.53
Industry agreements provide fixed terms and conditions specific to an
industry, and are agreed to by the Minister in consultation with industry
stakeholders. Such an agreement is considered if the Department of Home Affairs
has received evidence from a number of submissions to support a claim of ongoing
labour shortages within the industry. An industry agreement cannot be changed
once it is in place. There are currently seven industry agreements: dairy,
fishing, meat, minister of religion, on-hire, pork and restaurant (fine
dining).[53]
Designated area migration
agreements (DAMAs)
4.54
DAMAs are agreements between the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship
and Multicultural Affairs and State and Territory Governments or regional
bodies to provide a defined geographic region with foreign workers beyond those
available via the TSS and ENS visa programs by: allowing variation to standard
occupations and skills lists; and allowing negotiable concessions to the
standard skilled visa program requirements.[54] These can include, for example, concessions on the level of the Temporary
Skilled Migration Income Threshold and English language requirements.
4.55
DAMAs allow for a set maximum number of overseas workers to be nominated
each year. The terms of each DAMA are negotiated individually and are 'tailored
to the unique economic and labour market conditions of each regional area'.[55]
4.56
Five DAMAs are currently in place:
- The Northern Territory DAMA (where a new DAMA was agreed to in
December 2018, following the completion of an initial DAMA in place since 2015).[56]
- The Greater South Coast region of Victoria DAMA (announced on 10 December
2018).[57]
- The Adelaide City Technology and Innovation Advancement Agreement
DAMA (announced on 21 March 2019).[58]
- The Regional South Australia DAMA (announced on 21 March 2019).[59]
- The Kalgoorlie-Boulder DAMA (announced on 21 March 2019).[60]
4.57
The Minister stated in December 2018 that discussions are underway in
relation to potential DAMAs with other regions, including the Pilbara region
in WA, Cairns in far North Queensland and the Orana region in central NSW.[61]
4.58
Of the five DAMAs currently in place, full details of the agreement are
only publicly available in relation to the Northern Territory DAMA.[62]
Project agreements
4.59
Project agreements allow skilled and specialised semi-skilled temporary
foreign workers to work on infrastructure or resource development projects
where there are genuine skills or labour shortages. They are designed to
complement existing Australian Government initiatives to address skill and
labour shortages by ensuring that shortages do not create constraints on major
projects and jeopardise Australian jobs.[63]
General requirements for all labour
agreements
4.60
The Joint Departmental Submission noted employers accessing labour
agreement are required 'to provide specific details for each of the occupations
sought and the number of positions sought for each location and year' of the
proposed agreement. Additionally, labour agreements must:
- identify the relevant skills shortage in the business and why
these vacancies cannot be filled by the Australian workers;
- specify the number of skilled workers needed from outside
Australia; and
- provide the age, skill and English language requirements that
relate to the nominated occupations.[64]
Submitter support for labour
agreements
4.61
Some submitters expressed support for the use of labour agreements as a
necessary component of the skilled visa system. For example, the NFF commented
that these agreements are a 'means of overcoming some of the shortcomings—or rigidities—in the structure of the skilled
visa program, in particular where the ANZSCO codes are not reflective of the
business's needs'.[65]
4.62
The AMIEU expressed support for the template meat industry labour
agreement. It noted that this agreement was developed 'after exhaustive
negotiations with the industry', and submitted that it has 'proven effective in
in managing many issues
that had arisen prior to the agreement'.[66]
4.63
Australian Pork Limited commented that the Pork Industry Labour
Agreement (PILA) was developed because 'extensive industry-supported training,
development, and outreach programs' had not been enough to eliminate
long-standing and critical skills gaps in the pig production industry.[67] It noted that the PILA is the 'last‑remaining viable pathway for
meaningfully addressing skills shortages' in the industry.[68]
Arrangements for accessing labour
agreements
4.64
Some industry submitters supportive of labour agreements raised concerns
that agreements are difficult to access at an administrative and operational
level, or contain restrictive conditions. For instance, Australian Pork Limited
commented as follows in relation to the PILA:
Only the PILA retains a pathway to permanency, but access to
the agreement is being stymied at the operational level. Producers tell us they
are having difficulty at all levels of the system, mostly related to
unaccountable decision-making that lacks transparency, but also in terms of
bearing the cost of increased fees and extended timeframes.
It is as though officials on the working level are being
encouraged to obstruct access to the program, even when all formal requirements
are being met by applicants. This observation has been reported to APL by
producers, migration agents, and colleagues in other agricultural sectors with
similar requirements for skilled labour.[69]
4.65
The Australian Meat Industry Council argued that the template meat
industry labour agreement 'contains restrictions that limit the capacity to
provide long term certainty for both workers and company'.[70]
4.66
The NFF acknowledged that while labour agreements can be an effective
means to secure labour, they 'can be costly and time-consuming', and the
approval process 'features significant shortcomings'.[71]
4.67
The NFF relayed concerns that the 'template' arrangements for industry
labour agreements have taken up to two years to negotiate and implement,
requiring substantial commitment of private and public resources. Additionally,
requests by employers to access the agreements based on those template
arrangements can take more than six months to process:
This delay, during which the farm has to manage without the
necessary contingent of skilled staff, has a significant impact on business
productivity.[72]
Submitter and witness concerns
about the use of labour agreements
4.68
Other submitters and witnesses identified problems with the use of
labour agreements. For example, the ACTU's submission called for the abolition
of all labour agreements, stating:
Labour agreements create pools of exploitable workers. There
are currently [346] agreements with thousands of workers employed under them
with no evidence employers are taking any steps to train Australian workers in
the necessary skills or adequately test the local labour markets.[73]
4.69
Mr Zachary Duncalfe, National Legal Officer for the Australian
Workers' Union (AWU), told the committee that labour agreements:
...are subject to abuse by employers, are used far too
frequently, and are not subject to anything nearing the level of scrutiny that
should be required for agreements that have such significant potential to
negatively impact Australian workers in terms of employment opportunities,
career progression, training opportunities, and the maintenance of industry
terms and conditions of employment.[74]
Use of labour agreements where
there are no genuine skills shortages
4.70
Some stakeholders argued that labour agreements are being used in cases
where there is no genuine skills shortage that could not be filled by
Australian workers. Mr Duncalfe of the AWU argued that industry labour
agreements
...are the result of employer groups and employers unilaterally
determining what job classifications an industry is experiencing a 'shortage'
of and the terms and conditions of employment for these classifications. The
AWU's experience has been that employers seeking labour agreements are
generally only required to take minimal steps to demonstrate the relevant
positions have been advertised locally. The net result of such a system is that
Australian workers are denied employment and training opportunities in favour
of cheaper foreign labour.[75]
4.71
Mr Damian Kyloh of the ACTU raised a specific example where a labour
agreement was being used in questionable circumstances:
[W]e've had examples of labour agreements in fast food
work....That's work that was typically taken up by young teenage workers. That's
what I did for my first job as well. To have a labour agreement to bring in
temporary workers to do work in fast food outlets—I question whether there's a
genuine high-level skill shortage in fast food outlets.[76]
Excessive discretion in the
granting of labour agreements
4.72
The Law Council of Australia expressed concern at the increasing
prevalence of labour agreements in the TSS visa program, noting there has been
'a proliferation of labour agreement types and subtypes over the last few
years'.[77] It stated that labour agreements may have utility in some circumstances;
however, the labour agreement program should not be used simply as a means of
circumventing the usual requirements of the TSS visa.[78]
4.73
The Law Council expressed further concern at the lack of clear
boundaries around how labour agreements can be made, due to the fact that these
agreements sit outside the Migration Regulations:
The labour agreement regime is an unsatisfactory workaround
because the guidelines for approval sit entirely outside the [Migration]
Regulations and the outcome is subject to significant Departmental and
Ministerial discretion. A regime which is entirely discretionary,
non-compellable, and without the TSS regulatory framework is not an appropriate
mechanism for careful control of particular industries, occupations or regions.[79]
Lack of transparency around the
granting of labour agreements
4.74
The committee heard that there is a lack of transparency and
accessibility to information about individual company labour agreements. In
particular, the committee received evidence that during the process of a
company negotiating with the Department of Home Affairs to access a labour
agreement, there is only very limited scope for other relevant stakeholders to
provide input.
4.75
Commenting on requirements for companies to undertake consultation with
other relevant stakeholders when negotiating a labour agreement, the AWU noted
that in practice this can be extremely limited, and consist of nothing more
than sending a template letter to relevant stakeholders inviting input.[80] In these situations there is no requirement for the business or the Department
of Home Affairs to respond to any concerns raised by relevant stakeholders, no
opportunities for face-to-face discussions, and no visibility on whether
relevant stakeholders' concerns have been addressed.[81]
4.76
Mr Duncalfe of the AWU commented on the lack of communication in several
cases where the AWU had been contacted as part of a business's attempts to
access a labour agreement:
The AWU is a relevant industrial stakeholder for the purposes
of the proforma letter that must be completed and sent by employers seeking
labour agreements. However, we are shut out from all processes, including decisions
made by the department... We wish to make the point that we never hear from the
Department of Home Affairs, even when we copy them into our responses to
employers seeking labour agreements. We do not even get an email that confirms
our email has been received by the department. The department does not publish
any reasons for their decisions and we are not notified of those decisions
being made, even when we have been identified as a relevant industrial
stakeholder for that agreement. It is up to us to search on the Department of
Home Affairs website to find out if a labour agreement has been granted, and
even then the only information that we do receive is the company name and the
date of the agreement. We do not receive any information on whether any of our
submissions about the labour agreement have been heeded and we do not receive
any information about if the terms of the labour agreement have changed since
receiving our submissions or if the department has even required any further
submissions or amendments.[82]
Committee view
Labour market testing
4.77
The committee supports the principle of labour market testing (LMT) as a
means of ensuring that temporary skilled visas are only being utilised when
there is genuine evidence of a skills shortage that cannot be met by local
workers.
4.78
The committee is concerned by reports that employers may be
circumventing LMT by setting requirements in advertisements for vacant
positions that are different for domestic workers compared with visa holders,
to deliberately dissuade local applicants from applying. The committee is not
convinced, in instances such as these, by arguments that all domestic
applicants for jobs in particular industries are of low quality or unsuitable
for the position.
4.79
Further, given youth unemployment rates around the country and in
particular areas, employers should be willing to invest time and resources to
skill young Australians, as they have for decades in this country, rather than
turning to visa holders so that they are able to avoid this responsibility.
Arguments that LMT is not required
in some industries
4.80
The committee was not convinced by arguments from specific sectors that
labour market testing is unnecessary for their industries. Labour market
testing provides up-to-date evidence of a skills shortage in a particular
industry. Indeed, if undertaken correctly, this body of proof increases the
strength of arguments that specific sectors are continuing to experience skills
shortages and need to use the skilled visa system to fill vacancies. The
committee is also in favour of keeping existing requirements that labour market
testing should be required for visa renewals where workers are staying with
their current employer. The temporary skilled visa system is intended to fill temporary skills shortages; if these no longer exist, Australian citizens and permanent
residents should be prioritised to fill vacancies.
4.81
In some industries and some regions, particularly rural and regional
areas, there may indeed be genuine skills shortages. In other cases, however,
normal labour market conditions that regulate the market by ensuring that
employment conditions are satisfactory for both employers and workers, and wage
levels are increased to attract more and better candidates, may be suppressed
if employers are not genuinely looking to fill skilled positions with
Australian citizens and permanent residents.
Expense and form of LMT
advertisements
4.82
The committee notes evidence arguing that labour market testing
requirements are expensive for employers, particularly small business, and may
not be relevant in rural and regional areas, where word of mouth may be more
commonly used rather than online or print advertisements. The committee suggests
that the Australian Government should undertake further consultation with
regional stakeholders about how to implement appropriate labour market testing
requirements in these contexts that would help to prevent unscrupulous
employers avoid important regulatory measures and ensure Australian workers are
given priority.
Timelines for labour market testing
requirements
4.83
The committee notes concerns from stakeholders in the university,
technology and medical research sectors that in high-level recruitment processes
in these industries, the maximum time period allowable between completing
labour market testing and visa nomination (currently set at four months) is too
short. In the view of the committee, the Australian Government should give
consideration to extend LMT timeframes in these limited cases, to ensure that
Australia's research institutions are not missing out on top-level global
talent.
Need for proof of genuine labour
market testing
4.84
The committee considers that evidentiary proof of proper labour market
testing is the best measure to ensure that employers are not trying to avoid
normal labour market incentives that would make conditions better for workers,
or investing in training Australian workers. As such, the committee recommends
that the Australian Government introduce stricter requirements for labour
market testing, to promote the overall health of the Australian labour market.
Recommendation 8
4.85
The committee recommends that the Australian Government introduce more
stringent evidentiary requirements for labour market testing to ensure that the
intent of labour market testing arrangements is achieved and Australian
employment opportunities are protected.
Labour market testing exemptions in
international trade agreements
4.86
The committee is concerned about the potential impact of LMT waivers in
international trade agreements on Australian workers. The lack of proper
controls over the importation of skilled workers in these circumstances could
have a significant negative impact Australian employment conditions and
opportunities for Australian workers.
4.87
The committee notes calls from stakeholders that existing exemptions in
free trade agreements should be removed, and considers that, at a minimum, the
Australian Government should commit to including no labour market testing
waivers in future free trade agreements.
Recommendation 9
4.88
The committee recommends that the Australian Government resolve not to
enter into any future free trade agreements that would involve labour market
testing waivers.
Labour agreements
4.89
The committee recognises that labour agreements may in limited
circumstances provide a means to address genuine skills shortages. However,
evidence indicates that labour agreements may give rise to exploitation of
migrant workers, migrants being favoured as a cheap alternative to an
Australian workforce, and employers avoiding investing in jobs and skills
straining for locals.
4.90
The committee notes concerns raised during the inquiry about the lack of
opportunity for meaningful stakeholder engagement during the process of
businesses applying to access labour agreements. This is combined with a lack
of transparency around how final decisions are taken on company specific labour
agreements.
4.91
Given these issues, the committee recommends that the Australian Government
review the use and effectiveness of labour agreements issued under the skilled
migration program, and make necessary changes to ensure that labour agreements
arise because of genuine skills shortages, that all relevant stakeholders are
genuinely consulted and that the Department of Home Affairs publish its reasons
for entering into or renewing a labour agreement.
Recommendation 10
4.92
The committee recommends that the Australian Government undertake a
review of the use and effectiveness of labour agreements under Australia's
skilled migration program, and implement any necessary changes to ensure that:
- labour agreements are only entered into where there is publicly
demonstrated evidence of a genuine skills shortage that cannot be addressed by
the Australian workforce;
- all relevant stakeholders are genuinely consulted during the
process of finalising labour agreements and provided with appropriate feedback
in relation to concerns raised; and
- the Department of Home Affairs' reasons for entering into a
labour agreement (or a renewal of any labour agreement) are made publicly
available.
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