CHAPTER 4
AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION
Provisions in the Bill
4.1
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that:
The ACC, established under the ACC Act, is a statutory body
that works collaboratively with Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies, to
counter serious and organised crime in Australia. Using intelligence and
investigative strategies, the ACC endeavours to better position Australia to
meet and respond to the threats posed by serious and organised crime groups.[1]
4.2
Schedule 7 of the Bill would amend the ACC Act with the aim of improving
the operation and accountability of the ACC by:
(a) clarifying procedural powers for issuing summons and notices to produce;
(b) increasing the ACC’s powers to deal with uncooperative witnesses;
(c) adding the Commissioner of Taxation to the ACC Board; and
(d) requiring an independent review of the ACC every five years.[2]
4.3
Many of the changes proposed by the Bill respond to recommendations made
by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission (the
PJC) in the report on its inquiry into the Australian Crime Commission
Amendment Act 2007.[3]
Issuing summons and notices to
produce
4.4
Under Division 2 of Part II of the ACC Act, ACC examiners have coercive
information gathering powers, similar to those of a Royal Commission, which may
be used to obtain information in relation to a special ACC operation or
investigation.[4]
In particular, examiners have the power:
- to summons a person to appear before an examiner and require the
person to answer questions and to produce documents or other things (section
28); and
-
to issue a notice that requires a person to produce a document or
thing to a specified person (section 29).[5]
4.5
Subsections 28(1A) and 29(1A) require an examiner, when issuing a
summons or notice to be satisfied that it is reasonable in all the
circumstances to do so and to record in writing the reasons for the issue of
the summons or notice.[6]
At present under these provisions, the examiner may record his or her reasons
before, at the same time or as soon as practicable after the issue of the
summons or the notice. The Bill would amend subsections 28(1A) and 29(1A) so
that an examiner is required to record these reasons at or before the time the
summons or notice was issued.[7]
4.6
Subsections 28(8) and 29(5) currently provide that a failure by an
examiner to comply with various requirements for issuing a summons or notice
does not invalidate the summons or notice. In particular, these provisions
prevent a summons or notice being invalidated where the examiner fails to:
- record reasons for issuing the summons or notice;
- in the case of a summons, attach the relevant ACC Board
determination establishing the special operation or investigation to which the
summons relates; or
- to issue a non-disclosure notation under section 29A.[8]
4.7
The Bill would amend subsections 28(8) and 29(5) so that a failure to
comply with the requirements to record reasons will invalidate the summons or
notice. In addition, a failure to attach the relevant ACC Board determination
to a summons will invalidate the summons.[9]
4.8
The Bill would also amend subsections 29B(2) and (4) to ensure that, where
a notation under section 29A prohibits disclosures about a summons or notice,
this will not prevent disclosures:
- to the Ombudsman for the purposes of making a complaint under the
Ombudsman Act 1976; or
-
to the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity
(ACLEI) for the purpose of referring to the Integrity Commissioner an
allegation or information that raises a corruption issue.[10]
Powers to deal with uncooperative
witnesses
4.9
The ACC Act contains a number of criminal offences aimed at ensuring
that a person issued with a notice or summons complies with that notice or
summons. These offences are punishable by up to five years imprisonment or a
fine not exceeding 200 penalty units and relate to:
- failing to attend an examination;
-
failing to take an oath or affirmation;
- failing to produce a document;
- failing to answer questions;
- giving false or misleading evidence; and
- obstructing or hindering an examiner or the ACC.[11]
4.10
However, the Explanatory Memorandum argues that that are difficulties in
relation to these offences achieving the aim of ensuring witnesses comply with
notices and summons:
There are two issues with the offences as they currently
operate. Firstly, there is no immediate threat of detention. At present, if a
person is summonsed to appear as a witness and attends the examination but
refuses to cooperate, the matter is referred to the [Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions] and the prosecution proceeds by way of summons. As a
result, there is no immediate detention or threat of immediate detention to the
person. ...
Secondly, the effectiveness of these offences is often
compromised by the delay in the commencement of court proceedings. It can often
take a long time before a matter is brought before a court and even longer
before the court is able to deal with the matter. Witnesses have been prepared
to not cooperate with examiners, knowing that no penalty will be imposed for at
least 12-18 months. Witnesses are aware that they may also be able to avoid
criminal conviction (and therefore any penalty) by eventually agreeing to give
evidence prior to the completion of the criminal process knowing that the
evidence will have lost its value to the investigation by that stage. By
delaying when information is provided, a witness is able to effectively delay
and frustrate the operation of an ACC investigation.[12]
4.11
The Bill proposes to insert new provisions in the ACC Act which would
allow the ACC to refer a witness, who is not cooperating with an examination,
to a court to be dealt with as if the person was in contempt of that court.[13]
Similar powers were proposed for the National Crime Authority by the National
Crime Authority Legislation Amendment Bill 2000 but were rejected by the
Senate.[14]
4.12
Proposed section 34A would provide that a person is ‘in contempt of the ACC’
if he or she:
(a) refuses or fails:
(i) to take an oath or affirmation;
(ii) to answer a question; or
(iii) to produce a document or thing;
(b) provides false or misleading information to an examiner;
(c) obstructs or hinders an examiner in the performance of his or her
functions;
(d) disrupts an examination; or
(e) threatens a person present at an examination.[15]
4.13
In addition, proposed subsection 34A(b) would provide that a legal
practitioner is in contempt of the ACC if the practitioner:
- refuses to answer a question or produce a document on the basis of
legal professional privilege; and
-
also refuses to reveal the name and the address of the person to
whom the privilege applies.[16]
4.14
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the elements of proposed section
34A mirror the offences under the ACC Act related to not cooperating with an
ACC examination.[17]
4.15
Where an examiner considers that a person is in contempt of the ACC, proposed
subsection 34B(1) would allow the examiner to apply to a court for the person
to be dealt with in relation to the contempt.[18]
The examiner would have to inform the person that he or she proposes to make
such an application.[19]
4.16
The application would have to be accompanied by a certificate setting
out the grounds for the application and the evidence supporting it.[20]
Proposed subsection 34C(3) would provide that this certificate is prima facie
evidence of the matters it sets out.[21]
The person accused of the contempt would have to be given a copy of the
certificate either before or at the same time as the application is made.[22]
4.17
Proposed subsection 34B(5) would allow the court, after considering the
certificate and any evidence in support of the ACC or the person, to determine
that a person was in contempt of the ACC. Where the court did so, it would be
able to deal with the person as if he or she were in contempt of that court.[23]
4.18
Proposed subsection 34D(1) would empower an examiner, who proposes to
make a contempt application to a court, to direct an AFP officer or a state or
territory police officer to detain a person for the purposes of bringing him or
her before the court for contempt proceedings.[24]
Where an examiner does so, proposed subsection 34D(2) would require firstly
that the ACC to make the contempt application as soon as practicable and
secondly that the person be brought before the court as soon as practicable.[25]
4.19
The Bill would amend section 35A to ensure that, where a contempt
application is made to a court in relation to a person’s conduct and the person
is dealt with by the court in relation to that conduct, the person cannot be prosecuted
for an offence in relation to the same conduct. Conversely, if a person has
been prosecuted for an offence in relation to conduct, a contempt application
will not be able to be made in relation to the same conduct.[26]
4.20
The ACC submission noted that state agencies with similar powers to the
ACC to investigate serious and organised crime or official corruption have the
option of citing a witness for contempt before the state Supreme Court:
This power is rarely used but its availability appears to
have a salutary effect on witnesses. It raises the prospect of immediate
custody and detention for an initially indeterminate period, even if the
alleged [contemnor] is able to obtain bail pending a full hearing of the
contempt allegations. This is a strong motivation for an initially recalcitrant
witness to reconsider their position and purge their contempt by complying with
the original requirement.[27]
4.21
The independent review of the ACC Act conducted by Mr Mark Trowell QC in
2007 (the Trowell report) recommended that contempt provisions be introduced
into the ACC Act.[28]
The PJC has also supported such provisions noting that:
In view of the ACC's function to combat serious and organised
crime, the PJC considers that the ACC examiners should be given assistance to
enable them to overcome the difficulties presented by persons who deliberately
obstruct the ACC examination process with a view to frustrating special ACC
operations and investigations.
The committee is persuaded that a limited statutory
definition of contempt and a statutory power of referral would be appropriate.[29]
ACC Board
4.22
Item 7 of Schedule 7 would amend subsection 7B(2) of the ACC Act to
include the Commissioner of Taxation on the board of the ACC. The Explanatory
Memorandum outlines the rationale for the change:
The current membership of the Board provides for a diverse
range of issues and views to be considered in setting the ACC’s priorities. The
benefits of adding the Commissioner of Taxation as a Board member is that it
will further enhance the ACC Board’s expertise and, in light of significant
taxation related activity identified in ACC investigations and intelligence
operations, increase the ACC’s capability to counter the impact of serious and
organised crime.[30]
4.23
The Explanatory Memorandum notes that the PJC has recommended that the
Commissioner of Taxation be included on the board of the ACC on several
occasions.[31]
Accountability and review
4.24
Finally, the Bill would insert a new section 61A to provide for regular,
five-yearly reviews of the operation of the ACC Act. The first review would be of
the period five years from the commencement of Schedule 7. A review would not
have to be conducted in a particular five year period if a parliamentary
committee commences a review of the ACC Act in that period.[32]
Commenting on this amendment, the ACC acknowledged that:
...it is endowed with extraordinary powers to interfere with
the rights of individuals in order to combat a major social evil, in the form
of serious and organised crime, and that it is vitally important that these
coercive powers are not abused. Accordingly, it accepts that from time to time
its performance should be subject to review, to ensure that it is continuing to
use the coercive powers, and to perform its functions more generally, in a
responsible way, balancing its objectives in robustly addressing the threat of
serious and organised crime with sensitivity to the genuine requirements of
human rights in a democratic society.[33]
4.25
This amendment responds a recommendation of the PJC but the PJC
recommended the first review should occur no later than January 2011.[34]
4.26
In addition, the PJC recommended that the Commonwealth Ombudsman should
inspect records of ACC examiners to ensure compliance with the ACC Act and that
the Ombudsman should provide at least annual briefings to the PJC in relation
to the exercise of coercive powers by the ACC.[35]
However the Bill does not implement these recommendations.
Issues raised in submissions
4.27
The Western Australian Attorney-General expressed some concerns in
relation to the amendments to the ACC Act which would treat a contempt of the
ACC as if it were a contempt of court. In particular, the Attorney-General noted
that proposed subsection 34A(b) appears to prevail over legal professional
privilege.[36]
4.28
In addition, the Attorney-General pointed out that, under proposed subsection
34D(1), a legal practitioner could be placed in detention, before they are
convicted of contempt, for refusing to produce a document to which legal
professional privilege would otherwise apply. The Attorney-General argued that,
unless there are compelling examples to support the need for such a power, this
provision should be amended to provide for contempt applications to be dealt
with expeditiously by the courts rather than immediate detention at the behest
of the examiner.[37]
4.29
The Law Council similarly argued that:
...ACC examiners, who are not judicial officers, should not
be given the power to authorise a person’s detention, for whatever purpose or
period.[38]
4.30
Furthermore, the Law Council expressed concern:
...that the power to order a person’s detention pending
referral to the court is not directed at securing their attendance, but rather
is intended to operate in a punitive way and thus provide a very immediate
incentive for cooperation.[39]
4.31
The Law Council opposed the enactment of proposed subsection 34D but
suggested that, at least, proposed subsection 34D(1) should be amended to
specifically provide that an examiner may only direct that a person be detained
where he or she believes, on reasonable grounds, that it is necessary to detain
the person in order to secure that person’s attendance before the court.[40]
4.32
In the context of its inquiry into the Royal Commission Act 1902,
the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has examined some of the
difficulties involved in applying the concept of contempt to non-judicial
bodies.[41]
ALRC also outlined alternative approaches to contempt provisions similar to
those contemplated by the Bill. One example is section 70 of the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (the ASIC Act) which allows the
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to apply to the Federal
Court for an order for enforcement of its orders. A refusal to comply with the
court order will then amount to a contempt of court.[42]
ASIC frequently considers the use of this power because ‘it generally aims to
secure compliance rather than impose punishment.’[43]
ALRC noted that:
The procedure of applying to a court to enforce an order for
compliance differs, in a subtle but important way, from the procedure used in
some state and territory legislation of applying to a court to punish conduct
as a contempt of court. The approach of applying for enforcement avoids using
the concept of contempt in the context of Royal Commissions and other public
inquiries. Rather, the scope of the conduct that may be referred to the court
is limited to a failure to comply with notices or directions of the tribunal or
inquiry.[44]
4.33
Similarly, the Law Council submitted that this procedure of applying to
a court to enforce an order for compliance is preferable to the procedure
proposed in the Bill because:
...rather than requiring the court to treat contempt of the
ACC as contempt of the court, it first requires the court to make a decision
whether or not to enforce the relevant order of the ACC.
If the Court decides to enforce that order and the person to
whom it is directed still refuses to comply, then this refusal to comply will,
in fact, be contempt of the court and may be treated as such. ...[T]he law of
contempt was developed to protect the administration of justice. Therefore, it
should only be employed to safeguard and reinforce the authority of the court,
and not executive bodies exercising executive powers – such as the ACC.[45]
4.34
On the other hand, the Police Associations supported the proposed
amendments to the ACC Act that relate to dealing with witnesses who refuse to
cooperate with ACC examiners.[46]
Government response
4.35
In explaining the need for the contempt provisions, Mr John Lawler,
Chief Executive Officer of the ACC, noted that the ACC was experiencing a
growing problem with uncooperative witnesses:
We are seeing a very deliberate, orchestrated and coordinated
campaign by serious and organised crime networks who are lawfully summons
before ACC coercive hearings. We are seeing them failing to attend hearings in
contravention of the lawful process that has been served upon them, when they
arrive at a hearing failing to enter the witness box or to take an oath,
failing to answer questions or indeed, when they do answer questions, providing
false or misleading evidence to the Australian Crime Commission examiner. ...
In 2007-08 eight persons were charged with such offences and
14 persons were charged in 2008-09, which was a 60 per cent increase. In the
five months of the 2009-10 financial year a total of 12 people have already
been identified and are in the process of being charged or briefs of evidence
are being prepared for the Director of Public Prosecutions, with six in the
last week.[47]
4.36
Mr Michael Outram, Executive Director of the ACC, explained how a
coordinated campaign of non-cooperation by witnesses can frustrate ACC investigations:
Under the current process, we cannot usually revert to an
arrest scenario because we generally cannot satisfy the arrest provisions. We actually
have to go through a summonsing process, and that can take some time. We then
have to go through the court process... We did an analysis in 2006, ...at that
time... the average time being taken was over 20 months to resolve these cases.
But, of course, our investigations are very dynamic; it is a very quick moving
environment, and when lines of inquiry become ‘hot’ we want to respond to that.
So what this does is undermine the outcome of the investigation or the special
intelligence operation and it means that opportunities are lost. Certainly two
years down the track the forensic purpose has all but gone and the opportunity
has gone.[48]
4.37
In response to a question from the committee regarding why an examiner
should have the power to detain a witness before he or she has even made a
contempt application to the court, Mr Outram stated:
In a practical sense, if somebody attends an examination and
refuses at that point to cooperate, either by refusing to take the oath or by
refusing to answer questions, then our purpose is to avoid delay and to get
that person to the point where they comply as soon as possible. ...If the
examiner does not refer it to the court immediately and the person is not taken
into custody by a police officer at the same time or almost immediately, it
defeats the purpose, which is to get them in front of the other court as soon
as possible.[49]
4.38
The Attorney-General’s Department rejected the position of the Western
Australian Attorney-General that proposed subsection 34A(b) overrides legal
professional privilege:
...that provision does not override legal professional
privilege, but it requires a lawyer, when claiming legal professional privilege
in relation to answers or documents, to provide the name and address of the
individual to whom the legal professional privilege relates—the lawyer’s
client—so that the ACC can make inquiries of the client about whether they also
wish to claim legal professional privilege or waive it in that instance. It is
only in relation to a failure to provide a name or address that that lawyer can
then be subject to offences.[50]
4.39
In addition, an officer from the Attorney-General’s Department advised
that the department did consider an approach similar to section 70 of the ASIC
Act but instead adopted the proposed contempt provisions in the Bill because
they are consistent with the recommendations of the Trowell report and the PJC.[51]
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