Chapter 3 - Key issues
3.1
This chapter discusses the key issues raised in the
course of the Committee's inquiry.
General response to the Bill
3.2
In accord with submissions to the ALRC's inquiry, some
witnesses noted that existing laws already provide for the protection of
sensitive national security information during criminal proceedings. The
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights asserted that 'proceedings that unavoidably
have to reveal matters of national security should and can be conducted in
camera.'[32]
Some submissions rejected the proposed legislation outright.[33] The main, but
not the only, objection was that the legislation would undermine the right to a
fair trial.[34]
3.3
A number of submissions, however, acknowledged that the
Bill attempts to address a significant issue in
reconciling the desire to protect Australia's
national security while at the same time upholding the rights of an individual
to a fair trial. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions submitted
that:
Our experience in prosecuting cases involving sensitive
information has demonstrated the potential for difficult issues to arise in
protecting the very information that is the subject of the prosecution. The DPP
supports legislative measures to provide a procedure in cases involving issues
surrounding the disclosure of information that may affect national security.[35]
3.4
The Australian Press Council (APC) submitted that 'the
bill makes a genuine endeavour to address a significant risk to the security of
sensitive information without unduly hampering judicial discretion to hear and
determine prosecutions in a fair and effective manner'.[36] The Tasmanian
Police Department of Justice and Public Safety supported the Bill.[37]
3.5
The Law Council believed that the current regime for
the protection of security sensitive information is satisfactory and noted the
adequacy of the existing mechanisms that involve:
-
the criminalisation of unlawful disclosure;
-
rules of evidence and procedure allowing for
restrictive orders including in camera hearings in special circumstances; and
-
well established
common law and statutory rules relating to public interest immunity.[38]
3.6
Even so, the Law Council was prepared to support
'reasonable and proportionate measures' which would 'positively impact upon Australia's
national security and the overall interests of justice'.[39] It recognised
that situations would arise 'which demand that access to sensitive national
security information be prohibited or restricted in courts and tribunals',[40] but was
strongly of the view that any such limitations remain the responsibility of the
courts, that the onus be always upon those seeking to limit access, and that
any permitted limitations upon access always remain consistent with the
principles of fair trial.
3.7
In particular, the Law Council argued that in a criminal
trial an accused should retain access before the trial to any information which
may be tendered in evidence by the prosecution or which may assist the accused
in representation of the defence. Further, all evidence presented against an
accused should be tendered in the presence of the accused and the lawyer of his
choice.[41] The
Law Council informed the Committee that it is:
generally supportive of proposals to create new procedures for
dealing expeditiously with the use and management of security sensitive
information in hearings as soon as a trial begins, or if already commenced, as
soon as possible after the relevant information comes to the court's attention.[42]
3.8
Indeed, in assessing the overall merits of the proposed
legislation, Mr Bret Walker SC, former President of the Law Council, told the
Committee:
The trade-offs have gone too far and have created dangers
Ultimately, day by day, our interestsnot just at the end of the day but at the
end of the analysislie in promoting fair trial values and in regarding the
Australian population and its 'security' you do not keep the population
secure by maximising the number of secrets that must be preserved. That being
said, you cannot fight either crime or terrorism without some secrets. We all
understand that, and that is why the trade-offs are really important
This bill is not all badfar from it. A very conscientious
attempt has been made to balance some very difficult things. It is just that,
in the upshot, I think one of the prevailing views is that trade-offs have gone
too far.[43]
3.9
The ALRC noted that the Bill
accords with one of the central recommendations in its report 'that the
Commonwealth enact a 'National Security Information Procedures Act to deal
specifically and solely with the protection of classified and security
sensitive information in legal proceedings'.[44] It
acknowledged that the Bill largely incorporates
the framework and terminology it developed in its proposed statutory scheme, as
well as adopting a number of principles and processes consistent with those
expressed by the ALRC.
3.10
The Bill and the ALRC's
proposed legislation cover common ground and in most instances agree on the
overall procedures that would govern the use of sensitive national security
information. Nonetheless, the ALRC noted significant points of departure in the
Bill from its recommendations. In its view, the Bill
represents somewhat different ways of achieving the same aims and outcomes,
rather than a direct rejection of the ALRC's recommended approach or the
application of a fundamentally different philosophy.[45]
Definition of national security
3.11
The definition of national security is central to the
proposed legislation. The Bill requires both the
prosecutor and the defendant to notify other parties and the court if he or she
is aware that evidence to be presented during proceedings is likely to affect
national security. It is on the grounds of national security that the
Attorney-General in issuing a certificate will determine whether information
may or must not be disclosed during criminal proceedings. Finally, it is a
matter that the courts must have regard to in deciding to make an order
regarding the Attorney-General's certificate. Indeed, the Bill
requires the court to give greatest weight to this matter.
3.12
Thus, in criminal proceedings involving sensitive
information, much depends on the interpretation given to national security. The
meaning of this term, however, is strongly contested. One of the main
challenges is to capture the meaning of a condition or state of affairs that is
constantly changing.
3.13
The definition of 'national security' in the Bill
is expressed in comprehensive terms to include defence, security, international
relations, law enforcement interests and national interests.[46]
3.14
The Committee received a considerable amount of
evidence expressing concern about the definition. APC, supported by John
Fairfax Holdings Limited and FreeTV Australia,
was concerned about its breadth, arguing that it is 'ridiculously wide'.[47] It stated
that:
The sweeping nature of this definition has the potential to
include within its scope a broad range of types of information which not only
relate to matters of public interest but which are appropriate matters for
public debate. Just a few examples would be contracts for government tenders,
analysis or forecasts of the Australian economy, proposed trade agreements with
foreign governments, planned changes to Australia's
telecommunications infrastructure, or reports of mismanagement within Australia's
immigration detention centres.[48]
3.15
Amnesty International Australia (Amnesty International),
Mr Joo-Cheong
Tham from the School
of Legal Studies at La Trobe
University, and Mr Patrick
Emerton also drew attention to the very
broad definition of national security and called for a more stringent test of
what constitutes national security.[49] The
Australian Muslim Civil Rights Advocacy Network (AMCRAN) stated that 'almost
any matter involving a non-Australian citizen could be covered by the
definition of 'international relations', namely 'political, military and
relations with foreign governments and international organisations'.[50]
3.16
However, the implications stemming from the breadth of
the meaning of national security go beyond the Attorney-General's certificate
of non-disclosure which is to be taken as conclusive evidence that the
material, if disclosed, would prejudice national security. It is of
significance to the prosecutor and defendant who are required to notify the
Attorney-General if they know or believe that they will disclose information
that relates to or may affect national security. The same obligation applies if
they know or believe that a witness will disclose national security information
or that the presence of the witness may affect national security. Failure to do
so is an offence which carries a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment.[51]
3.17
Amnesty International expressed concern that:
the definition of 'national security' is so broad as to make it
virtually impossible to know if information is going to relate to national
security or affect national security and therefore it is virtually impossible
to know if one is committing an offence.[52]
3.18
The Attorney-General's Department agreed that the
definition was very broad. At the public hearing, a representative of the
Department informed the Committee that, in
seeking to narrow the definition, it had considered identifying offences to
which the legislation would apply. It found, however, that activities such as
fraud may have been excluded. The representative explained that, for example,
fraud in a defence contract involving the purchase of sensitive equipment may
give rise to national security issues.[53] The
Department did not elaborate on other approaches that might be taken to narrow
the definition and participants in the inquiry did not offer alternative
definitions.
The Committee's view
3.19
The Bill does not
specify or even indicate what would be prejudicial to national securitythis is
a matter for the Attorney-General to decide. The Committee
accepts that the term 'prejudice national security' is inherently difficult to define
and interpret, relying on a highly subjective assessment. Further, any
interpretation of the term assumes significance in light of the political and
security environment which changes over time depending on perceived threats and
developments in international relations.
3.20
Even so, the Committee
believes that the definition contained in the Bill
is broad in the extreme, especially considering it is being used as the basis
for the non-disclosure of information in criminal proceedings. The defendant is
required to notify the Attorney-General and the court if he or she knows or
believes that information to be presented during the proceedings relates to, or
if disclosed is likely to affect, national security. The Committee
notes that the definition of national security incorporates such broad areas of
national activities which in effect may make the definition unhelpful or
unworkable for the defendant.[54]
3.21
The Committee considers that in light of the broad and
vague definition of national security, the Bill may
place a heavy and unfair burden on the defendant to comply with its
requirements.
Appropriate use of the definition
3.22
Susceptibility to abuse is one of the main concerns
with legislation that allows an agency or a person the discretion to determine
whether the disclosure of information would prejudice national security in
order to restrict the disclosure of information in criminal proceedings. A
number of submissions expressed concerns that the Attorney-General may use his
or her authority to protect interests that are not related to national
security. They underlined the importance of having in place sufficient
safeguards to ensure procedural fairness.
3.23
For example, APC noted that there is no requirement that
the information that may be disclosed in a Federal criminal proceeding 'must be
soundly based.'[55]
It proposed that the definition of national security be narrowed so as to
exclude information relating to matters which ought 'rightfully to be the
subject of public debate'.[56]
3.24
APC suggested further that a provision be inserted into
the proposed legislation which would make it an offence 'to issue a certificate
for an inappropriate purpose'.[57] It added '(s)uch
inappropriate purposes would include the concealing of incompetence, misconduct
or corruption'.[58]
Furthermore, APC argued that the Attorney-General should be prohibited from
making a determination on the issuing of a certificate 'if he or she has a
conflict of interest'.[59] Ms
Inez Ryan
from APC told the Committee that:
There may be information which the government, for political
reasons, does not want revealed, and this definition has the potential for the
issuing of certificates in such circumstances.[60]
3.25
Ms Ryan acknowledged that such a measure may not
necessarily prevent the Attorney-General from issuing certificates improperly
but would set a 'tone of responsibility and would make an Attorney-General
think twice before issuing a certificate purely for political purposes'.[61]
3.26
APC also suggested that:
If the information concerns the policies or actions of a current
government the decision as to whether to issue a certificate should be made by
an independent officer, not by a member of the cabinet.[62]
The Committee's view
3.27
The Committee agrees
that the Bill should not be used to prevent
disclosures that would expose incompetency or wrongdoing. It believes that any
restriction placed on the disclosure of information in criminal proceedings on
the grounds of national security should ensure that the limitation is
reasonable, justifiable and necessary. Accountability must therefore be a central
feature of such legislation.
3.28
In taking this view, the Committee
sees merit in the suggestion by APC that the Attorney-General publish written
reasons to justify the classification of information as prejudicial to national
security.
3.29
Recommendations are made along these lines later in the
report where the Committee examines the provisions governing the Attorney-General's
non-disclosure or witness exclusion certificates.
The right to a fair and public trial
3.30
The main concerns raised in submissions received by the
Committee cover a range of issues dealing with the right of the defendant to a
fair trial. Generally participants in this inquiry acknowledged the importance
of the right to a public trial but also accepted the need for this right to be
abridged in certain circumstances. Even so, a number of submissions and
witnesses raised concerns about the reliance in the Bill
on in-camera proceedings.
3.31
Clauses 23, 25 and 26 of the Bill
require the court to hold a closed hearing in certain circumstances. Under clauses
25 and 26, the court must convene a hearing after the Attorney-General has
issued a non-disclosure or witness exclusion certificate to consider the
certificate and decide whether to make an order.
3.32
The Law Council accepted that in the interests of
national security it may be necessary, in exceptional cases, for a court to
restrict public access to a hearing. It stated:
if sensitive national security information is to be protected
and the interests of justice achieved, there must be exceptions to the general
principle that it is in the interests of open justice that courts remain open
to the public. However, any exceptions must be to the minimum extent necessary
to protect national security, reasons for restricting access must be given and
transcripts of proceedings which are not public need to be maintained.[63]
3.33
It also noted that the Bill
does not address the issue of providing reasons for restricting public access.[64]
3.34
To the same effect, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission (HREOC) argued that the discretion to hold part or all of a hearing
in camera should be left to the courts. It suggested that, in considering
whether to have a closed hearing, there should be safeguards in place that:
-
reflect the requirement that the exclusion of
the public may be 'necessary in a democratic society';
-
reflect the requirement of proportionality; and
-
ensure that clear reasons for not providing a
public trial are given and recorded.[65]
3.35
APC also recognised that in specific cases involving
the protection of sensitive national security information in-camera proceedings
may be necessary. Even so, it believed that the decision to hold a closed court
should not be taken lightly and the court should be 'required to weigh the risk
of prejudice to national security against the public interest in having the
proceedings heard in public.'[66]
3.36
Amnesty International has also acknowledged the right
not only of the parties involved in the case to be present during the
proceedings but the general public as well. It argued that:
The public has a right to know how justice is administered, and
what decisions are reached by the judicial system.[67]
3.37
The ALRC in its report concluded that:
whenever there is any restriction on the basic principles of
open courts and the right to a public hearing, the court's judgment on those
issues should be set out in a statement of reasons. This would mean that
whenever a court makes an order for an in-camera hearing or a suppression
ordersuch as an order restricting publication of proceedings or restricting
access to documents on the court fileto protect classified or security
sensitive information, it should provide reasons for doing so.[68]
3.38
The ALRC also maintained that in all cases where a
hearing is conducted in secret, a transcript or full record of the proceedings
should be made. It suggested that these would 'normally be sealed in line with
the secrecy attaching to these proceedings'.[69] It
recommended, however, that:
-
the court may determine to what extent (if at all) a transcript of a closed
proceeding should be sealed or distributed to the public, the parties or their
legal representatives; and
-
to the greatest extent reasonably
possibleconsistent with the determination of the need to protect classified or
sensitive national security information used in proceedingsthe court should
ensure that all parties receive a
copy of the transcript that allows them to pursue any avenue of appeal that may
be open to them.[70]
3.39
It should be noted that Subclause 27(4) of the Bill
requires the court to make and keep a sealed record of the hearing and make the
records available to, and only to, a court that hears an appeal against, or
reviews, its decisions in the hearing.
The Committee's view
3.40
The Committee believes
that trials should be held in public to prevent injustice, to inform the
public, to promote public confidence in the administration of justice and to
maintain the appearance and actuality of the court's impartiality. The
Committee accepts that in some cases evidence that supports conviction is
properly kept from the public where its disclosure would pose a threat to
national security. Nonetheless, it believes that the decision to hold a closed
hearing should be based on clear and convincing grounds that secrecy is
required and that the defendant's rights to a fair trial are not compromised.
3.41
Of concern to the Committee
is the requirement placed on courts to hold certain hearings in-camera. In such
cases the court has no discretion to determine whether these proceedings should
be opened or closed. The Committee is of the
view that courts should retain the discretion in relation to whether or not to
make an order for in-camera hearings when considering the Attorney-General's
certificate. In addition, the Bill should
require the court to provide a statement of reasons for holding the closed
hearing.
3.42
With regard to the transcript of a closed hearing, the Committee
believes that the Bill should allow the court
greater flexibility in determining how evidence taken in-camera should be made
available, such as allowing the court the discretion to release the transcript
or parts of it that, in its view, would not prejudice national security. In
particular, the Committee believes that the defendant and his or her legal
representative should have access to the transcript except in the most
extraordinary of circumstances. Again, in keeping with the object of
maintaining an open and transparent justice system, the Committee believes that
the court must make public a statement of reasons for any restriction placed on
access to court transcripts.
Recommendation 1
3.43
The Committee
recommends that Subclauses 23(4), 25(5) and 26(5) of the Bill,
which require the court to hold closed hearings, be removed so that the court
retains its discretion to determine whether its proceedings are open or closed.
Recommendation 2
3.44
The Committee
recommends that the Bill be amended to include a
provision requiring the court to provide a written statement of reasons
outlining the reasons for holding proceedings in-camera.
Recommendation 3
3.45
If Recommendations 1 and 2 are not supported, the Committee
recommends that, as a commitment to the right of a defendant to a fair, public
trial, the Bill should be amended to include a provision requiring the
Attorney-General to publish a statement of reasons for any decision to hold a
closed hearing.
Recommendation 4
3.46
The Committee recommends that Subclause 27(4) of the
Bill be amended to allow the courts the discretion to determine to what extent
a court transcript or parts of it should be sealed or distributed more widely
and any undertakings required for people to have access to the transcript.
Recommendation 5
3.47
The Committee recommends that the Bill
be amended to include a provision requiring a court to provide a statement of
reasons for any restriction placed on the distribution of all or part of a
court transcript.
The right to be tried in own presence and to defend in person
3.48
Clause 27 allows the court to make an order that the
defendant or the legal representative, or both, are not entitled to be present
during particular parts of the closed hearing if the court considers the
presence of the defendant or any legal representative of the defendant is
likely to prejudice national security. This applies to any part of the hearing
in which the prosecutor gives details of the information concerned or argues
why the information should not be disclosed or why the witness should not be
called.[71]
3.49
In relation to this issue, the ALRC's report
recommended that 'on the application of any party or of the Attorney-General of
Australia intervening, or on its motion, the court or tribunal may order that
the whole or any part of a proceeding be heard in the absence of any one or
more specified people, or the public. Its recommendation did not apply to the
parties to the proceedings or their legal representatives, except in relation
to the court or tribunal's power to remove any person by reason of his or her
misconduct during proceedings.[72]
3.50
Professor Weisbrot
noted that the ALRC's proposal 'would not permit a situation where there were
criminal proceedings without the presence of the accused'.[73] He told the Committee:
We saw that the most important thing was for the lawyer to be in
there and for the person to be properly represented. Again, our proposals made
no recommendations for criminal proceedings to go ahead absent the accused and
ideally the persons counsel.[74]
3.51
A number of submissions and witnesses endorsed this
view. They generally accepted that, under certain circumstances, it may be
appropriate for the court to hold a closed hearing but rejected the proposal
that the defendant or his or her legal representatives should be excluded from
a closed hearing as contemplated in the Bill.
3.52
The Law Council objected strongly to any restrictions
placed upon a party or their legal representatives from 'examining and making
representations to the court about the prosecution's attempts to restrict
access to certain information pursuant to a ministerial certificate of
non-disclosure.'[75]
It referred specifically to the ALRC's recommendation that 'the fact that a
hearing is taking place should never be kept from the party whose rights are
being determined or affected by the hearing'.[76] It noted that
Clause 27 contains no such requirement of notice.[77]
3.53
Mr Brett Walker SC, Law Council of Australia, told the
Committee that:
In this country the accused's position ought to be that they are
present at every argument, either personally or through their representative,
which will have an effect on the outcome of the process.[78]
3.54
Mr Patrick
Emerton, Faculty of Law, Monash
University, took the same approach.
He argued that:
It is impossible for the defendant, or his or her lawyer, to
make an effective case for disclosure of information, or for the calling of a
witness, if they are prevented from hearing the details of the information
concerned, or from hearing the prosecution arguments to the contrary.[79]
3.55
Likewise, AMCRAN contended that under the Bill
a defendant's right to a fair trial would be limited because under Clause 27
they 'would not be given the opportunity to respond to or argue against the
disclosure or otherwise of the disputed information'.[80]
3.56
The New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties
(NSWCCL) argued that an essential feature of Australia's
adversarial system of criminal justice is that 'a defendant should be present
at all times'. It explained further:
At the very least, a defendant's legal representatives should be
present in court to represent his or her interests. This is important because
the court might not realise the significance for the defence case of the
information or witness being examined during the closed hearing. That is why it
is paramount that a defendant be represented at all times.[81]
3.57
NSWCCL recommended that Subclause 27(3) be amended to
ensure that a defendant is 'not left unrepresented as a result of a court's
ruling to exclude a defendant and/or his or her legal representatives from any
part of a closed hearing'.[82]
3.58
To the same effect, Amnesty International observed that
the Bill may breach the right of the accused to
be present at trial and appeal. It argued that under such circumstances the
defendant is not in a position to rebut the evidence or to provide appropriate
instructions to their legal representative. According to Amnesty International,
the defendant would be prevented from knowing the full details of the case
against him or her which would 'limit their defence in breach of international
law'.[83]
3.59
APC maintained that, while Clause 27 would grant the
court the power to exclude the defendant or the defendant's counsel from the
proceedings while the prosecutor addresses the court, no such provision is made
for the exclusion of the prosecution. It stated that:
The implied assumption is that the prosecution can always be
trusted but that defence counsel cannot, and that fairness to the accused
should be as a rule be sacrificed to the aim of protecting security sensitive
information. This apparent bias against defendants would pose a significant
threat to the ability of defence counsel to adequately defend their clients.[84]
3.60
HREOC concluded:
The possibility of restrictions on material disclosed to a party
and denying a party access to the hearing undermines the right to a fair trial.[85]
3.61
The Attorney-General's Department acknowledged the
closed court hearing as a source of major concern. A representative of the
Department told the Committee:
Its purpose is solely to determine whether and in what form the
information that is the subject of the Attorney-Generals certificate may be
given during a normal trial process. There has been concern that the defence
could be excluded from those proceedings. The legislation provides that that is
solely at the discretion of the court, and we would not envisage that security-cleared
counsel would be excluded from those proceedings.[86]
3.62
Subsequently, the Department notified the Committee
that the Office of General Counsel had been consulted and, on close examination
of the current version of the Bill, had
recommended that:
the intention of the Bill, that
the courts will only exclude defendants and their legal representatives from
hearings in limited circumstances, and will retain the power to stay
proceedings if the defendant cannot be assured of a fair trial, is not entirely
clear from the Bill in its present form and that
this should be clarified to avoid any doubt.[87]
The Committee's view
3.63
The Committee holds
strongly to the view that defendants, as guaranteed under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), are entitled to be present at
trial and to defend themselves in person or through legal representation. It
also notes the comments by the Attorney-General's Department that the court
retains the discretion to decide whether or not to exclude the defendant and or
his legal representative from a closed hearing on the grounds that their
presence is likely to prejudice national security.
Recommendation 6
3.64
The Committee
recommends that Clause 27 of the Bill be amended
to provide that defendants and their legal representatives can only be excluded
from hearings in limited specified circumstances, and courts will retain the
power to stay proceedings if the defendant cannot be assured of a fair trial.
The right to know the evidence supporting the conviction
3.65
Aligned with the right to be tried in his or her
presence and to defend him or herself in person or through legal
representation, an accused has the right to know the evidence so that he or she
may answer the case against them. In commenting on the Bill,
a number of submissions underlined the importance of this principle but feared
that the Bill as currently drafted undermines it.
3.66
For example, Clauses 22, 23 and 24 of the Bill allow the
Attorney-General, for national security reasons, to issue a non-disclosure or
witness exclusion certificate which may prevent the defence from gaining access
to documents, parts of documents or from calling and questioning witnesses.
3.67
Amnesty International expressed concern about
restriction of provision of information under the Bill.
It argued that, if the information is in the possession of the prosecution, it
may not be disclosed to the defendant and his or her counsel and thus may
affect his or her ability to prepare a defence. On the other hand, if the
information subject to the certificate were in the possession of the defendant
or his or her counsel, the defendant would not be able to build and develop
their case 'as they will be unable to rely on the information pre-trial and
will be uncertain of its status at trial until the court has held a hearing on
the certificate'.[88]
3.68
Amnesty International also argued that the Bill
would circumvent safeguards by allowing 'a trial to be conducted and for
possible conviction of the defendant on the basis of information that the
defendant and the defendant's legal representative may not ever see or hear'.[89]
3.69
AMCRAN highlighted the importance of ensuring that 'the
defendant has the opportunity to see evidence that is being used against them
and has a right to respond to that evidence.'[90] Likewise, the
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights asserted:
It is a basic and fundamental rule of procedural fairness that
any evidence put before a court by one party must be made available to the
other party. The rationale for the principle is that the other side must be
allowed to test the evidence and make submissions upon it. If one side is able
to adduce evidence which the other side has not seen the evidence will be
untested. The parties will be in unequal positions before the court and the
process will be unfair.[91]
3.70
The Law Council held a similar view. As a general
principle, it did not support the use of material for any purpose that 'is not
freely available to all parties against a party, even in this limited context'.[92] It argued
that such a practice is 'very dangerous'.[93]
3.71
Mr Patrick
Emerton was highly critical of the court's
role under the Bill in allowing the tendering of
evidence in a form other than the source document, such as a copy of the
document with sensitive information deleted, or a statement of facts that the
deleted information would prove or likely prove. In his view such a provision
'undermines the impartiality of the judiciary'.[94] He stated
further:
By inviting the court to summarise the information deleted from
a document, or to issue a statement of the facts that the deleted information
would prove, or be likely to prove, the Regime invites the court to become a
participant in the proceedings before it, and to substitute its own judgement
on matters of fact for the judgement of the jury. This aspect of the Regime in
fact raises the possibility of unconstitutionality under section 80 of the Constitution, which provides that trial
on indictable offences shall be by jury.[95]
3.72
Mr Emerton also cited the example of where a defendant
at a bail hearing may wish to produce, as evidence of his or her lack of
intent, documents or witnesses which would demonstrate that he or she acted at
the request of, or with the acquiescence of an Australian intelligence agency,
or of an intelligence agency of a country allied with Australia.
He explained further:
Under the Regime, it is likely that the defendant would be
obliged to give notice prior to producing such evidence, and the Attorney-General
would then be able to issue a certificate which precluded the evidence from
being produced, with the consequence that the accused is not able to make out
his or her case for bail.
The likelihood of such adverse implications for the fairness of
pre-trial proceedings would be even greater for any individual charged with an
espionage or similar offence, for it is likely that a great many of the
relevant witnesses and documents which the defendant might want to produce or
gain access to at the pre-trial stage would be apt to be barred by a
certificate from the Attorney-General.[96]
3.73
Along similar lines, Mr Bret Walker SC, former
President of the Law Council, told the Committee:
There is no assurance whatever in this bill, except in the
institutional impartiality we expect from our judges, that the prosecution and
the court will not in effect be constructing part of the prosecution case
against the defence in the absence of the defence. We have never had that
happen before in criminal proceedings. That is because the judges are forced to
make decisions involving balance between a number of matters in which, among
other things, they are commanded to rate so-called national security higher
than fair trial. In truth, the act requires an almost impossible calculus. There
is no doubt that, because the prosecution makes the decisions about what
evidence will be the subject of this kind of special procedure, the judge is becoming
closely involved, in the absence of the defence, in deciding what will and will
not be part of the case against the defence.[97]
The Committee's view
3.74
The Committee shares
the concerns raised by participants in the inquiry that the defendant and/or
his legal representatives may be denied full access to information relating to
their case. It notes that the Attorney-General must give the court a copy of
the source document as well as a copy with the material deleted and in some
cases a summary or statement of facts with the non-disclosure certificate. This
certainly is an important safeguard in ensuring that the court is able to
assess whether the copy of the document or substitute documents provides an
appropriate and accurate representation of the information contained in the
original document. However, the Committee considers that a further safeguard should
be included in the Bill to offer additional
protection in cases where source documents are amended through the deletion of
material or where summaries or statements of facts are used as a substitute for
sensitive information.
Recommendation 7
3.75
The Committee
recommends that the Bill be amended to include a provision that requires the
court, when making an order allowing information to be disclosed as being subject
to the Attorney-General's non-disclosure certificate, to be satisfied that the
amended document and/or substitution documentation to be adduced as evidence
would provide the defendant with substantially the same ability to make his or
her defence as would disclosure of the source document.
The right to prepare a defence including the right to call and question
witnesses
3.76
Amnesty International suggested that the Bill
may breach the right to call and examine witnesses. It noted that this right
ensures that 'the defence has an opportunity to question witnesses who will
give evidence on behalf of the accused and to challenge evidence against the
accused'.[98]
3.77
Mr Bret Walker SC elaborated on this matter:
It is not a simple black-and-white matter to look at evidence
which may hurt an accuseds prospectsthat is, contribute towards proof of
guiltand evidence which may help the prospects of the defence; that is, give
rise to the possibility of exculpation, particularly bearing in mind that one
can be exculpated not by proving that one is innocent but by simply leaving a
reasonable doubt at the end of a prosecution case. It is not the case, as I am
sure any prosecutor will tell you, that they can divide their witnesses up into
the goodies and the baddies
So a decision not to call a witness not only spares the accused
that witnesss testimony against the accused but also spares the court the
prospect that weaknesses in that witnesss evidence not only will affect the credibility
of that witnesss testimony but also may affect the whole credibility of the
case. It is for those reasons that the judge will, in the absence of the
defence, be engaged in an exercise which makes, as I say, a prosecution
caseassembles a prosecution dossierand the judge cannot possibly appoint
himself or herself as defence counsel in that. They do not know what the
defence case is, assuming that the concept of a defence case is a useful one in
any event.[99]
3.78
Mr Patrick
Emerton argued that the unfairness of the provisions
of the Bill does not stop there. He suggested
that Clause 23 of the Bill establishes another
opportunity for denying defendants access to evidence. He explained:
The unfairness to the accused of the obligation to give notice
is even greater in the circumstances where it is the defendant who gives notice
that a witness's answer will disclose information of the relevant character. In
such circumstances, the Regime ensures that the prosecutor gains access to a
written answer to the relevant question, although the defendant does not. This
is not consistent with the right of the accused to have access to witnesses
against him or her, and to have access to those witnesses able to testify in
his or her defence.
This undermining, by the Regime, of the rights of the accused is
only compounded by the fact that, once notice of the possibility of disclosure
has been given to the Attorney-General, it is an offence for the defendant to
disclose the information, but not for the prosecutor, who may disclose the
information in the course of his or her duties. Such a disparity in the rights
accorded to prosecution and defence is manifestly unfair. Combined with the
provision for a witness's answer being available to the prosecutor, but not the
defendant, it is doubly so.[100]
3.79
He concluded that if the object of the Bill
were achieved, it would mean 'the possibility of prosecution upon the basis of
evidence that is not disclosed in full to, and hence is unable to be properly
tested by, the defence'. In his view this would 'constitute a radical change to
Australian criminal procedure'.[101] He believed
that the proposed legislation had 'grave potential for injustice'.[102]
3.80
HREOC was also concerned about the possibility of
breaches of Article 14 of the ICCPR. It cited the European Court of Human Rights
which recognises that 'the right of a defendant to call witnesses and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses against him are not absolute rights where
there is a compelling reason for encroaching on these rights'.[103] It noted,
however, the requirement for appropriate measures 'to assess the necessity for
doing so, in which the defence can take part (to the extent that the purpose of
the protective measures is not undermined).[104]
The Committee's view
3.81
The Committee holds the view that a defendant is
entitled to call and examine witnesses and that any limitation on this right should
only be permitted in the most exceptional circumstances. It believes that the
court must ensure that, not only is the defence's ability to prepare his or her
case not prejudiced by the exclusion of a witness, but that the proceedings are
seen to be fair and impartial to the defendant.
Recommendation 8
3.82
The Committee
recommends that the Bill be amended to include a
provision that requires the court, when making an order to exclude a witness
from the proceedings, to be satisfied that the exclusion of the witness would
not impair the ability of the defendant to make his or her defence.
Adequate time to prepare defence
3.83
Article 14 of the ICCPR sets down as a minimum
guarantee for a defendant facing any criminal charge the entitlement to 'have
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence'.
3.84
Amnesty International suggested that the Bill
may breach the right to prepare a defence. It quoted from Principle 21 of the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers which states:
It is the duty of the competent authorities to ensure lawyers
access to appropriate information, files and documents in their possession or
control in sufficient time to enable lawyers to provide effective legal
assistance to their clients. Such access should be provided at the earliest
appropriate time'.[105]
3.85
NSWCCL argued that a defendant in a criminal proceeding
should be aware of all the evidence against him or her at trial and have time
to prepare his or her case. It was concerned with paragraph 25(3)(a) of the Bill
which deals with a case where the Attorney-General's certificate is given to
the court before the trial begins. It would require the court as soon as the
trial begins to hold a hearing to decide whether to make an order in relation
to the disclosure of the information. NSWCCL noted that a court could, contrary
to the Attorney-General's certificate, rule that the information be tendered or
a witness called. In its view such an overruling could present the defence team
with new evidence when the trial had already commenced. It was concerned that
in such circumstances the defendant may not have sufficient time to prepare his
or her defence at variance with the fundamental principles underpinning a fair
trial.[106] It
suggested that:
To avoid unnecessary delay in proceedings the NSI Bill should
provide for pre-trial interlocutory closed hearings to allow for the challenge
of certificates issued by the Attorney-General. In a criminal proceeding, where
the liberty of the accused is often at stake, it is a fundamental tenet that
the Crown must inform the defence of all the evidence against the defendant before trial. Full pre-trial disclosure
can only occur if closed hearings are available before a trial begins.[107]
3.86
NSWCCL recommended that the Bill
be amended to expressly require pre-trial interlocutory proceedings at least
four weeks prior to the hearing date relating to all certificates issued by the
Attorney-General.[108]
3.87
The legislation proposed in the ALRC report and the Bill
require a party to give notice as soon as practicable after he or she becomes
aware that sensitive national security information is likely to be disclosed.
The ALRC's approach allows the court on its own motion to give notice regarding
the use of classified information and, further, that the court must hold a
directions hearing to determine the future conduct of the proceedings in
relation to the classified information. One of the essential purposes of the
proposal was 'to identify and bring forward as early in the proceedings as practicableand
preferably before the trialthe issues associated with the admission, use and
protection of any classified and security sensitive information.'[109] The Bill
makes no provision for the court to give notice and, as noted above, if the
Attorney-General issues a non-disclosure certificate before the trial
commences, the court must hold a hearing as soon as the trial begins.
The Committee's view
3.88
The Committee is
mindful of the importance of allowing the defendant ample time to prepare his
or her defence. It notes that both the proposals in the ALRC's report seek to
expedite proceedings by providing for pre-trial court proceedings to resolve
matters about the use of information during the trial.
Recommendation 9
3.89
The Committee
recommends that the Bill be amended to allow the
court to make decisions about the use of information before the commencement of
the trial.
Right to a fair hearing in a reasonable time
3.90
Mr Patrick
Emerton noted that the proposed legislation
does not place time limits on the Attorney-General in which to consider and
make a decision on a matter. In his view, this could result in extending the
time under which the defendant 's future is uncertain and, if innocent, the
time in which his or her liberty is restricted. He also envisaged potential for
abuse by intentionally delaying proceedings:
during this time it is not an offence for the prosecution to
disclose any information in question in the course of his or her duties. This
creates the possibility of deliberate delay on the part of the
Attorney-General, in order to give the prosecution the time to develop its case
in response to information it believes is going to be disclosed, or in response
to the written answer of a witness to which the prosecutor, but not the
defence, has had access.[110]
3.91
NSWCCL shared the concern that the Bill
does not specify time frames in which the Attorney-General must make a decision
following notification. It was of the view that the proposed legislation should
impose a time limit within which to make a decision on the issuing of a
certificate. It argued that otherwise the Attorney-General 'might be able to
delay issuing a certificate until after
a trial has commenced-or even finished'.[111] Further:
This gives the Executive an effective veto over the information
or witnesses in a criminal proceeding. The information or witness might be
vital to an accused's defence and its exclusion would be prejudicial to his or
her case. Alternatively, the information or witness might be embarrassing to
the government. Either way, this loophole is open to abuse by the government of
the day.[112]
3.92
NSWCCL submitted that the Bill
be amended to:
-
oblige the Attorney-General to inform the
parties and the court of his or her decision to issue (or not issue) a
certificate within a reasonable time;
-
provide a defence to these indictable offences
that the Attorney-General failed to make a decision within a reasonable time;
and
-
provide the court with the express power to stay
proceedings until the Attorney-General makes a decision to the issuing of a
certificate.[113]
The Committee's view
3.93
The Committee is
mindful of a defendant's right to be tried within a reasonable time and notes
criticisms that the Bill may allow for
unnecessary delay.
Certificate to be considered as conclusive evidence
3.94
Clause 25 of the Bill stipulates
that, if the Attorney-General issues a certificate pursuant to Clause 24, the
certificate is to be taken as conclusive evidence that the disclosure of the
information in the proceedings is likely to prejudice national security. The
Australian Lawyers for Human Rights argued that this provision means that 'the
Attorney has made a finding of fact in the case (29(8),(9)), without any
opportunity for the defendant to be heard'.[114] In its view
the finding may lead the court to exclude the evidence when considering the
matters in Clause 29 which would be 'fundamentally unfair'.[115] Mr
Simon Rice,
President of the Australian Lawyers for Human Rights stated further in evidence
that 'the Attorney-General will issue the definitive certificate but as far as
we can see it may well be an unreviewable decision'.[116]
3.95
The Law Council was of the view that this clause,
together with the provisions of Subclause 27(3), which expressly allows for a
lawyer and defendant to be excluded from a closed hearing, means that there are
insufficient safeguards 'to ensure a defendant's interests are protected
throughout this process.'[117] It,
together with the Law Institute of Victoria, also noted that Item 1 of Schedule
1 of the Consequential Amendments Bill means that decisions regarding whether
to issue a certificate are exempt from judicial review.[118] Mr
Joo-Cheong Tham
also cited Clause 25 including the lack of judicial review as a provision that
would undermine the right to a fair trial.[119] AMCRAN was
similarly critical that the decision is not reviewable under the ADJR Act and
recommended that the Attorney-General's decisions and certificates should be
open to judicial review.[120]
3.96
The Commonwealth Ombudsman, in observing that the
Attorney-General has a key role in the administration of the proposed
legislation, also commented on the issuing of an Attorney-General's certificate
under Clauses 24 and 25 and the lack of review of such a measure. He stated:
Judicial review of decisions by the Attorney-General is
restricted by the Consequential Provisions Bill. Nor can action taken by a
Minister be the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman, under s 5(2)(a) of
the Ombudsman Act (although the Ombudsman can investigate the advice given to
the Attorney-General and action taken by Commonwealth officials to implement
decisions of the Attorney-General).[121]
3.97
The Ombudsman also noted:
Essentially, the only method of accountability of action taken
by the Attorney-General that is preserved by the bills is the requirement
imposed by clause 42 for the Attorney-General to make an annual report to the
Parliament.[122]
The Committee view
3.98
The Committee notes that the Consequential Amendments
Bill will exempt the Attorney-General's decision in relation to a certificate
from review under the ADJR Act and will limit review under section 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 to the High Court.
The right to legal assistance of own choosing
3.99
The Bill imposes a
restriction on this right for a defendant to choose and freely communicate with
counsel of his or her own choice by requiring in some cases that information
can only be disclosed to those with an appropriate security clearance. The
requirement for a security clearance arises in circumstances where the
Attorney-General's Department gives written notice to a legal representative of
the defendant that an issue is likely to arise in proceedings relating to a
disclosure of information likely to prejudice national security.
3.100
A person who receives such a notice may apply to the
Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department for a security clearance at the
level considered appropriate by the Secretary. The defendant may apply to the
court for a deferral or adjournment of the proceedings until the legal
representative has obtained the clearance. If the representative is not given
such a clearance, the defendant may apply for a deferral or adjournment until
another legal representative is given the required security clearance.
3.101
The Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that 'uncleared
counsel cannot receive access to information that relates to, or the disclosure
of which may affect, national security.[123]
3.102
During the course of its inquiry, the ALRC received a
number of submissions expressing strong reservations about requiring lawyers to
have a security clearance. Having considered this matter in some depth, the
ALRC informed the Committee about its findings:
The ALRC felt uncomfortable about making a recommendation to the
effect that a court or tribunal could order a lawyer to submit to the security
clearance process. However, the ALRC noted that if important material is not
available to counsel in the proceedings, they run a risk of failing to provide
their client with effective assistance, and consequently should consider
seeking a security clearance or withdrawing from the proceedings. The ALRC
suggested that the proper focus should not be on the dignity or convenience of
the lawyer, but rather on the client
receiving the best possible representation in circumstances in which highly
classified information must be protected. The central involvement of the court
would guard against any unfairness, including any suggestion that the
Government or the prosecutors were improperly seeking to interfere in the
ability of the other party to retain their counsel of choice.[124]
3.103
In its report, the ALRC used a recommendation to
enunciate the principle that 'an accused person and his or her legal
representatives should have access to all evidence tendered against him or
her'. Another recommendation, however, would allow the courts to order that
specified material not be disclosed to a lawyer unless he or she holds a
security clearance at a specified level; in which case the affected person has
the option of retaining a lawyer with the requisite security clearance.[125] Under the
ALRC proposal, the court may also require undertakings from legal
representatives on such terms as the court sees fit as to the confidentiality
and limits on use to be attached to any classified or sensitive national
security information.[126]
3.104
The ALRC was of the view that its scheme would leave
courts with a measure of discretion to grant lawyers participating in
proceedings without a security clearance access to classified material. They
would be subject to conditions and undertakings considered by the court to be necessary.[127] It noted,
however, that in many cases, the court would conclude that access to the
information must be restricted to lawyers who hold an appropriate security
clearance.[128]
3.105
The same arguments raised against the requirement for a
security clearance during the ALRC's inquiry were placed before the Committee
in this inquiry. Many held that this proposal would significantly undermine the
right to legal representation of defendants in cases involving national
security matters.[129]
The Committee has also considered these issues in inquiries on earlier bills. NSWCCL
restated its opposition to the requirement for security clearances, asserting
that it was unnecessary for a lawyer to undertake a security check before
viewing the material. It submitted that:
A lawyer is an officer of the court. His or her highest duty is
to obey the court. Any lawyer who contravenes a curial order not to disclose
information relating to national security risks proceedings for professional
misconduct.
Furthermore, it is sufficient that the Bill
creates an offence for contravening a certificate of the Attorney-General or an
order of the court. Any lawyer convicted of such an offence would be subject to
the discipline of the court and risks being struck off. [130]
3.106
Furthermore, it saw scope for the Commonwealth Government
'to manipulate who can represent a defendant and who cannot'. It maintained
that:
Such a power could be used to harass or oppress individual
defendants and/or lawyers. Every defendant has the right to chose who will
represent them. This is a minimum
element of a fair trial. Parliament should not interfere with that right by
deeming some lawyers 'inappropriate' or a 'national security risk'.[131]
3.107
The Law Council also objected to a proposed security
clearance system governing the legal profession. It asserted that such a regime
'involves a very direct and serious prejudice to lawyers and clients'[132] and was of
the view that the existence of a pool of security-cleared lawyers would not
actually promote securityindeed, there are serious practical and legal problems
with the proposed system. Further, the system would not reduce the likelihood
that sensitive information would leak into the community. There would be
practical difficulties, such as the unexpected emergence of classified information
in the course of a trial which would result in delays while the appropriate
clearance is obtained.[133]
3.108
Moreover, the Law Council contended that lawyers in
criminal proceedings are well-used to dealing with confidential information in
a variety of situations and that court-controlled processes are adequate. It
argued that the Commonwealth Government has not produced any evidence which
'indicates that the experience of courts or disciplinary tribunals shows that
lawyers frequently or infrequently breach requirements of confidentiality
imposed either by agreement or by the Courts'.[134] In
rejecting the proposal, it told the Committee that:
The protection of democracy based on the rule of law requires a
legal profession that is independent of, and not beholden to, the Executive.[135]
3.109
The Law Council also queried whether, in circumstances
where there might be relevant and sufficient grounds for objecting to a
particular lawyer participating in a case dealing with national security
information, the onus should be on the Commonwealth Government 'to demonstrate
the factual basis of such an objection'. It suggested that the 'conventional
court approach of ensuring a significant period in active practice without
either previous criminal convictions or adverse findings in disciplinary
matters sufficient to demonstrate both good character and reliability should be
retained'.[136]
3.110
The Criminal Bar Association supported this argument.
It believed that the present disciplinary and court controlled processes are
adequate for the purposes and there was no evidence to suggest otherwise. It
stated:
the problem is able to be solved by the Court simply requiring
that at a point where a disclosure is necessary in the course of the case which
effects national security, counsel then engaged would be entitled to be
appraised of the information simply after making a formal undertaking of
confidentiality to the court and potentially to relevant government
departments. A breach of those undertakings would of course be punishable
either as a contempt or by some other aspect of the criminal law which
protected that information.[137]
3.111
HREOC similarly noted that the courts and litigants
'already have a range of mechanisms at their disposal to protect national
security information'.[138] It
preferred the scheme proposed by the ALRC which leaves the courts with the
discretion 'to grant lawyers without a security clearance participating in the
proceedings access to classified material, albeit subject to such conditions
and undertakings that the court considers necessary.'[139]
3.112
As well as being unnecessary, the Law Council argued
that the proposal contravened Article 14 of the ICCPR and concluded that:
the interests of justice are not served by excluding an
accused person's right to choose their own legal representative on the basis of
a security clearance.[140]
3.113
Amnesty International, AMCRAN and HREOC shared the
concern that the requirement for a security clearance 'may limit the ability of
the defendant to choose their own lawyer'.[141]
3.114
Aside from a possible infringement of the rights of the
defendant, a number of witnesses were worried about the effect of the proposal
on the lawyers. The Law Council was of the view that the system was open to
abuse. It maintained:
The prospect of the Government holding detailed private information
about lawyers who regularly defend in contentious cases always creates the
appearance, if not the actual risk, of a misuse of that information. Such a
prospect exists no matter how secure and how separate the relevant sections
within Government are from each other.[142]
3.115
Mr Joo-Cheong
Tham expressed concern that the security
clearance procedures alone would expose the defendant's legal representatives
to a subjective and invasive process.[143] He
explained further:
This process is all the more subjective and invasive because of
the criteria listed in the Protective
Security Manual. This manual lists the following as attributes that might
indicate a person is suitable to obtain a security clearance: maturity,
responsibility, tolerance, honesty and loyalty. The application of such vague
criteria would clearly depend upon the value judgments.[144]
3.116
He went on to state:
What makes this proposal even more egregious is that it will
confer extraordinary power on the executivethe prosecution is in a position to
determine whether or not this process applies. If the process applies, it is
then controlled by the Attorney-General's Department, a body that is intimately
connected with the prosecution.[145]
3.117
To further discredit the process, he noted that the Commonwealth Protective Security Manual (PSM), which is available to government
departments, agencies and contractors working to government, is not a statutory
instrument and can be changed at the will of the Commonwealth Government. In
his view the security clearance process would be 'controlled by the executive
branch of government on the basis of a secret document promulgating
indeterminate and invasive criteria'.[146] In effect,
the ability of defendants in criminal proceedings involving national security
would be 'severely hampered' by this proposed imposition on their legal
representatives.
3.118
On similar grounds, AMCRAN and Mr
Patrick Emerton
were concerned about the subjective nature of the criteria used to satisfy the
requirements for a security clearance and called for a more carefully
considered definition. They objected to the use of the PSM as the security
clearance criteria on the following grounds:
-
the unavailability of the document to the
general public (although not security classified, its availability is limited
to government departments, agencies and contractors working to government);
-
evidence to suggest the PSM is constantly being
reviewed and changed and is not subject to any legislative, judicial or public
review; and
-
the descriptions used seem vague and subjectivematurity,
responsibility, tolerance, honesty and loyalty.[147]
The Committee's view
3.119
The Committee shares the ALRC's sense of unease about
supporting a proposal whereby a court could order a lawyer to submit to a
security clearance. Such a measure clearly infringes the right of a defendant
to legal counsel of his or her own choosing. These feelings are sharpened when
considering the Bill's proposal. Firstly, the
Attorney-General has stepped into the court's role in determining who cannot
have access to specific information in criminal proceedings. Secondly, there
are problems with the appropriateness of the procedures surrounding the
security clearance procedures. A number of witnesses noted:
-
the security clearance assessment is based on
vague and subjective criteria which are subject to change; and
-
the apparent conflict of interest in having the
department involved in the prosecution of the case as well as in determining
the appropriate level of clearance, vetting the defendant's legal
representative and possibly denying him or her a clearance.
Recommendation 10
3.120
The Committee recommends that the court assume a more
active role in determining whether a defendant's legal representative requires
a security clearance before he or she can access information. The Committee
recommends that the Bill adopt the
recommendation by the ALRC that 'the court may order that specified material
not be disclosed to a lawyer unless he or she holds a security clearance at a
specified level'.
Admissibility of evidence
3.121
Concerns were also expressed about Subclause 29(6)
which requires the court, in considering whether to make an order in relation
to a certificate issued by the Attorney-General, to decide first whether the
information concerned is admissible as evidence in the proceeding. NSWCCL
argued that:
While a judicial officer might be able to make an advance ruling
on the relevance or exclusionary rules of evidence, it is highly controversial
whether a judge in a criminal trial may exercise his or her discretion under Part 3.11 of the Evidence Act to exclude, or limit the
use of, evidence before that discretion is invoked.[148]
3.122
NSWCCL explained further:
This is so because in our adversarial system a judge is not, at
the beginning of the trial, in possession of all the facts. The facts emerge at
trial from the evidence adduced by both parties. So it is plainly wrong to
expect a judicial officer to make an advance ruling on the admissibility of
evidence when he or she does not know, for example, whether it will be
prejudicial to the defendant or should be excluded because it was improperly or
illegally obtained. Evidence should be excluded at the appropriate point in a
trial and not before.[149]
3.123
NSWCCL also recommended that Subclause 29(6) be removed
from the proposed legislation because it 'interferes with the discretion of a
judicial officer to exclude evidence'.[150]
3.124
In its report, the ALRC recommended that the court
should retain the flexibility to deal with evidence revealing classified or
sensitive national security information previously found to be inadmissible or
which is raised unexpectedly at the hearing. [151] The
Attorney-General's Department accepted that the Bill
does not directly provide flexibility for dealing with evidence previously
found to be inadmissible. However, the Department noted that the Bill
'does provide that orders remain in force until further order of the court'.[152] It was of
the view that 'where the inadmissibility is due solely to the sensitive nature
of the material the court could make further orders'.[153]
3.125
Even so, the Committee
notes that Subclause 29(6) requires the court to decide whether the information
is admissible before deciding whether to make an order. Rather than directing
the court to make such a decision, the Committee
believes that the wording of the provision should be changed to allow the court
the discretion to make any such decision at the time its judges to be most
appropriate.
Recommendation 11
3.126
The Committee recommends that Subclause 29(6) be
amended to allow the court the discretion to make decisions in relation to the admissibility
of evidence containing classified or sensitive national security information at
such time as the court considers appropriate.
Weighing national security against the right to a fair trial
3.127
A number of participants in the inquiry were concerned
about Subclause 29(8) which deals with the matters the court must consider
before deciding to make an order or the form that order should take regarding
the Attorney-General's certificate. The provision directs the court to take
account of:
-
whether there would be a risk of prejudice to
national security if the information were disclosed or the witness called in
contravention of the certificate;
-
whether any such order would have a substantial
adverse effect on the defendant's right to receive a fair hearing;
-
any other matter the court considers relevant.
3.128
It should be noted that Subclause 29(9) requires the
court to give 'greatest weight' to whether there would be a risk of prejudice
to national security.
3.129
Mr Patrick
Emerton stated that:
The weighting of considerations mandated by the Regime puts the
Attorney-General's certificate at the top, and renders the questions of a substantial adverse effect on the
defendant's right to a fair trial, and of serious
interference with the administration of justice, lesser matters. It is thus
apparent that the method of court response to a certificate that is mandated by
the Regime risks compromising the right of the accused to a fair trial.[154]
3.130
A number of submissions were concerned that Subclause
29(9) of the Bill effectively undermines this
principle of a fair trial. This clause expressly directs the court to give
greatest weight to the risk of prejudice to national security in deciding
whether to make an order and the order to make. For example, APC stated that
'the notion that an accused may be subjected to an unfair trial in order to
protect national security is extremely disturbing'.[155] APC also
expressed the view that the provision should be removed or reworded to require
the court 'to give equal weight to both national security and to fairness to
the accused'.[156]
3.131
NSWCCL viewed this provision as 'a blatant legislative
usurpation of judicial power and undoubtedly violates the doctrine of the
separation of powers'.[157] It stated
further:
It is permissible for Parliament to list relevant considerations
for a court to consider when making a decision. But it [is] the exclusive role
of a judge to weigh and balance those considerations on a case-by-case basis.
Parliament interferes in the judicial power of the Commonwealth by ordering a Ch
III court to give more
weight to one consideration than another.[158]
3.132
It suggested that Subclause 29(9) be removed from the Bill
as it violates the principle of separation of powers.[159]
3.133
In a written answer to a question on notice to the Committee,
the Attorney-General's Department informed the Committee
that it had sought advice on the application of Clause 29. It offered the
following explanation to the Committee:
That advice identifies that the intention of the Bill,
that the courts will only exclude defendants and their legal representatives
from hearings in limited circumstances, and will retain the power to stay
proceedings if the defendant cannot be assured of a fair trial, is not entirely
clear from the Bill in its present form. Some
amendments to clauses 27 and 29 could be made to the Bill
to clarify the intention and remove any doubt about its meeting the
requirements of chapter III of the Constitution.[160]
3.134
NSWCCL was also concerned about the use of the word
'substantial'. It noted that the court, in making a decision about an order,
must consider whether 'any such order would have a substantial adverse effect
on the defendant's right to receive a fair hearing. It asserted that '(a)
defendant's right to a fair trial should not be diminished by the requirement
that any prejudice be substantial
before it should be considered worthy of consideration.'[161]
Accordingly, it recommended that the word 'substantial' be removed from paragraph
29(8)(b).[162]
The Committee's view
3.135
The Committee takes
note of the additional information provided by the Attorney-General's
Department in regard to the intention of Clause 29 and agrees that amendments
are required to clarify the intention of the Bill.
3.136
The Committee endorses
the view that the term 'substantial' should be deleted from paragraph 29(8)(b)
and that Subclause 29(9) should be removed from the Bill.
Recommendation 12
3.137
The Committee recommends that the term 'substantial' be
removed from paragraph 29(8)(b) of the Bill.
Recommendation 13
3.138
The Committee recommends that Subclause 29(9) of the Bill
be removed from the Bill, or at the least,
amended to reflect the response received from the Attorney-General's
Department.
Intervention of the Attorney-General
3.139
AMCRAN was concerned by what it perceived to be the
unprecedented ability of the Attorney-General to intervene in proceedings as
though 'he or she is a party to the hearing' under Clause 28 of the Bill, and
also his or her power to appeal against any order of the court made, as
authorised by Clause 33. AMCRAN argued that they 'allow someone from the
executive and representative arms of government to interfere directly with the
judicial proceedings of an individual case, and indeed grant him the right to
lodge appeals separately and additionally to the right of the prosecution to
lodge appeals'.[163]
3.140
Mr Patrick
Emerton was also troubled by the extent of
influence allowed to the Attorney-General during the proceedings. In his view:
there is a general unfairness in the executive government,
acting through the Attorney-General, being empowered to exercise a significant
degree of interference in the conduct of a criminal trial, by issuing
non-disclosure and witness exclusion certificates. This unfairness is only
increased by the vesting in the Attorney-General, by clauses 24 and 26, of the
power to issue a certificate even in the absence of notice being given by
either the prosecutor or defendant.[164]
3.141
Professor David
Weisbrot argued that:
Ultimately the government would have the right to not put
forward evidence that it felt was causing any concern to national security, but
the court would have the ultimate authority in the proceedings to say that it would
be unfair to the accused to be in a position where they could not cross-examine
a key witness or could not to see a critical piece of evidence. The court would
then be in a position to say that the charges would have to be withdrawn or
that it would amount to a breach of process.[165]
3.142
In addressing some of the concerns about Clause 29
raised by participants in the inquiry, a representative from the
Attorney-General's Department stated:
It has been said that the process is very much one which favours
the prosecution. But as we saw in the Lappas case, in fact, the end result of
the consideration of some of that national security information was to favour
the defendant and the DPP withdrew some of the charges. That is still a
consequence of this legislation. This legislation gives the court more
flexibility than it had in Lappas in that it can edit the information by making
deletions or providing a summary or whatever. But there will still be cases
where the court says, No, this information is of a kind that does not lend
itself to editing, and it is of a kind which has to be protected and therefore
cannot be led. The DPP will be in the same situation of having to withdraw the
charge or the court to stay the proceedings.[166]
The Committee's view
3.143
The Committee notes the objections raised about the
level of intervention allowed in court proceedings by the Attorney-General. It
has made a number of recommendations that are intended to give courts greater
discretion in the conduct of their proceedings.
Omissions from the Bill
3.144
The Law Council expressed disappointment that the Bill
does not address a number of matters raised by the ALRC in its report. The Law
Council specifically mentioned that, to date, the Commonwealth Government has
given no indication of his intention to:
-
legislate to introduce a comprehensive public
disclosures scheme to cover all Australian Governments, including enhanced
protections of whistleblowers;
-
review, update and enhance measures contained
within the PSM; and
-
amend sections 70 and 79 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and section 91.1
of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)
to provide for injunctive relief to restrain disclosure of classified or
security information in contravention of the criminal law.[167]
3.145
In its report, the ALRC recommended that 'in any
proceeding in which classified and security sensitive information may be used,
the court should have the assistance of a specially trained security officer to
advise on the technical aspects of managing and protecting such information'.[168] In this
inquiry, Professor Weisbrot
told the Committee that there is no court security officer mechanism to provide
that basic type of assistance. He explained:
There is nothing that tells them when or whether redacted
information is appropriate for use.[169]
Conclusion
3.146
The Committee recognises
that the Bill attempts to reconcile two
important objectives that in some cases may conflictpromoting and upholding
the right of a defendant to a fair trial and maintaining national security by
protecting sensitive information during criminal proceedings. The Committee
has made a number of recommendations intended to ensure that there are adequate
safeguards in the proposed legislation that will protect this right. The Committee
further notes advice from the Attorney-General's Department in relation to
identified areas where the intention of the Bill needs to be clarified. On
balance, the Committee is of the view that the Bill should proceed, subject to
the Committee's suggested recommendations.
Recommendation 14
3.147
The Committee recommends that, subject to Recommendations
1-13, the Bill proceed.
Senator
Marise Payne
Chair