National long term planning
3.1
The importance of a long term national strategic plan for Australia’s
naval shipbuilding industry continued to be a focus during public hearings in
the 45th Parliament. This followed similar discussion in the committee's
third report, tabled during the 44th Parliament, which recommended
the establishment of an ongoing shipbuilding industry advocate providing advice
to the government during the development of the defence investment plan and
naval shipbuilding plan. The third report emphasised that a national strategic
naval shipbuilding plan was central to achieving the goal of maintaining a continuous
stream of work for Australian shipyards.
3.2
During the course of the 45th Parliament inquiry, evidence
presented to the committee indicated that a naval shipbuilding plan would
perform an integral role in assisting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to
identify and plan for opportunities to become involved in the Australian naval
shipbuilding industry. A plan would also provide an assurance to the industry
that there would be continuous work into the future – enabling economic and
employment benefits gained through securing the permanency and longevity of an
Australian naval shipbuilding sovereign capability. Witnesses also suggested
that a naval shipbuilding plan should go beyond a focus on Australian industry
supporting Australian customers, and move towards building an internationally
competitive Australian shipbuilding industry which includes non-navy vessels,
such as research vessels, police vessels and ferries.
3.3
This chapter examines the current state of the Australian naval
shipbuilding industry, key defence-focused industry planning documents, the
government's naval shipbuilding plan, economic benefits derived from the
industry, and the potential for a national exports industry. The committee then
assesses this material against progress made towards implementing a continuous
shipbuilding program that would support an indigenous defence industry.
Insights from the ANAO's recent report Naval Construction Programs—Mobilisation are also
considered.
Overview of the Australian naval shipbuilding industry
3.4
Australia's naval shipbuilding industry includes:
-
The government owned ASC Pty Ltd, which was supposed to
have been separated into three independent companies from July 2017: ASC Shipbuilding,
ASC Submarine Sustainment (maintenance and support), and Australian Naval
Infrastructure (ANI);
-
Australian and international defence prime companies servicing
both commercial and defence production lines; and
-
SMEs contracted to these primes.
3.5
The Australian government, through the Department of Defence, is the
major procurer of ships from the industry. In its Defence Industry Policy
Statement, the Department of Defence stated that:
A robust partnership between Defence and industry and a
highly skilled Australian workforce will be critical if we are to deliver
shipbuilding and submarine programs of such national significance.[1]
3.6
Australia's shipbuilding and repair services industry consists of 448
businesses in both defence-related and commercial industries.[2] A snapshot of market
share by major players in the Australian industry is below, followed by a
breakdown by state and territory of business locations.
3.7
Figure 3.1: Snapshot of market share by major players in the industry[3]
3.8
Figure 3.2: Breakdown by state and territory of business locations[4]
3.9
The Department of Defence Industry Policy Statement states that 25,000
people are employed by the Australian defence industry, with prime companies
accounting for 50 per cent of employment in the industry. Approximately 3000
SMEs operate in Australia as subcontractors to prime companies.[5]
Key planning documents
3.10
Prior to the release of the government's naval shipbuilding plan and
subsequent planning documents from May 2017 and onwards into 2018, the
2015 RAND report and the 2016 Defence White Paper provided insight
into the government's strategic direction for the shipbuilding industry in
Australia. The content of these reports, along with the announcements outlined in
Chapter two, culminated in the eventual publication of the government's naval
shipbuilding plan, which is discussed further below.
2015 RAND Corporation report
3.11
In September 2014, the Department of Defence commissioned the RAND Corporation
to undertake a series of material studies and analysis activities to inform the
development of an enterprise-level naval shipbuilding plan for consideration by
the government.[6]
3.12
On 16 April 2015, the government released the RAND report titled Australia's
Naval Shipbuilding Enterprise: Preparing for the 21st Century.[7] The report
explored the question of whether Australia should support a domestic naval
shipbuilding industry or buy ships from foreign shipbuilders. The report found
that:
- Production
of naval warships in Australia involves a 30 per cent to 40 per cent price
premium over the cost of comparable production at shipyards overseas. This
premium could drop over time, however, with steady production drumbeats and
mature designs.
- The
economic benefits of a domestic naval shipbuilding industry are unclear and
depend on broader economic conditions. That said, the industry could
potentially employ more than 2,000 people in long-term positions.
- Controlling
critical production offers wider strategic benefits and flexibility. It would
avoid dependence on foreign sources; enable performance of ship alterations,
modernisations, and life-of-class maintenance; and support in-country
suppliers.
- Sustaining
a naval shipbuilding industry will require specific steps. These include
adopting a continuous build strategy starting with the Future Frigate and
matching industrial base structure to demand.[8]
3.13
As part of implementing a continuous build strategy, the report proposed
four strategies 'to close the short-term gap in demand for naval shipyard
workers while retaining the ability to build all the planned warships
domestically'. This included the option to commence construction of the
Offshore Patrol Vessels by the end of 2017 and the Future Frigate class before
2020. This option, along with the recommendation to adopt a continuous build
strategy, was adopted by the government.[9]
3.14
On 4 August 2015, the Hon Tony Abbott MP, Prime Minister, and the
Hon Kevin Andrews MP, Minister for Defence announced that the government
would implement a continuous build of surface warships in Australia. In
addition, the government announced that it would bring forward the Future
Frigate program (SEA 5000) to replace the ANZAC class frigates, and the
construction of the Offshore Patrol Vessels (SEA 1180) to replace the
Armidale class patrol boats.[10]
3.15
Some stakeholders, however, did not agree with this option proposed by
RAND, arguing that it relied disproportionately on ship production in one state
(South Australia) to the detriment of other states. For example, the Western
Australian government submitted that the report contained limited content on
the shipbuilding capabilities and capacities of Western Australia and other
states.[11]
3.16
The committee was informed a second RAND review was underway which
focussed on workforce, basing and facilities.[12]
Various stakeholders advised they had been contacted by people involved in the
second RAND review. The Western Australian government indicated that the
inquiry was likely to take into account the capability and capacity of Western
Australia's infrastructure and industry to deliver naval shipbuilding programs
beyond building minor vessels.[13]
3.17
The Department of Defence advised the second report's publication would
likely occur during 2017–18.[14]
The second report has not yet been published.
2016 Defence White Paper
3.18
The government's 2016 Defence White Paper (DWP), released on
25 February 2016, is the primary document that sets out Australia's
defence policy and capability needs, based on its assessment of a more complex
strategic environment that the country will face out to 2035.
3.19
The 2016 DWP stated that 'modernising our maritime capabilities will be
a key focus for Defence over the next 20 to 30 years'.[15] The DWP reiterated the
government's policy announcement made on 4 August 2015 that it would implement
a continuous build of surface ships that will transform the country's naval
shipbuilding industry, generate significant economic growth, sustain local jobs
for decades and provide a long-term future for this defence industry. These
plans will commence with the build of offshore patrol vessels from 2018 and
future frigates from 2020.[16]
3.20
Investments outlined in the DWP included the new generation of
submarines, surface warships, surveillance aircraft and support vessels.[17] In
particular:
-
the rolling acquisition of 12 future submarines to enter service
from the early 2030s, and upgrades to wharves and port facilities, simulators,
training and submarine rescue systems;
-
the investments in the existing Collins Class fleet until the
introduction of the future submarine fleet;
-
the acquisition of 12 new major surface vessels: three Hobart
Class Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs) entering into service in 2020s, and nine
new future frigates entering into service in the late 2020s to replace the
existing fleet of ANZAC Class frigates;
-
the acquisition of 12 new Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs), with
construction to start in 2018 and delivery by 2030, and;
-
updates to mine countermeasures and military hydrography
capability.[18]
2016 Defence Industry Policy
Statement
3.21
The Defence Industry Policy Statement (DIPS), released with the 2016
DWP, aligns defence capabilities with the DWP's strategy to establish an
internationally competitive and innovative Australian defence industrial base. As
industry has a 'fundamental input' to capability, the DIPS is an attempt to
transform the Department of Defence's relationship with industry.[19]
Over a ten year period, the government will invest in programs to: build
industry skills, drive competitiveness and export potential; and harness
Australia's innovation and expertise.
2016 Integrated Investment Program
3.22
The 2016 Integrated Investment Program (IIP), released alongside the
DWP, brings together all capability-related investments including new weapons,
platforms, infrastructure and science and technology over a ten-year period.
The IIP provides guidance on the implementation of the DWP's policy goals and
will be annually reviewed in response to the development of the budget and
changes in capability priorities and the like. The IIP was developed through a
comprehensive Force Structure Review that assessed the country's defence
capability needs into the 2030s.[20]
3.23
The IIP's capability stream for maritime and anti-submarine warfare
attracted around 25 per cent of the IIP to enhance Australia's maritime and
anti-submarine warfare capabilities. In addition to existing approved acquisitions,
new investments included those listed in the shipbuilding program contained in
the Naval Shipbuilding Plan.[21]
2017 Naval
Shipbuilding Plan
3.24
On 16 May 2017, the Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and Minister
for Defence Industry released the Naval Shipbuilding Plan (the Plan) in
Adelaide, South Australia.[22]
This followed a lengthy delay from the government's original schedule that such
a plan would accompany a 2015 Defence White paper.[23] The Minister stated in
February 2017 that its release was 'imminent', but the plan was not
available until after the committee had held its two hearings for the
re-referred inquiry in April 2017.
Background
3.25
Prior to the plan's release in 2017, the development of an
enterprise-level naval shipbuilding plan to provide for the long-term future of
Australia's naval shipbuilding industry was initially raised with the then
Minister for Defence's announcement in 2015.[24]
The 2016 Defence White Paper was eventually released on 25 February 2016
(originally scheduled for 2015) without the promised accompanying naval
shipbuilding plan.
3.26
In the intervening period, and in the absence of such a shipbuilding
plan, the government made a series of announcements as part of its broader
naval shipbuilding program. The government's subsequent advice that the plan's release
was 'imminent' drew attention to its delayed publication at Senate estimates
hearings and in the parliamentary chambers.[25]
The delayed release also prompted discussion among industry stakeholders who
were seeking certainty on the government's industry policy for the sector. At
two April 2017 hearings in Perth and Adelaide, which predated the plan's
eventual delayed release, the committee heard from multiple witnesses who
emphasised the importance of a naval shipbuilding plan for the industry, and expressed
concerns about the delayed release of the plan.[26]
3.27
For example, Air Commodore Margot-Lee Forster (Retired), Chief Executive
Officer, Defence Teaming Centre stated:
[A plan would give] Australian businesses confidence about
what is going to happen so they can make the investments necessary to prepare
themselves to be capable and accredited to be a part of the supply chains for
all of the builds.[27]
3.28
The committee heard that a plan would formalise the government's
commitment to a continuous build and provide the industry with certainty. Mr Glenn Thompson,
Assistant National Secretary, Australian Manufacturing Workers Union (AMWU)
stated that without a plan and the industry policy contained within, little was
known about how local content could be maximised.[28]
3.29
In anticipation of the release of the Plan, Mr Andy Keough,
Chief Executive of Defence SA, tabled a copy of the United States (US) 2016 fiscal
year national shipbuilding plan prepared by the Office of Chief Naval
Operations.[29]
Mr Keough suggested that Australia should produce a similar document containing
the level of detail that would be useful for industry. He explained that the US
document:
...provides absolute clarity for the next 30 years on their
best estimate of the number of ships they are going to have, how many aircraft
carriers they will have in the mid 2040s and how many submarines et cetera.
That is the sort of document we need, and that is the level of detail that
industry needs in order to get clarity around some of these issues.[30]
Overview
3.30
When the Plan was released on 16 May 2017, the Minister for Defence
Industry emphasised the historical scale of the naval shipbuilding enterprise:
The [naval shipbuilding project is] largest project for any
state, any territory, for the whole country, $89 billion of naval
shipbuilding, twice the size of the National Broadband Network, much, much bigger
than the Snowy Hydro scheme...[31]
3.31
The Plan reiterated policy commitments previously announced regarding
the acquisition and sustainment of naval ships, infrastructure upgrades, and
workforce growth. It provides the policy and direction-setting architecture for
the naval shipbuilding enterprise. The Plan does this by setting out the government's
delivery strategy based on four key enablers:
-
a modern, innovative, and secure naval shipbuilding and
sustainment infrastructure;
-
a highly capable, productive, and skilled naval shipbuilding and
sustainment workforce;
-
a motivated, innovative, cost-competitive, and sustainable
Australian industrial base, underpinned initially by experienced
international ship designers and builders who transfer these attributes to
Australian industry; and
-
a national approach to delivering the Naval
Shipbuilding Plan.[32]
3.32
These four enablers form the foundation for implementing the naval
shipbuilding plan, which is based on the RAND Corporation's 2015 analysis for
the Department of Defence. The RAND analysis outlined 'guiding principles' that
drew from lessons learnt from previous shipbuilding programs, like the Collins
Class submarine and Hobart Class Destroyer programs.[33]
3.33
These 'guiding principles' include:
-
establishing a consistent production and build demand;
-
selecting a mature design at the start of the build and limiting
the amount of changes once production starts;
-
limiting the amount of unique Australian design changes;
-
introducing a continuous build philosophy for naval combatants
and a different in-service model based on retention of vessels for no more than
25–30 years;
-
ensuring a well-integrated designer, builder and supplier team;
-
ensuring there is visionary leadership provided by company management;
and
-
developing a productivity based culture of continuous
improvement.[34]
3.34
In a recent update, the ANAO's audit report Naval Construction
Programs—Mobilisation
reported that the Department of Defence's planning and mobilisation activities
related to the four enablers 'remain a work in progress'.[35]
The next four sections consider each enabler in more detail.
Infrastructure
3.35
The first enabler refers to investments in infrastructure following a
strategic review of infrastructure needs at the two major shipyards in South
Australia (Osborne Naval Shipyard) and Western Australia (Henderson Maritime
Precinct) responsible for the delivery of Australia's continuous shipbuilding
programs.[36]
3.36
The government made several announcements in support of infrastructure
upgrades, including the redesign work of the Osborne South shipyard by Defence
and Odense Maritime Technology (OMT), a Danish company. OMT will work with
Defence, the South Australian Government and ASC to deliver a shipyard required
to sustain the surface ships and then later the submarines. This investment is
valued at up to $535 million with commencement for the second half of 2017.[37]
Another investment of $100 million for sustainment and industrial
infrastructure projects at the Henderson naval shipyard in Western Australia
was announced in February 2017.[38]
The Henderson investment was due to take place from 2017 to 2020, with costings
approved in 2018, but has not yet commenced.[39]
3.37
Recently, the ANAO reported that Defence has identified short term
infrastructure requirements and has commenced construction. The longer term
requirements remain under development.[40]
These relate to the core physical infrastructure at the Osborne (south)
shipyard required for the surface ship (OPV and future frigate) programs'
construction. Shipyard upgrade at Osborne commenced in late 2017 and is
expected to be ready for the future frigate program. Elements of the core IT
infrastructure are still under determination. The Henderson shipyard
infrastructure requirements for the OPV program are in the process of
finalisation and the infrastructure requirements for the Future Submarine Program
(FSP) at Osborne (north) shipyard are still in the early stages.[41]
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the committee is concerned that the delay
in finalising a strategic partnership agreement will have a flow on effect and
cause further delays to programs, including work on the submarine program at
the Osborne (north) shipyard.
3.38
Australian Naval Infrastructure has the responsibility of managing the
infrastructure at the Osborne shipyard. This includes managing assets,
developing program infrastructure, providing precinct services, and managing
common user facilities.[42]
Workforce
3.39
The workforce enabler of the naval shipbuilding enterprise requires a
highly capable, productive and skilled naval shipbuilding and sustainment
workforce.[43]
3.40
As the work on the third and final vessel nears completion, the naval
shipbuilding workforce will shrink. According to the Naval Shipbuilding Plan,
this period, also known as the 'valley of death', has resulted in the loss of
thousands of employees with critical skills from the industry in recent years.
The recruitment of these skilled workers and more will again be necessary when
the new shipbuilding programs commence. When these new shipbuilding programs
start, there may be difficulties in mobilising the necessary number of skilled
workers to meet the industry's demand.[44]
The Plan predicted that by 2026 the industry will need over 5,200 construction
workers, and over 15,000 people directly and indirectly employed in the
industry.[45]
3.41
Recruitment, training and retention of highly skilled workers in the naval
shipbuilding enterprise requires an investment over a lengthy period of time.[46]
Mr Herve Guillou, CEO of Naval Group, recently commented in the media that
the company was facing challenges in building an experienced local workforce to
assist with the submarine build:
My worry is always that people confuse education with
experience. These are very, very different.
...
Finding people with a diploma is not so difficult, finding
people with experience and managerial skills is more difficult...it's nearly a
one-by-one exercise. [47]
3.42
A workforce plan for the whole of the naval shipbuilding programs remains
under development. The Auditor General found that Defence had not considered
cost-effectiveness when determining its approach to maintain a shipbuilding
workforce between the Hobart Class destroyer's completion and the surface ship
program's commencement.[48]
3.43
Chapter 4 discusses in more detail issues related to workforce planning and
government investments related to workforce skilling for the naval construction
programs, along with recent workforce developments at the ASC.
Industrial base
3.44
The third enabler of the naval shipbuilding enterprise is 'a motivated,
innovative, cost-competitive and sustainable industry'.[49]
Building an industrial base in Australia that is capable of implementing the
naval shipbuilding plan is critical to securing a 'sustainable, long-term
Australian naval shipbuilding industry with a sovereign capability to build and
sustain its vessels'.[50]
3.45
To establish a strong industrial base, underinvestment in the
shipbuilding industry must be remedied. This means significant re-investments
in Australia's heavy manufacturing and engineering capability and a closer
partnership between Australian governments, industry, unions and the workforce.[51]
3.46
Reforms to address deficits in the country's industrial base are
underway, with recent funds directed towards infrastructure modernisation and
the establishment of training centres to broaden and deepen the skills required
for a shipbuilding workforce for decades ahead.
3.47
The ANAO recently reported that broad areas of industrial reform
required to achieve productive and cost-effective naval construction programs
have been identified. However, no decision has been reached on how these
reforms might take place.[52]
3.48
An important aspect of establishing an industrial base is the
requirement that when selecting an international ship designer to deliver any
of the major shipbuilding programs, certain transfers of technology, intellectual
property, business processes and workplace cultures to Australian industry
should be mandated during the competitive evaluation process.[53]
Chapter 5 discusses sovereign capability in greater details.
National approach
3.49
The fourth enabler of the naval shipbuilding enterprise involves a
national approach to the shipbuilding plan's implementation. The committee
agrees that a national approach is required to build an internationally
competitive Australian industry. Such a historically large scaled project that
is technologically challenging and complex requires a coordinated national
approach. This means support and contributions from all state and territory
governments, as well as from many sectors, will be required. The ANAO reported
that 'initial activities have commenced towards adopting a national approach'.[54]
3.50
In the absence of a national approach, state and territory governments
as well as companies will likely expend their resources competing with one
another.[55]
During the course of the inquiry, the committee heard that discussion about the
national naval shipbuilding industry was often premised as a competition
between states about who would win defence contracts and the subsequent flow-on
work. This discourse suggested that only one state could host Australia's naval
shipbuilding industry. However, as demonstrated by the Offshore Patrol Vessels
project which will take place in both Adelaide and Perth and the content of Figure
3.2 in this chapter, Australia's naval shipbuilding industry is not limited
to just one state but is rather a national industry located across Australia.
3.51
Evidence presented to the committee suggested that the Australian
industry should redirect its focus from a state versus state debate towards
providing an internationally competitive exports industry, servicing
international customers, in addition to defence projects, other Commonwealth
projects and commercial projects.[56]
3.52
In an opinion article published after the release of the government's
naval shipbuilding plan, Mr David Singleton, Chief Executive Officer, Austal,
suggested that rather than a focus on unhelpful domestic competition between
states on 'who gets what', attention should be directed towards competing for
export contracts with foreign defence companies. Such an approach is necessary if
the country is to expand its shipbuilding industry and create thousands of jobs
across Australia.[57]
3.53
At the committee's public hearings, several witnesses reiterated
the national contribution to the shipbuilding programs. For example, at the
committee's hearing on 4 April 2017, Mr John O'Callaghan, Executive
Director, Australian Industry Group Defence Council, explained that
shipbuilding is a national enterprise and there were many examples of where
this national approach has proven successful, including supply of smart
technology related to combat system activity from NSW and work undertaken by
Victorian companies on the ANZAC frigates.[58]
3.54
Mr Brent Clark, then interim Chief Executive Officer, Naval Group
Australia, observed that although the future submarine's hull construction and
assembly take place in Adelaide, the parts and component suppliers will come
from across the country. He added that despite Queensland often being left out
of the naval shipbuilding discourse, suppliers from Queensland have supplied
parts that go into a warship—pumps,
cables, componentry, and electrical equipment.[59]
3.55
Similarly, the Hon Greg Combet, Victorian Defence Industry Advocate,
explained that even though Victoria had not been awarded major contracts for defence
builds, Victorian industry will still contribute to the nation's endeavours. He
noted that Victoria's 'very significant' supply chain will be a large
contributor to shipbuilding programs. Further, Victoria's capabilities in
research and in engineering will play a large role in the delivery of these
shipbuilding programs.[60]
Defence Export Advocate
3.56
As noted in Chapter 2, the former Defence Minister David Johnston was
appointed to the role of Australia's first Defence Export Advocate on 9 April 2018.[61]
The government advised Mr Johnston will provide international advocacy work on
behalf of Australian defence industry to support Australian defence industry to
secure export sales and contracts. This includes overseas travel to support
defence export objectives, including assistance to government and Commonwealth
officials as required. Mr Johnston will work closely with the Defence Export
Office (via Team Defence Australia which sits within the office) as well as
Austrade and the Centre for Defence Industry Capability. He will support the
development and delivery of strategic export campaigns, including working with
States and Territories to achieve this. In his role as Defence Export Advocate,
he will also be the Chair of the Defence Export Forum—working closely with States, Territories and
industry to provide a national approach to support the delivery
of defence exports. The Defence Export Advocate reports to the Minister for Defence
Industry and the Secretary of the Department of Defence.[62]
3.57
At the Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade Legislation Committee's
estimates hearing on 29 May 2018, the Department of Defence confirmed that the
role was a paid position and refused to release further details on Mr
Johnston's remuneration, noting only that the remuneration was commensurate
with those for 'eminent persons' who are in similar advisory roles.[63]
The department was queried on the Defence Minister's previous correspondence
advising the President of Senate that the position's remuneration was nil.[64]
The Department clarified that the advice referred to Mr Johnston's role as
an unpaid member of the Centre for Defence Industry Capability Advisory Board
rather than to his Defence Export Advocate role, which is a paid position.[65]
2018 Defence Export Strategy
3.58
The government released its Defence Export Strategy on 29 January 2018.
The strategy sets out an ambitious vision for the industry to become one of the
top ten global defence exporters within the next decade. In launching the
Strategy, the Minister for Defence Industry stated that it provides Australian
companies the necessary support to grow, invest and to deliver defence
capability.[66]
3.59
The Australian Industry Group described the Strategy as a significant
step in helping to build the capability of the defence industry to support the
Australian Defence Force, grow the country's local industry, and promote
Australia's economic goals.[67]
3.60
The Minister listed several new initiatives and investments contained in
the Defence Export Strategy, including:
-
A new Australian Defence Export Office. The Office will work
hand-in-hand with Austrade and the Centre for Defence Industry Capability to
coordinate whole-of-government efforts, providing a focal point for defence
exports.
-
A new Australian Defence Export Advocate (discussed above).
-
A $3.8 billion Defence Export Facility administered by Efic,
Australia’s export credit agency. This will help Australian companies get the
finance they need to underpin the sales of their equipment overseas. It will
provide confidence to the Australian defence industry to identify and pursue
new export opportunities, knowing Efic’s support is available when there is a
market gap for defence finance.
-
$20 million per year to implement the Defence Export Strategy and
support defence industry exports, including $6.35 million to develop and
implement strategic multi-year export campaigns, an additional $3.2 million to
enhance and expand the Global Supply Chain program, and an additional $4.1
million for grants to help build the capability of small and medium enterprises
to compete internationally.[68]
3.61
Some experts have commented on assumptions implicit in the Strategy that
do not appear to be founded, pointing to the Strategy's optimistic estimates of
current defence export activity, which lacks documentary and corroborating
evidence.[69]
For example, Mr Ron Burke in an article published in The Strategist,
described the estimates of current defence export activity – between $1.5 and
$2.5 billion – as 'unusually high'. Mr Burke explained:
Those figures appear optimistic for a number of reasons. To
start, the exact origin of the figures is difficult to determine. Also, the
strategy lacks corroborating evidence identifying the largest contributing
companies and/or projects (even in an aggregate form to guard against the
disclosure of confidential information). And the project at the vanguard of
Australia’s recent export success—JSF global supply chain
participation—accounts for only around 5 per cent of the $2.5 billion figure.
Further, the estimates seem to hinge on company predictions (possibly for
export projects spanning many years) rather than actual, annual export
outcomes. Finally, SIPRI data for Australia, based on actual rather than
predicted values for major defence projects, show a great deal of volatility,
with 2016 representing a peak that far exceeds anything achieved over the
preceding five years. [70]
3.62
Mr Burke observed that evidence from a departmental industry survey
targeted at capturing export activity and Austrade data demonstrate that
'exports may equate to no more than 10 per cent of what the industry as a whole
produced—or roughly one-third of what the strategy implies'. [71]
2018 Defence Industrial Capability
Plan
3.63
On 23 April 2018, the Minister for Defence Industry
released the Defence Industrial Capability Plan (the DICP). The DICP builds on
the 2016 Industry Policy Statement. It also outlines Australia's long-term
vision and objectives for the country's defence industry and how the government
and Defence will partner with industry to achieve the government's ambition.[72]
3.64
The Minister for Defence Industry stated that the DICP addresses defence
and defence industry sovereignty and outlines the initial Sovereign Industrial
Capability Priorities. The DICP makes it clear that simply having an ABN and an
Australian shopfront is not enough to be considered an Australian defence
company. The Minister stated that:
[W]e want to see Australian leadership, an Australian board,
and an Australian workforce value-adding right here at home.[73]
3.65
The DICP explained that:
The Government’s investment in Australia’s defence capability
comes with an expectation that international companies wishing to work with
Defence will invest in Australian defence industry and establish Australian
subsidiaries. The Government has an expectation that those companies wishing to
work with Defence will have an Australian presence and Australian leadership
influence, including at the senior leadership and board level.[74]
3.66
The Sovereign Industrial Capability Priorities are industrial capabilities
critical to achieving the Australian Defence Force's operational mission and to
the development of Australia's future force over the next few years.[75]
Collins Class Submarine maintenance and technology upgrade and the continuous
shipbuilding program (including rolling submarine acquisition) are included
among the ten sovereign capability priorities.[76]
They are assessed as:
-
operationally critical to the Defence mission;
-
priorities within the Integrated Investment Program over the next
three to five years; or
-
in need of dedicated monitoring, management, and support due to
their industrial complexity, Government priority, or requirements across
multiple capability programs.[77]
Figure 3.3: Department of Defence's Industry Policy Agenda[78]:
Source: 2018 Defence
Industrial Capability Plan (DICP)
3.67
Support for the Defence Industrial Capability Plan's implementation will
be provided by Australian industrial strategies for each of the six Integrated
Investment Program capability streams and Implementation Plans for each
Sovereign Industrial Capability Priority from 2019.[79]
3.68
The DICP allocated up to $17 million in annual funding from 2018–19 to support Sovereign
Industrial Capability Priority grants. The grants will be delivered by the
Centre for Defence Industry Capability.[80]
3.69
ASPI has described key additions to the Naval Shipbuilding Plan as
including:
-
a tighter definition of Australian defence industry;
-
a list of 10 'sovereign industry capability priorities', along
with a framework to assist with force design and contracting; and
-
more information on the capability streams that make up the $200
billion Integrated Investment Program.[81]
Economic benefits
3.70
The government's naval shipbuilding plan stated that the establishment
of a continuous naval shipbuilding industry will create 'economic growth
through maximising Australian industry participation, and securing Australian
jobs that will endure for decades to come'.[82] The
committee heard that by sustaining a long-term industry, families and their
communities will be supported through secure, long-term careers. It was also
noted that a strong domestic sovereign capability has the potential to become a
competitive and thriving exports industry into the future, leading to further
economic benefits and less reliance on Australian defence contracts to sustain
the industry.
3.71
The long-term benefits of naval shipbuilding investments can be
substantial. Although the shipbuilding and repairs services industry has grown
slowly over the past five years, the industry is expected to experience
'robust' growth onwards. This is mostly due to the Commonwealth government's
commitment to support the industry through the continuous naval shipbuilding
program, which aims to stabilise revenue streams and shorten times between contracts.[83]
It is anticipated that for the current 2017–18 period, industry revenue will
reach 3.3 billion with $397.2 million in expected profits. Industry
revenue is forecast to grow at a compound annual rate of 4.4 per cent over
the five years from 2018 to 2023, to reach $4.1 billion.[84]
3.72
Economic benefits extend to broader shipbuilding industry exports. Although
international trade comprises a small part of the industry, only accounting for
1.6 per cent of industry revenue in 2017–18[85],
there are opportunities for growth in niche product segments such as high-speed
passenger catamarans, particularly in Southeast Asian markets.[86]
These commercial exports will be an important driver of economic benefits going
forward.
Production efficiencies
3.73
Findings by the 2015 RAND report and the ANAO's performance audit report
suggest that ships built in Australia come at a premium cost. Witnesses and
submitters considered that this premium was worth it, given the other benefits
of a local ship building industry.
3.74
The 2015 RAND report found that producing naval ships in Australia
includes a 30 to 40 per cent premium in price in contrast to comparable ships
produced overseas. The RAND report noted that this premium could drop over time
with continuous production, reform to acquisition and contracting processes
focusing on cost effectiveness, selection of mature designs containing minimal
changes, and adoption of an integrated design, builder and supplier model of
production.[87]
This was supported by the Department of Defence's evidence that with more ships
built, the productivity and cost of each subsequent ship built will improve.
This productivity is also reflected in the learning curve moving down until it
reaches the 'most efficient and effective build process' in place and workers
become more skilled and experienced.[88]
3.75
However, the ANAO's recent report into the competitive evaluation
process for the future submarines project suggested a more modest price premium, with
the submarines provided by the successful participant Naval Group likely to
incur a premium of around 15 per cent for an Australian build option
(in comparison to an international and hybrid build).[89]
3.76
The committee reiterates its conclusion from its third report during the
44th Parliament that 'the committee is not convinced by assessments
that dismiss the economic benefits from a vibrant domestic ship building
industry'.[90] Primarily,
naval shipbuilding is a critical input to national security and 'most countries
are more than willing to pay a price premium for this security'.[91]
As Ms Deirdre Willmott, Chief Executive Office, Chamber of Commerce
and Industry of Western Australia, explained, it is important for Australia to
have a naval shipbuilding sovereign capability despite narrow considerations of
immediate cost. She added that it made little sense to 'keep going overseas' to
build ships when Australia can build these ships locally, and with the added built
in advantage of having sovereign capability for the future.[92]
3.77
Mr David Singleton, Chief Executive Officer, Austal explained that it was
possible for ships to be produced economically if the buyer requires the
supplier to produce subsequent ships at a cheaper cost. He gave the example of
Austal's experience with the US government:
[We] have two ships and no competition for those ships at
all—so there is not another aluminium defence shipbuilder and there isn't
anybody else who competes for both the littoral combat ship and the EPF. I can
tell you that the US government has an extremely effective way of making sure
that we produce ships to a very good economic standard. In fact, we are managed
by the US to make sure that every single ship we produce is cheaper than the
previous ship we produced, and by quite large percentages.[93]
3.78
Mr Glenn Thompson, Assistant National Secretary, AMWU, explained
that the more ships built, the more efficiently and economically they are
produced. In the case of the AWD project:
From ship 1... to ship 2, there is a 45 per cent increase in
productivity. [And the] government has announced that it is ahead of budget and
on time.[94]
3.79
At the 24 May 2017 Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation
Committee estimates hearing, Mr Mark Lamarre, then Chief Executive Officer, Australian
Submarine Corporation Shipbuilding, confirmed these productivity and economic
gains. Indeed, on the day of the hearing, ASC delivered ship one to the
Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) within the Department of
Defence.[95]
Mr Lamarre explained that productivity and financial gains made with each
subsequent AWD program ship produced had a multiplier effect: ship three would
be more economical than ship two and one, with ship three currently 38 per cent
less expensive than ship two, and over 50 per cent complete.[96]
Mr Lamarre stated that the ASC was proof that Australia could produce ships
economically without a premium cost:
We are cost competitive, as I have indicated in the turnouts
that we are getting on the three ships, but also as benchmarked by others... [T]he
team ... are absolutely smashing the notion that Australians have to accept a 40
per cent premium for building ships.[97]
3.80
Findings by the ANAO in an audit report in March 2017 further supported
this evidence. In the ANAO's audit report into the procurement of the
replacement Antarctic Vessel, the ANAO found that the view held by the
Department of Defence that a home build will cost 40 per cent more was not
adequately supported by relevant documentary evidence.[98]
ANAO Audit Report: Naval
Construction Programs—Mobilisation 2018
3.81
The recent ANAO Audit Report Naval Construction Programs—Mobilisation,
released on 14 May 2018, raised serious concerns for the committee about
aspects of the government's implementation of the naval shipbuilding plan. These
concerns were not fully assuaged by the Department of Defence's explanations at
the recent Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee's budget estimates
hearing on 29 May 2018.
3.82
In its findings, the ANAO noted that:
The Naval Shipbuilding Plan did not identify how Defence will
address the high to extreme level of risk associated with its naval
construction programs, as advised to the Government in 2015 and 2017. [99]
3.83
The ANAO reported that Defence's main risk mitigation strategy was the
implementation of the government's guiding principles. The ANAO reported that
the successful implementation of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan would require
'seamless' management of the naval construction program and the following
factors falling into place:
-
the timely and effective mobilisation of key enablers;
-
the timely and effective implementation of each construction
project; and
-
the seamless management of the naval construction program as a
whole, to avoid flow-on effects and maintain a continuous build process which
delivers the specified capability on time and within budget.[100]
3.84
The ANAO noted that based on Defence's past experiences with naval
shipbuilding programs in Australia, successful implementation of the naval
shipbuilding plan required very high expectations:
The history of naval construction programs in Australia
suggests that these are very high expectations indeed. Shortcomings in the
management of program risk will result in the extension of service of the
Armidale and ANZAC class ships, and the Collins Class submarines, and the
associated costs and effects on naval capability.[101]
3.85
The ANAO also noted that Defence did not have an updated cost estimate
for its naval construction programs that included the FSP's domestic build.[102]
Indeed, current cost estimates do not reflect changes to the earlier design and
build milestones for its surface ships.[103]
3.86
Other issues raised which are of concern to the committee include:
-
the progress of the Offshore Patrol Vessel through second gate
approval without detailed sustainment costs and finalised commercial
arrangements;[104]
and
-
the high risk level related to aspects of the Future Frigates
program identified by Defence in an internal review in 2016.
3.87
The 2016 Defence internal review found an accelerated schedule would
risk cost and construction overruns. It provided two options to mitigate these
risks but an alternative option was chosen. This alternative option allowed for
construction to commence in 2020 with 'prototyping activities'. The ANAO noted
this alternative option was not supported by any analysis.
3.88
The Department of Defence responded to these concerns at the Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade Legislation Committee's estimates hearing on
29 May 2018. It also took the opportunity to respond to the negative media
coverage and 'selective' reporting and interpretation of the ANAO's report.[105]
Mr Kim Gillis, Deputy Secretary CASG, claimed media coverage had conveniently
ignored the report's positive findings that:
-
Defence continues to work towards effective planning and mobilisation
to deliver the Australian government's Naval Shipbuilding Plan;
-
Defence has identified the key elements for a successful
continuous shipbuilding enterprise; and
-
Defence is currently meeting scheduled milestones for the naval
construction programs, noting that each program is in the early stages.[106]
3.89
Mr Gillis advised that the department was making steady progress in its implementation
of the government's national shipbuilding plan, stating that in the year since
the naval shipbuilding plan's release, 'Defence has progressed the key policy
initiatives and critical milestones outlined in the plan in a timely and
coordinated national effort'.[107]
3.90
Mr Gillis also refuted several negative claims reported in the media. Mr
Gillis told the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee' that:
-
There was 'no cost blowout' related to the Offshore Patrol Vessel
program. As the contract is a fixed-price contract, the department 'understands
precisely' the costs of building these vessels in both South Australia and
Western Australia.
-
The 'government was provided sustainment data for the Offshore
Patrol Vessel, based on historical usage and designer forecasts'. This was 'standard
shipbuilding practice'. Further, the most current sustainment costs for the Offshore
Patrol Vessels are only available following the outcome of the tender process
and the known type of vessel to be purchased.
-
Defence has provided the government 'with an indicative
life-cycle cost for the Offshore Patrol Vessel across a 20 year-year life'. The
cost was 'based on previous programs, historical usage and upkeep data provided
by tenderers'. This was typical for a shipbuilding project at a similar stage.
-
Defence first used the terms 'high to extreme risk' (and not the
ANAO) when it identified that aspects of the future frigate program were of a 'high
to extreme risk level' in early 2016.
-
'All of the changes associated with the domestic build of the
future submarine and future frigate programs are been reflected in Defence's
Integrated Investment Program.' The shipbuilding provisions identified in the IIP
have 'been consolidated to enable government to consider the affordability of
the naval construction program as each project is presented to government. Offsets
are recommended for any shortfalls between funding requirements and existing
provisions'.[108]
3.91
Mr Gillis disagreed with the ANAO's concern that there were no detailed
sustainment costs for the OPV, stating that:
[The ANAO] misinterpreted the requirements, because the
requirements are to have tender-quality pricing for the tender. There was only
one tender there, which was to build ships. It's a separate tender to actually
provide the detailed costing for sustainment. We have been doing that for as
long as I can remember because it would be illogical for me to then ask three
tenderers to then go and have, potentially, five or six sustainment companies
then tender against three different ships, when we haven't selected one, to go
through that process. It is an illogical path to say that we should have had
tender-quality prices for sustainment when we hadn't even released the tender.[109]
3.92
The Department of Defence reported several strategies were adopted to
lower these risks to a manageable level. These strategies included:
-
The commencement of the future frigate prototyping in 2020 to
demonstrate the ship design, shipyard processes and workforce are production
ready[110];
-
The decoupling of shipyard design and construction ahead of the
future frigate decision; and
-
The adoption of an enterprise approach to Combat Management
Systems and bringing forward the future frigate combat management decision.
This has allowed for the commencement of studies prior to the future frigate
decision.[111]
3.93
At the committee's public hearing on 7 June 2018, Dr Tom Ioannou, Group
Executive Director, ANAO, advised that the office remained committed to the
findings and recommendations contained in the report, notwithstanding the
statements made by Defence officials during the May 2018 Budget Estimates.[112]
In relation to the suggestion by Defence officials that the report was out of
date, Dr Ioannou advised the committee that the audit continued up until the
day it was tabled by the Auditor General, on 14 May 2018:
Our report was, of course, tabled on 14 May 2018, and it
includes at page 12 a formal, written Defence response to the audit report,
which was received on 26 March 2018. It's in the nature of such responses that
we also receive a variety of more detailed comments in addition to the formal
response to be published in the report. Our audit standards require us to
continue the audit process until the completion of an audit.[113]
3.94
In relation to the use of the term 'high to extreme risk' with regard to
the future frigate program, the ANAO agreed that this term was first used by
the Department of Defence. Dr Ionannou told the committee that he had no reason
to doubt that this term had been used accurately by the Department.[114]
Committee comment
3.95
National long term planning is vitally important for Australia's naval
shipbuilding industry to sustain and consolidate its sovereign capability.
Since the tabling of the committee's third report in July 2015, the Coalition
government has made a number of announcements in support of the continuous
naval shipbuilding program. The eventual release of the naval shipbuilding plan
on 16 May 2017 went some way to formalising a long term plan for the industry.
However, the committee believes that further work is required to provide a more
comprehensive and holistic long term plan for the Australian naval shipbuilding
industry.
3.96
The committee acknowledges that a large amount of evidence received at
the April 2017 hearings pre-dated the release of the government's naval
shipbuilding plan and associated documents. However, the evidence remains
relevant, in that the delayed release of the Plan created unnecessary
uncertainties for industry. Further, having assessed the Plan after its release,
it is clear that the Plan has failed to meet the expectations of witnesses who
were disappointed in its lack of details.
ANAO Audit Report Naval
Construction Programs—Mobilisation
3.97
The ANAO report raises serious concerns about Defence's mitigation of
the risks associated with its implementation of the naval shipbuilding plan. Despite
Defence's evidence that it identified risks early and undertook risk mitigating
strategies to manage them, the committee remains concerned with the management
and implementation of the naval shipbuilding programs. Much of Defence's risk mitigation
strategies to minimise any cost overruns and construction delays are premised
on all the pieces in the strategies falling into place smoothly, including prototyping
activities to address the future frigate's accelerated schedule. Against this
background are Defence's past challenges working on Australian shipbuilding
projects in Australia.
Defence Export Advocate
3.98
The committee is concerned that information on the remuneration for the
Defence Export Advocate is not publically available and that such information
was withheld from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee
at its recent estimates hearing. As at the date of this report's tabling, the
committee's questions on the matter remained unanswered. The lack of
information impedes on the work of the senate and its ability to hold the
government and departments accountable to Parliament.
The naval shipbuilding plan
3.99
The committee welcomes the release of the Naval Shipbuilding Plan (NSP).
However, the NSP failed to include key information identified by witnesses as
vital for inclusion. For example, the NSP lacks guidelines about mandated
levels of Australian industry involvement and content in defence projects. As a
result, information about when Australian industry involvement and content
should be achieved in these projects, how these requirements would be enforced,
and what penalties exist for not adhering to the mandated requirements, are
absent. The committee returns to this issue in Chapter 5.
3.100 A plan should be
a strategic document for the industry, providing a framework for action.
However, the NSP as currently drafted is little more than an explanation of
decisions and announcements already made. If the government's intent was to
produce a project plan for the management of these announcements already made,
it failed by not providing a detailed project schedule for the continuous build
nor specifying the related dependencies between projects– something a project
plan would be expected to contain. In addition, limited detail was provided
about these projects – for example, no further information was provided about
the $100 million Western Australian infrastructure upgrade announcement
discussed earlier in this chapter.
3.101 The committee
further notes that the NSP does not mandate regular reporting or updates to the
NSP. In contrast, the committee heard that in the United States, an updated
Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels is required under law
to be submitted to Congress annually.[115]
If the Secretary of Defence does not provide this to Congress, funds available
for implementation of the plan in that financial year are reduced by
50 per cent until such documentation is provided. By comparison, the
Australian naval shipbuilding plan simply states that the government will
provide regular updates on its implementation through national security
statements and naval shipbuilding updates to the Parliament. While the
committee acknowledges the internal governance arrangements in place and direct
reporting to the National Security Committee of Cabinet, this does not enable
the public or the Parliament to hold the government to account in regard to its
implementation of the NSP, as limited as it is. The committee considers that at
a minimum, a status report and updated plan is required to be provided twice a
year to the Parliament.
3.102 The Plan only
focussed on one part of the Australian industry – government defence contracts—ignoring a thriving
domestic commercial sector and a growing exports industry. An internationally
competitive Australian industry is vital to the sustainability of the
Australian naval shipbuilding industry, enabling it to maintain its sovereign
capability, and the realisation of future economic benefits. Long term planning
for consolidating the commercial and exports side of the industry is still
required.
3.103 Evidence
presented by Mr Glenn Thompson, AMWU, highlighted the use of minor and support
vessels by the Commonwealth, outside of the Defence sector.[116]
The committee considers that these vessels should also be included in a
national shipbuilding plan.
3.104 A large number
of support vessels relied on by the Royal Australian Navy are being managed by
Serco Defence which operates across Australia.[117]
As one of the country's largest maritime service operators, with facilities
across the country, it has an important role to play in sustaining a viable
shipbuilding industry in Australia. This means having a consistent flow of
maintenance and construction work for people to build skills, gain experiences,
and for businesses to 'attract investment and improve productivity'.[118]
The company has designed, built, operated and maintained a large number of
vessels. It has provided maintenance and in service support for the Pacific
Patrol Boats, Bay Class Australian Customs Vessels, Cape Class Patrol Boats,
and Armidale Class Boats.[119]
3.105 Mr Thompson,
AMWU, advised the committee that Serco Defence manages a large number of
vessels for Defence and other government agencies, including the Antarctic
Supply and Research Vessel (ASRV) which will replace the icebreaker and
research vessel Aurora Australis, and a 93-metre aviation
training vessel to the Australian government. [120]
The training vessel was built in Vietnam and the replacement icebreaker vessel will
be built in Romania.[121]
Unfortunately Serco Defence declined the committee's invitation to attend and
give evidence at the hearing on 7 June 2018. As a consequence, the committee
has not had an opportunity to discuss these vessels with Serco Defence.
3.106 The committee
considers that the contracts, construction, maintenance and support services
related to all Commonwealth procured and leased vessels, such as those outlined
above, should also be included in a national shipbuilding plan.
3.107 The finding by
ANAO that the naval construction program's cost of implementation did not
reflect changes to the original cost assumptions remains relevant. The committee is not
convinced that the original cost assumption which omits an Australian build for
the Future Submarine program and an earlier construction of the surface ships
(bringing forward expenditure) has been satisfactorily reflected in the
Integrated Investment Program. The committee does not believe the arrangement
that shortfalls between the funding requirements and existing provisions be covered
by 'offsets' is a satisfactory solution for not having more up-to-date cost
assumptions.
Other Commonwealth vessel
procurements
3.108 One of several
notable absences from the government's Naval Shipbuilding Plan is the absence
of other key Defence Department and Commonwealth vessel procurements. For
example, the Plan did not include:
-
the Department of Defence's own RAN replacement replenishment
ships (SEA1652) program (the subject of this committee's first report); or
-
the Department of the Environment and Energy's Replacement
Antarctic Vessel (the subject of a March 2017 ANAO audit report).
3.109 In both
instances, the successful tenderers were both international companies, Navantia
of Spain and DMS Maritime Pty Ltd (now Serco Defence) respectively.
3.110 The committee
can only assume in the instance of replenishment ships (SEA1652), because these
ships will not be built in Australia by an Australian company, the program was
not included in the naval shipbuilding plan and as a result, Australian
industry involvement will not be prioritised in these projects.
3.111 The committee
considers that the government's Naval Shipbuilding Plan is limited in scope and
falls short of achieving the government's intended aim of a continuous national
build of ships in Australia. It is a document that focuses on a small number of
defence naval procurements and their sustainment, in a limited number of
Australian states.
The need for a national shipbuilding
plan
3.112 The committee considers
that a continuous build of ships and utilisation of Australian industry is more
readily achievable through the development of a truly national shipbuilding
plan that includes all Commonwealth vessel procurements, state vessel
procurements, as well commercial opportunities and support for a growing
exports industry. The committee considers that one national plan is required.
This plan should incorporate the government's existing naval shipbuilding plan,
along with plans for other Commonwealth and state/territory vessels, commercial
vessels, and all existing Australian shipbuilding yards. Australia can only
plan for, and achieve, a continuous build of ships, if all ships produced in
Australia are included in a national plan.
3.113 The committee
notes that state and territory procurements are a matter for state governments
and that state procurement frameworks may differ. Predominantly, the main
vessels procured by state and territory governments are for their police
forces. While there are a limited number of procurements for state public
transportation, a mixture of private and public ownership and operations
arrangements makes a national approach difficult in these circumstances.
3.114 Moreover, the
committee is aware that in the past decade, an overwhelming number of state and
territory vessel procurements have been awarded to Australian industry. Despite
this, the committee considers there to be value in developing a shared
principles framework to ensure that:
-
state involvement in Australian industry continues;
-
the Commonwealth can learn from its state counterparts; and
-
the Commonwealth and state and territory governments work
together to ensure a national continuous build of ships, maximising Australian
involvement.
3.115 In regards to
non-defence naval Commonwealth vessel procurements, the committee is aware of
several procurements that should have been, or should be, planned in
conjunction with defence procurements and non-government opportunities in order
to sustain a continuous national build of vessels in Australia. These include:
-
Replacement Antarctic Vessel (icebreaker). Department of
the Environment and Energy. Awarded to DMS Maritime Pty Ltd (now Serco
Defence). Discussed in ANAO report 45 2016–2017;
-
Cape Class Patrol Boats. Australian Border Force (formerly
Department of Immigration and Border Protection and before that Australian
Customs and Border Protection Service). Awarded to Austal. Discussed in ANAO
report 13 2014–2015;
-
RV Investigator – scientific research vessel. CSIRO.
Teekey Holdings Australia, constructed in Singapore. The number of days spent
at sea by this vessel and the backlog of bookings for use by researchers was
discussed at a Senate Environment and Communications References Committee
public hearing into the impacts of climate change on marine fisheries and
biodiversity held in Sydney on 17 March 2017;[122]
-
STS Young Endeavour ship. Operated by the Royal Australian
Naval for the Young Endeavour Youth Scheme. This vessel was a gift from the
United Kingdom government in 1988. At the 30 May 2017 Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade Legislation Committee's estimates hearing it was revealed that the
vessel had a planned withdrawal date of 2021–22.[123] The Department of
Defence is in the process of developing options for replacement of the vessel;[124]
-
Vessels used by Australian Border Force such as the Ocean Shield
and Thaiyak.
-
Vessels used by the Department of Agriculture and Water Resources;
and
-
Vessels such as patrol boats and rigid hull inflatable boats used
by the Australian Federal Police.
Recommendation 1
3.116
The committee recommends that the Commonwealth and state governments
work together to develop a national shipbuilding plan, incorporating the
existing naval shipbuilding plan. A national shipbuilding plan should include
the following:
-
agreed procurement principles focused on support for a continuous
build of vessels in Australia utilising Australian industry and Australian
shipyards;
-
at a minimum, all vessels procured by the Commonwealth, including
scientific and research vessels, federal police, and customs and border
protection vessels, and agriculture vessels. These procurements should be
subject to the same level of scrutiny as naval procurements have been, and be
planned accordingly in the national interest;
-
how remaining shipyards not identified in the government’s naval
shipbuilding plan will be utilised in a continuous national shipbuilding build
program;
-
how Australia's commercial and exports industry can be supported
and planned for into the future;
-
the requirement that reporting against the plan be provided every
six months to the Commonwealth Parliament for scrutiny; and
-
any other matters deemed essential to the development of a
holistic national plan.
Recommendation 2
3.117
The committee recommends that in the absence of a national shipbuilding
plan in the short term, reporting against the government's current naval
shipbuilding plan and its four key enablers and three major continuous build
programs be provided to the Commonwealth Parliament every six months.
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