Chapter 5
Practical concerns with the bill
Impact on prices for consumers
5.1
The committee heard that the present structure of Australia's retail
grocery market is not indicative of a lack of competitive pressure in the
sector, nor its capacity to pursue geographic price discrimination for
anti-competitive purposes.
5.2
The Australian National Retailers Association (ANRA) told the committee
that in a contestable market, predatory pricing would be difficult to achieve.
It argued that it is not the presence of a certain number of operators in a
market that would indicate the presence of monopoly power but whether the
market as a whole is contestable. An ANRA spokesperson explained that if there
are few entry costs to a new player joining the market, 'the threat of entry
itself is a guarantee of competitiveness'. He cited the recent entry of Costco
into the Australian market and concluded that the market is 'fairly
contestable'.[1]
5.3
Conversely, the Southern Sydney Retailers Association told the committee
that geographic price discrimination only happens in areas where there is a
substantial lack of competition. The Association argued that the practice in
turn ‘destroys competition, distorts investment and is a significant economic
problem for this country’. High prices in a market should encourage investment
and the entry of small competitors. However:
...when a small business knows that geographic price
discrimination exists, he knows that the minute he goes into that market that
large store can simply come in and undercut him in price or so called match his
price but in effect undercut him while keeping prices in their other locations
high. It becomes a significant disincentive to investment. Also it sends the
wrong investment signals.[2]
5.4
The Association told the committee that the Blacktown Amendment would
redress this situation by creating a proxy for competition:
If this Blacktown amendment comes in, it will give that small
businessman a chance. He will say: ‘I can go in and undercut that big
supermarket price. I went to the markets early this morning and got a special
buy on apples’—or whatever the goods were—‘and I can undercut them on price,
win market share and drive prices down.’ That is what will happen in the
market. It will free people up to give lower prices. It will increase
competition. The big supermarket will then have to work out what it is going to
do: ‘Am I going to leave my price higher and lose market share or am I going to
lower them to match it? If I have to lower my prices, I have got to lower them
everywhere.’ And that is what they are most likely to do.[3]
5.5
However this argument is entirely dependent on the assumption that the
"small" retailer would in fact lower their prices on a particular
item to undercut the larger players – rather than simply price match or only
slightly undercut those who would be required to uniformly price across stores.
Furthermore should the retailers uniformly price their items at a higher end of
the scale the ultimate outcome could be higher prices across the entire sector
for consumers.
5.6
It is interesting that independent retailers felt that the price
transparency offered by the GROCERYchoice website would possibly lead to
"price maintenance" across a range of competitors.
I made the point at the time that if you made available on a
particular site the price of milk—and I think CHOICE used the word ‘gaming’—why
would somebody not go one cent cheaper? Over a period of time, would you end up
with retail price maintenance by default? What would be the incentive for
anybody to price baked beans at any different price to what was there?...There
is that chance. If we stocked 16,500 items and you had 500 items on a website,
why would I ever be one cent more expensive than Coles or Woolworths? Why would
I ever be one cent cheaper?...Why would I not be the same price? What you end
up with is everybody selling at the same price...When the wholesale price of one
of those items goes up and one retailer—me or Coles or Woolworths or
whoever—puts its price up from $1.60 to $1.80, why would anybody else go to
$1.79? Why would they not go to $1.80?[4]
5.7
However they argue that the price uniformity across geographic areas
imposed by this legislation on all retail outlets with more than five stores
would not result in price maintenance and would benefit competition.
5.8
Both the ACCC and Treasury expressed concern that the Bill would result
in higher prices over the long term for consumers:
If businesses were required to set a single price at all
stores in a particular region (as defined by the 35 kilometre rule in the
Bill), they would choose a price somewhere between the highest and lowest
prices in that region. In locations of lower prices, the Blacktown Amendment
Bill would cause a business to raise prices. The Bill would also have the
effect of removing incentives for competitors to compete strongly on price,
with the likely result that they also would raise prices. In such locations
consumers will be forced to pay higher prices under the Guaranteed Lowest
Prices Rule contained in the Bill compared to a flexible pricing scenario.[5]
5.9
In giving evidence to the committee the ACCC also expressed concerns:
Unfortunately the bill takes quite a blunt approach when
dealing with this issue—an issue which has more than one dimension. The absence
of a link to anti-competitive effect or purpose means that the bill will catch
not only the occasions of anti-competitive price discrimination but also the
many examples of harmless or even pro-competitive price discrimination that
occur in the marketplace today. Related to this is the real concern that,
absent that link, the amendments could do more harm than good.[6]
5.10
The ACCC also expressed concerns that the normal discounting behaviour
of retailers due to increased demand or supply of goods may be reduced as a
result of the Bill:
In most cases, for industries that currently have price
differentials across regions it is very unlikely that prices will gravitate
towards the lower end. Generally speaking businesses will want to maintain at
least the same average margins. More likely, at the very least, some prices
will go up and others will go down. For example, the higher margin areas might
see price falls but the current lower margin areas might see price increases. I
am a little worried that, at worst, under the proposal as it is, prices could
gravitate upwards to the current ceiling or beyond. This could happen where ad
hoc discounting, currently prevalent in the Australian marketplace, which
lowers overall pricing, is discouraged or where competitive pressures are
dampened because of these provisions.[7]
5.11
The committee also note the contradictions that appear when comparing
evidence provided to the Fuelwatch inquiry that by legislating that retailers
fix prices for a period of twenty-four hours it would stifle discounting—yet
this Bill which will effectively see uniform pricing across most major retail
outlets all of the time—has not drawn the same concerns regarding the ability
to discount.
5.12
For example the committee heard from Associate Professor Zumbo during
the Fuelwatch inquiry that:
There will be a failure to deliver real competition between
retailers. The proposed Fuelwatch system would create an artificial
environment. It would force retailers to stick to a price for 24 hours. It
would remove pricing competition within that 24 hours. Price is the essence of
competition. Therefore the proposed Fuelwatch is an interference in that
pricing mechanism.[8]
5.13
The Australian Convenience and Petroleum Marketers Association commented
on the proposed Fuelwatch legislation that 'the consumer's ability to get the
best deal at all times will be diminished.'[9]
5.14
Perhaps ironically, these criticisms are even more appropriate for the
"artificial environment" that will be created by this legislation –
where the large retailers as well as any number of small to middle sized retail
stores will effectively be forced to uniform price without any
"guarantee" that lowest prices will prevail.
5.15
The Law Council of Australia raised its concerns that the amendment:
...would deter firms from lowering prices to meet or respond to
price competition from other suppliers in the particular locality. Some
retailers would be prevented from matching a quote by selectively discounting
products. An offer of matching or beating a competitor's price -- either in a
particular case or as a general policy -- would not be permitted. It is clear
that competition and consumers would be worse off.[10]
Committee view
5.16
The committee heard evidence that ALDI already uniformly prices
nationally, Woolworths are moving to a national uniform pricing policy and
Coles set their maximum prices nationally but allow store managers to lower
prices to manage stock or compete locally. Therefore it is possible that this
legislation will impact the pricing behaviour of the major stores it targets
very little, but have a much larger impact on small to medium chains across the
entire retail sector. The committee is very concerned that no substantial
survey of retail chains outside the grocery and petrol sector appears to have
been undertaken in regards to the legislation. The committee is also concerned
that the bill may unintentionally increase prices across the board for
consumers and result in substantially less discounting that currently occurs.
The domino effect
5.17
One of the practical issues raised by the bill is what Coles has
referred to as the 'domino effect'. A retail outlet that first lowers its price
on a product will force all affiliated outlets within a distance of up to 35
kilometres to match that lower price, in turn requiring all affiliated outlets
within 35 kilometres of these 'secondary' outlets to follow suit, and so on.
5.18
It would seem that—given the presence of at least one affiliated
supermarket (and petrol) outlet within 35 kilometres of each other within the
metropolitan area—the knock on effect will be substantial. Indeed, it seems
likely that corporations such as Coles and Woolworths would be required to have
uniform pricing for their products in each of the capital cities.
5.19
The bill, as currently drafted, would essentially require Coles and
Woolworths to set a uniform national pricing strategy for each of the
metropolitan areas.[11]
5.20
In states such as South Australia, the 35 kilometre rule would
essentially result in the entire metropolitan area having price uniformity
across any retail outlet with more than five stores. This would potentially
encompass smaller retail businesses including clothing stores and some fruit
and vegetable retailers.
5.21
When asked about this impact on smaller retail chains both NARGA and
Professor Zumbo claimed that such stores would normally have uniform pricing
anyway. However no empirical evidence was provided to the committee, using
surveys of such chains or any other research, to demonstrate that uniform
pricing is adopted across all retail outlets with more than five stores.
Compliance costs for small businesses
5.22 There is concern that the Bill would impose
unnecessary compliance costs on small and medium-sized businesses. If a
franchisee that owns six stores wanted to drop the price of one of its products
at one store in response to the price-drop of a nearby competitor, it would
have to coordinate the new price at the other five stores. This would
potentially require an onerous change to the franchisee's software system.
Managers would be required to advise of all price changes on all product lines
continuously.[12]
5.23 The Law Council of Australia also noted some drafting
problems with the definitions in the exemptions in the bill. The bill exempts
products supplied or offered for supply at a genuine "factory",
"warehouse" or "clearance outlet". However none of these terms
are recognised as definitions either commercially or legally. It would
therefore be extraordinarily difficult in the absence of any commercial
definition or legal precedent to determine where this exemption would or would
not apply.
Stock management
5.24 The committee also notes the concerns of the major
supermarket chains that the bill would have an adverse effect on their stock
management. It notes the comments of the Australian National Retailers
Association (ANRA) that the efficient allocation of goods in a highly
competitive market requires 'a very rigorous form of stock control management'.[13]
In ANRA's view, the bill would affect a company's ability to discount prices to
clear stock.
5.25 The bill allows discounting for an outlet that is
closing down or because a product is damaged, imminently perishable or is to be
permanently removed from supply. It is not clear to what extent individual
supermarkets move prices in response to short-term inventory fluctuations. For
example, on an unseasonably cool and wet summer's day, sales of soft drinks
will slow. Do stores just order fewer bottles in their next delivery, or do
they cut prices below cost to clear the shelves?
Pricing of fresh fruit and vegetables
5.26
The third issue of a practical concern relates to stores' pricing of
fresh fruit and vegetables. The bill contains a provision for company to
discount perishables at one of its stores, but it does not allow for a product
of a different quality to be priced differently. The committee understands
that, currently, store managers at Woolworths and Coles have some discretion to
set the price of certain fruit and vegetable products depending on their
quality.
Obligation to supply
5.27
The fourth matter of practical concern with the bill is the reference to
'must supply'. The ACCC noted in its evidence to the committee that:
Read literally, as a court may well read it, this requires a
retailer to sell the same products at each of its outlets and exposes retailers
who choose to supply different product ranges to suit the market differences to
possible prosecution. Obviously unintentionally it would expose retailers to
alleged contravention when they run out of stock at one location but continue
to supply it at other locations.[14]
Ad-hoc store discounts
5.28
A further concern raised was about the impact of the bill on 'haggling'
about prices or special discounts:
The provision of ad-hoc discounts is a normal feature of many
Australian markets. Negotiated prices for electrical goods, for example, or a
discount to local community organisations may well be a thing of the past. More
formal policies, such as trade discounts or match-to-beat policies may, too,
come into question, depending on the interpretation of the legislation.[15]
5.29
The common example of haggling could be going to a bulky goods store to
buy a washing machine. The sticker price is $500 but you talk to the
salesperson and he says he could offer it for $480 if you pay cash. You try
your best to look unenthusiastic and say you are not prepared to pay more than
$440. The salesperson furrows their brow, ruffles some papers, taps away at a
pocket calculator, perhaps confers with a colleague and then with a pained
expression says the absolute lowest price they could offer is $450 and you
agree to this, congratulating yourself on how your negotiating savvy had saved
you $50.
5.30
If the bill requires all sales to be at a uniform price, then the
retailer will need to lower the sticker price and compete more transparently. An
unintended consequence may be that retailers simply stop discounting in this
way altogether resulting in less ability for consumers to "haggle" or
renegotiate on a ticket price.
Committee conclusions
5.31
The committee believes that there are legitimate operational reasons as
to why the price of a good may vary between a company's metropolitan stores. Furthermore
the committee agrees that the bill does not differentiate between price
discrimination that is competitive and advantages the consumer with lower price
outcomes and price discrimination that is non-competitive and possibly
predatory and is of disadvantage to consumers.
5.32
The committee have grave concerns that this legislation may
unintentionally result in higher prices for consumers for retail goods as a
result of uniform pricing with no "guaranteed" lowest prices being
offered at all.
Recommendation 1
5.33 The committee recommends that the Senate reject the bill.
Senator Annette Hurley
Chair
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page