Chapter 2 - Cultures and Compliance
Introduction
2.1
The Committee’s reports thus far have focused on
the specific measures taken by the regulatory authorities in response to mass
marketed schemes, and on the extent to which further action or regulation is
required in order to resolve the current problems and to curb future outbreaks
of aggressive tax planning.
2.2
The academic literature on regulation and
citizen compliance with taxation law, however, increasingly recognises that
regulatory enforcement is only one, and not necessarily the most effective way
of achieving a desired outcome. Or, putting the point differently, it
recognises that tax planning and paying behaviours arise out of particular
contexts or cultures. Understanding and addressing the political, social and
psychological background of those behaviours may assist agencies to promote
compliance far more effectively, than an approach which relies purely on the
threat of enforcement or punishment.
2.3
In this Chapter, the Committee briefly outlines
some of the theoretical findings on the relationship between cultures and
compliance. It then analyses evidence from those involved in mass marketed
schemes with a view to understanding how cultural factors affected choices to
participate and responses to the ATO’s action.
2.4
Finally, the Committee discusses the
Commissioner’s recent statements concerning the responsibility of the wider
community of taxation professionals for the integrity of the tax system, the
response of that community, and the extent to which appeals of that sort can be
relied upon to promote a culture of compliance in relation to taxation matters.
Modelling compliance
2.5
A key issue for taxation agencies is the
efficacy of punishment or deterrence versus that of persuasion or compliance in
ensuring taxpayer conformity to the law. Research on regulation in a range of
fields indicates that, in tax matters as in many others, a ‘mix’ of the two
approaches produces the best outcome.[1]
2.6
One kind of theoretical model for such a mix is
known as a ‘regulatory pyramid’. As a result of the work of the Cash Economy
Taskforce in 1997-98, the ATO has adopted such a regulatory pyramid as its
Compliance Model for all ATO operations.[2]
2.7
The premise of the pyramid is that regulatory
action relies upon a broad base of voluntary taxpayer compliance and
self-regulation, with the role of the ATO being to promote taxpayer
understanding and acceptance of obligations. As the pyramid climbs and narrows
towards the apex, taxpayer ‘postures’ or attitudes harden from acceptance to capture,
to resistance and finally disengagement. The role of the ATO in managing those
postures alters correspondingly, escalating through a range of sanctions to the
final option of prosecution at the top. Academics from the Centre of Tax System
Integrity, a joint research project involving the Australian National
University and the ATO, have argued:
Regulatory pyramids
provide tax officers a set of tools that can be applied without regard to
reasons for noncompliance. One starts with the expectation of cooperation, and
escalation on the pyramid occurs only when one or the other becomes
noncooperative or defaults.[3]
2.8
An important feature of the ATO’s Compliance
Model is its capacity to explain the dynamic nature of the relationship between
taxpayer motivations and attitudes, and regulatory sanctions.
2.9
As noted earlier, the model posits four
‘motivational postures’ that may be adopted by taxpayers.
2.10
There are two ‘compliant’ postures, namely the
postures of accommodation and capture. ‘Accommodation’ involves a deliberate
and conscious commitment to fulfilling one’s obligations under the taxation
law, while ‘capture’ involves accepting one’s taxation obligations, without
necessarily embracing them or having a particular view about their value.
2.11
These two compliant postures are mirrored by the
two non-compliant postures of ‘resistance’ and ‘disengagement’. ‘Resistance’ is
a confrontational approach to tax officers and the tax system, which sees the
tax system as burdensome, oppressive and, perhaps, unfair. ‘Disengagement’ is
like resistance, but incorporates a ‘spirit of hopelessness’ in addition. ‘The
state of disengagement is accompanied by non-responsiveness ... Cynicism about
the tax system is likely to be matched by cynicism about the power of
government’.[4]
2.12
The research suggests that individuals whose
attitudes are characterised by accommodation and capture feel part of the
regulatory community. Those who resist feel apart from the community but still
want to feel respected by it, whereas those who are disengaged experience a
‘psychological separation’ from the community without feelings of loss.
2.13
According to this model, a serious difficulty
for the regulator is that its own attempts to ensure compliance may result in
taxpayer attitudes hardening through this scale and thus in taxpayers being
less inclined to see themselves as part of and respected by the regulatory
community. Thus:
As regulators expose
behaviour that is non-compliant, those being regulated protect themselves from
disapproval by placing more social distance between themselves and their
accusers. Through construing the situation in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the
non-compliers are able to hide in the safety of an identity that is at odds
with the ‘demonic’ other. To sustain this protective mechanism, the social rift
must be allowed to continue and grow. When non-compliers pursue this path,
cooperative resolution of the problem is difficult. The challenge for the
regulator then becomes one of changing the motivational posture.[5]
2.14
Importantly in the context of this inquiry, the
research further indicates that:
To the extent that
social rift is manufactured through feelings of shame, offering cooperation
displays the elements of social reintegration that are a necessary part of
eliciting compliance in the future. Offering cooperation to resistant and
disengaged non-compliers, however, may not always be the response that
regulators feel like making. If regulators respond to resistance and
disengagement in a like manner, they may exacerbate the social rift already in
existence.[6]
2.15
The explanatory power of this model seems
confirmed in many respects by the evidence to this inquiry. In the following
section, the Committee employs the ATO’s Compliance Model in attempting to
analyse more fully aspects of the climate in which tax effective schemes were
mass marketed and to characterise the climate which has developed since the
ATO’s crackdown.
Culture of scheme
participants
2.16
Overwhelmingly, participants whose deductions
have been disallowed by the ATO told the Committee that they had always been,
and had prided themselves on being, ‘good’ taxpayers. They said that their
motives for participating in schemes could be entirely explained in terms of
their desire for a long-term investment income, their desire to provide for their
own retirements and to invest in Australian industries, particularly rural
industries.
2.17
For example, Mr Peter and Mrs Linda Southern
wrote that:
...[we] have been
enthusiastic supporters on ‘buy Australian’ schemes ... We have always paid our
taxes on time and are happy to do so, realising that this money is used to keep
this country great in providing infrastructure etc.[7]
2.18
Mrs Geraldine and Mr Roger Farr submitted:
As ‘babyboomers’ we
have been constantly urged by politicians, academics and the media to attempt
to provide for our own retirements ... Like so many other families who invested
in Budplan, we invested in good faith expecting an opportunity to grow our nest
egg for the future.[8]
2.19
Mr Michael McGinty explained:
As a law abiding tax
paying Australian citizen I saw Budplan as an opportunity to become involved in
a project which could not only provide a good investment return but also create
wealth and intellectual property for this country.[9]
2.20
These quotations represent a tiny sample,
selected almost at random, from the close to 900 submissions received by the
Committee. The sentiments expressed in them could be multiplied more or less
indefinitely.
2.21
In terms of the ATO’s Compliance Model, these
participants represent themselves as having had ‘compliant’ attitudes towards
their taxation obligations. That is, their attitudes or ‘motivational postures’
were, at worst, postures of ‘capture’, and, at best, postures of
‘accommodation’. On these accounts, the ‘tax effectiveness’ of the schemes was
not a significant factor in participants’ decisions to invest.
2.22
One witness, however, questioned whether
participants’ characterisation of their pre-scheme attitudes to taxpaying were
entirely accurate. Mr Rick Shenton, who sold schemes extensively in Western
Australia, told the Committee:
When people give
information to this Committee sometimes the truth and they themselves do not
sit in the same seat and their recollections are convenient recollections
because they feel sorry for themselves, they need to tell lies or they have to
blame somebody else.[10]
2.23
Speaking of his experience in selling scheme
participations at mine sites in Western Australia, Mr Shenton claimed that the
prospect of a substantial tax refund ‘had these clients crawling’. He said:
I was going to mines
at 8 o’clock at night and was still working at 6 o’clock the next night –
honest to God! One lady in a mine ... was actually bringing people to me on the
half hour. They were queuing up. There was almost a fight at one stage because
one man was in a queue half an hour after he thought he should have been seen.
You can imagine that a $10,000 refund is a lot of money, because you have got
to realise that most of these people, even against the evidence that they have
given you, might earn $80,000 a year and pay $30,000 tax, but they usually
spend $55,000 a year. They have usually got credit cards and a four-wheel drive
or whatever, and they are usually up to their ears in debt. Desperation breeds
lack of judgement.[11]
2.24
On this account, it seems unlikely that all
individuals who chose to participate in this sort of scheme could be described
as having motivational postures of ‘accommodation’ towards their taxation
obligations. At best, they seem to have been ‘captured’ and prepared to accept
an offer of ‘freedom’ if assured of the legality of the alternative. There may
even have been an overlaying element of ‘resistance’ to the loss of ‘hard
earned income’ to taxation and a preparedness to avoid such loss if possible.
2.25
The Committee notes that generalisations about
the ‘motivational postures’ held by individuals are difficult to make and may
be misleading. In particular, different kinds of scheme may have appealed to
very different underlying values or sets of motivation, and the Committee does
not assume that Mr Shenton’s account of the attitude of some participants can
be extrapolated to all.
2.26
The evidence to the inquiry indicates that, by
and large, participants want to see themselves as law-abiding citizens and as
part of the regulatory community. This is true whether or not, as Mr Shenton
suggests, some individuals are retrospectively ‘dressing up’ or excusing what
they did, and indeed would explain why such ‘dressing up’ is required.
2.27
That desire then seems to go a large way to
explaining the acute sense of outrage and shock experienced by participants at
being labelled ‘tax cheats’ or ‘avoiders’ because of the ATO’s crackdown on
schemes. Such labelling, according to the testimony of many witnesses, has
dislocated their sense of their own identity and their sense of connection with
the broader taxpaying community.
2.28
From the point of view of future compliance, the
danger posed by this dislocation is that participants move out of the
motivational posture of ‘compliance’ into postures of resistance and
disengagement. In the words of John and Valerie Braithwaite, quoted earlier:
As regulators expose
behaviour that is non-compliant, those being regulated protect themselves from
disapproval by placing more social distance between themselves and their
accusers. Through construing the situation in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the
non-compliers are able to hide in the safety of an identity that is at odds
with the ‘demonic’ other.
2.29
Many participants express just such feelings of
‘social distance’ between themselves and the regulator, as well as a sense of
loss of trust in the institutions of government. For example, Mr Michael
McGinty began his submission in the following way:
The Australian Tax
Office, the Commissioner of Taxation and the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation,
Mr Steve Chapman, have classified me as a tax cheat.
I AM NOT A TAX CHEAT!
I am writing this
letter in the hope that my situation, as small and insignificant as it may be,
may be heard without prejudice, disinterest or ulterior motive.[12]
2.30
Other participants wrote to the Committee of their
‘extreme distress and bewilderment regarding the treatment afforded us by the
Australian Taxation Office’. The Farr family wrote that:
... we find we are
labelled tax cheats by the ATO as it relentlessly pursues us, along with all
other hapless Budplan investors ... It is difficult to fully convey the pain and
embarrassment the actions of the ATO have caused us. I beseech you to consider
the disastrous impact of this whole attack upon our personal integrity and
financial position on our family and thousands of other well meaning
Australians.[13]
2.31
Mr Ian Parkinson said ‘I am very disillusioned,
concerned and disappointed in our Australian Bureaucracy [for] leaving the ATO
to weave its path of destruction’[14], while Mr Peter and Mrs Linda
Southern wrote ‘to express our disdain for the ATO in its labelling of
investors in so-called “tax effective investments” as tax cheats’.[15]
2.32
In terms of the ATO’s Compliance Model these
expressions of disillusionment, disdain, disappointment and unfairness indicate
postures of resistance tending towards disengagement on the part of these
taxpayers. This supports the theory that:
When sanctioning
strategies communicate increasing disapproval to the taxpayer, the social rift
between non-compliers and the regulatory culture likely increases, and the
entrenchment of non-compliant regulatory postures is more likely to follow.[16]
2.33
The challenge for the ATO, then, is to try to
re-establish a dialogue with scheme participants, such that interaction between
the two parties can be resumed as soon as possible at the bottom of the
pyramid.
2.34
The Committee notes that a complication for the
ATO in this regard may be that aspects of the organisation’s own culture tend
towards the escalation of strong enforcement behaviour rather than towards
cooperation with perceived non-compliers.
2.35
The Committee received only very limited and
anecdotal evidence about the ATO’s internal culture. However, that evidence did
suggest the possibility that there may be tensions within the organisation
between an older regulatory culture of enforcement and deterrence, and a newer
culture of cooperation and dialogue in the ATO. For example, in reporting on
the work of the Cash Economy Task Force, from which the ATO’s Compliance Model
emerged, researchers observed:
Setting out styles of
regulatory interaction was important for ATO staff. Different groups dealt with
problems at different levels, and each group had its own culture and set of
beliefs as to the ‘correct’ regulatory style.[17]
2.36
The Committee notes that through its collaboration
in the Centre for Tax System Integrity, the ATO is actively researching ways of
working with taxpayers to achieve compliance through cooperation rather than
punishment. In particular, the Committee notes the significance of current
research into the reintegration into the regulatory community of taxpayers
bruised by their experience of the ATO in its crackdown on mass marketed tax
effective schemes.
2.37
The Committee commends the ATO for the
initiative and creativity of its approach to compliance issues and to trying to
improve its relationships with the taxpaying community.
Culture of taxation
professionals
2.38
The ATO’s Compliance Model focuses on the
motivational postures of the general taxpaying community. Recently, the ATO has
also turned its attention to the attitudes of the community of tax
professionals. To borrow again from the Compliance Model, the ATO has seemingly
been attempting to promote a culture of ‘accommodation’ amongst that group.
2.39
In speeches to the community of taxation
professionals, Mr Carmody and other ATO officers have asked that community to
consider its role in maintaining the integrity of the tax system and have asked
for its help in monitoring and controlling the activities of aggressive tax
planners. [18]
2.40
For example, in a speech to the Taxation
Institute of Australia, Assistant Commissioner Michael O’Neill concluded with
the following exhortation:
If taxation is the
price we pay for civilisation, we tax advisers, lawyers and accountants, each
have a key role in advancing our community. Your advice will assist clients
when considering the legal and financial benefits of investing in year end
schemes.[19]
2.41
Mr Carmody told the Committee that:
In my view, the
community’s tax system would be best protected by others supporting the tax
office in meeting this objective. In particular, the tax profession, which is
at the coal face on a day-to-day basis, could provide a valuable role in
bringing developments to our attention. There are mixed views on this in the
profession, some preferring the view that their only responsibility is to their
client and that this would be compromised by taking a community responsibility.
This view raises for me a number of responsibility issues that are worthy of
considering. In saying that, is it saying that tax professionals know or knew
the schemes were ineffective but, because the tax office had yet to act, they
would recommend or support claims made for them? Otherwise, why not make them
available to us? If so, is there no responsibility to the community for the integrity
of the tax system, even when they know or expect the arrangements will not pass
muster under the law?[20]
2.42
Clearly, the ATO would like to encourage a sense
of responsibility among tax professionals for the promotion of taxpayer
compliance, not only with the letter of the law, but also with its spirit and
policy intent. As Mr Carmody told the Institute of Chartered Accountants:
It is one thing to
approach an interpretation of the law from the perspective of advising a
client, particularly where the whole objective is to minimise tax payable. It
is another thing to approach the law from the perspective of a responsibility
to the community for the integrity of the law.[21]
2.43
In terms of the Compliance Model outlined
earlier, this strategy is part of the broader focus on fostering a community
consensus on the importance of ‘doing the right thing’ in tax matters.
Professional response
2.44
As the Commissioner conceded in the evidence
quoted above, the response of the taxation profession to this strategy has been
‘mixed’. The reasons for that ambivalence are complex, and cannot necessarily
be dismissed simply by assuming a lack of ethics or community spirit in the
profession.
2.45
The ATO asked professional bodies at a meeting
of the National Tax Liaison Group (NTLG) on 9 March 2001 whether they accepted
that ‘when they did come across an issue that impacted on the integrity of the
tax system it would be in the interests of the professional bodies and of their
members to have matters drawn specifically to the ATO’s attention’.[22]
2.46
Representatives of the Certified Practising
Accountants of Australia (CPAA) agreed with that proposition, although they
remarked that if aggressive schemes were already entrenched by the time
professional bodies became aware of them, then the bodies were in a difficult
position. That is:
By the time the bodies
were in a position to inform the ATO, this could result in grief for a large
number of members, who in turn complain about the behaviour of their
representatives.[23]
2.47
The National Tax and Accountants Association
(NTAA) expressed its willingness to work with the ATO to identify schemes, so
that the ATO could develop an early view of the arrangements. Likewise the
Institute of Chartered Accountants of Australia (ICAA) and the Taxation
Institute of Australia (TIA) said the provision of early warnings by the ATO of
concerns about particular arrangements would allow them to work with members to
identify the type of arrangements in question.[24]
2.48
However, the TIA also expressed the view that:
... private practitioners
were not interested in owning the tax system other than incidentally. They are
in business to sell advice and make money. To overlay a community
responsibility of not promoting aggressive tax planning on tax practitioners or
their representative bodies was not realistic according to the TIA.[25]
2.49
The TIA said that sometimes problems with
aggressive schemes start when someone is given an incorrect private ruling from
the ATO which is then exploited in the development of dubious arrangements. The
TIA warned:
... tax agents or
representative bodies helping the ATO or telling the ATO about the error in an
isolated private ruling was frankly ‘Fairyland’. Moreover, in the TIA’s view,
to expect a professional body to reveal the existence of resultant mass
marketed schemes amounted to a conflict of interest.[26]
2.50
In a similar vein, the Law Council of Australia
(LCA) advised that, in its view:
... the primary role of
an adviser is to give proper advice, even where that went against the ATO view.
Proper advice nevertheless included advising clients when the ATO took or was
likely to take an alternative view.[27]
2.51
The Committee asked a number of witnesses to
respond to the argument that tax professionals have a responsibility for the
integrity of the tax system, such that they should be prepared to assist the
ATO in identifying and deterring aggressive tax planning arrangements. Again,
the response was mixed.
2.52
Mr Robert O’Connor QC, who advised the promoters
of a number of schemes in Western Australia, gave a response to this issue which
the Committee considers is worth quoting at length. He wrote:
In my opinion, the
culture of the tax advising community is not one of tax minimisation.
The duty of a tax adviser is to advise what, in his or her opinion, is the
correct interpretation of the law, based on Court decisions already given and
opinion as to what views a Court would hold if the matter comes before a Court
in the future ... In interpreting the meaning of a law, morality is not a
relevant consideration. An Opinion is being sought on what the law is.
That is the adviser’s specialisation. If an Opinion on morals or ethics is
required, the person requiring an Opinion should go to a moralist or an
ethicist. If morality had to be taken into account in interpreting the meaning
of a law, whose morals should be applied? The answer as to what the law is
would vary and depend on the morals of the particular person giving the
Opinion. The appropriate course is that the adviser states what in his or her
opinion is the law, and then it is up to the taxpayer to apply his or her own
morals as to whether to adopt the advice given as to what the law is.[28]
2.53
Mr Richard Gelski of Blake Dawson Waldron took
this point a step further, telling the Committee that:
... not only is it our
obligation to advise on the law as it is – we can be sued if we do anything
else – but if we fail to advise a client that a transaction can be carried out
in a more tax effective manner we can be sued for negligence by that client.[29]
2.54
Somewhat by way of contrast, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
submitted that the professional somehow has to balance the private interests of
the clients against the public interest of the community. In this sense, there
are competing ethical demands at stake. Mr Michael de Palo, National Managing
Partner – Tax, wrote that the Institute of Chartered Accountants’ Code of
Professional Conduct prescribes that:
‘Members must at all
times safeguard the interests of their clients provided that they do not
conflict with the duties and loyalties owed to the community and its laws’. In
this context, a tax expert, at the same time as providing client advice, is
obliged to ‘help to establish confidence and efficiency in, and the fair
application of, the tax system’.[30]
2.55
Mr de Palo continued:
The balance between
these two ethical requirements often cannot be reached without difficulty. The
professional advisor must make this judgement call often at the advisor’s
peril. Further, there are decided cases that say an advisor has a duty to
advise his client as to how to lawfully minimise tax.[31]
2.56
The Committee notes that the complexity of this
issue arises in part from the fact that the line between legal tax minimisation
and avoidance which is punishable by the application of Part IVA may sometimes
be difficult to find.
2.57
The Commissioner’s call for an ethos of broad
community responsibility or civic mindedness within the tax profession seems to
be a call for an approach which is more generous in its interpretation of the
overall spirit of the law. As quoted earlier, the Commissioner has said:
It is one thing to
approach an interpretation of the law from the perspective of advising a
client, particularly where the whole objective is to minimise tax payable. It
is another thing to approach the law from the perspective of a responsibility to
the community for the integrity of the law.[32]
2.58
As is evident from the response of the
profession, however, that call may be seen to conflict with other professional
duties, such as duties to act in the best interests of one’s client.
2.59
Further, tax professionals may well argue that
precisely what they are doing is taking responsibility for the ‘integrity of
the law’. If certain actions are allowable under the law, then performing those
actions even with the objective of minimising tax payable, does not undermine
the law’s integrity. There is, arguably, no penumbra or spirit which causes
legal minimisation strategies to lack integrity simply because they do not
fully conform to a broader ethic of civic-mindedness.
2.60
The Committee acknowledges that the appropriate
balance between the legal rights of individuals to minimise their tax and the
community’s interest in the generous observance of the intent as well as the
letter of taxation law may sometimes be difficult to find. However, the
Committee strongly endorses the view that tax professionals do have obligations
to the broader community as well as to individual clients.
2.61
The Code of Professional Conduct published by
the Institute of Chartered Accountants states that:
A distinguishing mark
of a profession is its acceptance of its responsibility to the public. The
accountancy profession’s public consists of clients, credit grantors,
governments, employers, employees, investors, the business and financial
community and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of members to
maintain the ordinary functioning of commerce. This reliance imposes a public
interest responsibility on members. The public interest is defined as the
collective well-being of the community of people and institutions that the
members serve.[33]
2.62
The Code goes on to say that the ‘member’s
responsibility is not exclusively to satisfy the needs of an individual client
or employer’.[34]
In the Committee’s view, these principles of professional conduct serve as an
admirable benchmark for all those involved in advising on taxation matters.
2.63
The Committee is thus not convinced by those who
suggest that their only responsibility is to their clients and that the law
will look after itself. Clearly tax paying and planning behaviours are observed
and modified, not only through the enforcement or amendment of black letter
law, but also by the community’s consensus about the values and expectations
that surround that law and its interpretation.
2.64
The Committee considers that members of the
taxation profession and their representative bodies should take responsibility
for their role in shaping that consensus.
2.65
To this end, the Committee considers that a
review of the sort of public interest role that the tax profession should adopt
would be timely and valuable. Such a review would provide the tax profession
with an opportunity to reach consensus on its responsibilities to the broader
community, as well as the long-term interests of its clients. Without such
consensus, further regulation of the profession may be required.
2.66
The Committee recommends that the Government
appoint an appropriately qualified person to conduct the review. As part of the
review, the appointed person should consult with the Board of Taxation, the
ATO, the tax profession and other relevant business and community bodies.
2.67
The Committee also considers that, as part of
the review, the role of tax professionals in the mass marketed schemes episode
deserves closer analysis. This episode highlights many of the dilemmas that tax
lawyers, accountants and other financial advisers face in tendering advice on
grey or contested areas of the law, particularly in relation to tax
minimisation (see Chapter 3). It also raises questions as to whether tax
professionals, especially lawyers, should be obliged to provide advice that
extends beyond the particular issues at law raised by clients to wider matters
that could affect the client’s interests (such as Part IVA anti-avoidance
issues). All these questions relate to the broader concerns about the need for
tax professionals and their representative bodies to meet responsibilities to
both clients and the community.
Recommendation
2.68
The Committee recommends that a review be
conducted into the nature and extent of the public interest responsibility that
tax professionals should adopt for the integrity of the tax system. The review
should be conducted by an appropriately qualified person, who should consult
with the Board of Taxation, the ATO, the tax profession and other relevant
business and community bodies. The review should include consideration of the
issues of tax planning and the mass marketed schemes episode.
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