Chapter 3 - Duplication and Relationships
Introduction
3.1
The Inspector-General will provide a new source
of independent advice to Government on the effectiveness of tax administration
and process, and as such is intended to complement existing agency responsibilities
and taxation administration review mechanisms. It is expected that the
functions of the Inspector-General would interface with the roles of the
Commonwealth Auditor-General, the Board of Taxation and the Commonwealth
Ombudsman.
3.2
The Bill requires the Inspector-General to
consult with the Commonwealth Auditor-General and the Commonwealth Ombudsman at
least once a year, to ensure that there is no duplication of the reviews
conducted by the three statutory authorities with principle responsibility for
reviewing tax administration.[1]
The discretion of the three bodies in regard to their work program is not
intended to be constrained by this provision.
3.3
Of these existing bodies, the greatest potential
for duplication is evident with the Ombudsman. Whilst the Auditor-General may
conduct performance audits examining the administrative effectiveness and
efficiency of the ATO, submissions to the inquiry have in the main not
identified concerns in regard to the relationship between that office and the
Inspector-General. Several submissions have, however, raised issues in regard
to duplication between the Inspector-General and the taxation functions of the
Ombudsman, and these objections are considered later in this chapter.
3.4
Before examining this aspect of the proposed
legislation, the Committee looks at the relationship between the
Inspector-General and the Commissioner of Taxation and the Inspector-General
and the Board of Taxation.
Powers in respect to the Commissioner of Taxation
3.5
The Inspector-General has no power to direct the
Commissioner of Taxation, other than to disclose information for a review.
3.6
A minority of submissions to the inquiry
considered that the Inspector-General should have greater authority in relation
to the ATO. Resolution Holdings held that the Inspector-General must be able to
make recommendations to the ATO and give directions if those recommendations
are not followed.[2]
3.7
The Financial Planning Association of Australia
Ltd submitted that the Inspector-General should have the legislative power to
suspend the activities of the relevant agency in an area that is subject of an
ongoing investigation until such time as that investigation has been completed,
the response of the agency received and the Inspector-General’s final report
delivered.[3]
3.8
CPA Australia commented in evidence ‘that the bill needs to look at giving the
Inspector-General some teeth or some power to require the Government or the
Commissioner of Taxation to respond to issues that the inspector-general is
concerned about.’[4]
3.9
The Committee has
no desire to see the power of the Inspector-General increased to the extent
that he or she can direct the Commissioner of Taxation to follow a
recommendation. It believes that the investigative process itself coupled with
the ability of the Inspector-General to report publicly on the administration
of taxation laws is sufficient incentive for the Commissioner of Taxation to
take appropriate action if required. This raises the important matter of the
reporting obligations of the Inspector-General which is dealt with in greater
detail in chapter 4.
The Inspector-General and the Board of Taxation
3.10
The Board of Taxation is an independent
non-statutory body responsible for providing advice to the Treasurer on the
quality and effectiveness of tax legislation and the processes for its
development, including the processes of community consultation and other
aspects of tax design, improvements to the general integrity and functioning of
the taxation system, and other matters referred by the Treasurer.[5]
3.11
In its report to the Minister for Revenue and
Assistant Treasurer, the Board examined the potential relationship between the
Inspector-General and itself, and concluded that the establishment of the
Inspector-General should not impact upon the Taxation Board, nor should the
Inspector-General be an ex officio member of the Board.
3.12
In reaching these recommendations the Board
concluded that, while the Board’s functions contemplate a role for it in
reviewing tax administration, the establishment of the Inspector-General would
imply that the Board would become involved in administrative issues only when
it had an additional perspective to offer. It also considered that the
effectiveness and efficiency of the Inspector-General, as a key component of
the tax system, could itself be a matter on which the Board may provide advice
to the Treasury Minsters. Membership of the Board would also involve the
Inspector-General as a participant in the development of new policies and
legislation, an issue considered in chapter 2.
3.13
In its submission to the Committee, CPA
Australia notes that there is merit in the Inspector-General being an ex
officio member of the Board, as are the Commissioner for Taxation, the
Secretary to the Treasury, and the First Parliamentary Counsel. It also notes,
however, that the purposes it seeks to achieve through membership can also be
achieved by the Inspector-General having regular access to the Board.[6]
3.14
The Committee agrees with the Board of
Taxation’s recommendation that establishment of the Inspector-General should
not affect the functions of the Board and that he or she should not be an ex-officio
member of that Board. It also agrees with the practical and sensible approach
taken by the Board that it would be better for ‘the Board to meet with the
Inspector-General formally and regularly to discuss matters of mutual interest
and work priorities, and to otherwise liaise with the office, principally
through the Board’s Secretariat, on an as needed basis.’[7]
The Inspector-General and the Ombudsman
3.15
There are similarities in the roles of the
Commonwealth Ombudsman and the Inspector-General in the investigation of
problems in tax administration. Unlike the Ombudsman, however, the
Inspector-General will not investigate complaints concerning the treatment of
individual cases.
3.16
As well as handling the investigation of
complaints from taxpayers with regard to the administrative actions of the ATO,
the Ombudsman is also empowered to conduct own motion investigations, which
generally focus on broader questions of administration.[8] Systemic issues also arise from
the investigation of individual complaints. The Ombudsman explained that:
Many of the individual complaints that we receive raise systemic
issues affecting more people than the complainant, and many of the investigations
of those complaints produce systemic remedies—that is, remedies that can be
applied to people in similar circumstances to the complainant. In my view, this
is an important—and inevitable—result of effective complaint handling and
investigation.[9]
3.17
It is in this area of review of the
administration of the tax system more broadly that the potential arises for
duplication of effort in the work of the Inspector-General and the Commonwealth
Ombudsman. The Bill includes a clause requiring the Inspector-General to
consult with the Commonwealth Auditor-General and the Commonwealth Ombudsman at
least once a year in recognition of this concern.
3.18
The Ombudsman’s own submission to the inquiry
notes that while there is clearly some overlap, he is confident that through
appropriate liaison between both bodies each will be able to complement the
work of the other and cooperate closely, consistent with their respective
legislative responsibilities.[10]
3.19
The two bodies, although sharing some overlap of
functions, have a clearly different focus, with the Inspector-General primarily
envisaged as a source of advice to government, while the Ombudsman has ‘a
relationship separately and equally with Parliament, the Executive and members
of the public, individually and collectively.’[11]
3.20
The Commonwealth Ombudsman told the Committee:
...the concept of an ombudsman is different from the concept of an
inspector-general. A distinguishing feature of an ombudsman is that we are a
neutral investigative body. We are not there to take up the cudgels of the
taxpayer or the citizen, nor are we there to defend the administration. We look
at issues on their merits and we make our own judgements as to where the
balance lies. So we are not an advocate of citizens per se.[12]
3.21
The focus is also different in that the
Inspector-General is to look beyond individual complaints. Ms Johnston from the
Department of Treasury explained:
The inspector-general will not be handling individual complaints
in the sense of pursuing case management of individual complaints and coming to
some sort of recommendation to government about an individual complaint or
making a recommendation to an agency. But that is not to say that an individual
cannot complain to the inspector-general and say, ‘I think that my individual
case discloses a broader systemic issue in the tax system and I think you
should investigate that broader systemic issue.’[13]
3.22
Along similar lines, Mr Sheppard from the
Institute of Chartered Accountants told the Committee that they expect the
Inspector-General not to simply address a particular case but to provide
project management. He told the Committee:
That is the view we have put to the ATO: ‘When we bring a
problem to you, don’t just fix it up for that particular taxpayer; throw a mini
task force at it to understand why that systemic problem arose and fix it once
and for all so that over time we will have progressive improvement of the tax
system’. We would hope that the role of the inspector-general would offer that
better project management to improve the tax system over time.[14]
3.23
The majority of submissions to the Committee
maintained the importance of the new office not affecting the functions and
operation of the Ombudsman, while noting that practical arrangements will need
to be worked out between the offices to avoid duplication.
3.24
Some submissions, however, took a different view
and favoured one body assuming the role of both investigating individual
complaints as well as the broader systemic matters. CPA Australia recommended
that the Inspector-General should also take responsibility for the
investigation of individual complaints currently handled by the Ombudsman.[15]
The submission recognised that there are advantages to keeping the review of
the merits of the administrative system separate from review of its application,
but gave greater weight to the avoidance of potential duplication, confusion
and overlap. The submission also contends that the close link between
individual complaints as indicative of more systemic problems argues for one
body retaining responsibility for the investigation of both.
3.25
A further argument put forward for combining the
functions of the Inspector-General and the Taxation Ombudsman in one office has
been the budget proposed for the Inspector-General, which is $2 million per
annum. This proposition holds that, given that the proposed budget is
considered insufficient for the new office to fulfil its functions in a
meaningful way,[16]
a better outcome could be achieved by combining the resources and taxation
roles of the two offices.[17]
This argument also draws upon the point that the Inspector-General must comply
with any direction from the Minister to conduct a review, raising concerns that
Ministerially directed reviews could potentially consume the small budget
available.
3.26
The setting of work priorities and the
relationship of the Inspector-General with the Minister and the Parliament are
considered more fully in the next chapter.
3.27
The Committee acknowledges that there is the
potential for overlap in the functions between the Inspector-General and the
Ombudsman of Taxation. It notes, however, that there is a distinct difference
in the focus of each office and rather than duplicate functions, it expects
that they would work in close cooperation to keep each other informed and
indeed would be well placed to offer each other assistance in the relative
areas of investigation.
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