Chapter 2 - The Provisions of the Bill
Background
2.1
The proposal to establish an Inspector-General
of Taxation was announced by the Prime Minister in the Coalition’s election
statement Securing Australia’s Prosperity, 15 October 2001:
As a separate and distinct
initiative, in a third term, the Coalition will strengthen the advice given to
government in respect to matters of tax administration and process through the
creation of a senior office, the Inspector General of Taxation. This position
will report to the Parliament through the Treasurer and will provide a new
source of independent advice. The role will act as an advocate for all
taxpayers, including Australian business, and provide an avenue for more
effective conflict resolution than currently exists.[1]
2.2
The proposal followed taxpayer concerns about
aspects of tax administration such as delays in processing, the provision of
inconsistent advice and the lack of certainty surrounding taxation obligations.[2]
2.3
On 29 May 2002, the Minister for Revenue and
Assistant Treasurer, Senator the Hon Helen Coonan, released a Government
consultation paper, the Inspector-General of Taxation in the Taxation System.[3] The consultation paper was
presented to the Board of Taxation (the Board) to undertake public consultation
on the proposal for an Inspector-General of Taxation before the Government’s
model was finalised.
2.4
The Board presented its report on the proposal
to the Minister for Revenue and Assistant Treasurer in July 2002. It reported
that it had found strong support from the community, business taxpayers and the
tax advisory professions for the establishment of the office.[4] It produced fifteen
recommendations concerning the implementation of the proposal for an
Inspector-General of Taxation which were accepted in principle by the
Government (See Appendix 3).
2.5
Recommendations of the Board with which the
government concurred included that:
- the functions of the Inspector-General should be broadly defined
to include providing advice to government, reviewing the systems used by the
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) to administer the tax system, and making
recommendations to government concerning how these systems could be improved;
- the Inspector-General should be established outside the
Ombudsman’s office with the Ombudsman retaining his existing functions,
including his role in reviewing administrative action taken by the ATO;
- the Inspector-General should have a right of access to individual
taxpayer information held by the ATO, but only to the extent necessary to carry
out its functions, with an obligation to maintain the confidentiality for such
information; and
- the functions of the Board of Taxation should not be affected by
the establishment of the Inspector-General, and the Inspector-General should
not be an ex-officio member of the Board.
2.6
The Government differed from the detail of the
Board’s recommendations in regard to the Inspector-General’s ability to publish
reports of reviews and recommendations to government, proposing instead that
the Treasury Ministers have the responsibility for releasing reports by the
Inspector-General.[5]
2.7
In regard to the Inspector-General’s work
program, the Board recommended that the Inspector-General should be able to
undertake work on both an own motion basis and in response to a direction given
by a Minister, and that the legislation should not prescribe how work
priorities would be established. The Government agreed in principle. However,
it indicated that the Inspector-General would be obliged to respond to
directions from Treasury Ministers.
2.8
These two points go to issues of transparency
and independence which have emerged as recurrent themes in submissions to the
Committee’s inquiry.
The concept of an Inspector-General of Taxation
2.9
In general the evidence presented to this
Committee was strongly supportive of the proposed legislation. For example the
Commonwealth Ombudsman and Taxation Ombudsman told the Committee that he was of
the view:
[T]here was scope and value in increasing the amount of external
review of tax administration, and I think the proposal that the government has
developed clearly embodies that as one of its major objectives.[6]
2.10
Mr Brian Sheppard from the Institute of
Chartered Accountants also strongly supported the concept of the
Inspector-General. He informed the Committee:
We feel that it offers more accountability and will be a more
tax focused position than the role of the Ombudsman as we see it. We have had
to deal with 2½ years of quite serious systemic problems in the tax system.
Those flaws crept into the tax system with the current checks and balances, so
that if the Inspector-General of Taxation offers the opportunity of greater
accountability and greater control over tax administration and a better system
in the longer term, we are supporting the position.[7]
2.11
Similarly, CPA Australia believed that the
proposed Inspector-General offered some important advantages and provided an
opportunity for ‘a significant contribution to be made by the appointment of
such a person to the tax administration system in Australia.’[8]
2.12
Nevertheless witnesses expressed some
reservations about the effectiveness of particular aspects of the Bill. This
chapter considers and assesses the adequacy of the provisions relating to:
- the purpose of the bill;
- the selection of the Inspector-General; and
- the functions of the Inspector-General.
The object of the Bill
2.13
The proposed legislation is intended ‘to improve
the administration of the tax laws for the benefit of all taxpayers.’[9]
2.14
This object, as stated in the Bill, does not
necessarily fully reflect the advocacy and conflict resolution role of the
office proposed in the original policy statement[10] or the second reading
speeches.[11]
As noted earlier, the Prime Minister made clear that the Inspector-General
would provide a new source of independent advice to the Government as well as
be an advocate for all taxpayers.[12]
This point was raised in a submission from the National Institute of
Accountants:
It will be noted that the object of the Bill does not
make specific reference to acting as ‘an advocate for the ordinary taxpayer’...
An object clause which directly reflected the comments of the
Prime Minister would provide more comfort to tax payers about the perceived
role of the position.[13]
2.15
The perceived loss of the advocacy role was more
forcefully noted in a submission from Resolution Holdings:
The proposal as understood and endorsed by the voting public was
to appoint a taxpayer advocate who would represent taxpayers and resolve
systemic problems...
In the present proposal, however, there remains a duplication of
roles together with an emasculation of the powers of the IGT to the extent that
that Office would be nothing more than a puppet to the Minister. [14]
2.16
The importance of clear objectives for the
office was also commented upon in a submission from CPA Australia, which held
that the Bill should state that the objective of the Inspector-General is to
ensure that the criteria relating to good tax administration in respect to
efficiency, fairness, accountability and transparency are met.[15] Similar criteria are expounded
in the Explanatory Memorandum for the Bill, although not included in the Bill
itself.
2.17
The Committee considers that the Bill
could be enhanced by including in clause 3—Object of the Bill—a clear statement
of intention that the proposed legislation is not only to strengthen the advice
given to government on tax administration but also to promote the advocacy of
taxpayer concerns. This objective is consistent with the commitment given by
the Prime Minister during the election campaign in 2001 and with the message
conveyed in the second reading speech. The inclusion of such a statement of
intention would contribute to increasing public confidence in the legislation.
Establishment of the office
2.18
The Bill proposes the establishment of a new
statutory office of Inspector-General of Taxation, sets out appointment and
administrative arrangements, and stipulates grounds for dismissal.
2.19
As noted earlier, the Inspector-General of
Taxation is to be appointed by the Governor-General for a fixed term of up to
five years. Appointment criteria are not stipulated in the Bill. A number of
submissions to the Committee’s inquiry considered the attributes and experience
of the appointee a significant factor in the success of the office. They
recommended that the inaugural appointee should have experience of taxation
administration from a business perspective, and an ‘understanding of practical
taxpayer experiences of dealing with the tax system.’[16]
2.20
These views are consistent with the
recommendations of the Board of Taxation concerning the desirable
characteristics of the inaugural appointee. The Board recommended that :
The Government should appoint as the inaugural Inspector‑General
of Taxation someone who:
- has a strong capacity to understand both commercial and
public sector issues in tax administration;
- is committed to community consultation and building
constructive relationships with stakeholders; and
- has earned the trust of both government and external
stakeholders.[17]
2.21
The Committee strongly endorses the above
recommendation.
2.22
Although the Government agreed with this
recommendation, there is no reference to the selection process in regard to the
qualifications of the proposed Inspector-General in the Bill.[18]
2.23
As noted above, a number of witnesses emphasised
the importance of appointing a well-qualified and highly respected person to
the position. Mr Sheppard from the Institute of Chartered Accountants was of
the opinion that the success of the role would depend on the candidate.[19] The Commonwealth Ombudsman
reinforced this view. He told the Committee:
In the final analysis, as with all things, the way organisations
like this operate in practice depends very heavily on the calibre and the
quality of the individual who is appointed to the office. That is the most
significant issue...[20]
2.24
The Committee is of the view that the Bill
could be improved by including a provision that before the Governor-General
appoints the Inspector-General the Minister must be satisfied that the nominee
meets specified selection criteria and that the choice is based on merit. This
criteria would follow the recommendation made by the Board of Taxation as
outlined above and agreed to by the Government.
2.25
The Inspector-General can only be dismissed by
the Governor-General on certain grounds including bankruptcy; extended
absences; engaging in outside work; misbehaviour; and physical or mental
incapacity. Treasury Ministers do not have the power to unilaterally dismiss
the Inspector-General.[21]
These provisions are consistent with provisions in similar legislation such as
that concerning the Auditor-General and the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
The functions of the office
2.26
Many submissions to this inquiry expressed
concern about the ‘narrowness’ of the Inspector-General’s functions as set out
in clause 7 of the Bill. They identified three main limitations—the Bill:
- deals only with the administration of tax laws and not policy
matters;
- focuses only on the Australian Taxation Office (ATO); and
- is confined to existing systems and not proposed ones.
2.27
The Bill proposes that the Inspector-General
review systems established by the ATO to administer the tax laws, including
systems for communicating with people or organisations in relation to tax
administration, and review systems established by tax laws, but only to the
extent that those systems deal with administrative matters.
2.28
This matter was canvassed in a number of
submissions to the Board of Taxation. Some wanted to see the scope of the
Inspector-General’s functions extended beyond administrative issues to include
broader policy matters. The Board, however, felt that such a role would overlap
with existing processes, including its own functions:
The Board considers that the Inspector-General should focus on
improving the ATO’s existing business. While the Inspector-General may
sometimes identify the underlying policy as a source of compliance problems for
taxpayers, and recommend that the policy be reconsidered, it would not be
appropriate for the Inspector-General to review the policy. A review of
existing policy should be undertaken using existing policy processes, including
those involving the Treasury Department and, if appropriate, the Board.[22]
2.29
Submissions to the Committee raised similar
points in regard to the Inspector-General’s functions. CPA Australia, for
example, felt that the Inspector-General should be able to review and make
recommendations on broader tax policy and law design issues in order to deliver
improvements to tax administration,[23]
a view also expressed by Taxpayers Australia Inc, the Financial Planning Association
of Australia Ltd, the National Institute of Accountants and the Australian
Institute of Company Directors.[24]
2.30
A further concern with the functions of the
Inspector-General was raised in regard to the ability to review administrative
systems that affect tax administration but are implemented by government
agencies other than the ATO. Concerns in this respect went largely to the
increasing integration of the administration of the social welfare system with
that of the tax system.
2.31
Professor Coleman from the Australian Institute
of Company Directors maintained that;
If you look at problems the ATO has when it is interacting with
other welfare benefits, such as the family tax benefit, then the
inspector-general needs to be able to deal with that sort of thing because it
is a major systemic issue affecting tax, even though it is a separate
organisation.[25]
2.32
Mr Gavan Ord, National Institute of Accountants,
also gave evidence to the inquiry on this point:
If the position is going to be successful, the inspector-general
must be able to look at other areas apart from just tax administration. I think
they should look at tax administration from the definition of a taxpayer—the
taxpayer does their tax return, and what is on the tax return is tax
administration. We believe that if the role is going to be successful, what is
already in the bill in regard to position of the inspector-general has to be
expanded. [26]
2.33
A similar issue arose in respect of the
Inspector-General’s ability to review or comment on proposed or potential
systems, with its functions as defined within the Bill confined to established
systems.[27]
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia argued, in a submission to
the inquiry, that prevention of poor administration is clearly preferable to
remedying it later, and the Inspector-General should be able to have input to
the design of new administrative models.[28]
2.34
The view that prevention of systemic problems is
the preferred course has obvious appeal. Contrary arguments have been raised,
however, that involving the body that is to check the tax system in the
development of the system creates a potential conflict of interest.[29]
2.35
The Inspector-General’s role in the development
of policy would also produce issues of duplication with existing authorities.
The Board of Taxation has an existing mission to contribute a business and
broader community perspective to improving the design of taxation laws and
their operation. Because of the likelihood of duplication of functions, it
recommended against having both the Board and the Inspector-General involved in
bringing a taxpayer perspective to the consideration of policy initiatives.[30]
2.36
The avoidance of duplication, and ensuring that
the Inspector-General makes a valuable contribution to the existing
administrative review framework, is a fundamental issue addressed further in
the next chapter.
2.37
The Committee is appreciative of the widespread
view expressed in evidence to the inquiry that the roles of the
Inspector-General are too narrowly defined in the Bill and notes a response on
this point from Ms Susan Johnston, Department of the Treasury, in evidence:
In the submissions there has been a lot of discussion about
where the boundary is between what the inspector-general can look at in terms
of the law and what the inspector-general cannot look at. The delineation is
that the inspector-general cannot look at tax policy and law that imposes taxes
or benefits but can look at not only tax administration but also laws that
underpin tax administration. So where the law deals with an administrative
matter, the inspector-general can look at it.[31]
2.38
The Committee suggests that the Government
consider broadening the definition of the functions of the
Inspector-General within the Bill to allow him or her to
provide advice to government in relation to legislation, or the administration
of legislation, which is identified as a source of systemic compliance
problems, and to provide advice to government on any potential systemic
administration problems which might arise from the implementation of new
proposals.
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