Chapter 2
Views on the Bill
2.1
The committee heard from a broad range of witnesses who, in varying
degrees, supported or opposed different aspects of the Bill. For the most part
witnesses focused on specific aspects of the Bill, rather than supporting or
opposing the Bill as a whole.
2.2
Mining companies and peak bodies were strongly supportive of the repeal
of the MRRT. These companies and peak bodies were broadly united in arguing
that the MRRT was a poorly designed tax which imposed a significant compliance
cost on the Australian mining industry and undermined the industry's
competitiveness. In contrast, other witnesses argued that the MRRT provided a
mechanism, however flawed, for capturing the rents earned through the
exploitation of Australia's non-renewable resources.
2.3
A number of witnesses addressed the repeal of the loss carry-back
regime. Broadly speaking, witnesses argued that that the loss carry-back regime
was a useful means of reducing the asymmetrical treatment of tax losses in
Australia.
2.4
Similarly, several witnesses advocated retaining in their current form
the small business capital allowances that would be revised by the Bill.
Others, however, acknowledged the difficulty in retaining the current measures
given the challenging fiscal situation confronting the government.
2.5
Superannuation organisations and peak bodies were united in arguing for
the retention of the LISC as a means of addressing the effective lack of concessions
available on the superannuation contributions of low income earners.
2.6
Similarly, most of these superannuation organisations argued against the
rephasing of the increase in the SG rate, although there was some recognition
of why the rephasing was necessary. In contrast, the Ai Group and the
Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) supported the rephasing,
while arguing that the government's broader commitment to lifting the rate to
12 per cent should be subject to review.
2.7
Welfare advocates and unions argued against the abolition of the income
support bonus and the schoolkids bonus, underlining the apparent impact these
changes would have on welfare recipients and low and middle income earners.
Other witnesses, however, acknowledged the difficulties of funding these
measures given the failure of the MRRT to raise any significant revenue and the
imminent repeal of the tax.
Views on the Bill as a whole
2.8
As noted above, most witnesses addressed their comments to specific
schedules to the Bill, rather than assessing it as a whole. One exception was
the Australia Institute, which, in addition to criticising discrete parts of
the Bill, also argued that:
...this package as a whole transfers income from something
like 10 million Australians, including the poorest ... as well as at any time
around 8.2 million wage and salary earners. The main beneficiaries, as we point
out in the submission, are a handful of foreign owned corporations that are
collectively worth $200 billion.[1]
2.9
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) also noted its opposition
to the Bill as a whole, suggesting:
...it is very rare in approaching an omnibus tax bill to not
find any redeeming features in respect of any of the measures, but this is such
a bill. We say all the elements of this bill are retrograde steps and we reject
the bill in its entirety.[2]
2.10
The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), meanwhile, challenged
the packaging of the repeal of MRRT-related measures with the repeal of the
MRRT, arguing that each measure should be assessed on its own merits. It
referred, in this respect, to recommendations it had made in its submission to
the Commission of Audit about how social spending could be funded by the
government:
We have made a range of recommendations for how we can raise
revenue and make savings in order to meet those social objectives, but as we
were just discussing, the social expenditure measures in this bill have
compelling social objectives behind them and there are pressing needs to be met
in those areas. So the simplistic linking of this tax measure with these
spending measures is hugely problematic and would cause great damage in the
short term, by the abolition of those payments. I do not think this is the
forum in which to do away with a range of measures that were making some,
however small, progress towards greater equity in this country—by a knee-jerk
abolition of those payments due to a point-of-time link with this tax measure.[3]
2.11
Although concerned with different aspects of the Bill than ACOSS, the
ACCI also made the argument that decisions relating to certain measures in the
Bill should not be linked to the MRRT. Specifically, the ACCI argued that
existing small business capital allowances and the loss carry-back regime 'have
merit in their own right and should always have been decoupled from the MRRT
legislation and funded independently.'[4]
2.12
Expanding on this point, the ACCI told the committee that:
...in the context of the overall Commonwealth budget, these
measures are relatively small, particularly in circumstances where the incoming
government is putting in place and able to put in place some different
approaches to spending priorities leading up to the May budget next year. There
should be mechanisms found inside the overall budget to keep funding these two
measures.[5]
2.13
While noting that revenue from the MRRT was not directly hypothecated to
measures in the Bill, Treasury agreed with the suggestion that, given the
inherent volatility of MRRT revenue and the relative stability of the
expenditure measures, the passage of the Bill would have a positive impact on
the structural position of the budget on an ongoing basis.[6]
Schedule 1: Minerals resource rent tax
2.14
The committee received evidence both in support of retaining the MRRT (or an improved version of it), and in support of its repeal.
Arguments for retaining the MRRT
2.15
The ACTU, the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU)
and the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association (SDA) argued in
favour of resource rent taxation for the mining industry generally, and
suggested that while the MRRT might be flawed in design, it should nonetheless
be retained and improved, rather than abolished.[7]
2.16
ACOSS also spoke in favour of the idea of resource rent taxation. While
conceding that the MRRT itself was flawed in design, ACOSS contended that:
...if we were to choose to abolish a list of poorly designed,
economically inefficient and distortionary taxes, there is a long queue ahead
of the MRRT. It is still a relatively good tax, and we need the revenue.[8]
2.17
The Australia Institute, meanwhile, argued that the mining industry was
paying relatively low levels of tax by historical standards, and that given the
high levels of foreign ownership of mining operations in Australia, much of the
benefit from mining was not going to the Australian community. At the same
time, the Australia Institute rejected the idea that investment in the
Australian mining industry had been adversely impacted by the MRRT. It further
suggested that resource rent taxation was an efficient means of capturing a
better return for Australians on the mining of the resources they owned.[9]
Responses to supporters of resource
rent taxation and the MRRT
2.18
In evidence to the committee, the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA)
disputed suggestions that resource rent taxation does not impact on investment
decisions. This was, the MCA told the committee, simply a 'theoretical and
conceptual argument,' and one that was not borne out by the mining industry's
experience with the MRRT.[10]
2.19
The MCA also challenged the notion that the MRRT was a necessary or
significant component in ensuring Australians benefited from mining in
Australia. In particular, the MCA pointed to its most recent annual survey of
taxes paid by the industry, which showed that mining companies had paid $17.6
billion in company tax and state royalties in that tax year. This figure, it
was stressed, did not include MRRT payments or indirect taxes, and made for an
effective tax rate of 42 per cent.[11]
2.20
For its part, the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies (AMEC)
took issue with the idea that resource rent taxation was an efficient means of
taxing non-renewable resources, and suggested governments should look elsewhere
if it believed the Australian community was not receiving a fair share from
mining:
I do not think that the MRRT or the RSPT were in any way a
clever way in which the government and the Australian community were going to
get their so-called fair share. There is already a system in place through the
Commonwealth Grants Commission to achieve that. If you really want to start
somewhere and look at the taxation and the whole issue of fair share, go back
to the CGC and go back to horizontal fiscal equalisation to see how that has
played havoc with this whole system, including royalties.[12]
2.21
The MCA, AMEC and Treasury all rejected the suggestion from the
Australia Institute that the benefit Australians received from mining activity
was significantly reduced as a result of the high proportion of foreign
investment in the sector. For example, the MCA told the committee that:
...there have been a range of studies by the Bureau of
Resources and Energy Economics, the Reserve Bank and Treasury, which have
looked at the various mechanisms by which the benefits have flowed around
Australia both directly, in terms of incomes to workers, in terms of increased
purchasers to suppliers. In the last couple of weeks, the Minerals Council
released some new work that looked at what we would call the community spend. None
of that is charity. That is business spending on local suppliers, including
Indigenous contractors; its local infrastructure. An element of that is a
voluntary contribution. That was of the order of $34.7 billion.[13]
2.22
Similarly, Treasury told the committee that foreign investment increased
the national income, along with wages and output. Asked about the idea that
profits resulting from foreign investment in mining overwhelmingly flowed
offshore, Treasury responded:
Clearly profit does not go offshore in the sense that the
investment comes in and then income is earned in Australia, and once it is
earned in Australia it is taxed in Australia under the company income tax
system. Now there are ongoing debates about how much of that can be shifted out
of Australia. Clearly when you are digging rocks out of the ground and shipping
them off somewhere it is pretty hard to push too much of that value out of
Australia, so there is some clear benefit to Australia from that point of view.[14]
2.23
The MCA also made the broader point that foreign investment was an
important and necessary component of a successful Australian resources
industry.[15]
Support for repealing the MRRT
2.24
In contrast to the evidence received from the unions, ACOSS and the
Australia Institute, mining companies and industry peak bodies voiced strong
support for repealing the MRRT.
2.25
For instance, the Chamber of Minerals and Energy of Western Australia
welcomed the proposed repeal, suggesting the MRRT:
...has been administratively onerous and costly as well as
ineffective, falling significantly short of delivering the genuine tax reform
needed to ensure Australia's continuing international competiveness.[16]
2.26
Similarly, the ACCI indicated that it had consistently opposed the MRRT
and supported its repeal, on the grounds that the MRRT was a poorly designed
tax that was implemented without proper consultation with the mining industry.[17]
2.27
The Ai Group suggested that while there is a good case for a
well-designed tax on 'super profits', the MRRT is itself 'very poorly designed
and would not serve as an effective basis on which to build a well-designed
approach.'[18]
2.28
Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) argued that tax systems should be 'simple,
transparent and efficient,' and that the MRRT, and the previously proposed
RSPT, 'fail absolutely on these essential tax principles.' Expanding on this point, FMG wrote in its
submission that:
...the MRRT introduced a new layer of administrative complexity
into an already highly regulated industry. Taxing at a 'project' level rather
than a corporate level has further complicated matters and has significantly
increased the cost of overall taxation compliance. Implementing the MRRT
regime, in terms of systems modification requirements, technical consultancies
and legal interpretation, within Fortescue alone has cost millions of dollars.
The MRRT imposes an additional unnecessary layer of taxation on top of the
existing State and Territory based royalty systems, and the Federal income tax
regime, in a manner that does not simplify taxation, nor make the taxation
process more efficient. In fact, since it is an entirely new tax impost all it
has done is to increase the complexity of the compliance burden and necessarily
acts as an investment deterrent due to perceptions of sovereign risk and the
extent that it reduces forecast project returns.[19]
2.29
In their appearance before the committee, representatives of Atlas Iron
and BC Iron also underlined the high administrative and compliance costs
associated with the MRRT.[20]
2.30
AMEC argued strongly in favour of the repeal of the MRRT, telling the
committee it was:
... an ill-conceived, poorly designed and discriminatory tax
that should be rescinded and replaced with a long-term tax strategy that
encouraged investment and was internationally competitive.[21]
2.31
AMEC outlined the administrative and compliance burden imposed by the
tax, even for hundreds of companies that have a pre-mining interest in iron ore
and coal but may never have an actual MRRT liability. It told the committee
that:
...minimum total set-up costs in the first year of smaller iron
ore and coal miners and junior exploration companies, excluding large miners,
was estimated to be over $20 million and ongoing administration and compliance
costs in excess of $2 million.[22]
2.32
The MCA also told the committee that it thought the Explanatory
Memorandum's estimated annual cost of $10.5 million to the mining industry
for compliance with the MRRT was:
...a fairly conservative estimate. There are not just the
ongoing costs, which we think would be higher than that. I cannot give you a
precise figure without doing a survey of the whole industry, but based on what
we know it would be higher. Added to that are the setup costs, I guess you
could call them. Throughout the debate there has been a lot of toing and
froing—valuations had to be done for starting bases, there are IT costs,
systems setups and other such things and dealings with the ATO. That would be a
very substantial sum of money; we estimate it would be well in excess of $30
million over the last three years. That is not taken account of in the bill
itself, because they are sunk setup costs rather than ongoing costs.[23]
2.33
In response to the MCA's point, Treasury acknowledged that its estimate
of a $10.5 million MRRT compliance cost for mining companies in Australia
might well be on the conservative side, and readily allowed that companies
themselves would be better placed than Treasury to provide advice on the costs
of administering the MRRT.[24]
2.34
Treasury also acknowledged, both at the hearing and in the Explanatory
Memorandum, that far more companies need to comply with the MRRT than have
actually had to pay the tax to date. Specifically, the Explanatory Memorandum
confirmed that there are approximately 235 companies registered for the MRRT,
and 65 more are due to register should the repeal of the MRRT not proceed.
However, fewer than 20 companies had actually incurred an MRRT liability in
2012–13.[25]
2.35
AMEC was particularly critical of what it regarded as the MRRT's bias
against mining projects that were new or in relatively early stages of
development. This bias, AMEC explained, resulted from the ability of
established miners to apply the market value method to their depreciable
starting base assets (that is, to use the market valuation of a mine as at 1
May 2010, just prior to the announcement of the RSPT), an option that in effect
is not open to small and emerging miners:
Small, emerging miners are not able to claim such an
extensive tax shield and therefore their unit cost of production and ultimate
effective tax rate is detrimentally affected. So as much as you can be
designing a tax with all the correct aspects incorporated in event, such as the
asset base, it has a serious distortion effect and it is this distortion effect
that has discriminated against, in particular, the mid-tier producers.[26]
2.36
A number of witnesses also indicated that the MRRT had undermined the
capacity of the Australian mining industry to attract much-needed investment.
2.37
In response to questions from the committee, FMG advised that it would
have struggled to grow into the company it now was had it needed to contend
with the MRRT when the company was getting started. In particular, FMG
suggested it would have struggled to attract investors had the MRRT been in
place at that time.[27]
2.38
Atlas Iron provided a concrete example of the impact of the MRRT,
suggesting that:
...the introduction of the MRRT substantially delayed the
process of marketing our Ridley magnetite project to foreign investors as it
created a further layer of cost and uncertainty over such projects which are
already considered risky by virtue of their capital requirement.[28]
2.39
Asked about the impact of the MRRT on foreign investment and growth in
the mining industry, the ACCI responded that:
...the debate around the measure and the high level of
questioning within the public and economic community about the measure and its
iterations did contribute and was one of the elements that contributed to a
reduction in business confidence, and business confidence includes investment
confidence.[29]
2.40
The MCA, meanwhile, suggested that while the impact of the MRRT itself
on investment was difficult to assess, there 'is also an important point to be
made that, particularly for some of the smaller players in the coal and
iron-ore area, the debate in 2010 created particular difficulties in accessing
capital.'[30]
2.41
Expanding on this point, the MCA told the committee:
I think there is a sense, though, in which the 2010 tax
debate, as I said, casts a pall over Australia's investment reputation. You
have seen that, for example, in some of the surveys done by the Canadian Fraser
Institute, where the state jurisdictions of Australia invariably all sat within
the top 20 of roughly 60 or 70 global jurisdictions. And even today they have
moved to about the middle of the pack. So we have not actually seen any real
recovery in terms of the investment standing of Australian jurisdictions based
on that annual Fraser Institute survey. So I think there has clearly been an
impact. Again, without commenting on particular examples, I am sure there are
companies that have looked elsewhere based on the uncertainty that has existed
in Australia's tax system over the last few years.[31]
2.42
Mr Michael Young, Non-Executive Director of BC Iron, provided the
committee with anecdotal evidence illustrating the impact the debate over the
proposed RSPT, and the subsequent introduction of the MRRT, had had on
perceptions of Australia as a foreign investment destination. Conversely, this
evidence also touched on the reaction of foreign investors to the proposed
repeal of the MRRT:
When the RSPT was announced in 2010, in June of that year we
travelled to New York, London and Toronto to raise money for BC Iron as we were
in pre-development stages. I got some comments from one particular fund manager
in New York who would not allow me to identify him. He runs a $6 billion fund.
They had several investments in Australian companies with assets in Australia.
His comments were quite colourful, so I will not repeat them. He basically
said: 'What the heck are you guys doing? You've just come through the GFC and
now you have introduced this tax. We don't understand it, but we've put a hold
on Australia investment.' I want to reiterate that: his company with a $6
billion fund and put a hold on investments in Australian companies in
Australia. I had not heard from the guy again until last week. He called me
last week, post election, and said, 'It looks like you guys are open for
business again' and we had a long chat about investment in our company. I am
now chairman of a uranium company as well in Australia. That sentiment was
repeated over and over again, and I know of several companies.[32]
2.43
Mr Young added that 'the investment community was basically shut down
because of the uncertainty around the tax and it is really the uncertainty of
that tax that created the issue.' Clarifying this point, Mr Young suggested
that the MRRT was in fact only the 'tip of the iceberg,' and the problem was
that it had created a perception (rightly or wrongly) that the then government
was anti-mining, and this perception was in turn reinforced by a range of
issues, such as the carbon tax.[33]
2.44
Mr Young told the committee that the MRRT had, in fact, created
perceptions of sovereign risk with respect to foreign investment in Australian
mining projects. While acknowledging that some of the rhetoric was 'pretty
thick' (particularly the comparisons of Australia to African nations), it was
nonetheless the case that, for investors, 'perception is indeed reality'.[34]
2.45
AMEC told the committee that the MRRT has impacted on investor
confidence and business certainty in such a way as to detrimentally affect 'the
risk profile of small Australian iron ore and coal miners and junior
exploration companies, making raising equity and debt capital extremely
difficult over the past three years.'[35]
2.46
AMEC further suggested that the share of exploration funds raised on the
ASX that went toward domestic mining projects had decreased significantly as a
result of the MRRT, and the number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of metals
and mining companies had fallen.[36]
To support this point, AMEC provided two graphs to the committee, reproduced
below as Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: Destination of Exploration Funds Raised on ASX –
Australian Projects v Global Projects
Source:
Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Additional Information, p. 5.
Table 4: ASX Initial Public
Offerings of Metals and Mining Companies
Source: Association of Mining
and Exploration Companies, Additional Information, p. 5.
2.47
AMEC concluded that:
... the implementation of the repeal of the MRRT combined with
other initiatives contained in the coalition government's various policy
documents will provide much needed stimulus to the Australian mining industry.
These actions will help restore industry and investor confidence which are
essential to growth and productivity and the creation of jobs in Australia.[37]
2.48
Similarly, the MCA argued that the repeal of the MRRT would improve
confidence in the mining industry and signal that Australia remained an
attractive investment destination:
Repeal of the MRRT will help to restore industry confidence,
remove an additional layer of tax on coal and iron ore projects, reduce
compliance costs and improve the simplicity of the tax system. Repeal of the MRRT
will send a powerful signal that Australia is determined to remain a
world-leading destination for new investment and production.[38]
2.49
The MCA argued that given the challenges currently facing the mining
industry—including lower commodity prices, high production costs and growing
sources of supply competition—it is now 'time to begin a new conversation about
how Australia regains its competitiveness and wins its share of future minerals
resource investment.'[39]
Schedule 2: Loss carry-back
2.50
The ACTU argued strongly in favour of retaining the loss carry-back
regime, and noted that it had in fact been involved in the design of the regime
as a member of the Business Tax Working Group:
This was an important measure that ended the asymmetric
treatment of tax losses. It was an important reform, particularly for small and
medium sized businesses, especially in circumstances of an economic downturn.
The Business Tax Working Group, which was made up of business groups, myself,
academics and tax professionals, had a fair bit of difficulty agreeing on a lot
of things but we did manage to agree on this as an important reform. It was a
good thing the former government took it up. It is good for [small and medium
enterprises] and it should be retained for the future.[40]
2.51
The ACTU concluded that the repeal of the loss carry-back regime would
mean that more businesses would fail over the economic cycle, and this would in
turn impact on employment.[41]
2.52
The CFMEU, meanwhile, expressed disappointment at the proposed repeal of
the loss carry-back regime, which it suggested could 'help a firm survive a
tough year or two'.[42]
2.53
The Ai Group indicated that it did not support the repeal of the loss
carry-back regime, which it regarded as a useful (if limited) step towards
addressing the asymmetrical treatment of tax losses in Australia.[43]
2.54
Expanding on this point, the Ai Group told the committee:
There are two benefits for the loss carryback. At present, a
company in a loss-making year does not pay tax, nor is it entitled to a tax
refund, even though when it makes a profit it pays a tax in the year that it
makes the profit. It is entitled to claim that loss later on—when it next makes
a profit it can claim that loss back against that profit in a subsequent year.
However, waiting for that is recognised as a cost on business, across the
globe. Most countries have loss carryback or other provisions that deal with
this asymmetrical treatment of losses. Businesses making a loss need cash now.
Rather than having a contingent asset on their books, if you like—that is, an
ability to claim money when they are making money—loss carryback would be much
better for them and for their businesses, and would reduce the business closure
and so on that results when businesses go through this cash flow crisis in a
year they make a loss. Symmetrical treatment of tax losses would alleviate that
quite considerably. The present law gives them access on a limited basis to
some of the tax they paid in the previous year, in the year they make a loss.
This provides a very important boost to their cash flow at a time when they
need it most and at a time when it is going to be most critical in ensuring the
survival of that business.[44]
Schedules 3 and 4: Capital allowances for small business entities
2.55
The Real Estate Institute of Australia suggested that the proposed
changes to small business capital allowances, along with the changes to the
loss carry-back regime, would:
...have a major detrimental impact on real estate agencies,
their employees and, in general, all small businesses. For real estate agencies
cars are a major part of conducting business and the asset base. The proposed
repeal of the accelerated depreciation provisions will see a reduction in cash
flow and a reduced turnover in motor vehicles with the consequent impacts on
the local vehicle industry. The consequences on the turnover of computers and
other office equipment will be similar.[45]
2.56
Ai Group argued that the question regarding the measures was not whether
deductions could be claimed or not, but when they could be deducted. As such,
the issue was essentially one of timing, and the 'revenue estimates presented
across the forward estimates grossly overstate the net present value of these
measures to the Commonwealth.'[46]
2.57
Ai Group outlined the benefits of the higher instant asset write-off
threshold in its appearance before the committee:
It increases cash flow so that, instead of waiting over the
life of the asset to recover its nominal value as a tax deduction, with a
$6,500 threshold you can claim a very large proportion of it in the year that
it is made. So this boosts cash flow. It changes quite drastically the net
present value calculations of any particular investment because it boosts their
cash flow. Of course it reduces cash flow in subsequent years, because it is,
after all, only a bring-forward of the depreciation deductions.
The second element—and in some ways more important,
particularly for the small businesses to which it applies—is that the
recordkeeping is very much reduced. Everyone who has been a small business
person knows what a hassle it is to trace, over the life of an asset, the
deductions that have been made in previous years and the statutory accelerated
depreciation rates and to make small deductions over a number of years. Making
a single big deduction in the year that it is purchased is simple. It relieves
business of all the paperwork, it reduces the costs they have to pay to their
accountants and it gives them more time in their businesses—less money to the
accountants and more money for reinvestment.[47]
2.58
Ai Group conceded that consideration of the capital allowances for small
business could be considered as a part of the government's tax review, but
maintained that:
...right now the Australian economy faces a large gap in
investment, particularly outside the mining sector. This is an issue that the
Reserve Bank, for example, has been raising. It is an issue that the
Commonwealth Treasury has been raising. The proposal to remove the instant
write-off facility for small business will have a material impact on them and
will decrease investment at the time it is needed most. Waiting for the tax
review in these cases is poor timing. We need this investment now because
mining investment is coming off and there is no adequate pick-up in investment
across the board. It is in fact a timing measure and the timing need is right
now.[48]
2.59
However, while opposed to the reduction in the threshold available under
the small business asset write-off regime, the Ai Group supported the repeal of
the accelerated depreciation arrangements for motor vehicles used by small
business. It argued that these arrangements distort 'small business's
investment decisions in favour of expenditure on motor vehicles relate to
expenditure on other, and in many cases, more productive assets.'[49]
Schedule 5: Geothermal expenditure deduction
2.60
The Australia Institute argued against the repeal of the geothermal
expenditure deduction, on the basis that if the repeal proceeded 'geothermal
exploration will not have the same incentives as any ordinary explorer looking
for fossil fuels will get.' It added that, given the potential of geothermal as
a renewable energy source, 'if anything the playing field should be tilted in
[its] favour'.[50]
2.61
The Ai Group, however, suggested that geothermal exploration deduction
would be best considered in the context of the government's general tax review.[51]
Schedule 6: Rephasing the Superannuation Guarantee Charge percentage
2.62
While most of the superannuation groups the committee heard from opposed
the rephasing of the increase in the SG rate, a number also expressed support
for the government's commitment to increase the rate to 12 per cent
(albeit on a delayed schedule).
2.63
The ACCI and Ai Group, by contrast, supported the pause in the SG rate
increase, and more broadly made the case against the eventual increase in the
rate to 12 per cent.
2.64
The ACTU expressed its opposition to the rephasing, suggesting that it
was 'a long awaited measure which had already been factored into wage and
salary negotiations.'[52]
2.65
The Financial Planning Association of Australia (FPA) opposed the rephasing,
underlining the need to boost the currently inadequate levels of Australian
retirement savings. The FPA added that given the importance of the increase in
the SG rate, it should not be tied to the MRRT.[53]
Similar arguments were made by Industry Super Australia (ISA).[54]
2.66
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) argued that
the increase in the SG rate 'unequivocally will assist future retirement
incomes while having only a relative minor impact on take home pay.'[55]
2.67
Mercer suggested that, in addition to reducing retirement incomes of
future retirees and increasing pressure on the future cost of funding the Age
Pension, the delay in the SG rate increase could 'result in practical
difficulties for employers.' Specifically, Mercer noted that many employers
would have already modified their payroll systems to allow for the increase in
the SG rate from 1 July 2014, and have budgeted for the increase in
remuneration. Mercer argued that employers should be allowed to know the SG
rate at least 12 months before the start of the financial year:
In other words, if the SG charge percentage is to be paused
at 9.25 percent for two years commencing 1 July 2014, then this should have
been enshrined in legislation no later than 30 June 2013. Obviously this is not
possible however employers still need to be given a reasonable period of
notice. As an absolute minimum, we consider employers need at least a period of
three months between the passage of any legislation through both Houses of
Parliament and the effective date of the pause. Hence, if the legislation is
not passed by 31 March 2014, the pause should be deferred until 1 July 2015
with a 9.5% rate applicable from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2017. Whist this might
alleviate some of the administrative issues for employers, it may not be enough
to remove the potential for industrial action by employees/unions seeking
compensation through additional salary remuneration
2.68
Mercer also suggested that the changes could ‘potentially result in
industrial action by employees who consider they have been disadvantaged by
accepting lower salary increases determined after taking the already legislated
SG increases into account.[56]
2.69
While acknowledging the government's election commitment to rephase the
increase in the SG rate, and welcoming the government's commitment to increase
the rate to 12 per cent, the FSC nonetheless expressed its view that the 'proposed
delay undermines the policy rationale underpinning increasing the SGC to 12 per
cent to minimise the expected cost of the aging population to the government.'[57]
2.70
AIST, meanwhile, reluctantly accepted the need to delay the increase in
the SG rate, and indicated that it was 'encouraged that this increase is to
eventually proceed'.[58]
2.71
The ACCI indicated that it supported the pause in the increase in the SG
rate, and more broadly opposed the proposed increase to 12 per cent. It argued
that, once fully implemented, the measure would increase costs for business by
at least $20 billion in today's dollars. According to the ACCI, this would
represent 'a significant new cost burden for industry for which no offset has
been provided in our industrial relations frameworks.'[59]
The ACCI also suggested the former government had implied that taxpayers would
fund the phased increase in the SG rate, when in reality it is Australian
businesses that are required to pay the additional superannuation liability
associated with the increase. The ACCI explained:
A budget impact from the increase in the [Superannuation
Guarantee Levy] only arises because superannuation contributions are taxed at a
lower rate relative to income and higher levy would lead to a higher level of
superannuation contributions and lower level of income over the forward
estimates period.[60]
2.72
The ACCI stressed the need for the Bill to be enacted prior to 1 July
2014, given the timing of the next phased increase in the SG rate.[61]
2.73
While Ai Group acknowledged the inadequacy of retirement incomes for
many people, it indicated that it did not support the phased increase in the SG
rate, and supported the proposed pause. In its submission, Ai Group wrote that
it:
...favours a more considered approach to examining the case for
improving the adequacy of superannuation arrangements and the alternative means
of doing so. This should be considered in the context of the government's
review of taxation.[62]
Schedule 7: Repeal of the low income superannuation contribution
2.74
Superannuation groups that provided evidence to the committee were
broadly united in opposing the repeal of the LISC. These groups were
particularly concerned that the repeal of the LISC would remove any concession
low-income earners received on their superannuation contributions, as the
15 per cent flat rate on superannuation contributions was higher than
the rate they paid on their take-home income.
2.75
ISA argued in its submission that the LISC is:
...integral to the compact whereby the Government offers compensation
to individuals, by way of tax concession, for their deferral of consumption
cause by the SG. Arguable the deferral of consumption for low income earners is
felt most acutely due to their budget constraints – making the LISC a
particularly important measure in the system.[63]
2.76
The FPA expressed concern that 'repealing the Low Income Superannuation
Contribution will disproportionately affect already disadvantaged members of
Australian society, and dissuade low income earners from engaging with their
superannuation.'[64]
2.77
The FPA added that the repeal of the LISC would:
...disincentivise low income earners from engaging with their
superannuation, and effectively return Australia to a flat tax on
superannuation contributions. As such, the LISC represents a significant
structural change to superannuation in Australia, and repealing it will
negatively impact on Australian society and the Federal budget in the long
term.[65]
2.78
Mercer also suggested that the repeal of the LISC would remove a measure
that addressed the 'inequity whereby low income earners effectively receive
very limited or no income tax concessions on their SG contributions,' and
where, 'in fact, in many cases, superannuation contributions are taxed more
heavily than normal income.'[66]
2.79
ACOSS suggested that the LISC was the minimum needed to ensure some
equity in the way the superannuation contributions of low income earners were
taxed:
In a fairer superannuation system they would actually receive
a positive incentive for their compulsory saving rather than what is, in
effect, a zero incentive. This is the case with the contribution in place, but
at least they are not been penalised 15c in the dollar. We believe that in the
end, those super contributions are coming out of wages, so it is not worthwhile
for people on the lowest incomes to be compelled to save if they have that
penalty of 15c in the dollar for doing so. It is not fair to compel people to
save and then penalise them in that way.[67]
2.80
ACOSS told the committee that the LISC was:
...a small step towards a fairer super system. The present
system penalises those on the lowest incomes, the majority of whom are women,
for saving and gives those on high incomes twice the subsidy paid to
middle-income earners. So the tax system for super contributions is upside-down.
Ideally, the Henry report reforms would be implemented whereby the flat 15 per
cent tax on employer contributions is replaced by taxation at marginal rates
offset by a rebate. Still, the contribution is a good start. It means the tax
break for people earning less than $37,000 a year is increased from minus 15
per cent to zero. That is not fantastic, but it is a good start, and we think
it should be retained.[68]
2.81
ACOSS contrasted the level of concession given to low income earners for
their superannuation contributions with the substantial discount received by
income earners on the highest tax rates:
The low-income earner is, without the contribution, losing 15
per cent. The tax break for those on over $180,000 a year is 33c in the dollar
or so. The tax break per dollar contributed for the bottom end without this
measure is minus 15c, with this measure zero. So the system is still skewed to
the top end, it is still inequitable. Apart from the extra 15 per cent tax for
a very small proportion of people earning over $300,000, which we believe
should be kept, the system is massively skewed towards higher income earners
who are unlikely to rely on the age pension in any event. They are likely to
save without the incentive in any event. There is really no good reason in
public policy to offer that level of subsidy to those people, and certainly no
good public policy reason to penalise those at the bottom end for compulsory
saving.[69]
2.82
The ACTU picked up on this point, arguing that the repeal of the LISC
would, in effect:
...leave those earning less than $37,000 per year as the only
Australian wage and salary earners who do not receive a concessional treatment
of their superannuation contributions. Everybody else in the economy except
these low income workers would receive some measure of tax break, and as Mr
Davidson has pointed out, at the top end there are very significant
concessions.[70]
2.83
The ACTU also pointed to Treasury analysis that showed how in 2009–10
the top decile of income earners received 38.2 per cent of all superannuation
tax concessions, which was more than the share of the bottom 70 per cent of
income earners combined. It described this situation as 'grossly inequitable.'[71]
2.84
Similarly, the ACTU argued the repeal of the LISC would:
...restore the position where large numbers of low-income
Australians pay more tax on their superannuation than they pay on their
take-home pay. That is an absurd proposition for money which is compulsory and
preserved and in contrast to the enormous tax concessions given to high-income
earners.[72]
2.85
In its submission, the Financial Services Council (FSC) wrote that it
was 'a long-standing flaw in the superannuation system that low-income earners
would pay a higher rate of tax on their compulsory contributions than they
would if that money was paid to them as income.’[73]
The FSC recommended that rather of repealing the LISC, the government 'instead
"pause" the policy by amending the date from which fund members can
accrue an entitlement to a LISC payment to 1 July 2017 to allow the Budget position
to first strengthen.'[74]
2.86
A number of witnesses, including Women in Super, the ACTU, FPA, FSC and
ISA, expressed particular concern about the impact the abolition of the LISC
would have on women, who constituted 2.1 million of the LISC's 3.6 million recipients.[75]
As ISA explained to the committee:
As others identified and as we identified in our submission,
about two-thirds of those affected are women. We think that the LISC has been
the single most important policy setting in the super system which helps to
address the inequity in savings gap whereby women are currently retiring with
about 40 per cent less than men, which is significant given that their
longevity is greater.[76]
2.87
ISA added that many of these women eligible for the LISC were, in fact,
second-income earners in family households.[77]
2.88
ISA also suggested that the full benefits of the government's proposed
Paid Parental Leave scheme, wherein women would receive superannuation payments
while on paid maternity leave, would:
...only be realised if the low-income super contribution
remains in place alongside it. If there are to be any changes to the paid
parental leave scheme, as it progresses through the parliament, then any
savings could be directed to retaining the LISC. In relation to that, I would
draw attention to our submission, where we have made the point that under the
paid parental scheme our analysis in the submission, which is at Table E, shows
that there will be very significant offsets between the paid parental leave
scheme and the low-income super contribution, such that the repeal of the LISC
will wipe out the very worthy benefits of the proposed PPL scheme by a factor
of two-thirds, and, in some instances, almost twice over.[78]
2.89
Women in Super argued that the LISC, along with the phased increase in
the SG rate, would help address the gender gap in superannuation savings:
We see the increase in the superannuation guarantee from nine
to 12 per cent and the low-income superannuation contribution as crucial
policies to deliver adequacy in retirement and to take the pressure off future
taxpayers. These measures are doubly important for women who currently have
such a marked superannuation savings gap. The LISC is not simply a mechanism to
increase superannuation savings; it is fundamental to the equity of the
taxation treatment of compulsory superannuation savings.[79]
2.90
The AIST also told the committee that the LISC supported workforce
participation, particularly in terms of individuals in part-time work and
low-income earners.[80]
2.91
In addition to emphasising the disproportionate impact of the repeal of
the LISC on women, ISA also suggested it would have a disproportionate impact
of Australians in rural and regional areas.[81]
2.92
ASFA acknowledged the budgetary constraints facing the government, and
indicated it was:
...very willing to have a discussion with Treasury and the
government about ways in which the low-income superannuation contribution may
be funded. Certainly we say that its permanent abolition is not justified.
Already superannuation has done some very heavy lifting in terms of budget
measures. The amount of additional revenue taken out of super over the last few
budgets has been very considerable, and the super co-contribution, when it was
last phased back on a permanent basis was put in the context that that was an
acceptable measure given that the low-income superannuation contribution was
being introduced.[82]
2.93
Similarly, ISA indicated that it was:
...would be only too happy to work with the committee, the
Senate and the government in trying to find alternatives to this. It is about
choices. We think it would be a bad choice to remove this integral part of the
system. We have put forward potential alternative savings which would enable
the LISC to continue without detracting from the government's budget
objectives.[83]
2.94
In contrast to the arguments from the superannuation industry, Ai Group
suggested that the LISC was a 'patchwork' solution to addressing the problem of
low income earners paying higher tax on their superannuation contributions that
if they were to take the contributions as wages:
Ai Group supports a more substantial response to this policy
issue which should also be considered in the context of the Government's tax
review.[84]
2.95
Treasury also reiterated that the government had committed to revisiting
concessions for lower income earners when 'the budget returns to a strong
surplus,' and stated that 'there is an acknowledgement that further work needs
to be done when there is capacity.'[85]
Concerns regarding the
retrospective application of the LISC repeal
2.96
A number of witnesses, including Mercer, FSC and ISA, expressed concern
about the apparent retrospective application of the repeal of the LISC.[86]
As Mercer explained in its submission:
Removing the LISC for contributions made from 1 July 2013 is
effectively an adverse retrospective amendment to existing legislation. Part of
the LISC for the 2013–14 year has already 'accrued' in respect of contributions
already made in the period from 1 July 2013.
Making retrospective amendments is not appropriate policy and
will further diminish confidence in the system.[87]
2.97
With respect to concerns expressed about the 'retrospective' application
of the LISC, Treasury told the committee:
The term 'retrospectivity' is bandied around in a number of
ways. At a very strict reading one could argue that anything that takes effect
before the particular piece of legislation receives royal assent could be
considered to be retrospective. There are other arguments saying that anything
that takes effect before the date of announcement could be considered
retrospective. I must say, in the tax world that is probably more the working
definition of 'retrospective', even though the legal purists would argue that
it falls short and you should still go to royal assent. But if we take the
working definition for tax—that is, it retrospectively takes effect an income
year before the date of announcement, and I think in this case the announcement
that the low-income super contribution would be repealed along with the repeal
of the MRRT—that I guess has been a proposition that has been in place for
quite a period of time. So from that point of view one can mount the argument
that it is certainly not retrospective.[88]
Schedules 8 and 9: Repeal of income support bonus and schoolkids bonus
2.98
Welfare groups and unions argued that the repeal of the income support
bonus (schedule 8) and the schoolkids bonus (schedule 9) would hurt welfare
recipients and low and middle income families. Other witnesses, however,
acknowledged that the poor state of the budget and the failure of the MRRT to
raise any significant revenue made these measures difficult to afford.
2.99
ACOSS told the committee that the income support bonus, which was worth
about $4 per week to recipients, was in effect the first increase to the
Newstart Allowance and other allowance payments in two decades. As such,
according to ACOSS, its abolition would have a 'very detrimental effect' on the
poorest households in Australia.[89]
2.100
With respect to the schoolkids bonus, ACOSS told the committee that
while it believed the bonus needed to be better targeted to families most in
need, it nonetheless opposed the abolition of the payment without it being
replaced by an alternative support.[90]
2.101
ACOSS added that:
...the link between the schoolkids bonus and the mining tax we
believe is more tenuous than some of the other measures being considered today.
In terms of the background of the schoolkids bonus, it replaced the education
tax refund payment, which cost approximately two-thirds of the cost of the
schoolkids bonus. The mining tax, theoretically, only paid for a third of the
cost of the schoolkids bonus not the full amount. Should the abolition of the
mining tax proceed that should not be used to justify the abolition of 100 per
cent of the schoolkids bonus payment.[91]
2.102
The SDA argued for the retention of the income support bonus and the
schoolkids bonus, emphasizing the importance of such payments for low income
families. It suggested that 'should the government proceed with the repeal of
the Income support bonus and/or the Schoolkids bonus then the government should
commit to returning the money low income Australian families will lose to them
in the form of real increases in family payments.'[92]
2.103
The committee also received submissions from Ms Georgina Cross and the
Welfare Rights Network Australia which argued in favour of retaining these
support payments.[93]
2.104
As noted earlier in this chapter, ACOSS told the committee that the
future of support payments such as the income support bonus and schoolkids
bonus should not be linked to the MRRT. ACOSS further noted that it has
identified other potential savings measures that could be used to fund the
payments:
Although we believe these measures are linked in time, we
believe that they otherwise have no necessary connection with each other and we
oppose the passage of the bill. While we support firm action to restore the
budget to structural balance, we believe each measure should be considered
separately on its merits. Our commission of audit submission details a range of
direct and tax expenditure savings and revenue measures, which we believe could
achieve savings more efficiently and fairly than this bill would.[94]
2.105
Other witnesses, however, acknowledged that the pressure on the budget,
and the failure of the MRRT to raise significant revenue, made such decisions
unavoidable. For instance, the Ai Group indicated that it supported the repeal
of the low income support bonus and Schoolkids Bonus, as these payments 'amount
to a redistribution of $5.7 billion over the forward estimates from an
anticipated revenue source that has not materialised.'[95]
2.106
In response to questions from the committee, Treasury indicated that if
the Bill did not pass by 31 December 2013, then the savings from the schoolkids
bonus element of the package would be reduced by $727.9 million in
underlying cash terms. Treasury also indicated this would have a public debt
interest cost over the forward estimates.
2.107
During the hearing, Treasury confirmed that the Minister for Finance,
Senator the Hon Penny Wong, had indicated that the mining tax would be used to
fund the schoolkids bonus.[96]
Committee view
2.108
The committee views the Bill as an appropriate and necessary response to
the difficult budgetary situation confronting the government.
2.109
Prior to this inquiry, it had already been well established that the
Minerals Resource Rent Tax is a poorly designed tax, that imposes a significant
compliance and administrative burden on mining companies and damages
Australia's competitiveness. During the inquiry, the committee received clear
and compelling evidence from industry participants and peak bodies that the tax
continues to have a detrimental impact on the Australian resources sector and
the Australian economy more broadly.
2.110
Similarly, the failure of the Minerals Resource Rent Tax to raise any
significant revenue, and in particular its failure to raise the levels of
revenue projected by the former government, was already well known prior to
this inquiry. This failure underlines the need to repeal or revise measures
that the tax was intended to fund.
2.111
The committee acknowledges that some of the MRRT-related expenditure
measures that are repealed or revised by the Bill are worthy in nature.
However, these measures have been linked to revenue that has not materialised,
and the committee believes it would be fiscally irresponsible to leave unfunded
measures in place in the budget. The committee also notes that while the repeal
of certain measures linked to the MRRT may be difficult and unpopular in some
quarters, the government made it clear prior to the 2013 Federal Election that
it was committed to repealing the MRRT and, with it, repealing or revising
MRRT-related measures.
2.112
At the same time, the committee would encourage the government to
revisit certain measures repealed or revised in the Bill, including the
incentives in superannuation for low income earners, once the Budget is back in
surplus. The committee also suggests that the government might consider this
matter as part of its tax review.
2.113
The committee acknowledges the concerns of some superannuation groups
regarding what they characterise as the retrospective application of the repeal
of the Low Income Superannuation Contribution (LISC). However, the committee
notes and agrees with Treasury's argument that as the repeal does not apply to
income years prior to the year in which it was announced, it cannot be regarded
as 'retrospective' in the way that term is broadly used in relation to taxation
policy. The committee further notes that taxpayers eligible for the LISC are
unlikely to have arranged their finances in anticipation of receiving the LISC,
and could not be said to have been unfairly penalised as a result of the
application of the changes from 1 July 2013.
Recommendations
Recommendation 1
2.114
The committee recommends that the government revisit certain measures in
the Bill, in particular incentives in superannuation for low income earners and
taxation issues affecting small business, once the Budget returns to strong
surplus.
Recommendation 2
2.115
The committee recommends that the government consider revisiting the
question of incentives in superannuation for low income earners as part of its
tax review.
Recommendation 3
2.116
The committee recommends that the Bill be passed.
Senator David Bushby
Chair
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page