Chapter 7
Enforcement and dispute resolution
7.1
This chapter examines the Australian Consumer Law's (ACL) enforcement
and dispute resolution provisions. The bill introduces a suite of national
enforcement powers for consumer law enforcement agencies to administer the ACL.
There will also be national penalties for breaches of the ACL.
Enforcement
7.2
Under the provisions of the bill, a regulator:
-
may accept (under section 218) a court-enforceable undertaking in
connection with conduct regulated by the bill. If a person becomes aware they
may have breached the ACL, they will be able to offer an undertaking to a
regulator that they will not engage in the conduct again;
- can issue a notice to a business requesting information relevant
to substantiating claims made in the marketplace. When a regulator becomes
aware of a representation that may appear to contravene the ACL, it can require
a person to provide information which could support the claim; or
- may issue a public warning notice (section 223) to inform the public
about the conduct which may be detrimental.[1]
Enforcement agencies
7.3
Treasury notes in its guide to the legislation that the following federal,
state and territory consumer agencies will jointly administer and enforce the
ACL:
- the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission;
- the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC);
- NSW Fair Trading;
- Consumer Affairs Victoria;
- Queensland Office of Fair Trading;
- Western Australian Department of Commerce—Consumer Protection;
- South Australian Office of Consumer and Business Affairs;
- Consumer Affairs and Fair Trading Tasmania;
- ACT Office of Regulatory Services; and
- Northern Territory Consumer Affairs.[2]
7.4
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) emphasised in
its evidence to the Committee that the bill's additional enforcement tools and
remedies, combined with the 'increased scope and enthusiasm for cooperation
amongst agencies' will enhance consumer protection.[3]
7.5
In terms of information sharing between the regulatory agencies, the
ACCC explained:
...there will be enhanced lines of communication between
agencies. Practically speaking we still have that capacity now to have
discussions with our co-regulators around the country, and we share information
and track down who is behind a particular scheme. But one of the beauties of
this reform process is that it is through having consistent laws encouraging
greater cooperation and coordination between agencies. I am sure that will lead
to better enforcement.[4]
7.6
The ACCC also referred to the importance of some flexibility in both the
regulator to which consumers can complain and where the complaint is
subsequently handled:
There will be situations where a complaint is made directly
to the ACCC, and reasonably so from the consumer's point of view, but that
matter is already being investigated by one of the state agencies. In that
circumstance, we want to make sure that we can pass the complaint that was made
to us, in as transparent a way as we can, to the agency already looking into a
similar matter or investigating a particular trader.[5]
While at times it may sound desirable to have black and white
lines about which matters will be handled by each agency, I suggest it is not
in the consumer’s interest to have such black and white lines. There will be
matters of common interest between agencies and I think the best outcome for
consumers is to allow that information to the agencies, have an environment
where it is shared and discussed, and we collectively work out the best way to
get consumer redress.[6]
7.7
The Consumer Action Law Centre explained that the ACCC's role in the
enforcement of the ACL is not as a complaints handling organisation. Rather:
They will take consumer complaints for the purposes of
building a picture of conduct in the marketplace that might, and hopefully
will, support their enforcement work in this area, but they are not a body,
unlike existing state and territory fair trading offices, which will take on a
portion of those complaints and resolve them for consumers, separate perhaps
entirely to any enforcement action that they may take. That is simply not a
role that the ACCC has. It is not a failing on their part that they do not do
it; it is just not their job.[7]
Submitters' views on the bill's
enforcement provisions
7.8
Several submitters commented on the bill's enforcement requirements. CHOICE
told the Committee it supported the introduction of the bill's new remedies and
powers for the ACCC and ASIC. It argued that the bill's substantiation notices
correctly place the onus of proof on those making the representations. CHOICE
also supported the new infringement and warning notice powers for the ACCC. It
did note, however, some concern that these powers may become an option in
difficult cases, adding, 'we would be concerned if there were parking tickets
being issued when full court action was more appropriate'.[8]
7.9
Professor Bob Baxt, representing Freehills, claimed the legislation was
likely to build unfair expectations on the regulator:
When legislation is enacted such as last year with the cartel
legislation there was an immediate expectation that the Commission would the
very next day start prosecuting people criminally. It is very unfair to expect
regulators to be able to suddenly find cases to bring to court and the same
thing is happening in relation to this legislation. There will be pressure on
the Commission to do something. Why aren’t you doing something? We have had
this legislation in force now for a month; why haven’t you already started
issuing infringement notices, et cetera? I think that is such a difficult
concept for people out there to understand how difficult it is for the
regulators to get on top of this legislation to understand it and train the
people, get the resources and apply it. We really do need to be patient and we
need to have a sensible approach to what is overall very useful and important
legislation.[9]
7.10
Coles identified the use of infringement notices for allegations of
misleading conduct (section 13A) as an area of potential difficulty. It argued
that:
...the imposition of infringement notices involving a financial
penalty where the regulator has "reasonable grounds to believe" that
a representation is misleading is inconsistent with the Commonwealth Guide to Framing
Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement Powers which states
that infringement notice schemes should only apply to strict or absolute
liability offences that "...carry physical elements on which an
enforcement officer can make a reliable assessment of guilt or innocence".[10]
...it remains Coles' view that such notices are inappropriate
where the alleged contravening conduct requires an assessment that might be
quite subjective.[11]
7.11
CHOICE agreed with the broad proposition that infringement notices are
appropriate for breaches of industry codes:
Industry codes provide a useful means to introduce a measure
of industry participation in the regulatory process and often involve a degree
of detail that exceeds that in the law itself. Breaches of the provisions of
codes are often at the less serious end of contraventions. These
characteristics make infringement notices a workable and appropriate
enforcement option and CHOICE supports a power to allow the ACCC or ASIC to
issue infringement notices for suspected breaches of codes.[12]
The need for consumer education and
a proactive regulator
7.12
The Consumer Action Law Centre argued the need for a combination
of education and enforcement on the part of the regulator to ensure that
consumers know their rights of redress under the bill. Their co-director told
the Committee that in the area of consumer guarantees:
...we think that the provisions there will hopefully go some
way to making those rights better understood by both parties because there is
certainly an issue around consumer and trader awareness of rights. Obviously
putting these things into law will not achieve that. There will need to be
promotion and education campaigns for consumers around their rights if that is
to occur.[13]
7.13
The Centre also emphasised the need for the ACCC to take enforcement
action and address 'widespread non-compliance' in terms of consumers' rights.
It argued that the bill does not tackle this issue and that the consumer
guarantee provisions continue to rely largely on individual consumers taking
individual legal action if a supplier fails to comply with their obligations. The
Centre noted that consumers do not generally initiate legal actions over
small-value disputes, which means that improvements in systemic practices are
not encouraged. Even where an individual consumer successfully enforces their
contractual rights, this does not benefit other affected consumers or provide
any incentive to traders to change their overall practices.[14]
7.14
The Centre recommended to the Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory
Council that:
- the regulators undertake a more active and strategic approach to
enforcing traders' guarantee obligations including through better use of the
prohibitions on misleading conduct and misrepresentations; and
- the guarantee rights, which the bill provides are enforceable by
consumers as individual rights, also be stated to be conduct obligations so
that the regulators can undertake enforcement action in relation to breaches of
guarantee obligations as they might for other breaches of the Australian
Consumer Law.[15]
Alternative and low cost dispute
resolution
7.15
Many of the remedies available under the proposed bill are through low
cost dispute resolution fora such as small claims tribunals.
7.16
Section 277 of the bill enables the regulator to commence an action on
behalf of one or more persons on matters relating to consumer guarantees (Part
5-4). CHOICE argued that the bill provides increased scope for alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms to assist consumers by avoiding costs of
litigation. It identified an area of particular interest as the ACCC's
representative actions under section 277.[16]
7.17
Other submitters emphasised the need for greater consumer access to low
cost dispute resolution mechanisms. Professor Justin Malbon advocated:
...greater accessibility for consumers to make complaints and
consider the idea of an industry funded dispute resolution scheme that is truly
independent so the consumers can get easy redress where they are being sold a
dud product or a product that has lots of problems. Because they tend to be relatively
low income purchasers dispute resolution is one of the major problems in this
area.[17]
7.18
Professor Malbon suggested that the Committee could consider a model for
consumer redress in guarantee disputes along the lines of the financial ombudsman's
service, and other similar industry funded dispute settlement schemes.[18]
7.19
Mr Lynden Griggs from the University of Tasmania emphasised that:
...the biggest practical barrier to effective consumer
protection is accessibility to alternative dispute resolution options. The
proposed legislation does little to improve this. Improvements to the
substantive law will do little if access to justice is not improved. The
Parliament is encouraged to undertake the research necessary to develop
national models of access that will serve and support the improvements made by
the substantive law. Something akin to the Victorian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal working at the national level may well be worth exploring.[19]
7.20
Mr Griggs elaborated on the need to improve low cost alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms:
It is a matter of encouraging, explaining and putting in
place the processes within those small claims tribunals that say to the
consumer that you can access this without the assistance of a legal
professional and it is not something that will be tied down in legal
requirements or the rules of evidence. It is a question of empowering the
consumer to be able to access that. There is no doubt that these proposed
changes will assist greatly. If we had a national tribunal system of some sort,
even if it were attached or connected somehow with the Federal Magistrates
Court, that would go a long way to allowing the empowerment of the consumer to
act on their own behalf.[20]
7.21
Treasury explained that its approach to dispute resolution mechanisms in
the bill was to harmonise what is already in place at the state and territory
level, rather than expand the range of options:
Certainly the scope of this reform was to harmonise existing
laws and create a single national consumer law. There are obviously issues
around access to justice and dispute resolution mechanisms which are being
addressed through other processes, including at the national level through a
process that the Attorney-General is leading at present. We have designed this
law to deal with the situation as it is now in the states and territories and
at the Commonwealth level. It is intended, obviously within the constraints
that are provided for by the rules about which forum you can access on which
sort of dispute, that people should and can do that.[21]
Onus of proof
7.22
In its submission to this inquiry, Treasury noted ten instances in the
bill where there is a reversal of the onus of proof. Of these, five replace
existing reversals in the TPA and five are new. The new reversals of proof
reflect the inclusion of new areas of consumer law at the Commonwealth level as
part of the bill. The new reversals are:
(a)
section 24(4) relating to unfair contract terms. There is a rebuttable
presumption that an unfair term is not reasonably necessary to protect the
legitimate interests of the party who would be disadvantaged by the application
or reliance on that term, unless that party can prove otherwise;
(b)
section 27(1), introduced in the first bill, relates to where a contract
is alleged to be a standard form contract. The onus will then be on the
supplier to prove that it is not;
(c) sections 29(2) relates to false or misleading representations
(testimonials). The section includes a requirement for respondents to provide
evidence in court that testimonials are not false or misleading. The accused
person does not have to disprove the alleged breach but must put evidence to
the contrary before the court.
(d)
section 151(2) is similar to section 29(2); and
(e)
section 70 provides that where a contract is alleged to be an
unsolicited consumer agreement, then the onus will be on the supplier to prove
that it is not.[22]
Concern at the bill's changes to
the onus of proof
7.23
Professor Bob Baxt, representing Freehills, cautioned that these changes
will create a burden on the defendant who 'in many cases...is going to be the small
person, the consumer or the small business'. He added:
We believe that this can lead to significant accidental
non-compliance which will be costly and time consuming to rectify. We would urge
the government to slow down the process so that this legislation when it is put
into effect can work more effectively.[23]
7.24
Ms Jacqueline Downes, representing the Law Council of Australia, told
the Committee that the reversal of the onus of proof should only be used where
there is sufficient empirical justification and should not apply for the
purposes of criminal prosecution:
...the bill provides that where an agreement is asserted to be
an unsolicited consumer agreement, it is presumed to be an unsolicited consumer
agreement unless proved otherwise. The committee does not consider this
reversal necessary as it should not be unduly difficult for the consumer to
establish that a particular agreement fulfils the elements of an unsolicited consumer
agreement. Even more concerning, the evidential burden regarding testimonials
has been reversed for criminal prosecutions. The committee does not support the
reversal of the evidentiary burden in relation to the proposed subsection
151(2). Although the imposition of an evidentiary burden stops short of an
actual reversal of onus, the finding of a criminal contravention is a very serious
matter and should require all elements of the offence to be proved against the
accused.[24]
7.25
Mr Stephen Ridgeway, of the Law Council's Trade Practices Committee,
noted that there are some circumstances in which it is proper either to reverse
the onus of proof or to create an evidentiary presumption. However, in cases
where the matter is being prosecuted by the consumer, Mr Ridgeway argued that the
consumer probably has the best evidence and recollection of the circumstances:
If there has been oral contact between the consumer and the
business at some prior time, with the breadth of the way the bill is drafted to
refer to any prior negotiations or contact—which is drafted in a very broad way
for the purposes of inducing the contract or even for the purposes of promoting
the product— the bill potentially proposes a very significant burden on
business to keep very extensive records. The consumer in the circumstances for
the transaction will probably have a pretty good recollection of what happened.
Salespeople, who deal with any number of consumers in a day or over time, may
not have the same recollection.[25]
7.26
Mr Ridgeway told the Committee that the reversal of the onus of proof
could have 'a very significant burden' on business, particularly in the case of
criminal prosecution. In these cases, he argued, the consumer is likely to be
in a position to be able to establish and get past that evidentiary burden with
reasonable ease. Businesses, on the other hand, face developing potentially
elaborate systems of record keeping for the most minor of transactions which
risks imposing costs on business which will be passed through to consumers. Mr
Ridgeway concluded that while the Law Council has no quarrel with the
introduction of the substantive amendment itself:
Procedurally...[it] is not satisfied that there is sufficient
evidentiary difficulty that warrants what traditionally in our law and in
English law is regarded as a fairly dramatic change in process.[26]
Committee view
7.27
The Committee notes various concerns with the enforcement powers and
remedies under the legislation and how these will be administered in practice.
There is the need to educate consumers about their consumer rights and promote
avenues for low cost dispute resolution. There are related concerns that the
regulator must take a proactive approach to enforce traders' guarantee
obligations through better use of the prohibitions on misleading conduct and
misrepresentations. There are also fears that the bill will impose an
unnecessary account keeping burden on businesses by reversing the onus of
proof.
7.28
The Committee believes it is important that the ACCC publicises the provisions
of the ACL to make consumers aware of their rights, and the fact that these
rights will now be consistent across the states and territories. It is also
important that the ACCC takes a proactive approach to enforcing the consumer
guarantee obligations.
7.29
In the Committee's view, the government has taken the correct approach
in harmonising the dispute resolution mechanisms that are currently available
across Australian jurisdictions. There are separate processes examining
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms for consumers.
7.30
In terms of the reversal of the onus of proof, the Committee argues that
this has only been done where it is impossible or unreasonable to expect a
regulator to meet the conventional standard of proof. In the case of solicited
contracts, it is not unreasonable to expect that the
supplier has evidence of the contact, rather than the consumer.
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