Chapter 3
FuelWatch in Western Australia
3.1
The national Fuelwatch scheme is not just a theoretical
construct. A FuelWatch scheme is already operating in Western Australia. It was
introduced by a state Liberal government in January 2001 in response to a parliamentary
select committee report, and supported by subsequent state Labor governments.
The incoming Liberal Treasurer and Consumer Protection Minister has said that
FuelWatch has his full support as it was working successfully and the new
Premier said it was working well.[1]
3.2
The WA scheme involves daily monitoring of prices for petrol,
diesel and automotive LPG within metropolitan Perth and 52 regional areas (in
total covering about 80 per cent of retail outlets). The prices provided by 2 pm each day, which are posted on a website by 4 pm, must be maintained from 6 am the next day to 6 am the following day. FuelWatch also operates a personalised email
service, and its information is disseminated in the evening news on TV and in
the main morning newspaper. FuelWatch allows customers to choose where to buy
tomorrow, and if prices are going up gives fourteen hours to buy at today's
prices.
Opinions of FuelWatch in WA
3.3
The WA Government argues 'FuelWatch enables motorists to make
informed decisions about their fuel purchases, which puts downward competitive
pressure on fuel prices.'[2]
Given the variation in petrol prices at stations across Perth, 'on average at
present consumers can save between 13c and 14c for most types of fuel in Perth...about
$7 a trip to the petrol station'.[3]
3.4
The Royal Automobile Club of Western Australia supports the
scheme:
we know from general community support and general use of the
FuelWatch scheme, both if you like in an active way and in a passive way, that
it is something that has worked well here in WA for consumers.[4]
3.5
Consumer surveys have shown over 90 per cent of WA motorists are
aware of FuelWatch.[5]
It is widely used:
...RAC surveys show that 57% of consumers do [use the FuelWatch
service]...[6]
Over 32 000 are receiving personalised emails daily so they can
make choices about where they buy their fuel...60 per cent of people have
indicated that they actually use FuelWatch.[7]
...demand for FuelWatch information from the community increases
in line with increasing petrol prices.[8]
Because FuelWatch is available on the evening TV news, on the
radio and in the newspaper on a daily basis, you are aware generally of the
span of prices available tomorrow or that day. You do not have to be the
concerned buyer who actively seeks the information by email or SMS or rings up
on a daily basis or when you are about to buy the fuel. [9]
3.6
The scheme is popular with consumers in Western Australia. Consumer
surveys have shown two-thirds support it.[10]
Another measure of the scheme's popularity is the support for it across the
political spectrum, as noted above.
3.7
Some consumers were alarmed when they heard about opposition to
the national Fuelwatch scheme and feared it meant that the WA FuelWatch scheme
might be scrapped. They sent emails to the WA Department of Consumer and Employer
Protection, saying:
...the FuelWatch service is invaluable!
Please ensure the service is retained...A great Government
service!!
I was appalled to hear on the radio yesterday some senator
saying that the WA FuelWatch scheme had not done anything to reduce petrol
prices.
...I find it invaluable...[11]
3.8
An industry representative in WA saw some benefit:
for the battlers of the world who are struggling to fill up
their cars at the moment and who are prepared to take the time to go onto a
website, yes, they will be able to get cheaper fuel...[12]
The 6 am price change
3.9
Some submissions raised concerns about whether 6 am was a good time to require price changes to take effect and some operational
difficulties.[13]
In Western Australia this problem is handled in a pragmatic manner:
One issue that we have recently encountered...is that one retailer
in particular has complained about issues around making the change precisely at
6 am. This goes to the logistics of doing the price boards as well as changing
the actual dispensers of fuel. This is a matter that we have been very
pragmatic about. We accept that right on 6 o’clock precisely there may be some
issues, and so in dealing with any complaints about people not actually
imposing that change right at the point of 6 am we tend to be quite reasonable
in terms of looking for practical ways to manage such situations and a
reasonable outcome. We have generally taken the approach that this is clearly
about the principle as opposed to being pedantic about small issues that can
arise from time to time.[14]
Comparison of Perth fuel prices with other capitals
3.10
In the preceding chapter, it was argued that while the primary
focus of Fuelwatch is to empower consumers to find the best price, a
consequence of this is to make the retail petrol market more competitive, and
this would place downward pressure on average prices and shift prices in the
rest of the week down to what was charged on 'magic Tuesdays'.
3.11
A simple comparison of Perth petrol prices with those in Sydney
and Melbourne over recent months suggests this is exactly what has happened
(Charts 3.1 and 3.2). The weekly cycle in petrol prices has disappeared in Perth,
although it took several years for this to happen. (There had been an
intermediate period when Perth moved from a weekly cycle like that in other
capitals to a smaller fortnightly cycle.) Perth consumers are able to buy
petrol at the time of the week convenient to them. It is little wonder they are
less focused on which day of the week to buy petrol. Perth consumers have not
'dumbed down'[15];
they just do not need to monitor petrol prices as closely. It is
interesting to note that the big petrol retailers call the very volatile Sydney
and Melbourne prices 'predictable' and the stable Perth prices 'unpredictable'.
Chart 3.1
Source: Informed Sources
Chart 3.2
Source: Informed Sources
3.12
Charts 3.1 and 3.2 only compare Perth prices with Sydney and Melbourne.
Average petrol prices are also lower in Perth than in other capital cities.
During the inquiry the committee was told:
...the average price for petrol was 3c cheaper than in Melbourne,
4.2c cheaper than in Brisbane—without the subsidy—2.4c cheaper than in Sydney
and 2.6c cheaper than in Adelaide. [16]
3.13
This has continued to be the case. On the most recent 'magic
Tuesday', the average price for a litre of unleaded petrol in Perth was over a
cent lower than in Adelaide and Sydney, almost 3 cents lower than in Melbourne
and almost 6 cents lower than in Hobart. A couple of days later, Perth prices
were over 10 cents below Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, and even less than the
subsidised price in Brisbane.[17]
3.14
While this comparison suggests that FuelWatch in WA is working as
would be expected, it not a conclusive argument. Aside from any effect from
FuelWatch, there are three factors that would tend to make petrol prices higher
in Perth than in other capitals, and one that may make them lower:
- there is only one refinery in the Perth area whereas there are
two each around Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane,[18]
- Western Australia has tighter standards on the proportion of
methyl tertiary‑butyl ether in petrol, which means a premium is added to
the price there,[19]
- the Queensland government provides an 8.4 cents a litre subsidy
(although some studies suggest this does not get fully passed on to retail
prices), [20] and
- the closer proximity of Perth to Singapore may act to make prices
lower than in other capitals.[21]
3.15
A better approach is to look at margins rather than prices.
Over five years, the ACCC found that the average retail margin in Perth was 3
cents per litre, the lowest in Australia.[22]
3.16
When Caltex was asked how profitability in Western Australia
compared to other states, they replied 'the profitability is broadly similar'.[23]
BP claimed 'FuelWatch has not had any noticeable impact on the profitability of
our business in Perth'.[24]
Another piece of anecdotal evidence came from a Caltex franchisee in WA who
remarked:
There are very few markets left in Western Australia where there
is a healthy margin on fuel...Unless you go to somewhere way out, like Exmouth,
...nowhere else in Western Australia has any big margins in fuel.[25]
3.17
An even better approach may be to compare margins in Perth
relative to other capitals before and after the introduction of FuelWatch.
While the WA Department of Consumer and Employment Protection, who administer
FuelWatch, claim it lowered petrol prices in Perth relative to other capitals,
Informed Sources claim it raised them by 1 to 1½ cents per litre.[26]
3.18
An unusual objection to comparisons between Perth prices and
those on the Eastern seaboard is that the Perth market is inherently
'different'; that Western Australians 'just think differently to what
Victorians think'.[27]
This could mean that Fuelwatch is more effective in other parts of the country.
3.19
In a similar vein, Professor Harding suggests changes in tax
policy around 2000 may have had different effects on petrol station margins in Western
Australia to eastern Australia.[28]
He gives no possible explanation as to why the GST should have one effect in WA
and another in other states.
Econometric approaches
3.20
Opponents of Fuelwatch have claimed that it led to higher petrol
prices in Western Australia. The reasons why shifting market power from large
retailers to consumers would have this effect were not stated. Nonetheless, the
ACCC conducted an econometric study to test this assertion, which formed a few
pages (Appendix S) of their 2007 report. It has led to a 'battle of the
models' between economists supporting and opposing Fuelwatch.[29]
3.21
As discussed in the previous chapter, economic theory implies
that empowering consumers with the information to buy where petrol will be
cheapest should lead to a fall in average prices. The magnitude of the fall would
depend on how competitive the market had been previously and how many consumers
make use of the Fuelwatch information in deciding when and where to purchase
petrol.
3.22
The overall conclusion from the econometric studies is that the
average retail margin in Perth relative to other mainland capitals has fallen
since FuelWatch was introduced. This emerges from the studies by the ACCC, Professor
Davidson, Professor Harding, Access Economics and Concept Economics.[30]
3.23
What is in dispute is the extent to which the fall can be
attributed to FuelWatch or to other factors. The average difference between
terminal gate prices and retail prices is around 5 cents a litre. Part of this is
used to pay for staff and other operating costs of service stations. So the
impact of FuelWatch on average prices is likely to be a few cents a litre. Furthermore,
it appears that the full impact took a long time to be felt. Given the numerous
other changes to the factors driving petrol prices in recent years, it is
therefore unsurprising that the econometric studies are not able to agree on
precise estimates of the impact of FuelWatch on WA petrol prices. Furthermore,
as Professor Wang points out, no amount of econometric sophistication will get
around the problem that assessing the impact of FuelWatch when there is only
one capital city that has implemented it means that there is effectively a
single observation.[31]
3.24
All the studies basically adopt the approach of testing whether
the retail margin fell significantly after a particular event at a certain date,
referred to as a 'break'. The test assumes that there was an immediate and
sustained impact of a constant size as a result of the event. The ACCC's (2007)
results suggested the average differential dropped by a statistically
significant 1.9 cents per litre after the introduction of FuelWatch.[32]
3.25
Further analysis has attempted to distinguish the effect of the
introduction of FuelWatch from the effect of the entry of Coles into the Perth
market. The ACCC's (2008) results showed that the entry of Coles had a much
smaller impact than did FuelWatch.[33]
By contrast, Professors Harding and Davidson and Concept Economics conclude the
entry of Coles was the only factor lowering the WA retail margin and that
FuelWatch had no impact. A similar claim is made using a chart rather than
econometrics by Neumann Petroleum.[34]
3.26
However, Dr Stephen King questions whether some of the FuelWatch
impact is being wrongly attributed to the Coles entry in these tests.[35]
No convincing argument has been put as to why the entry of the supermarkets
should have affected Perth petrol prices in a different way to its impact in
the eastern states. As Professor Wang comments, 'one cannot separate out the
effect of the Fuelwatch from that of Coles or Woolworths by comparing the Perth
market and the Melbourne or Sydney markets. Supermarkets entered all the major
petrol markets.'[36]
3.27
It is worth emphasising that the break tests assume the events
had an immediate and constant impact. But it appears that the introduction of
FuelWatch had quite a gradual and protracted impact.[37] It would be hard
for a break test to disentangle these effects.
Replication and 'peer review' of
the ACCC study
3.28
The ACCC has been criticised for not having a blind review done
of its econometric work, as would be done with an article published in a
scholarly journal.[38]
A full peer review of this kind would be time-consuming and potentially
breaching the confidentiality of cabinet advice. Instead, the work was reviewed
within the ACCC. The ACCC's methodology was also examined and found 'reasonable...
valid and robust' by Treasury.[39]
There were also complaints that the ACCC have not made public as much
information as they might about the procedures they used in conducting their
tests.[40]
Professor Joshua Gans described the ACCC's work as 'a far more rigorous
investigation of the WA scheme than anyone had ever done'.[41]
3.29
The ACCC was also criticised for not making the Informed Sources
data it had used for its study available to other researchers. The organisation
had provided the data to the ACCC (it is not clear whether voluntarily or under
subpeona[42]).
The ACCC did not want to make this proprietary data publicly available but was
happy for Informed Sources to make it available to academics.[43]
(Similarly, the ACCC had been provided with confidential data from the
refineries on the impact of fuel quality premia.)
3.30
Informed Sources have chosen to supply it to some but not all
academics who requested it. They say they apply two criteria in deciding
whether to release their data; academics must be 'entirely independent of any
organisation related to the Inquiry and that the analysis and subsequent report
by the analyst will in no way compromise the commercial status or value of the
Informed Sources pricing data'.[44]
There have been suggestions that there may be another test; that 'the data have
been released to parties who had previously expressed ... opposition for
Fuelwatch'.[45]
3.31
The Committee regrets that academics who had not previously
expressed opposition to Fuelwatch, and so might bring an open mind to the
analysis, have not been allowed access to the necessary data.
Recommendation 1
3.32
The committee recommends that any data collected by Fuelwatch be
made available by the ACCC to independent academic researchers to allow open
analysis of the scheme.
Volumetric data
3.33
Simple unweighted averages of listed petrol prices may not be a
good basis for econometric tests. For example, if there are two service
stations, one that sells its petrol for $1 a litre and another for 50c a litre,
the (unweighted) average price is 75c per litre. But if the service station
that sells its petrol at 50c a litre sells all the petrol, the average price
paid by consumers is not 75c but 50c a litre. The committee therefore notes that
the quantity of fuel sold at any stage of the price cycle is a vital component
of any study.
3.34
Ideally, the average observation for each day and market should
refer to prices paid weighted by the amount sold at that price. The failure to
use consumption‑weighted or 'volumetric' data would understate the
benefits of FuelWatch as it would not capture the effect of consumers being
better placed to switch from buying petrol at dearer stations to cheaper
stations.
3.35
A similar argument applies to buying on cheaper rather than more
expensive days from a given station. Unfortunately, the data were not available
to make the comparison using consumption-weighted prices. The closest
approximation to a volumetric analysis was in the ACCC's original study. The
true volumetric result (which would reflect some substitution) would be bounded
by the estimated fall in the unweighted average weekly price (which assumes no substitution
effects on volume) and in the minimum weekly price (which assumes an extreme substitution
effect on volume). The ACCC found that prices were lower whether calculated on
average (1.9 cents per litre fall) or minimum price (0.7 cents per litre fall).[46]
The implication of their econometrics is therefore that a test done on a
volumetric basis would also show that FuelWatch was associated with lower
petrol prices in WA.[47]
Other criticisms of the ACCC study
3.36
Professor Don Harding's main criticism in his first paper (Submission
4a) is that the difference between the retail petrol price margins should
be deflated by a price index. This argument apparently did not convince other
Fuelwatch critics as Professor Davidson and Concept Economics were content to
present results using undeflated margins. However even Professor Harding's own
preferred methods suggest the relative margin in WA is more likely to have
fallen rather than risen after the introduction of FuelWatch.
3.37
There are various weaknesses in Professor Harding's study. It
would be interesting to know whether other economists would support his
assumption that the margin varies with the fuel price or that it is better to
deflate the weekly price margins by the interpolated fuel component of the CPI
rather than the weekly price itself.[48]
3.38
Having already dismissed the scheme as 'foolwatch', Professor Harding's
second paper (Submission 4b) benefits from access to Informed Sources
data. Instead of comparing Perth prices to those in the rest of Australia, he
just compares them to Sydney. The ACCC's Dr King believes this was done because
comparisons with other cities put FuelWatch in a good light, a selective use of
data which means the test 'has no statistical validity'.[49]
Notwithstanding his criticism of the ACCC on this issue, Professor Harding's
own paper is not peer‑reviewed and the data used are not made available.
3.39
Professor Davidson from the Institute of Public Affairs and
Concept Economics were also provided with data by Informed Sources and conducted
econometric tests, also not peer-reviewed and also without making the data used
available, and concluded that Fuelwatch had not reduced relative petrol price
margins in WA.[50]
However Concept Economics' credibility as independent analysts of the topic was
somewhat reduced by their chairman having previously called those giving weight
to the ACCC's support for Fuelwatch as 'a fitting subject for psychiatric
investigation'.[51]
Conclusion
3.40
The various econometric studies consistently show that compared
to the eastern capitals, petrol prices in Perth are lower now than before
FuelWatch was introduced. This change did not occur instantly upon the
introduction of FuelWatch but over time. Some critics argued the reduction is
due to the entry of the supermarkets into the Perth market, but this seems
unlikely given that the supermarkets also entered the eastern markets. The
committee therefore concludes that there is no compelling reason on the basis
of the econometrics to overturn the reasoning in Chapter 2 that a national
Fuelwatch scheme would place downward pressure on average retail petrol prices.
3.41
The committee notes in passing that the critics of Fuelwatch are
introducing a demanding standard for changes in policy. If economic policy
changes were only made after supportive econometric studies that satisfy all
critics, and give precise estimates of the benefits from new policies, then
there would have been no floating the dollar, allowing in foreign banks,
introducing the GST, cutting taxes or phasing out high tariffs. It would also deny
governments the ability to take political judgments on economic reforms.
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