Chapter 4 - Cost impacts and their consequences
Introduction
4.1
The Explanatory Memorandum states that the compliance
cost impact for 'Australian enterprises' as a result of Schedule 3 is not
expected to be significant. Although Schedule 3 targets rights and options
supplied offshore by non-resident entities—specifically foreign tour operators
(FTOs)—there has been no assessment of cost impacts on or connected with these
entities.
4.2
Evidence to the Committee suggests that the cost
impacts for FTOs, whether registered or becoming registered under the proposed
legislation, will be substantial, the main concerns being that:
- the 10 February 2005 starting date for Schedule
3 and the failure to provide a transition period, will deny many FTOs the
opportunity to pass on GST charges to consumers;
- registration could expose FTOs to GST
liabilities on the accommodation components of tours sold since 1 July 2000;
- compliance costs for FTOs will be substantial;
and
- the Australian packaged tour industry and
Australian tourism generally will see tourists and FTOs abandon the Australian
market for other, less expensive destinations.
4.3
The Committee will examine the evidence regarding these
cost impacts and their potential wider implications in this chapter.
Lack of a transitional period
4.4
The retrospective application of Schedule 3 and the lack
of a transitional period attracted particularly virulent opposition. The
principal objection was that, in an industry where forward pricing was the norm
and tour prices had been published as far ahead as March 2006, FTOs would be
forced to bear the GST as a business cost until new, GST-inclusive prices could
be charged.
4.5
Mr Nick
Hill, appearing with the Australian Tourism
Export Council (ATEC), said in this regard that:
This bill, if passed, becomes effective from 10 February, but
the brochures that were distributed globally for the tourism period 1 April 2005 through to 31 March 2006 were published back in
November and distributed in December and January. The brochures are already out
there with their pricing in them.[22]
4.6
Yon Sha Kai[23] said that its members had published
prices up to March 2006 and that even where it might be possible to raise
prices, the 'market reality' was that the competitive nature of the industry
ruled out such an option.[24]
4.7
The Interactive Travel Services Association (ITSA)
argued that the imposition of GST liabilities without allowing for their
recovery was inconsistent with the 'design and intent of a GST/VAT system that
GST should not be a cost to business'. In this regard, ITSA referred to the principles
espoused by the OECD in its publication, The
Application of Consumption Taxes to the International Trade in Services and
Intangibles.[25]
4.8
Similarly, a representative of the Institute
of Chartered Accountants in
Australia (ICAA) told the Committee:
We see it as absolutely inappropriate that these businesses...will
not be in a position to recover this GST. They are locked into their existing
contracts without the opportunity to change them and they will have to put in
systems and processes just to accommodate the Australian tax obligation.[26]
4.9
It is clear that the design and intent of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax
Transition) Act 1999 (GST Act) recognises that the GST should not be an
impost on business. For this reason, the Act allows businesses to claim input
tax credits on previously taxed supplies to ensure that business is not taxed
but, rather, the final consumer of the supply.
4.10
Furthermore, as Deloitte contended, transitional
periods have been granted in the past specifically to enable businesses to
revise long-term contract prices in the light of GST changes. Deloitte referred
to the 5-year GST-free concession granted to Australian business to revise long-term
contract pricing when the GST regime was first introduced. It added that,
following the Australian Tax Office's ruling in November 2003 regarding the GST
treatment of Inbound Tour Operators' (ITO) margins, a 15-month transitional
period was granted so that tourist operators could 'align the commencement of
the ruling with the tourism calendar, which is 1 April to 31 March'.[27]
4.11
The justification for the immediate commencement of the
provisions was that they were an 'integrity measure' to adjust competitive
inequities and also to correct a deficiency whereby registered FTOs could claim
input tax credits without bearing any GST liabilities.[28]
4.12
Witnesses disagreed with this characterisation and
argued that the scope of the provisions extended far beyond merely correcting
an unintended consequence of the GST legislation. Mr
Adrian Firmstone,
representing the ICAA, said in this regard that:
[Schedule 3] goes beyond fixing the problem. It is more than an
integrity measure—it goes to imposing a new liability on a class of people who
are not in Australia.
It is much more than an integrity measure. As to the way in which it has been
dealt with, if it were just an integrity measure, the legislation would have
focused just on the availability of import tax credits to the foreign tour
operators. This has gone much further than that.[29]
Retrospective cost impact for newly registered FTOs
4.13
In addition to their concerns that FTOs would incur GST
liabilities that could not be recovered by raising prices for published tours
or by claiming input tax credits, witnesses argued that compliance requirements
to accommodate Schedule 3 would generate significant costs.
4.14
At the hearing, the Department of the Treasury explained
that, in assessing compliance cost impacts:
...We did not look at the aspect of those not in the system now
that should be in the system. Rather, we looked at the existing law and asked,
‘What are we imposing above that?’ The answer was: ‘Above that we are imposing
a tax on a few extra items.’[30]
4.15
Certainly, with international airfares and connected
domestic flights being GST-free and accommodation provided by registered tour
operators presently attracting GST, the 'few extra items' would generally not
constitute the major GST expense in a packaged holiday. These items would
include coach fares; hire car costs; meals; admission prices to venues; and so
on.[31]
4.16
Consequently, Treasury's approach would appear to be reasonable
especially in view of Schedule 3's envisaged application to those registered
entities which presently pay GST on the accommodation component of packaged
tours. However, as a representative of Deloitte stated, some FTOs are not
presently registered because they are not required to be. Should they become
registered to meet the new requirements of Schedule 3, it is possible that they
will find themselves with GST liabilities on the accommodation components of
tours sold as far back as 1 July 2000.
The circumstances giving rise to this are explained thus:
...there is a wholesale market that occurs offshore. One foreign
tour operator sells to another foreign tour operator. So you have got a foreign
tour operator that only buys off other foreign tour operators. The first
foreign tour operator was registered for GST and was claiming the credits
approved by the tax office. The ones that were not making acquisitions from
Australian suppliers were not registered because the commissioner had ruled
that those suppliers were out of scope. So, when the tax office introduced the
ruling on 28 November, all of those that were claiming the credits were
protected retrospectively against any adjustment, but their customers—the other
FTOs that bought from them—immediately had a retrospective liability for four
years.[32]
4.17
For these FTOs, the cost impact from GST liabilities alone,
without taking into account the start-up compliance costs involved, could be
significant.
Compliance costs
4.18
Much of the opposition to Schedule 3 was founded on the
premise that compliance with the new provisions would require substantial
modifications to existing systems and, for newly registered entities, the
installation of new systems.
4.19
Yon Sha Kai
referred to some of the practical 'complications' involved—presumably for FTOs
not already registered:
...how to handle foreign exchange, cash flow issues such as timing
of the GST liability versus receipt of payments from the customer and claiming
input tax credits from suppliers, substantial costs in changing systems to
record the GST liability, particularly where the system would then have to
handle the consumption tax in Japan and GST in Australia, and education of
staff in Japan to name a few.[33]
4.20
ATEC argued that where an FTO entered the GST system by
becoming registered, there would be additional compliance costs not only for
the FTO but also for 'consolidators and ITOs' having business dealings with the
FTO:
Application of the GST on FTOs will...necessitate FTOs reworking
their business systems so that they can handle the preparation of the Business
Activity Statements...that go hand-in-hand with the application of the new tax.
This in turn will mean that the invoicing procedures for consolidators and ITOs
will also need to change.[34]
4.21
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, representing ITSA, argued that
compliance costs for FTOs would be 'considerable' given the many and varied
tasks involved in compliance:
...Non-residents will have to invest significant resources in
understanding their Australian GST obligations. They will have to train their
own staff—in other words, non-resident staff—in the nuances of the Australian
GST and other taxation obligations. They will need to develop or reprogram
systems in order to account for output tax. They will need to implement a
process to identify and claim appropriate amounts of input tax credits and to
obtain and ensure they obtain valid tax invoices in order to claim credits.
They will need to design, prepare and produce valid tax invoices or compliant
tax invoices. They will need to prepare a monthly or quarterly business
activity statement, establish an Australian bank account and implement a
process in order to deal with the ATO remotely.[35]
4.22
Deloitte claimed that compliance costs for FTOs whether
already registered or outside the present GST system, would be 'of a magnitude
greater than those faced by all Australian businesses in the lead up to the
introduction of GST in July 2000'.[36] For
FTOs whose Australian tours constituted only a minimal portion of their overall
business, compliance would constitute a 'particular burden'.[37]
4.23
Deloitte said that, in the absence of Australian Tax
Office guidance, FTOs were exposed to particular difficulties in calculating
GST on any given tour price which depended on, and varied according to, the
different components of a tour package and the circumstances of acquisition and
supply. Deloitte referred to travel insurance; domestic airfares; input-taxed
accommodation; supplies from unregistered vendors and tour incidentals as among
the package components which posed GST difficulties and commented that:
...Even adopting a case by case approach will not assist the FTO
in fulfilling their GST obligations as the GST liability is payable to the ATO
before the taxable ratio can be determined. The 'attribution rules' under the
GST law require the FTO to pay GST at the time of sale but the taxable ratio
cannot be determined until after the conclusion of the tour when the actual
AUD$ costs of the tour are determined by the FTO.[38]
4.24
In a supplementary submission, Deloitte took issue with
the Department of the Treasury's position that compliance costs for registered
entities would not be high, the basis for which a Treasury representative
explained at the hearing:
...there is an existing obligation under the law for foreign tour
operators that make supplies of $50,000 or more that are connected with Australia
to be registered, to claim their input tax credits and to remit GST. The
amendments would apply to 10 per cent, by value, of additional amounts of
Australian tourism packages. So, under the existing law, we did not feel that
there would be a significant impact on registered businesses, although there
would be some impact on the businesses that are not registered.[39]
4.25
Deloitte
argued that FTOs already within the system would have to make a 'total change
in compliance approach' to accommodate their change in status from a net GST
refund to a net liability position. Deloitte referred to several adjustments
which it considered would be required:
Booking systems will
need to be linked to accounting systems, methodology for the projection of GST
liabilities will need to be developed and aligned with pricing models and
accounting systems, instalment payment arrangements will need to be recorded
within the income recognition modules in the accounting systems and parallel
clearing accounts introduced.[40]
4.26
While cost impacts of themselves might be pertinent to
the selection of one regulatory approach over another, evidence to this inquiry
claimed that GST cost impacts would have wider, adverse implications for the
Australian packaged tour industry.
Impact on tourism
4.27
Even for FTOs already in the system, the prevailing
view was that the cost impacts arising from Schedule 3 would also be
significant—not only because FTOs would incur retrospective GST liabilities
which they might not be able to recoup but also because of the complexities and
expense involved in complying with the new requirements.
4.28
Arguments were raised that these cost impacts would
produce competitive inequities and make Australia
a less profitable destination for FTOs and a more expensive place to visit for
foreign tourists. This outcome, in turn, would threaten the viability of the
Australian packaged tour industry at a time when it was just recovering from a
number of setbacks.
4.29
Most witnesses took the view that FTOs would respond to
higher business costs ensuing from the proposed amendments by raising tour
prices or otherwise abandoning the Australian packaged tour market for other,
more profitable destinations.
4.30
The Association of British Travel Agents Ltd (ABTA) was
one proponent of this view but also argued that higher costs could encourage
tour operators to offer inferior products to consumers:
The effect would be felt particularly by the bonded tour
operating sector which compared to the DIY or self-packaging market requires a
level of margin sufficient to cover this relatively high cost as well as other
consumer protection that such operators are obliged to give customers, i.e. the
proposed regime could likely result in more UK tourists visiting Australia
without proper financial protection, a consequence which we could not support.[41]
4.31
Similarly, ATEC predicted that the quality of the
Australian tourism product would suffer as suppliers sought to cut costs by
dealing with 'unrealistically cheap and unethical ITOs [inbound tour operators]
and product suppliers, many of them engaged in allegedly illegal consumer
practices'. ATEC said this was 'a very real current threat' and had prompted
the Queensland Government to pass the Tourism
Services Act 2003 to enable it to deal with this problem.[42]
4.32
Yon Sha Kai
commented that Australia
had to compete with other comparable destinations for the tourist dollar in an
environment where price and value for money were major determinants of choice. Yon
Sha Kai said that a rising cost base in Australia and the difficulties for tour
operators in staying price competitive with other destinations had already
translated into a drop in bookings of approximately 30 to 40 per cent for the 2005
April and June quarters. In what Yon Sha Kai described as an 'already contracting
Australian market', it predicted that costs arising from the proposed
amendments would force tour operators to increase their prices or abandon the
Australian market altogether.[43]
4.33
A representative of the Hotel Motel Accommodation
Association Victoria also predicted FTOs' abandonment of the Australian market,
arguing that the financial and procedural burden entailed in GST compliance
provided 'every incentive for [FTOs] to simply substitute in their packages
alternative destinations that do not have these higher compliance and
transaction costs'.[44]
4.34
While much of the opposition to the proposed amendments
was based on the argument that the GST would result in increased business costs
which, in turn, would lead to price rises and ultimately threaten the viability
of the Australian packaged tour industry, evidence of price impacts was
limited.
4.35
ATEC initially estimated price increases of between 4
and 4.5 per cent but revised this estimate to between 3 and 7 per cent. Five
worked examples for tour packages offered in ATEC's USA,
UK and Japanese
markets were provided in support of the revised estimates.[45]
4.36
In contrast to ATEC's estimates and the views expressed
in much of the evidence that cost increases would be significant enough to
cause a downturn in the Australian packaged tour industry, modelling conducted by
Econtech Pty Ltd suggested only very minor impacts on price and inbound tourism.
4.37
The Econtech study, commissioned by the Department of
Industry, Tourism and Resources and presented with the Department's submission,
modelled the likely impacts of the proposed legislation on the tourism sector
and, among other things, concluded that:
- the cost of tourists' purchases through FTOs would
rise by 1 per cent with an overall cost impact per tourist visit of 0.2 per
cent; and
- the cost of organised tours would rise by 1.4
per cent.[46]
4.38
In the following excerpt, Econtech explains how these
figures were arrived at:
Because airfares and accommodation are estimated to contribute
to around 90 per cent of the total cost of purchases made through FTOs,
adding a 10 per cent GST to the remaining 10 per cent of purchases
adds only 1 per cent to the overall price of purchases from FTOs by intending
visitors to Australia.
In addition, purchases made through FTOs contribute to less than
20 per cent of total expenditure by foreign tourists (80 per cent is made
directly with ITOs or on-shore). This
further dilutes the impact of the amended legislation on the price of a visit
to Australia
from 1 per cent to 0.2 per cent.[47]
4.39
Drawing on these figures, Econtech estimated that the
volume of tourist numbers would fall by 0.7 per cent [around 35,000 inbound
tourists and expenditure of $150 million annually], which it predicted would
flow through to 'modest losses' in tourism-related industries. However, when assessing
the overall economic impact, Econtech predicted a fall in production in tourism-related
industries, an accompanying small depreciation in the Australian dollar and an 'offsetting
increase' in other 'trade-exposed' industries such as agriculture, mining and
manufacturing.[48]
4.40
Econtech said that the more competitive markets for
tourist services such as the United States of
America and the United
Kingdom would be less able to absorb price
impacts. In addition, tourist numbers from long-haul markets were expected to
fall given the higher likelihood that FTOs would arrange this travel.[49]
4.41
The following comments made by a representative of the
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources suggest that a downturn in the
long-haul segment could have adverse, longer-term implications:
[FTOs] are 'quite important for first-time travellers'. Through
doing this research we have found that it is often the case that people’s first
experience of travelling overseas is through a foreign tour operator. Once they
gain confidence in travelling to another country then they are more likely to
use the internet or other means to source their holidays.[50]
4.42
While Econtech did not envisage 'any significant
compliance cost...in terms of FTOs registering for GST', it proposed that
additional costs might be associated with pricing of tour packages. In this
regard, it said:
Rather than simply identifying the accommodation component of
packages, the amended legislation requires FTOs to identify all items that are
subject to GST. This may be time consuming given that some tourism products are
not subject to GST. For example, international airfares are not subject to GST,
but restaurant meals are subject to GST. Thus, the amendment may add to the
time spent on administrative tasks. However, as part of this project, it was
not possible to model or accurately quantify the compliance costs associated
with the changes.[51]
4.43
Certainly, Econtech's conclusions regarding the additional
costs likely to be entailed in pricing are consistent with claims made by
several witnesses. Deloitte, for example, referred to 'complex issues'
associated with tour pricing such as variable taxable value of tour packages;
variations in package profiles; impacts of currency fluctuations and adjustment
events; and difficulties associated with the attribution of GST as expected to
increase compliance costs.[52] However,
as reported earlier, Deloitte also contended that compliance costs for
registered FTOs would increase as a result of the proposed legislation.
4.44
At the hearing, the Committee invited comment on
Econtech's estimates in an attempt to reconcile their predictions of relatively
negligible price impacts with concerns expressed in several submissions that
price increases would threaten the viability of the Australian packaged tour
industry in offshore markets.
4.45
Most responses were to the effect that Econtech's
models of average impacts and impacts across the industry as a whole were not
necessarily appropriate when looking at the Australian packaged tour industry. Arguments
were raised that averaging did not factor in variables associated with tourist
profiles; the content of packaged tours offered by FTOs; and timing or pricing,
for example.
4.46
A representative of ATEC commented in this regard that:
I think we and Econtech are talking about different fruit here.
Econtech is not talking about the price effect on tour packages; it is talking
about the impact on FTOs on the basis of the totality of the FTOs’ operations
and on the export industry as a whole. What we are saying is that, within that
whole, there are smaller segments of it and the tour package segment is a very
important and high-yielding segment of the Australian tourism industry. For
first-time travellers, the likelihood of a tour package being the way in which
they would visit Australia
is a lot higher than for travellers who have been here before. What we are
saying is that the price effect on tour packages is of the order of magnitude
that we have identified—between four and 4.5—but we have examples that run
higher than that. That is not inconsistent with what Econtech is saying, in our
analysis of the Econtech work.[53]
4.47
Similarly, Deloitte told the Committee that:
...I do not really believe that average impact is the significant
impact to examine. Each country has different impacts in terms of pricing and
timing. If we look at a UK-to-Australia based tour, the low season cost of an
airfare is ₤450 and the high season cost of an airfare is ₤1,350.
So therefore, depending on what time of year it is, the non-taxable component
is quite a different percentage than the taxable component...[54]
4.48
Tipping points, namely, the point at which price will drive
tourists to other destinations, were raised as another factor that should be
considered when assessing impacts on the tourist industry.
4.49
Deloitte said, for example, that 'market-by-market
price impact plus tipping point...are instrumental in calculating impact on
tourism numbers'.[55] ATEC said that price
sensitivity was such in some markets that a tipping point, once reached, would
produce a 'rapid fall off in demand'.[56]
4.50
As far as variables within tour packages are concerned,
ATEC commented that:
...a tour package comprises two or more travel components, such as
airfares and ground services (hire cars, coach transport, meals etc) and other
components such as accommodation, optional tours and insurances. ...increasingly,
tour packages are purchased by international visitors without an airfare
component being included since travellers are making use of frequent flyer
points or special, low cost, airfare deals. To a lesser extent this also
applies to the accommodation component. To the extent that this occurs, it results
in a larger increase in the price of those packages that have a relatively
higher non-accommodation component.[57]
4.51
In addition to the more specific debate on price
impacts and tourism numbers, much of the evidence to the inquiry referred to more
general concerns about the proposed legislation and its impact on the Australian
packaged tour industry.[58]
4.52
ATEC predicted that smaller wholesalers and resellers concentrating
on Australia's niche tourism market in rural and regional areas, would be
particularly hard hit with the result that there would be 'much less
differentiation in the international offering'. Such an outcome, ATEC claimed,
ran counter to 'the stated aims of the Australian Government in its Tourism
White Paper and in the Tourism Australia Act 2004'.
4.53
In addition, it was ATEC's view that Schedule 3 posed a
threat to the viability of highly successful international marketing strategies
such as the 'Aussie Specialists' program and the Australian Tourism Exchange
trade show,[59] both developed by Tourism
Australia.[60]
4.54
Witnesses argued that difficulties in securing
compliance by all FTOs would amplify existing competitive distortions[61] in an industry 'barely recovering'
after the 'negative shocks' generated by events such as September 11, the SARS
outbreak, international terrorism and so on.[62]
4.55
Some witnesses argued that, from a policy perspective,
tourism products sold to overseas tourists were essentially exports and, as
such, should be GST free. A representative of the Hotel Model Accommodation
Association of Victoria contended that the proposed legislation was discriminatory
against all tourism exports, except air travel, with there being no explanation
of the rationale provided for the differences in tax treatment.[63]
4.56
The ICAA was unequivocal that there was no policy
justification for Schedule 3 and said:
...it is most inappropriate from a policy perspective that the
reach of the GST should extend to tax the margin derived by a non-resident of Australia
on a transaction with other non-residents of Australia,
which occurs outside Australia.
Such a margin has no contractual or economic connection with Australia
and should not be subject to the GST.[64]
The Committee's views
4.57
The Committee accepts that the proposed legislation is
likely to have undesirable cost impacts on FTOs by exposing them to immediate
GST liabilities and high start-up and ongoing compliance costs.
4.58
The Committee also considers that the characterisation
of Schedule 3 as an 'integrity measure' thereby providing justification for its
application from 10 February 2005
cannot be supported. While it accepts and supports the initiative to correct
what is a clear shortcoming in the GST legislation, the Committee does not
consider that Schedule 3 can be described as just an integrity measure.
4.59
In these circumstances, the Committee believes that a
more equitable commencement date should be negotiated with affected parties to
ensure they will not have to bear GST liabilities as a business cost. A
transitional period should also factor in the time required for establishment
of the necessary compliance systems and the Australian Tax Office's formulation
of guidance papers to ensure an orderly and consistent adoption of new
requirements.
4.60
The Committee notes the comments from the relevant
industry bodies that they were not consulted about the proposed legislation.
Given the possible adverse implications for the Australian packaged tour
industry and the importance of tourism to Australia's
economy, the Committee believes an investigation of the potential impacts
should have been conducted. Although the Department of Industry, Tourism and
Resources commissioned a study into the likely impact of Schedule 3 on
Australian tourism, this was done after introduction of the bill into
Parliament.[65]
4.61
As Ms Kerry
Rooney advised the Committee, the Department
of Industry, Tourism and Resources had not been consulted about the legislation
nor had it conducted any analysis of witnesses' claims that its impacts would
be inconsistent with the objectives of the Tourism White Paper.[66]
4.62
The Committee has no reason to question the integrity
of the Econtech report and, in fact, found it most useful in its assessment of
the evidence regarding impacts on tourism. However, the Committee notes the
comments of several witnesses that more specific analyses of the Australian
tour package industry taking into account different market places; seasonal
fluctuations; variations in tourist profiles; tipping points and so on would
have produced different results.
4.63
On the basis of the evidence, the Committee concludes
that, before Schedule 3 is re-considered by the Parliament, the Department of
the Treasury, the Australian Taxation Office and the Department of Tourism,
Industry and Resources should conduct a thorough analysis of its likely impact
on the Australian packaged tour industry. In coming to this view, the Committee
took into account the substantial contribution which Australian tourism makes
to the national economy. Figures taken from the ABS Tourism Satellite Account
cited in Econtech's report say, for example, that for the 2002-03 year:
- tourism for the year accounted for $32 billion,
or 4.2 per cent, of Australia’s GDP;[67]
- international visitors consumed nearly $17
billion in goods and services[68], a
contribution of 11.2 per cent to total exports of goods and services;[69] and
- tourism accounted for around
5.7 per cent of total employment equating to about 541,000 employed
persons of whom about 26 per cent were in retail trade; 18 per cent
in accommodation and 10 per cent in cafe and restaurant industries.[70]
4.64
In the next chapter, the Committee reviews the proposed
legislation against claims that it will be unenforceable and, in effect, will
not work.
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