Chapter 5 - Is current regulation of private equity adequate to protect the economy and the national interest?
5.1 This
chapter looks at whether the current regulatory framework governing private
equity activity in Australia is adequate to protect the Australian economy,
sectors of the economy and the national interest. Most witnesses downplayed
concerns that private equity activity may injure either the economy or the
national interest. They variously cited the rigour of existing reporting
obligations for unlisted companies under the Corporations Act 2001, the
small scale of current private equity activity in Australia, the
difficulty defining which sectors are nationally significant and the power
vested in Australian shareholders. The witnesses who expressed concern about
the impact of private equity activity on national interest grounds claimed
existing reporting requirements are inadequate and the need to regulate private
equity ownership of key public services to guard against their failure.
The Reserve Bank of Australia's view
5.2 The Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia
(RBA), Mr Ric Battellino, told the committee that the spike in leveraged
buy-out (LBO) activity in 2006 was the result of 'very unusual circumstances'
in Australian capital markets, associated with the low cost of debt. He argued
that the influence of these circumstances is—at least anecdotally—waning[1]
and that some of the 'covenant-lite' loans are not being accepted by the
market. Asked whether there is a need for any regulatory or legislative
changes, Mr Battellino replied:
No, I think that from our point of view we certainly do not see a
case for regulatory change in this area. As I say, it was the outcome of a very
unusual set of circumstances. Those circumstances are closing, and I do not
think there is a lasting problem here at all.[2]
5.3 Mr Battellino suggested that the fundamental structure of capital
markets in Australia is unlikely to change significantly. Institutional
investors will still favour the liquidity advantages of equity and their
debt-based investments will continue to be reinvested on the stock exchange.[3]
For this reason, he explained, Australians' savings in superannuation are not
at serious risk.[4]
Further, Australian banks have very low exposure to private debt financing
activity and are protected from a private equity buy-out.[5]
Mr Battellino
concluded that 'the overall exposure of the economy to this particular form of
financing is quite low'.[6]
He added: '...from our perspective, as a general macro picture, I do not think
there is anything worrying the Reserve Bank here.' As the body principally
responsible for the systemic stability of the Australian economy, this is a
significant statement.
The financial regulators' view
5.4 ASIC
and APRA also downplayed any threat that private equity might pose to the
Australian economy. In their evidence to the committee, both regulators
reiterated the RBA's observations of the small scale and relatively low
exposure of private equity activity in Australia. ASIC's Deputy Chairman, Mr Jeremy Cooper,
emphasised that the current size of the private equity market in Australia was
small compared with the total value of the listed equities market. He also
noted that Australian superannuation funds are aiming to maintain their exposure
to private equity at about four or five per cent.[7]
APRA's Executive General Manager, Mr Tom Karp, told the committee that Australia's
five largest domestic banks have private equity and leveraged lending exposure
limits of $1 billion to $3 billion, which represents less than five to ten per
cent of the total capital for a bank.[8]
He estimated that the private equity exposure of Australian super funds
regulated by APRA is around one per cent of total assets.[9]
5.5 Both
regulators also expressed confidence that the current regulatory framework for
private equity activity was adequate to safeguard institutional investors. Mr Cooper noted
that the merit of Australia's financial regulation framework is that 'it is
flexible and can deal with private equity without having to write a new chapter
of the Corporations Act for private equity'.[10]
He added that private equity is already 'quite comprehensively regulated' with
disclosure obligations for private companies not listed on the ASX.[11]
Further, he argued that the current size and nature of private equity activity
in Australia does not warrant further powers of new regulation.[12]
Indeed, Mr Cooper described private equity in Australia as
'a healthy development' which has forced Australian institutional investors to
focus more closely on the value of their investments in listed entities.
5.6 Mr Karp told the committee that the banks' internal
mechanisms, combined with APRA's prudential framework, are an effective
strategy for dealing with private equity's risks. He told the committee that
the banks have their own policies for leveraged lending with formal credit
approvals and ongoing monitoring. Lending for private equity is assessed as a
higher level of risk given it typically has a higher level of gearing than other
investments. Mr Karp also observed that Australian banks' approach to
lending for private equity appears to be 'fairly cautious' compared to
international banks. In addition, APRA has its own credit risk management
processes to ensure that banks hold capital against potential losses.[13]
He concluded that 'we do not see any significant prudential risks in private
equity to the banks'.[14]
5.7 Mr Karp expressed similar confidence that APRA has
appropriate supervision and monitoring of superannuation funds' investments in
private equity.[15]
In the event that super funds' exposure to private equity continues to grow to
become a 'major asset class':
...that has to be separately identified
in annual reports to members so that people are aware of it. We [APRA] would be
tracking the returns on it and people would be aware of that.[16]
5.8 Significantly, neither APRA nor ASIC
identified any prospect that the banks, superannuation funds or retail
investors' current exposure to private equity would have serious ramifications
for the Australian economy. Rather, APRA noted that publicly listed companies
are also exposed to risks and prone to failure.[17]
While high levels of leverage and over-reliance on private equity activity are
factors of potential concern to the regulators, there is no evidence that private
equity activity in Australia is currently engaged in these levels of risk.[18]
The adequacy of existing regulations for unlisted companies
5.9 Several witnesses addressed concerns that
private equity activity in Australia can escape public scrutiny. Mr David Love, Manager
of Treasury's Prudential Policy Unit, told the committee that a private company
has the same obligations under the Corporations Act to report its financial
position as a publicly listed company. The only difference is that listed
companies are subject to the ASX continuous disclosure rules, aimed at
determining price signals on a daily basis.[19]
Mr Battellino
told the committee that the financing of private equity activity is 'all public
information' and that 'people are overestimating the amount of secrecy' that
happens in private equity deals.[20]
The same observation was made by Mr Cooper who described the disclosure obligations of the
Corporations Act as 'quite comprehensive'.[21]
5.10 The law firm, Allens Arthur Robinson, also
argued that there is already appropriate regulation and laws relating to
private equity transactions. Its submission summarised the current
arrangements:
Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act
provides a comprehensive regime for the regulation of Australian public company
takeovers. This regime, in combination with Australia's detailed insider
trading, conflict of interest and directors' duties laws, provides an
appropriate and satisfactory framework for private equity acquisitions.
The Treasurer, with the support of
the Foreign Investment Review Board, has broad ranging powers under the Foreign
Acquisitions and Takeover Act to review proposed acquisitions which fall
above the relevant thresholds. If the Treasurer considers a proposal to be
contract to the national interest, the power exists (and has been used) to veto
such an acquisition proposal.
The Foreign Acquisitions and
Takeovers Act law and policy framework has been criticised in the past as
unduly fettering foreign investment into Australia. Nevertheless, that
framework (together with the 70 per cent debt funding/thin capitalisation
rules) remains in force for acquisitions by foreign interests, and governs
private equity acquisitions along with all other acquisitions.
No further regulation is required to
protect Australia's national economic or strategic interest. [22]
The Takeovers Panel's Guidance Note
5.11 The
role of the Takeovers Panel is to consider the process under which takeover
bids are conducted in Australia, consistent with section 602 of the Corporations
Act 2001. In particular, the Panel is responsible for making declarations
of circumstances that are unacceptable to the purposes of section 602.[23]
Mr Nigel Morris,
Director of the Takeovers Panel, told the committee:
The panel’s concern is the takeovers
process. Our concern is an efficient, competitive and informed market. Our
concern is information to target shareholders. Our concerns would be that the
people who accepted were going to get paid and that the people who did not accept
or were thinking of not accepting were aware of the level of gearing and what
the consequences for them as future shareholders might be.[24]
5.12 In
this context, the Takeovers Panel has this year issued Guidance Note 19, a copy
of which was reproduced in its submission to the inquiry.[25]
The Guidance Note was issued in relation to insider participation in control
transactions (takeovers). It provides takeover market participants with
guidance on situations where there is involvement or potential involvement by
the management, directors or external advisers of a target company with the
bidder in a takeover bid or potential bid for the target company. These
situations include potential conflicts of interests, provision of information
to potential rival bidders and disclosure to shareholders.
5.13 Mr Morris told the committee that 'the issues in relation to
takeovers that private equity raised were in fact issues that are seen in a lot
of other buyer types'.[26]
He further explained that the Panel's process is qualitatively no different
between a publicly listed company by a private firm and a public company
takeover of a public company. Failure to comply with the Guidance Note will
risk a 'declaration of unacceptable circumstances and orders'.[27]
5.14 Mr Morris was asked whether any further regulatory changes are
needed, given that the Corporations Act already enforces comprehensive conduct
and disclosure rules on both target corporations and bidders. He replied:
Based on our experience so far, we do
not see any particular need. We will continue to look. At least since the
guidance note was published, we have not seen any matters come before us that
have caused us concerns...One of the things about the Takeovers Panel is that
it is not just ASIC that can bring applications before it. Rival bidders,
unhappy shareholders as well as ASIC can bring issues before the Takeovers
Panel. There are additional layers of surveillance and scrutiny with other
people out there acting in their own commercial interests. At the moment—touch
wood—it seems to be adequate.[28]
The power vested in shareholders
5.15 Shareholders remain the ultimate arbiters
of whether a listed company is taken over. A private equity bid fails if
sufficient numbers of shareholders do not sell their shares.[29] The details of the offer are the responsibility of
the board, which clearly has a powerful role in terms of relaying information
to shareholders and recommending or rejecting the takeover offer. It should be
noted that there can be strong financial incentives for the various
stakeholders to accept the terms of the private equity offer.[30]
5.16 Mr David Jones,
Chairman of the Australian Private Equity and Venture Capital Association
(AVCAL), was asked whether there was anything to stop a large flow of funds
from the United States taking over blue chip Australian companies. He
replied:
...I am really not concerned about that...No-one can just come in
and say, ‘I will buy your business.’ The directors on behalf of the
shareholders and then ultimately the shareholders need to form a view about
value. We have almost seen here a bit of a reaction where people are going,
‘Well, if these private equity guys think this thing’s valuable maybe it is.’
And you get a rerating and a reassessment.[31]
5.17 Mr Jones also
noted that of the 80 companies taken off the Australian Stock Exchange in 2006,
only two were privatised through private equity. He added that in terms of
fears of a flood of private equity funds into Australia, 'there is just
nothing to show'.[32] Further, he noted that Myer, currently owned by a
private equity consortium, is opening new stores, attracting capital, lowering
costs and increasing profits.[33]
Concerns about the existing regulatory framework
5.18 The committee received comment that current
reporting arrangements relating to non-listed companies operating in Australia
should be strengthened. The National Institute of Accountants (NIA) identified
its main concern with private equity as:
...the lower degree of transparency in
terms of public accountability that may result when an economically significant
entity shifts from a status of being either proprietary public company into
another corporate structure such as a trust. [34]
5.19 The NIA explained that the current system
of reporting requirements is based on who owns the company, rather than the
substance of the entity's activities. As a result, a private equity structure
is a means by which entities can avoid public reporting obligations. Mr Tom Ravlic, a
Policy Adviser with the NIA, told the committee that the accounting profession
had argued 'for many years' that reporting requirements should be standardised
based on the nature of the company's activity rather than its ownership
structure.[35] He contended that it is in the public interest to
ensure that all 'economically significant' industries—such as utilities and
major transport entities—be required to report publicly. This would give the
public confidence and trust in all these industries, irrespective of their
ownership.
5.20 In its submission, the NIA recommended that
the parliament determine what types of entities should be regarded as
economically significant. It should then establish a mechanism for these
companies to prepare and lodge publicly available financial statements. The NIA
suggested that this could be done through an amendment to the Corporations
Act 2001 providing Treasury with the authority to identify economically
significant industries. Alternatively, industry-based legislation could be
amended to ensure that all industry players comply with disclosure requirements
'irrespective of ownership structure'.[36]
5.21 Another precautionary approach to national
interest concerns was suggested by Associate
Professor Frank Zumbo from the School of Business
Law and Taxation at the University of New South Wales.
He put two proposals to the committee to safeguard the national interest in
cases where a private equity entity is seeking a leveraged buyout in a
sensitive industry. The first was that consideration be given to either
restricting the involvement of private equity firms in sensitive industries on
a case by case basis, or by placing restrictions on the level of debt that
these firms can accrue in a strategic Australian company. The second proposal
was to require private equity entities to lodge a security bond to cover any
costs or losses arising from the disruption of essential services.[37]
The difficulty defining industries of economic significance
5.22 The committee highlights the difficulty in
establishing a basis for what constitutes an industry of economic significance.
Mr Ravlic himself
conceded that outside of utilities, defining an industry of 'economic
significance' is a 'woolly area'. When asked to give an example of a sector or
industry that is not of economic significance, he replied:
We would regard any entity which
falls under the ‘small proprietary company’ test in the Corporations Act as not
being economically significant. We will fall back to the Corporations Act
definition of ‘small proprietary company,’ because it is extremely difficult
once you move out of the area of utilities to begin to pick off entities that
are not economically significant.[38]
5.23 He explained that the size of the entity
should be a consideration in whether it is economically significant because
reporting requirements for small companies may become burdensome. It was not
clear whether a small company that is a utility would be subject to the NIA's
proposals for stricter financial reporting.
The health and aged care sector
5.24 The committee received comment that private
equity activity in not-for-profit and community based organisations was counter
to their service-based objectives. This view was put by two submitters—Ms Marie dela
Rama from the UTS Centre for Corporate Governance and Dr J Michael Wynne.
5.25 Dr Wynne argued
that national interest grounds should apply to protect the health care
industries because of the adverse consequences from private equity involvement
in the sector. Citing examples from the US, he claimed that the focus on financial
outcomes rather than service delivery inherent in the private equity model was
unsuited to the health sector, which relied on attention to proper process,
probity and an understanding of the community they are providing for.[39] The committee is unconvinced, however, that private
equity activity in Australia's health care sector has contributed in any
substantive way to problems that have arisen in the provision of private health
care services. The connection claimed by Dr Wynne is unclear. The case for greater regulation of
private equity activity in the Australian health care sector on national
interest grounds is thereby also unclear.
5.26 Ms dela Rama's submission highlighted the
growing role of private equity in the aged care sector in Australia. It
noted that private equity entities have 'turfed out' traditional non-profit
organisations as they compete for the same pool of government funds and
subsidies. The traditional organisations are now service providers rather than
the owners and operators, and their benevolent role has been reduced. Ms dela Rama
explained in her submission that the aged care sector is now:
...an unbalanced, unequal playing field
where the short-term investment horizon of private equity investment has placed
these players at an unfair advantage against traditional non-for-profit
participants. It is a matter of grave concern that a substantial part of the
aged care sector is now in the hands of fund managers with little hands-on
experience of the aged care sector.
She
also expressed concern that government policies do not distinguish between private
equity investors and not-for-profit participants in terms of their means or
their motives.[40]
5.27 By way of remedy, Ms dela Rama
proposed that short-term private equity investors should lengthen the term of
their investments, and that government aged care subsidies provided to private
equity owned facilities should be reassessed. She concluded that 'the presence
of private equity in the sector ought to attract continuous and close vigilance'.[41] These arguments were put to the NIA. Mr Ravlic agreed
with the need for stricter reporting in the sector, albeit for different
reasons:
I think we would support the idea
that governance in that area [the health sector] would need to be scrutinised
or at least monitored a bit more going forward because of the fact that a lot
more people are getting older and a greater number of people in the Australian
community will be using the services of these entities.[42]
5.28 On the question of differentiating public
funding for profit and non-for-profit investors, the NIA simply stated that 'it
would be a policy decision for the government'.[43]
Benefits to the Australian economy
5.29 The committee received a submission and
took evidence from AVCAL on the benefits and impacts of private equity on the
Australian economy. Unsurprisingly, AVCAL identified several benefits from
private equity for the wider local economy. Among these are increases in
employment, the funds management industry, productivity and innovation,
superannuation savings and business revenue and exports. The following section
looks at aspects of the impact of private equity activity on employment levels
and the superannuation industry.
Employment
effects
5.30 The
impact of private equity activity on employment levels is contested. AVCAL's
submission cited a 2007 international study by A. T. Kearney which concluded
that on average, private-equity financed firms generate employment at a much
faster pace than comparable, traditionally financed firms. It found that the
average annual employment growth of private equity backed firms was higher in
the European Union, the United Kingdom, the United
States and Germany. AVCAL
also cited a 2006 Australian study by Pricewaterhouse Coopers which concluded that 76 per cent of private-equity
backed companies are expecting to hire additional workers in 2007.[44]
5.31 The
committee heard anecdotal evidence that the net employment impact of private
equity on the company itself is also positive. Mr Brian Hodges, Managing
Director of foundry and heavy engineering group Bradken, told the committee:
...in the years up to and including
2001 where there were roughly 1,450 employees, we retrenched 1,000 people. That
was the phase of getting good, where we shut down a number of plants. We had no
capital to spend, but we became more efficient through work practices and a lot
of change.
Nobody ever made a big company
without increasing employment, I think. You can make a better company by having
some initial reduction in staff, which we did. We lost 1,000 staff out of 1,400
so that was quite a lot. From that 2002 year on, we have increased staff
levels. Today we are just tipping 3,000 staff. We have not had any further
reductions in staff.[45]
5.32 Not all the evidence on the employment
impact of private equity is positive. In its submission to the committee, the
Australian Manufacturing Workers' Union (AMWU) expressed concern that:
...the very high
rates of return required to finance private equity debt driven buyouts can
threaten target companies' long-term interests and provision of decent
employment conditions and security for employees.[46]
However, the submission did not provide an example of
private equity activity affecting AMWU members. Instead, its criticism relied
on the UK experience of job cuts and worker protests.[47]
Conclusion
5.33 The committee does not consider that any
convincing case has been made for any further regulation of private equity
activity in Australia at this time. It recognises and endorses the ongoing
watching brief maintained on this issue by the Treasury, the RBA, the ACCC,
ASIC and the FIRB. The requirements of Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act, the
conflict of interest rules, sector-specific legislation and the FIRB guidelines
offer appropriate and adequate protection for Australian companies and the
Australian public. The activities of both private and listed Australian
companies will continue to be reported under the Corporations Act and through
the international accounting standards set by the Australian Accounting
Standards Board. Private equity consortiums will themselves be guided in their
decision-making by prospects for economic success and growth.
5.34 The
committee believes it is important to continue to attract foreign investment
into Australia and does not accept the narrowly held view that some
sectors of the national economy should be protected from private equity
activity. The committee views private equity as an opportunity to reinvigorate
underperforming public companies, which will subsequently benefit Australian
consumers, shareholders and workers. It does not see the market imperative that
drives foreign investors to buy out Australian companies as being inconsistent
with the national interest and notes the protections already afforded under
foreign investment policy and the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act
1975.
Senator the Hon. Michael Ronaldson
Chair
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