Chapter 2 - The Bill
Introduction
2.1
The Bill amends Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. Many
of the amendments are procedural in nature and aimed at streamlining processes
and increasing transparency in the Part IIIA regime. According to the
Parliamentary Secretary's second reading speech:[6]
The key changes contained in the Bill aim to clarify the
Regime's objectives and scope, encourage efficient investment in new
infrastructure, strengthen incentives for commercial negotiation and improve
the certainty, transparency and accountability of regulatory processes.
2.2
Generally, submissions to the Committee's inquiry were
supportive of the Bill. However, concerns were raised by some about the method
by which the legislation proposes to introduce pricing principles into the
regime.
Pricing principles
2.3
Division 6A, inserted by item 110 of the Bill, requires
the Commonwealth Minister to determine pricing principles relevant to the price
of access to a service.[7]
2.4
Pricing principles are principles to which the ACCC
must have regard when arbitrating access disputes, and considering access
undertakings and access codes. On review, the Australian Competition Tribunal
will also be required to take the pricing principles into account when it reviews
a decision of the ACCC.
2.5
The Productivity Commission considered that introducing
pricing principles into the regime would have a number of benefits, including:[8]
- providing better guidance on how the broad
objectives of access regimes should be applied in setting more detailed terms
and conditions;
- providing a measure of certainty to regulated
firms and access seekers, in turn improving the operation of the
negotiation-arbitration framework;
- providing some guidance for the pricing
principles and/or approaches employed in industry regimes; and
- helping to address concerns that a regulator's
own values will unduly influence decisions relating to the terms and conditions
of access.
2.6
While the Government endorsed the Productivity
Commission's recommendation to introduce pricing principles, it adopted a
modified version of the wording originally proposed by the Commission:[9]
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) must
have regard to the following principles:
- that regulated access prices should:
- be set so as to generate expected revenue
for a regulated service or services that is at least sufficient to meet the
efficient costs of providing access to the regulated service or services; and
- include a return on investment commensurate
with the regulatory and commercial risks involved.
- that the access
price structures should:
- allow multi-part pricing and price
discrimination when it aids efficiency; and
- not allow a vertically integrated access
provider to set terms and conditions that discriminate in favour of its
downstream operations, except to the extent that the cost of providing access
to other operators is higher.
- that access
pricing regimes should provide incentives to reduce costs or otherwise improve
productivity.
2.7
Most submissions were satisfied with the wording of the
pricing principles and were keen to have them included in the regime.[10] One suggestion for amendment was put
forward by the Tourism and Transport Forum[11]
which advocated that where essential infrastructure providers are operating
under significant capacity constraints they should be able to apply demand
management pricing practices that may generate revenues that exceed production
costs:
Overbearing pricing regulation might have little regard to
market forces demanding use of a service, meaning high demand for a service
(due to an artificially low price) might result in no expansion to that service
if prices are set below costs of new investment.[12]
2.8
The Sydney Airport Corporation Limited (SACL) sought an
amendment to the Bill to clarify aspects of the pricing principles that it considered
would reduce the potential for the access regime to be used as a means of
regulatory gaming rather than to address genuine concerns over pricing as a
barrier to access.[13]
2.9
While the pricing principles were broadly supported by
all witnesses, the majority of submissions expressed concern at the
Government's method of introducing pricing principles into Part IIIA by the use
of a legislative instrument, rather than by enactment in the Bill itself.
One of the difficulties we have...is that the government, in
receiving the recommendations from the Productivity Commission and responding
to them formally...accepted the principles that the commission put forward. Yet
when the bill came to the parliament, those principles...were not to be found in
the bill and there was no explanation in the explanatory memorandum or the
second reading speech to explain why the government had changed the position
which it had accepted.[14]
2.10
Objections to the use of a legislative instrument for
this purpose include the fact that legislative instruments can be disallowed by
Parliament. Additionally, while they may offer greater administrative flexibility
than bills, submissions argued that in this case it is neither appropriate nor
necessary. Some submissions advocated that as an integral part of the proposed
amendments to Part IIIA, the pricing principles should appropriately be
developed and considered at the same time as the other provisions of the Bill.[15]
2.11
The Energy Networks Association contended that
infrastructure investment could be threatened because the principles are not in
the Act:
We think it could potentially have a chilling effect on new
infrastructure development because, if you put yourself in the case of being a
hypothetical offshore investor about to make a one-off investment in a large
capital asset which might be subject to part IIIA, one of the first questions
you would ask yourself would be: what rules of the road are going to be
applied? If those rules were in statute, you would obviously take a fair degree
of comfort in the fact that those rules were not going to be changed
arbitrarily without some form of public consultation process and potentially
without quite a long lead time. Those same protections may not be available
under a ministerial determination, so you may make a different sort of
risk-reward assessment investment decision on the basis of whether or not these
pricing principles are within ministerial determination or the statute.[16]
2.12
A significant concern about using a legislative
instrument is the possibility that the pricing principles, when they are
released, could be worded differently from those agreed to by the Commonwealth.
The Committee was told that the original Productivity Commission wording was
arrived at after significant consideration:
The Productivity Commission has been inquiring into these sorts
of matters generally for the last 2½, maybe three, years. It started with their
inquiry into what is now the defunct Prices Surveillance Act and has continued.
The pricing principles that they recommended to the government in their report,
which the government accepted, are pretty uncontentious in the minds of many,
and they are transparent.[17]
2.13
The Australian Gas Light Company (AGL) contended that
the wording agreed to in the Government's response was achieved after further
consultation between the Commonwealth, the States, Territories and industry and
should therefore not be changed.[18]
2.14
Submissions expressed concern that future alterations
to the principles by legislative instrument will be subject to the influence of
ministerial discretion[19] and there is
a possibility that Governments may alter the principles in response to short
run pressures.[20] If this were to
occur, it would be detrimental to infrastructure investors for whom it is
critical to know with certainty that regulators dealing with pricing issues are
obliged to comply with well defined pricing principles.
2.15
Several submissions assert that the need for certainty
outweighs the benefit of flexibility and certainty is best achieved via the
incorporation of the principles in the Bill. According to the Australian
Pipeline Industry Association Ltd:[21]
Using a Ministerially determined legislative instrument to
establish the pricing principles will result in significant concerns for
investors about the potential to vary the Government's agreed pricing
principles unilaterally, both upon their introduction and at some future stage.
This concern would not exist if the agreed pricing principles were
reincorporated into the Bill.
2.16
In summary, the consensus in submissions is that the
pricing principles should be placed in the Act and not in delegated
legislation.
2.17
The Committee notes that the Sydney Airport Corporation
Limited (SACL) was the only submission that recommended that the pricing principles
should be given effect through a subordinate instrument to the Trade Practices
Act.[22] It did so on the grounds of the
greater flexibility of legislative instruments to fine tune the principles as
regulatory practice develops. However, in line with other submissions, the SACL
wanted the Bill amended to enshrine consultation provisions on the pricing
principles (with infrastructure providers and the Productivity Commission, in
this case) in the primary legislation.
Regulatory risk
2.18
The importance of regulatory risk was highlighted in
the inquiry as a factor which influenced the views of certain witnesses in
relation to the pricing principles as proposed by the Government.
2.19
According to the Productivity Commission, potential
exposure to access regulation is likely to increase the general level of risk
attaching to investment in essential facilities.[23] The inevitable regulatory discretion
involved in the implementation of such regulation, and perceptions that
regulatory decisions are likely to be biased in favour of service users, are
among the factors that contribute to regulatory risk. These sorts of risks
attach to investment in any regulated activity. However, the scale of
investment in essential infrastructure, and the fact that, once in place, the
assets are ‘sunk’ with few alternative uses, mean that regulatory risk can be a
more critical factor in the investment decision and may sometimes deter
projects.
2.20
The pricing principles specify that regulated access
prices should include a return on investment commensurate with both the
regulatory and commercial risks involved.
2.21
As one would expect, submitters were divided in their
views about regulatory risk. On the one hand, regulated organisations and their
representatives contend that regulatory risk can be a significant obstacle for
infrastructure investment. The Australian Council for Infrastructure
Development (AusCID) holds the view that regulators have been primarily
motivated by removing rents from regulated firms and to a lesser extent by
looking after the perceived (short run) interests of users and consumers.[24] The effect of this is to present
infrastructure operators with a set of prices that are below those needed for
them to cover their long run costs. This becomes problematic in the long run as
investment is not forthcoming and in many cases there is a diminution of
competition in related markets. Furthermore, by holding down prices, regulators
run the risk of stifling innovation and skewing investment to less risky
projects.
2.22
Dr Mundy from AusCID made the point in relation to
regulatory risk that:
One of the great problems with risk is that it exists. The mere
fact that we cannot point to it turning up and ultimately being manifested does
not mean that it does not exist. Risks are mitigated. We never know what a risk
is.[25]
2.23
According to AusCID, the timeframes considered when
making major infrastructure investments are best measured in decades.[26] Certainty about the regulatory
treatment of investment is of critical importance not just today but in five,
ten or twenty years. For this reason regulatory frameworks that are robust,
transparent and predictable will inspire investor confidence, thus encouraging
investment.
2.24
AusCID considers that certainty about pricing outcomes is
the most important issue in the national access regime with perhaps the
exception of the declaration criteria.[27]
It submits that the absence of clear, appropriate and enforceable pricing
principles has been at the core of the tension between infrastructure providers
and regulators. These tensions have led to significant legal action.
2.25
On the other hand, regulatory organisations do not so
readily accept that regulatory risk exists and are concerned about provision being
made for such risk in the pricing principles.
2.26
Mr Rowe from the Economic Regulation Authority Western
Australia referred to three issues that are often raised as constituting
regulatory risk: firstly, the consistency and predictability of regulatory
decisions; secondly, time delays in decision making; and thirdly, pricing
decisions that do not reflect a commercial rate of return.[28]
2.27
In contrast to the claims that regulators make
inconsistent and unpredictable decisions, Mr Rowe cited research showing that
there is a consistency of approach to decision making by regulatory authorities
around Australia.[29] Secondly, he suggested
that time delays could be due to regulatory gaming, ambit claims and also
because the system is maturing. He considers that there will be a significant
speeding up in the process as both regulators and providers learn from the
process.[30]
2.28
Thirdly, in relation to the charge that regulators do
not provide commercial rates of return for infrastructure providers Mr Rowe told
the Committee that he could not find evidence to suggest that this is the case:[31]
We regularly have people, such as financiers, banks, investment
funds, share analysts, come to see us and there is no shortage of investment
funds looking for investment in regulated monopoly infrastructure. I have a
great deal of difficulty seeing why the issue of concern is about the rate of
return.
2.29
The Economic Regulation Authority Western Australia
acknowledges that it is reasonable for the relevant decision maker to have
regard to pricing principles that are made by the Minister in an endeavour to
promote consistent and transparent regulatory outcomes over time and therefore
to provide increased certainty for industry participants.[32] However, it considers that the
principles must not allow inconsistent interpretation. The Authority is
particularly concerned that the actual principles currently proposed may fail
to achieve the intended objective of promoting greater clarity or certainty in
the operation of the national access regime.
2.30
Mr Rowe said:[33]
Our concern is with the pricing principles themselves, whether they
are in the bill or not. There is nothing wrong with having pricing principles,
if they are good pricing principles. The concern we have with the particular
one I highlighted is that there seems to be a view that you need to make some
additional allowance for regulatory risk. Implicit in that is that the current
rate of return is not commercial and is not sufficient to encourage the
investment that is needed. We are disputing that. Not only is there an argument
which says that the allowance for regulatory risk is unnecessary—I do not think
the risk is great; in fact, a lot of super funds are now looking at investment
in monopoly infrastructure almost as debt investment: it is long-term, with
secure returns and it is very low-risk investment—but also what does ‘an
allowance for regulatory risk’ mean? It again introduces a degree of
uncertainty about what a reasonable degree of risk is into the process—a
process which, if I am right, is maturing and settling down. That will go
through a series of appeal processes and so on.
2.31
The Independent Competition and Regulatory Commission
ACT is also concerned that the wording in the pricing principles may imply that
an additional margin above efficient costs should be allowed, rather than a
return that is proportionate to the risk incurred.[34]
2.32
Both regulatory organisations consider that the pricing
principles potentially add more uncertainty through the use of imprecise terms
such as 'regulatory risk', as well as by loosely worded direction:
...the Commonwealth Government's proposal that regulated access
prices should be set in order to 'generate revenue that is at least sufficient' does not provide greater clarity or
predictability. Instead, such a loosely worded direction increases ambiguity
and lessens certainty...[35]
2.33
According to these organisations, the potential
consequence of the pricing principles as currently worded is greater scope for
aggrieved parties to pursue avenues of review.[36]
Treasury response
2.34
Mr Bradford Archer, Senior Adviser, Competition Policy
Framework Unit, Department of the Treasury, informed the Committee that the
Government has no intention to change the wording of the principles from that
agreed in the Government response. Also, the reason for using a legislative
instrument is to retain flexibility should the principles require amendment in
the future:[37]
The decision to provide for the making of a legislative
instrument to establish the pricing principles was one simply made to balance
the objectives of providing certainty to industry but retaining a degree of
flexibility should a future need be identified to amend those pricing
principles once we have experience with their operation in practice. The
government has made no indication that it intends to implement pricing
principles that are different to those principles announced in its final
response to the Productivity Commission review. The intention is to implement
those principles that were announced but it was felt that it would be
appropriate to retain a certain degree of flexibility greater than what would
be provided for if the principles were legislated directly by inclusion in part
IIIA.
2.35
According to Mr Archer, the requirement for flexibility
stems from the fact that the pricing principles are untested. While Treasury
anticipates how they might operate, it does not know for certain:
If we find after a couple of years, for example, of
administration of the regime with the new principles that they are not working
or they are creating more uncertainty than is anticipated, once appropriate
amendments are identified, they can be implemented quite readily.[38]
Committee view
2.36
The Committee accepts that pricing principles are
untested because the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has never
undertaken an arbitration under Part IIIA, and for this reason some flexibility
is required for altering the principles in the future if necessary.
2.37
Nevertheless, the Committee is not persuaded that the
need for flexibility outweighs, in this case, the imperatives of transparency
and appropriate Parliamentary scrutiny. In this case, since the language of the
pricing principles is itself generic, the Committee considers that they are
already sufficiently flexible. As well, proper principles of legislative
drafting would dictate that general provisions be contained in the Statute
itself, not in legislative instruments made under it. That is a fortiori the case here, where one of
the principal objects of the Bill is to enact
the pricing principles. Nor are the pricing principles controversial.
Timeframe
2.38
The Committee is also concerned that there is no
timeframe specified in the Bill within which the Minister must make the
determination. As there does not seem to be any functional or mechanical reason
for the provision to be open-ended in this way,[39] the Committee considers that if the
legislative instrument approach of introducing the pricing principles is
retained, the Bill should be amended to specify a set period within which the
Minister's determination must be made.
Recommendation 1
2.39 The Committee recommends that the Bill
be amended so that the pricing principles are included in the Bill
itself, rather than introducing them through a subordinate legislative
instrument.
Objects clause
2.40
The Bill inserts an objects clause in Part IIIA (item
4).
2.41
The Productivity Commission considered that the insertion
of an objects clause, by drawing attention to efficient use and efficient
investment, should help to redress the potential for regulatory interpretations
which discourage efficient investment in essential infrastructure.[40]
2.42
The objects of the Part are to:
- promote the economically efficient operation of, use of
and investment in the infrastructure by which services are provided, thereby
promoting effective competition in upstream and downstream markets; and
- provide a framework and guiding principles to encourage
a consistent approach to access regulation in each industry.
2.43
The objects must be taken into account by the National
Competition Council, the Minister, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission and the Australian Competition Tribunal in regard to declaring a
service, certifying that a regime is effective, registering a contract under
Division 4, and accepting access undertakings and access codes.
2.44
The implementation of an objects clause is intended to
promote consistency and provide guidance in the decision-making process and in
the application of Part IIIA, which in turn will enhance regulatory
accountability.[41]
2.45
Submissions were generally supportive of the addition
of an objects clause to the national access regime:
AusCID has long advocated the insertion of an object clause for
Part IIIA. In a number of regimes (such
as the old airports regime or the gas code), the objectives are unclear,
unstated or lack internal consistency.
The Bill contains amendments requiring all decision makers to have
primary regard to economic efficiency rather than more woolly notions such as
industry development or protecting users and seek to encourage a consistent
approach.[42]
2.46
AusCID advocates that all governments should include
this objects clause in the various general and industry specific regimes they
administer.
2.47
However, the Independent Competition and Regulatory
Commission ACT (ICRC) qualified its support by noting that the new clause, in
conjunction with the new pricing principles, adds to the existing lists of
considerations that apply to decisions under Part IIIA:[43]
Unless priorities are clear, and care is taken to ensure
consistency and compatibility, decision makers under Part IIIA could wind up
having the same problems State and Territory regulators have faced when trying
to juggle the numerous sets of requirements and objectives in the Gas Code.
2.48
The ICRC further noted that the pricing principles and
the objects clause are matters to which decision makers must 'have regard'
rather than criteria that must be satisfied.[44]
It considers that this goes some way towards alleviating conflict between
different objectives.
2.49
While the Tourism and Transport Forum (TTF Australia
Ltd) supports the insertion of an objects clause in Part IIIA, it recommends
that the clause be amended to include a provision that clarifies the
circumstances under which Part IIIA should apply.[45] TTF Australia considers that for
industries where the Government considers that essential infrastructure
operators do not have an incentive to deny access and that access will be
provided on open terms, Part IIIA should only be considered as a last resort.
That is, where a breakdown in commercial negotiation has occurred and access to
an essential facility has been denied, should reliance on the access provisions
of Part IIIA be used.
Declaration criteria
2.50
The Bill amends the criteria against which the National
Competition Council assesses whether or not to recommend that a service be
declared (item 16); and against which the designated Minister declares a
service (item 23). In addition to existing criteria, the Council and Minister
must now be satisfied that access (or increased access) to the service would
promote a material increase in
competition in at least one market (whether or not in Australia), other than
the market for the service (paragraph 44G(2)(a)).
2.51
According to the Explanatory Memorandum the change will
ensure access declarations are only sought where increases in competition are
not trivial.[46] However, the Bills
Digest suggests that these amendments are not a shift in policy as they reflect
how the Australian Competition Tribunal has interpreted the current requirement
in the legislation.[47]
2.52
Most submissions were supportive of this amendment. For
example, AusCID notes that:
...the primary purpose of Part IIIA is to deliver benefits to
consumers through the promotion of competition in upstream markets rather than
simply act to restrict the use of market power in the market for the service
concerned. The amendments to the promote
competition test will ensure that tangible competition benefits will need to be
demonstrated rather than the current situation where trivial improvements in
competition are sufficient to meet this criteria.[48]
2.53
However, in line with its concerns about introducing
uncertainty into the regime, the Independent Competition and Regulatory
Commission ACT suggested that materiality is a subjective measure, and one that
is difficult to define:
The absence of an accepted materiality threshold, or criteria
against which materiality might be assessed, is of particular concern when one
considers the availability of review, on merits, of the Minister's decision to
declare or not declare a service by the ACT.[49]
2.54
Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd supports the view that
services should not be declared where the promotion of competition would be
immaterial. However, it is worried that the onus will be placed on access
seekers to demonstrate that access would positively result in a material, and
quantifiable, increase in competition. This could lead to the bar for
declaration being raised too high; as well as requiring access seekers to
undertake expensive and detailed market analysis in order to support their
case.[50] Virgin Blue proposes
amendments to the Bill.
Other issues raised in submissions
2.55
A number of other issues were raised in submissions,
not all of which directly related to the contents of the Bill. The Committee
considers these matters briefly below.
Definition of production process
2.56
Access may only be sought under Part IIIA to a service
that is provided by means of a facility. Section 44B of the Trade Practices Act
defines the meaning of 'service'. The definition contains a number of
exclusions, one of which (paragraph (f) of the definition) is that 'service'
does not include the use of a production process, except to the extent that it
is an integral but subsidiary part of the service.
2.57
There is legal precedent[51] for this 'production process'
exclusion to be successfully used to prevent third party access to a railway
used to transport iron ore because the railway is integral and essential to the
integrated series of operations that constitute a company's production process.
2.58
Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (Fortescue) considers that
this definition should be clarified because the provision is being relied upon
by infrastructure owners to prevent a service from being declared. If the
service includes the use of a production process the National Competition
Council does not have jurisdiction to consider an application for declaration of
the service. Fortescue contends that the definition is being used in a way that
was not intended by the Parliament when the provisions were enacted.
It is clear that the intention was to exclude things that were
internal to a factory such as a conveyor inside a plant. It was never intended
to apply to a railway that runs 400 kilometres across the Pilbara.[52]
2.59
The essence of Fortescue's allegations is that the
existing Act allows for a legal stratagem to defy the intention of the Bill,
which is to improve competition, infrastructure development and access to
infrastructure.
2.60
Fortescue recommends that an unambiguous definition of
'production process' be inserted into the
Trade Practices Act. This amendment should define the 'production process'
to exclude railways, ports, roads, power transmission grids or any other
facility where the function involves transportation, distribution or
reticulation.[53]
Productivity Commission consideration
2.61
The Productivity Commission considered the production
process exclusion in its review.[54] It
concluded that the current exclusions in the Trade Practices Act should be
retained, but the National Competition Council should specifically monitor
developments in relation to the 'production facility' exemption (recommendation
6.4). In its response to the review, the Government agreed with the
Productivity Commission:[55]
The scope of these exclusions is a matter for the Courts to
decide on a case by case basis and the caselaw is still evolving. These
exclusions ensure that the Regime is not too broad in its application. Hence,
they protect the legitimate interests of owners of essential infrastructure
facilities and preserve incentives for investment in such facilities.
2.62
The Government may care to consider the matter further.
Telecommunications Access Regime
2.63
Telstra made a detailed submission to the inquiry.[56] Although access in the
telecommunications industry is separately regulated in Part XIC of the Trade
Practices Act, Telstra provided the Committee with insight into its experience
with Part XIC. Telstra supports many of the amendments in the Bill for Part
IIIA and advocates that they be mirrored in the telecommunications access
regime.
2.64
Telstra is concerned that Parts IIIA and XIC are
diverging rather than converging over time, which it considers is contrary to
the apparent intent of policy makers. Furthermore, Telstra advocates that a
couple of recommendations of the Productivity Commission that have not been
included in this Bill should be implemented, although not necessarily in the
form of the Commission's recommendation. These include 'investment safe
harbour' provisions, and the need to ensure that commercial negotiations and
agreements retain primacy in access arrangements.[57]
2.65
The Committee notes that in its response to
Productivity Commission recommendations 11.1 and 11.3 that relate to
'investment safe harbour' provisions,[58]
the Government proposes to consider the practicality of these recommendations
in the context of industry-specific regimes. It specifically referred to the
Productivity Commission review of the gas access regime which reported in June
2004. The Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) is developing a government
response to this review. Consideration and implementation of any changes to
certified access regimes would involve consultation with the relevant State and
Territory governments.
2.66
Telstra asserts that the first part of Productivity
Commission recommendation 8.2 has not been adopted in the Bill. The
recommendation reads as follows:
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, in
arbitrating terms and conditions for declared services, should generally limit
its involvement to matters in dispute between the parties. Where matters agreed
between the parties are subjected to re-assessment, the Commission should be
required to explain its reasons for doing so in the post-arbitration report
(see recommendation 15.6).[59]
2.67
The Committee notes that the Productivity Commission
proposal did not involve placing agreed matters completely off limits to the
ACCC.[60] Rather, the intention was to
discourage the unwarranted re-opening of matters that had been previously
agreed to by the parties to the dispute. Moreover, the Commission's proposal
did not seek to bar the ACCC from arbitrating on any matter; rather, it would
simply place an onus on the ACCC to explain its reasons for examining those
matters previously agreed between the parties.
2.68
The Government agreed to the Productivity Commission
recommendations 8.2 and 15.6 and these are implemented in the Bill by item 72
which creates a new subdivision in the Trade Practices Act requiring the ACCC
to prepare a written arbitration report about a final determination it makes.
2.69
Telstra also advocated that the Committee recommend
amendments to the Bill to implement certain outcomes from the Exports and
Infrastructure Taskforce.[61] The
Committee understands that the recommendations of the Exports and
Infrastructure Taskforce were considered at the Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) meeting on 3 June 2005. COAG will be advised by the end of
August 2005 on the implementation of the agreed measures and the Committee does
not intend to anticipate that process.
Recommendation 2
2.70 The Committee recommends that subject to the
Government introducing the amendment outlined in Recommendation 1, the Senate
pass the Bill.
Senator George
Brandis
Chair
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