Chapter 6
Insurance consumers’ interests
Introduction
6.1
The Committee understands that consumers of
insurance products have fewer options in the current hard market because of
reduced competition in the market place. This chapter discusses the
relationship between the insurer and the consumer and considers whether
measures to strengthen consumer protection are needed. Overall, the Committee
in this chapter looks at:
- concerns about consumer interests and consumer protection; and
- the regulatory bodies that have responsibility for various
aspects of the insurance industry including discussion of:
- APRA’s role,
- the ACCC’s role,
- ASIC’s role, and
- the role of the insurers and the industry code of practice.
Assessment of premiums
6.2
One of the most persistent messages to emerge
from this inquiry has been the confusion surrounding the assessment and pricing
of premiums. Generally, witnesses were not only bewildered by the sudden and
severe increase in premiums, despite relatively good claims history, but also
by the growing use of clauses to exclude coverage of particular activities.
6.3
Dr Kenneth Baker, Chief Executive Officer, ACROD
Ltd, told the Committee:
There have been premium increases ranging from 30 per cent to,
by today’s evidence, 400 per cent. In some cases, organisations are having
great difficulty getting any insurance cover at all. These refusals to insure
and the great increases seem to be unrelated to the history of claims of the
organisation. Organisations which may have been around for more than two or three
decades and had no claims have nevertheless faced dramatic increases in
premiums.[1]
6.4
The Royal Agricultural Society of Tasmania
submitted that for the majority of Agricultural Societies in Tasmania there was
no basis for premium increase which relates to the activities or heightened
public risk in the conduct of their affairs. It maintained that in their case
there had been no recent claims which could in any way have impacted on the
increases quoted by the underwriters.[2]
Similarly, the Australian Speleological Federation Inc. informed the Committee
that in spite of a claimless record, its public liability insurance premium
increased in 2002 from $4,500 to $18,000.[3]
6.5
The experience of the Australian Breastfeeding
Association (ABA) highlights the experiences of many others. It stated:
The threefold rise in our professional indemnity costs and
doubling of public liability insurance premiums does not seem to reflect a
realistic actuarial assessment of the actual risk associated with the ABA’s
activities. Rather, it seems that we are simply a low risk, small customer that
does not contribute significantly to insurance company profitability.[4]
6.6
St John Ambulance Australia, the Australian
Private Hospitals Association, Australian Nursing Federation, Outdoor
Recreation Council of Australia Incorporated, Volunteering Australia, the
Australian Rugby League, the Australian Cricket Board, the Australia Council,
the Financial Planning Association of Australia and the Institute of Chartered
Accountants are among the many witnesses who expressed concern that their risk
assessment bore little relationship to the good rating in their claim records.
They assert that insurers do not seem to take into account claims history in
setting premiums.[5]
CPA Australia stated bluntly that underwriters ‘are picking and choosing
clients without regard for previous good risks.’[6]
6.7
The Financial Planning Association of Australia
also noted that coverage is being increasingly restricted with respect to
policy wordings and endorsements as well as the introduction of new exclusions.[7] The Institute of Chartered
Accountants agreed with this view. It submitted:
There is clear evidence that
professional indemnity insurance is being offered on increasingly restrictive
terms by insurers. In some cases, feedback from members has raised concern that
up to 90% of a firm’s activity could essentially be uninsured because it falls
under one or another exclusion clause contained in the insurance contract.
...
Considerable uncertainty surrounds a number of new exclusions and
as a consequence members do not know to what extent they are protected by their
insurance policy.[8]
6.8
Moreover, the failure of the insurance companies
to communicate effectively and openly with consumers about premiums has
generated unnecessary disquiet at a time of difficulty in the industry.
6.9
Mr Gregory Nance from the Surf Life Saving
Association stated simply ‘I have never had adequately explained to me how
insurers assess the amounts for premiums’.[9]
Similarly, Mr Michael Potter from the Council of Small Business Organisations
of Australia called for transparency in the process. He stated, ‘Tell us, as
the people who are basically going to be paying the premiums, how you came up
with your actual premium content—where is the risk and where do you see the value
of the claim?’[10]
6.10
Some witnesses were asking that associations or
other representative bodies have access to the claims history of their
respective profession, trade or activity.[11]
The Association of Independent Schools of South Australia submitted that the
insurance industry should be required to be more transparent in explaining the
increased cost of insurance premiums.[12]
6.11
A number of witnesses were not only troubled by
the lack of explanation for higher premiums and the use of exclusion clauses
but they also mentioned the lack of regard and fairness shown by insurers. Mr
Paul Orton, General Manager Policy, Australian Business Ltd, told the Committee
that a number of brokers in dealing with insurers had found a certain sense of
indifference about ‘the difficulty that the ultimate consumers of insurance
products are facing’. He noted that that indifference is ‘reflected in the lack
of rationale for knockbacks for the retention of what had been long held cover
with a particular firm’.[13]
6.12
Mr Stephen Ball, Director, National Insurance
Brokers Association, pointed out the hard reality of the insurance business. He
explained:
In a market of abundant supply, insurers would say. ‘I don’t
really want to do that but, to be able to secure the premium placement, I will
give you cover for that risk.’ In a market of contracted supply, they will say
‘Sorry, I don’t really want to provide that cover any more.’[14]
6.13
While most acknowledged that insurance companies
operate in a commercial environment and are accountable to their shareholders,
they found difficulty in accepting the high increases and the lack of
consideration. A number harboured suspicions that the increases were not solely
the result of rising claim costs but were related to attempts to recoup other
business losses. A number of sporting and charitable organisations felt
strongly that it was ‘unjust and inappropriate to seek to recover losses from
sporting, charities and not-for-profit sectors of the community’.[15]
6.14
The Australian Council of Professions asked
whether professions with low numbers of claims were effectively
cross-subsidising claims by professions and by other insurance clients in
sectors where claims and litigation were more common. Similarly, Volunteering
Australia believes that they may be bearing the costs of others’ liabilities.
6.15
This suggestion of cross subsidy was made in
numerous other submissions often accompanied by a request for an investigation
into the pricing of premiums.
6.16
The Australian Council of Professions suggested
that it would be an appropriate subject for APRA or other relevant bodies to
investigate. It went on to state:
To the extent that claims history does influence premium
rises, APRA could also look into whether the ‘targeting’ of insurance claims,
and thus their impact on premiums is being driven more by the capacity to pay
rather than by responsibility for the damage or loss.[16]
6.17
As well as an independent investigation of the
pricing process, witnesses also wanted the insurance industry to take steps to
improve the way companies determine premiums. Some wanted changes and were
asking for the levels of risk in the various workplaces or activities
undertaken to be assessed and the premiums adjusted accordingly.
6.18
Sport Industry Australia suggested that the
Government should ‘require insurance companies to review the process by which
they assess the true risk of individual organisations to ensure it is fair and
equitable, and reflects the true risk of the sport’.[17] Likewise, the Institution of
Engineers recommended that the insurance industry change the way its costs
premiums. It stated that currently, costs are spread across the board for all
types of insurance. It suggested that premiums be structured so that everybody
pays different rates according to their risk profile and claims history. The
Institution submitted that only through ‘a consistent Australia-wide approach
can an effective solution to the complex problem of liability be solved.’[18]
6.19
The general thrust of the need for improvement
in the insurance industry focused on the principles of transparency, fairness
and equity. The Australian Institute of Quantity Surveyors suggested that
governments consider legislating to prevent the unfair penalizing of low risk
professions in relation to both professional indemnity and public liability insurance.[19]
6.20
The Real Estate Institute of Australia proposed
that the ‘Federal Government initiate consistent and meaningful measures to
ensure that there is a proper balance in professional indemnity insurance
between realistic premiums and small business confidence that they are
satisfactorily covered under insurance’.[20]
Committee’s view
6.21
The Committee believes that at the moment
consumers, in many cases, are not receiving adequate explanation for the
increase in premiums or the refusal by an insurer to cover particular services
or activities. This has been acknowledged by some companies in the industry.
The Committee believes that consumers deserve to be better informed about the
reasons for the increase or for the withdrawal of coverage. It accepts the view
that the insurance industry needs to improve the provision and clarity of
information they provide to consumers, which would include offering clear
explanations for increases, providing pricing trend data, improving query and
complaint handling systems, and using Plain English and standard terms in
policies.[21]
Unfair advantage
6.22
Criticism of the insurance industry, however,
extended beyond the paucity of information regarding the pricing of premiums
and the actual method of assessing premiums. The Committee also received
reports of insurance companies using unfair tactics, such as unreasonable
timeframes in which to accept increased policy quotes. Ms Monica Persson,
Executive Manager, Audiological Society of Australia, told the Committee that
their organisation had been deliberately hindered in their efforts to access
alternative cover. She explained that their insurer had:
...been tardy in providing documentation upon which another
insurer can assess our potential risk. By delaying the provision of appropriate
documentation, they have, in effect, deprived us of the opportunity to
negotiate alternative insurance options for our members, leaving our members in
a potentially precarious position as they try to find insurance cover in order
to continue to practise.[22]
6.23
Members of the Australian College of Midwives
Inc had similar experiences. Mrs Alana Street, Executive Officer, explained
that they had had a successful arrangement with their insurer for some years.
Initially, little notice was given of the insurer’s intention to withdraw from
the market. Mrs Street explained that:
We had to contact them directly to ask them to ‘please explain’.
It took them two weeks to contact us by letter, explaining that the reason for
their decision was a commercial one. We asked for evidence to support their
decision, and they chose not to provide any. We feel there is no evidence,
financial or otherwise.[23]
6.24
Mr Stephen Harrison, Chief Executive Officer,
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, also commented on the
inadequate notification given to renew their cover. He told the Committee that:
Despite the advanced notice that they gave over the renewal
process and starting that process with the brokers and, presumably, the brokers
with the underwriters, advice about renewal terms was left until the last 24 or
48 hours, leaving some firms either the option of taking those terms without
the ability to renegotiate with another company or risking going bare for a
period.[24]
6.25
Mr Leonard Earl, Member, Public Indemnity
Insurance Panel, Institute of Actuaries added that brokers generally have been
concerned about the lateness with which underwriters have provided them with
terms. He told the Committee that some people receive their renewal terms very
late and with restrictions on the various forms of coverage. According to Mr
Earl this situation has caused great angst and concern for many. In his words,
‘Suddenly, they find themselves without coverage in certain areas of practice
or with draconian terms’.[25]
6.26
In responding to a question about the problems
facing some in renewing their insurance cover, Mr Raymond Jones, President,
Insurance Council of Australia, told the Committee:
Rationalisation in the insurance broking sector of our industry
is also happening, and it is badly needed. A lot of the problems and publicity
that has been given to risks that have been hard to place and have not been put
away on time are because you have a lot of small suburban brokers out there who
are really being challenged by a very difficult environment. The big professional
brokers are very quick to get in touch with us and communicate on issues, and
we work closely with them. But a lot of these small brokers are really having
trouble.[26]
6.27
While agreeing that the insurance market was
experiencing trouble in adjusting to the changed circumstances, Mr Earl placed
a different slant on the reasons for poor service. He told the Committee:
...many experienced people left the industry as a result of
mergers and amalgamations over the last 10 years, so we have many people who
have never really gone through a hard market such as we are seeing now, which
is probably the most volatile that I have seen in 30-odd years in the business.
They just do not know how to manage the market.[27]
Committee’s view
6.28
The Committee accepts that the insurance
industry is having difficulty adjusting to current conditions. However it is
concerned at the many reports it has received of what seems to be inappropriate
or exploitative conduct by insurers, particularly in relation to last minute
offers of renewal on exorbitant terms. The Committee considers that at the
least insurers should be obliged to give 14 days notice of proposed terms of
renewal or proposed refusal to renew a policy.
6.29
Section 58 of the Insurance Contracts Act
1984 goes part way towards this. An insurer must, at least 14 days before
expiry, advise ‘whether the insurer is prepared to negotiate to renew or extend
the cover’. Unfortunately this does not require the insurer (if it is inclined
to negotiate) to make a firm offer at the time of giving notice. It leaves the
way open for bargaining to continue up to moment of expiry—a situation which,
in current conditions, will naturally favour insurers. The Committee does not
think this is adequate consumer protection. The Committee considers that the
provision should be strengthened to require insurers to make a firm offer at
the time of giving notice.
Recommendation 9
The Committee recommends that the
Government propose an amendment to section 58 of the Insurance Contracts Act
1984 to ensure that insurers must give at least 14 days notice of the
proposed terms of a policy renewal or proposed refusal to renew a policy.
A captive market and consumer concerns
6.30
Ms Lynne Curran from Treasury pointed out that
if the insured is ‘dissatisfied with the service that it is getting from an
insurance company, it can always go to another insurance company’.[28]
6.31
While agreeing in part with this view, Mr West
from Royal and SunAlliance placed the problems facing consumers in the context
of today’s market. He stated:
...if people do not like the premium from one insurer, they have
been able to just go to another insurer, get another premium and maybe find it
lower. There has not been the need for that same rigour. Obviously, the
liability issue has made that significantly more difficult for people. It is
also more difficult as to how you regulate free enterprise in terms of how it
prices individual risk.[29]
6.32
Clearly, in the current market, the option for
dissatisfied customers to take their business elsewhere is limited. As mentioned
earlier, for some it is a captive market and under such market conditions the
need for consumer protection increases.[30]
Committee’s view
6.33
The Committee accepts that at the moment
consumers looking for liability coverage do not have the degree of choice they
may have had a few years ago. Evidence presented to the Committee shows that
the current situation has certainly brought to the fore the issue of consumer
protection particularly in the area of setting premiums.
6.34
The following section of the chapter looks at
consumer protection matters and the regulatory bodies relevant to the insurance
industry.
Current
reviews—the ACCC and the Productivity Commission
6.35
As mentioned in the report, a number of current
reviews of various aspects of the insurance industry are underway. Two of
particular relevance to consumer protection are: the one being undertaken by
the ACCC and the other by the Productivity Commission.
6.36
On 30 May 2002, the Minister for Revenue and
Assistant Treasurer, Senator Helen Coonan, announced that the ACCC would
monitor ‘market developments and premium prices and that the Commonwealth would
review the ACCC’s involvement if it becomes clear the cost savings being made
are not being passed through to consumers’. She stated that the Commonwealth would
provide ACCC with a standing brief to continue to update its report on a six
monthly basis over the course of the next two years.
This ongoing monitoring role will enable an assessment of
whether the insurance industry is adjusting premiums to take account of cost
savings, and provide the gauge for the effectiveness of measures taken on a
national basis to stabilise and contain management costs as reflected in public
liability premiums.[31]
6.37
The updated report was expected to be completed
by July 2002.
6.38
On 26 July 2002, the Parliamentary Secretary to
the Treasurer, Senator Ian Campbell, asked the Productivity Commission to
undertake a research study into Australian insurers’ claims management
practices in the public liability class of insurance and benchmark them against
world’s best practice. In undertaking the study, the Commission is to have
regard to a number of aspects dealing mainly with claims costs such as the
impact of litigation on claims costs, the proportion of claims settled out of
court, and the time taken to finalise claims. It is also to have regard to any
connection between claims management practices and the affordability, and the
availability of public liability insurance.[32]
6.39
The Commission is to report by 31 December 2002.
Committee’s view
6.40
The Committee welcomes both reviews and
recommends that their findings be made available to the public.
Recommendation 10
Noting that the first update of the ACCC’s insurance industry
market pricing review was made public in September, the Committee recommends
that all subsequent six monthly reports be made public pursuant to section 27B
of the Prices Surveillance Act 1983.
6.41
Although the reviews will provide information
and improve transparency in the industry, the Committee notes that their role
is limited to review not enforcement. In particular, the Committee notes that
the ACCC, at the moment, has no power to ensure that savings from reforms
currently being implemented are passed on to consumers.
6.42
The ACCC, however, may intervene under the Trade
Practices Act if anti-competitive conduct is thought to be involved. It cannot
initiate action for the purpose of ensuring that cost savings being achieved
through current reforms are being passed through to consumers. The Committee
does note, however, that Senator Coonan in the Joint Communique stated that the
Commonwealth will ‘review the ACCC’s involvement (including more formal
processes) if it becomes clear that cost savings are being made but not passed
through to customers’.[33]
6.43
An example of a measure that the Commonwealth
could take, and for which there is a precedent with the introduction of the
GST, is to introduce price exploitation legislation. Such a measure would build
into the Trade Practices Act a requirement that businesses do not engage in
price exploitation as a result of the implementation of reforms designed to
lower the cost of insurance premiums.[34]
Penalties would apply for breaches of the legislation.
6.44
The ACCC would also have the responsibility to
educate and inform business and consumers about their rights and obligations
under the proposed price exploitation legislation. It could undertake
activities, as it did with the GST, such as establish a price ‘hotline’, which
would allow consumers to alert the ACCC to any unjustified price increase in insurance
premiums, as well as develop an information network database of consumer,
community and volunteer groups, businesses and organisations.[35]
6.45
The Committee believes that under such
legislation, the ACCC would be an effective force in protecting consumers from
exploitation by ensuring that insurers pass on the full benefits of any savings
due to law reform designed to reduce the costs of claims.
Recommendation 11
The Committee recommends that the Trade Practices Act be amended
to allow the ACCC to take enforcement action to ensure that any savings or
benefits that accrue directly or indirectly from legislative reforms being
implemented throughout Australia to minimise insurance premiums are passed on
by the insurance companies to consumers.
6.46
While the Committee believes that the reviews
are important, they do not address the problems raised by witnesses about the
actual method of assessment of premiums and whether unfair cross-subsidisation
is occurring. In other words, they do not deal directly with the lack of
transparency, fairness and equity in the assessment of premiums. The studies
also do not appear to take account of some of the consumer interest matters
raised by witnesses such as the imposition of unrealistic deadlines to renew
insurance coverage.
Market integrity, consumer protection and the regulators
6.47
At the moment there are three main regulatory
bodies responsible for monitoring and regulating various aspects of the
insurance industry in Australia—APRA, the ACCC and ASIC. A number of witnesses,
however, spoke of the confusion that exists in ascertaining the particular area
of responsibility covered by the respective bodies. In commenting on the
monitoring and complaints process, Dr Rhonda Galbally, Chief Executive Officer,
Our Community, told the Committee that their organisation was ‘very unclear
about where complaints should go and how they could be dealt with’.[36]
6.48
Dr David Stephens, Policy Consultant, Australian
Council of Professions, also told the Committee that one of the difficulties
they have is determining who is responsible for matters such as consumer
protection.[37]
6.49
Ms Sue Weston, General Manager, Office of Small
Business, Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources, acknowledged that one
of the main areas of complaints raised by small business was the lack of
timeliness in notifying a consumer that cover was not being renewed. She,
however, was uncertain of where such a complaint could be taken. She told the
Committee ‘we need to have a look at the extent to which there is any mechanism
they feel they can go to complain’.[38]
6.50
The Committee now looks at the role of the three
regulatory bodies involved in the insurance industry with particular emphasis
given to consumer protection issues.
APRA
6.51
Under legislation, APRA is established for the
purpose of prudentially regulating bodies in the financial sector, which
includes general insurance, and for developing the policy to be applied in
performing that regulatory role. In providing regulation and developing policy,
APRA is to balance the objectives of financial safety and efficiency,
competition, contestability and competitive neutrality.
6.52
As mentioned earlier, one of APRA’s key
responsibilities is to ensure the financial viability of insurance companies.
It told the Committee:
APRA is inter alia responsible for general insurance
safety and soundness in the interests of policyholders, which is essentially a
matter of helping keep insurance companies solvent and liquid, and thus able to
pay claims as they become due. APRA does not regulate insurance prices (premium
levels), as this would be inconsistent with the Australian tradition of
financial deregulation over the past 20 years. Nor is APRA responsible for
consumer protection matters more generally, these are the province of the
Australian Securities & Investments Commission.[39]
6.53
The Committee accepts that APRA does not have a
consumer protection role apart from ensuring that insurance companies are able
to meet claims. As discussed in the previous chapter, as part of its
responsibility as a regulator, APRA collects and analyses data on the insurance
industry. The Committee has already made recommendations in this area.
6.54
In regard to APRA’s role as a prudential
regulator, the Committee refers to APRA’s recent performance which has drawn
strong criticism. Media reports suggest that public confidence in APRA has
suffered and that the failure of HIH further eroded APRA’s credibility as a
strong and active regulator.[40]
6.55
In August 2001, the then Minister for Financial
Services and Regulation, Mr Joe Hockey, acknowledged that the management and
regulation of general insurance had been subject to intense scrutiny from the
media, State and Federal politicians and the community. During a keynote
address, he told the audience that:
The failure of HIH is clear evidence that our reforms to general
insurance are absolutely necessary. It has also given us the opportunity to
reflect on what additional improvements could be made.[41]
6.56
In turning to government reforms intended to
improve and strengthen the insurance industry, Mr Hockey mentioned the
introduction of the General Insurance Reform Bill 2001. He noted that the
Government had decided to amend the Bill with a view to ‘harmonise and improve
enforcement capabilities across all APRA-regulated institutions’. He stated:
It was decided to bring forward these particular amendments in
response to APRA’s dealing with HIH. The Act’s current enforcement provisions
lack flexibility and require the establishment of a high level of certainty by
APRA before it can take appropriate action.[42]
6.57
Also recognising the need to improve the
regulatory regime under APRA, Mr Graeme Thompson, CEO of APRA, conceded in
August 2001 that ‘the few months since the HIH Insurance went into provisional
liquidation have demonstrated sharply some of the perils of prudential
regulation, as well as opening some opportunities for us’. He expected that the
Royal Commission on HIH, would ‘show that not only did APRA inherit a flawed
regulatory system for general insurers, we inherited a deeply flawed company in
HIH’.[43]
6.58
Concern about prudential regulation of the
general insurance industry had been current for at least five years before
then. Senator Conroy noted that ‘In 1995, the ISC—the predecessor to APRA—first
mooted changes to general insurance prudential standards....’
So here is the key: in 1995, the ISC stopped talking about
trying to lift the standard...After a lengthy period of consultation, APRA
released a draft prudential standard on risk management for general insurers on
13 September 2000. It has taken five years for ISC and APRA just to get to the
draft guideline.[44]
6.59
The Committee regrets that it took so long to
establish a new prudential regulation regime. The General Insurance Reform Bill
was passed on 29 August 2001 and received assent on 19 September 2001.
Committee’s view
6.60
The Committee believes that in light of the
recognised weaknesses in the regulatory system for the insurance industry, a
close watch must be kept on the implementation of the legislative reforms
recently introduced to the Insurance Act to ensure that they produce the
intended benefits. The Committee also suggests that it is important for APRA to
now prove itself as an effective and assiduous regulator in ensuring the
prudential soundness of insurance companies. Its success in this area will help
to better prepare those in the industry to adjust to changing market conditions
and to prevent severe disruptions, such as the one Australia is currently
experiencing. An efficient, strong and competent regulator will go some way to
restore public confidence in the insurance industry.
Recommendation 12
The Committee recommends that the Government more actively monitor
the activities of APRA and ensure that it has adequate powers and resources as
well as a commitment to diligently supervise the industry.
6.61
The Committee also notes concerns that have been
raised about organisations such as medical defence organisations that are
outside APRA’s purview.
Medical
defence organisations (MDOs)
6.62
The National Farmers’ Federation maintained that
either medical defence funds are insurers or not. It stated:
If they are insurers, they should be subject to the same
requirements as other insurers, particularly prudential and reporting
requirements. This could have prevented the collapse of UMP. On the other hand,
if the defence funds are not insurers, it is not clear why doctors are allowed
to practice without insurance.[45]
6.63
Mr Nigel Ray from Treasury explained to the
Committee that medical indemnity is, indeed, different from other types of
insurance. Their operations are formally conducted on a discretionary basis and
so fall outside the APRA regulatory regime. He stated:
As it is currently structured it is not technically insurance
and it is not provided by insurance companies but, rather, by mutual
structures—which...are called medical defence organisations. Unlike insurance
products, which impose a contractual obligation upon insurance companies to
honour a policy when an insured event takes place, doctors are covered by
discretionary indemnity—that is, MDOs have an absolute discretion to deny cover
in any circumstance.[46]
6.64
MDOs, at the moment, are not covered by the Insurance
Act 1973, which has enabled them to do a range of things while not having
to hold the sorts of reserves that the insurance companies are obliged to hold.
Dr Robert Bain, Secretary General, Australian Medical Association, stated that
the Association would like to see some:
APRA requirements on the MDOs so that all of them have to meet
minimum capital. There is also the question of common accounting standards.
They have all adopted slightly different accounting conventions, with the most
starkly different being at UMP, which had not brought the tail of what are
called IBNR—incurred but not reported—incidents onto their balance sheet.[47]
6.65
The Insurance Australia Group agreed with the
view of bringing medical defence organisations under the General Insurance Act.
It stated:
The same prudential and reporting standards should apply to all
providers of general insurance, regardless of ownership structure, to ensure
consistency in the management of long tail classes and full funding of all
premium pools.[48]
6.66
As part of the Government’s longer term strategy
to deal with the difficulties in the medical indemnity market, the Prime
Minister, Mr John Howard, proposed on 31 May 2002 to improve transparency in
the financial reporting of MDOs and to bring all of their insurance business
into the prudential framework for general insurers.[49] This measure was only one key
element in a number of proposals. He announced that it was the Government’s
intention that ‘a new comprehensive framework of measures’ would be in place
before 31 December.
6.67
According to Mr Ray, the Department of the
Treasury is currently consulting on the possible measures to bring MDOs into
the APRA framework. As an example, Treasury is considering ‘requiring their
services, or at least their insurance-like services, to be offered via a
contract of insurance’.[50]
Committee’s view
6.68
The Committee supports the consultative process
that is taking place and hopes that it will lead to better regulation of MDOs.
The Committee, however, suggests that the current consultations take a broader
view of insurance providers and, with a view to assessing the level of
protection that they offer to Australian consumers, give consideration to
unregulated state insurers, all mutual insurers and overseas insurers providing
cover in Australia. By bringing all unauthorised and insurance-like providers
under the purview of APRA, the regulator is better able to appreciate how the
industry works as a whole including consumer protection matters.
ACCC
6.69
The ACCC is an independent statutory authority
with responsibility for administering the Trade Practices Act 1974 and
the Prices Surveillance Act 1983. The Trade Practices Act covers matters
such as anti-competitive practices, unconscionable conduct, industry codes,
unfair practices, product safety and information and product liability. The
Prices Surveillance Act has three main functions which in broad terms allow the
ACCC, under certain circumstances, to vet proposed price rises, to hold
inquiries into pricing practices and to monitor prices, costs and profits of an
industry or business. [51]
6.70
The ACCC told the Committee that it has a
‘fairly limited role in relation to insurance’. It noted that it has a
reporting role which started in June 2001 when it was asked by the then
Minister for Financial Services and Regulation, Mr Joe Hockey, to report on the
general insurance industry and premium increases following the collapse of the
HIH group of insurance companies. The ACCC reported in March 2002 and, as noted
earlier, has been asked to update the report which it anticipated would be
finalised by the end of July 2002. It is now available.[52] As already discussed, the ACCC
has also been asked to monitor insurance premiums over a two year period and to
report on whether they reflect the legislative changes that are currently being
made or proposed by Commonwealth and state governments.[53]
6.71
The Committee, however, believes that more is
required than simply monitoring and recommended earlier that the ACCC be given
the authority to ensure that savings from reforms are passed on.
6.72
The evidence before this Committee clearly
demonstrates that there is wide support for the work of the ACCC in monitoring
insurance pricing.[54]
ACROD submitted:
The dramatic rise in premiums, the widespread refusal to renew
or offer new public liability cover, the contradictory signals over
profitability, the failure and collapse of several companies (apart from HIH),
the uncertain consequences of current rationalisations and the industry’s
reluctance to disclose appropriate data—among many other things—all point to an
industry in denial. Traditionally cloistered, the private insurance sector has
unwittingly been subjected to critical public scrutiny. If only for the
industry’s own sake, a formal investigation of the more damaging aspects of
recent developments should be undertaken. From the viewpoint of disability
services, the most appropriate subject and mechanism would be an investigation
by the ACCC into premium rises of above 25% in the non-profit sector. The
purpose would be not so much to detect collusion as to explicate pricing
policy.[55]
6.73
Mr Paul Orton, General Manager Policy,
Australian Business Ltd, wanted the ACCC’s role to be maintained so that they
could be confident that ‘we have a competitive public liability insurance
market and that we see evidence of the state of competition through increased
capacity coming into the industry and new products that better deal with
particular sectoral insurance needs’.[56]
6.74
The ACCC informed the Committee that it has a
role in relation to consumer protection provisions in the Trade Practices Act,
notably, the warranty and liability provisions and the provisions relating to
misleading or deceptive conduct.
6.75
It is in this area of consumer protection that
confusion exists about the precise responsibility of the ACCC. The ACCC, under
the Trade Practices Act, is responsible for consumer protection generally, but
excluding financial services. ASIC, under the ASIC Act, is responsible for
consumer protection in relation to financial services—which includes insurance.
In these Acts ‘consumer protection’ refers to controlling a variety of
objectionable behaviours, of which the most important is ‘misleading or
deceptive conduct.’ However, separate provisions apply to ‘unconscionable
conduct’. Both authorities have continuing responsibilities in relation to
unconscionable conduct in the supply of financial services.[57]
6.76
This framework does not make it clear to whom
consumers should complain when they feel that pricing for public liability and
professional indemnity services is too high or inconsistent with previous
prices or policy coverage. Given that the ACCC is already monitoring pricing
within the public liability and professional indemnity insurance market to
ensure market competitiveness, and the Committee has recommended the provision
of enhanced enforcement powers (see paragraphs 6.43–45), it would be prudent
for the ACCC to handle complaints alleging price exploitation. The additional
information flow would provide a deeper understanding of the market and lead to
greater competition.
6.77
In turning to the more general aspects of
consumer protection, Mr Robert Antich from the ACCC explained that:
Insurance is a part of the financial
services role that ASIC now has after 11 March this year as part of the
Financial Services Reform Act. In terms of insurance itself...we do not have a
role in relation to consumer protection.
...our understanding is that ASIC would have that primary
responsibility in relation to consumer protection relating to insurance
services.[58]
6.78
Mr Brian Cassidy, Chief Executive Officer, the
ACCC, explained further that up till March, the ACCC would have potentially
been able to take action in relation to conduct that was thought to be
misleading or deceptive but that ASIC now had that role.[59] He also noted that the ACCC
has joint responsibility with ASIC for the ‘unconscionable conduct in business
transactions provisions insofar as they relate to the provision of financial
services’.[60]
6.79
Obtaining a clear understanding of who has
responsibility for consumer protection in regard to insurance matters is
complicated by the recent transfer of power to ASIC. Mr Antich explained:
That has been a source of discussion between us and ASIC in
relation to how this is handled. Obviously you will have investigations that
will straddle that date; you will have conduct that will happen before and
after that date [11 March 2002]. It is a very live issue and it is one we are
well aware of. There is a process in place and dialogue with ASIC so we can
have an orderly handover of those sorts of issues.[61]
6.80
Mr Sean Hughes from ASIC told the Committee that
they are aware of a number of consumer concerns in relation to accessing cover
and the terms in which the cover is offered. He told the Committee that they
refer those consumers and those inquiries elsewhere—to the ACCC—because it is
not within ASIC’s bailiwick. Mr Peter Kell stated:
It is the ACCC’s jurisdiction to cover the general price issues,
as long as the price is clearly and accurately disclosed and there is no
misleading information given about it; those are the issues that we are
concerned with.[62]
6.81
The confusion may in part stem from the
statements concerned about consumer interests and protection made by the ACCC.
For example in March 2002, the Chair of the ACCC, Professor Fels, suggested
that consumers needed clear information about the increased charges for their
individual insurance policies and that insurance companies should review and
improve their inquiry and complaints handling systems to help consumers who
want to query increases.[63]
6.82
The Committee endorses the views of Professor
Fels. However, it is also evident that members of the public are not generally
aware of the roles of the regulators in the general insurance market.
Committee’s view
6.83
The Committee understands that the transfer of
consumer protection responsibility in relation to financial services to ASIC
was to ensure that ASIC would be concerned with all aspects of financial
products. Thus, consumers would know that they could approach ASIC on any
matter related to financial products. Despite this transfer of power from the
ACCC to ASIC, the line separating them in their respective roles in consumer
protection is not widely understood.
6.84
The Committee believes strongly that the roles
of the ACCC and ASIC in relation to these matters must be placed beyond doubt.
Recommendation 13
The Committee recommends that, in close consultation, the ACCC and
ASIC review and report publicly on their respective statutory obligations in
regard to consumer protection and market integrity in the insurance industry
with a view to:
- clarifying their respective responsibilities, giving
particular attention to whether there is any unnecessary overlap; and
- establishing whether, in their opinion, the legislation
provides adequate and appropriate consumer protection in the insurance industry
and, if not, identifying the gaps or weaknesses in consumer protection,
including the prices and insurance coverage that are being offered to
consumers.
The Committee further recommends that the ACCC and ASIC actively
promote their roles in consumer protection for all financial products,
including general insurance.
ASIC
6.85
ASIC is an independent statutory body with the
responsibility to enforce company and financial services laws to protect
consumers, investors and creditors.[64]
6.86
The Australian Securities and Investments
Commission Act 2001 states clearly that ASIC has the function of monitoring
and promoting market integrity and consumer protection in relation to the
Australian financial system.[65]
ASIC also has powers conferred on it by a number of other acts including the Insurance
Contracts Act 1984.[66]
6.87
Under this
Act, ASIC has the power to do all things that are necessary or
convenient to be done in connection with the administration of the legislation.
The Act is intended to ensure that ‘a fair balance is struck between the
interests of insurers, insureds and other members of the public and so that the
provisions included in such contracts, and the practices of insurers in
relation to such contracts, operate fairly, and for related purposes’.
6.88
Without limiting
the generality of that power, ASIC has power inter alia:
- to promote the development of
facilities for handling inquiries in relation to insurance matters;
- to monitor complaints in
relation to insurance matters;
- to monitor legal judgments,
industry trends and the development of community expectations that are, or are
likely to be, of relevance to the efficient operation of the Act; and
- to promote the education of
the insurance industry, the legal profession and consumers as to the objectives
and requirements of the Act.[67]
6.89
The Act clearly
states that ‘a contract of liability insurance is a contract of general
insurance that provides insurance cover in respect of the insured’s liability
for loss or damage caused to a person who is not the insured’.[68] These
responsibilities are consistent with ASIC’s powers as defined in the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (FSR Act).
6.90
The new licensing and product disclosure regimes
introduced under the FSR Act apply to insurance companies and insurance
agents and brokers. ASIC informed the Committee that under the new legislation,
an insurance company will need to hold an Australian financial services licence
if it carries on a financial services business otherwise than as a
representative of a licensee.[69]
By the end of the two-year transition period, agents and brokers will need to
be appropriately authorised as representatives of an Australian financial
services licensee or need to hold an Australian financial services licence.
6.91
General insurance policies are deemed to be
‘financial products’. Part 7.9 of the Corporations Act contains a number of
requirements relating to financial product disclosure and the issue and sale of
financial products. Most important is that ‘regulated persons’ are required to
give a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) to retail clients in certain
situations, including where personal advice recommending the acquisition of a
particular product is given, or where a person offers to issue or arrange for
the issue of a financial product.
6.92
The PDS must contain sufficient information so
that a retail client may make an informed decision about whether to purchase a
financial product. The statement is to include information about fees payable
in respect of a financial product, the risks and benefits of a financial
product, and significant characteristics of a financial product.[70]
6.93
It does not appear, however, that public
liability and professional indemnity insurance is subject to the disclosure
provisions.[71]
Statutory
dispute resolution procedures
6.94
Under the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (FSR
Act) a licensee has certain obligations. Section 912A directs a licensee, if those financial services are provided to persons
as retail clients, to have a dispute resolution system that complies with
specified conditions set down in the legislation.[72] A dispute resolution system
must consist of
- an internal dispute resolution procedure that
- complies with
standards, and requirements, made or approved by ASIC; and
- covers complaints
against the licensee made by retail clients in connection with the provision of
all financial services covered by the licence; and
- membership of one
or more external dispute resolution schemes that:
- is, or are,
approved by ASIC.
6.95
Under section 915,
ASIC may suspend or cancel the licence if the licensee has not complied with,
or ASIC has reason to believe it will not comply with, its obligations which,
as noted above, includes having a dispute resolution system.
6.96
Policy Statement 139, issued by ASIC, provides
advice on how it approves external complaints resolution schemes operating in
the financial system. It contains ‘a common set of guidelines developed for
broad application’. In accordance with this statement, ASIC approved a scheme
in August 2000, known as the General Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Scheme,
operated by Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Ltd (IEC), as an approved
dispute resolution scheme.[73]
IEC is an independent company funded by participating insurers. It receives
about 90,000 to 100,000 inquiries per year.[74]
6.97
The Committee is concerned that both the
disclosure requirements and dispute resolution provisions of the FSR Act do not
effectively address the insurance problems revealed in the inquiry. Firstly, a
dispute resolution scheme applies only to ‘retail clients’ as defined in the
FSR Act. The definition is limited to individuals and small businesses, and is
limited to their dealings in respect of certain listed classes of insurance.
The listed classes do not include public liability or professional indemnity
insurance (though the list can be enlarged by regulation).[75] ASIC has advised the Committee
that no regulations have been made under this section to include public
liability and professional indemnity insurance.[76] Secondly, it is unclear
whether a complaint about price exploitation in a proposed policy renewal is
within scope; and if so, it is unclear whether IEC (which currently handles
only disputes over claims) is equipped to deal with it.
6.98
The concerns about the possible inadequacy of
the legislation are reflected in the terms of reference of the General
Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Scheme. The terms identify certain classes
of insurance, which includes professional indemnity insurance, that are outside
the terms of reference. The omission of public liability from the insurances
covered by the terms of reference suggest that this class of insurance is also
excluded from coverage. Not only are the classes of insurance limited but those
actually entitled to refer a dispute to the Scheme are also confined to include
natural persons and parties who conduct a small business. The definition of
small business is narrower than that given in the ASIC Act.[77]
6.99
Mr Peter Kell, ASIC, told the Committee that
under the FSR Act, ASIC had asked IEC to reconsider their coverage of that
scheme to ensure that it is compliant with the new regime. In particular,
according to Mr Kell, they will have to ensure that they can deal with
complaints about arguments about disclosure of premiums or costs, or arguments
about incorrect information recorded about details that lead to disputes down
the track when claims arise.[78]
6.100
The Committee, however, would like to see the
matter given urgent attention. It believes that the scheme, as it now stands
and approved by ASIC, fails to offer adequate consumer protection to a range of
insureds.
Committee’s view
6.101
The Committee regrets that the statutory
complaint-handling procedures now in place do not meet the needs of the groups
most affected by the insurance crisis, particularly not-for-profit
organisations. The Committee acknowledges the policy intent of the FSR Act that
the complaint-handling procedure should be an additional protection available
to retail but not wholesale clients.[79]
However it is regrettable that not-for-profit organisations have been excluded
from the definition of ‘retail clients’. Furthermore, the Committee sees no
logic in limiting the classes of insurance to which disclosure provisions or
complaint-handling procedures apply.
Recommendation 14
- The Committee recommends that the Government amend the FSR Act
to allow not-for-profit organisations to be included in the definition of ‘retail clients’.
- The Committee recommends that the Government, by regulation,
include public liability insurance and professional indemnity insurance in the
classes of insurance covered by the dispute resolution provisions of the FSR
Act.
- The Committee recommends that ASIC monitor the effectiveness
of the dispute resolution provisions and report on this annually to the
Parliament.
- The Committee recommends that ASIC review, as a matter of
urgency, the General Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Scheme and in
consultation with the Insurance Council of Australia ensure that it covers
adequately public liability and professional indemnity insurance and
not-for-profit organisations. Further that it re-examine definitions in the
terms of reference, such as small business, to ensure that they are consistent
with definitions in Commonwealth legislation.
General
Insurance Code of Practice
6.102
Before changes to
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989, under
section 12FA ASIC had the function of promoting the adoption of, and approving
and monitoring compliance with, industry standards and codes of practice
(including standards and codes in relation to the resolution of disputes
between the providers of financial services and consumers).[80]
6.103
Section 113 of the
Insurance Act 1973 also provided for ASIC to approve a code of conduct.[81] This
section was repealed by the Financial Services Reform (Consequential
Provisions) Act 2001.
6.104
Provisions to
allow ASIC to approve codes of conduct have now been included in the Financial
Services Reform Act.[82]
6.105
The General Insurance Code of Practice appears
to offer another avenue for improving consumer protection. IEC is responsible
for the administration of the code, which was approved by ASIC in August 2000.
It is a self-regulatory code of practice to promote good relations between
insurers, agents and consumers and good insurance practice by describing
standards of good practice and service. The code requires participating
insurers to establish internal and external dispute handling procedures and
insurers may be penalised if they fail to meet the code’s requirements.[83]
6.106
The Committee notes the principles espoused in
the code, which include having regard to the duty of utmost good faith and the
need for effective competition and cost efficiency being promoted in the
general insurance industry. As well, the code directs insurers prior to each
renewal ‘to provide to consumers information on any changes to the policy being
renewed in plain language and in a format aimed to assist comprehension by consumers’.
The code states further that:
Where an insurer declines cover or refuses to renew a policy
because of factors that do not relate to the assessment of the particular risk
(For example, the insurer has ceased to offer the cover) then the insurer shall
notify the consumer of that fact.[84]
6.107
The code, however, is narrow in focus and has
the same shortcomings as the General Insurance Enquiries and Complaints Scheme.
The present Code of Practice is expressed to apply only to individuals, and
only relating to insurance for private or domestic use. This excludes
not-for-profit-organisations and small businesses. The classes of insurance
covered exclude public liability and professional indemnity.[85] There are no provisions for
dealing with complaints about price exploitation in proposed policy renewals.
Any one of these points would prevent the Code from being useful to the groups
suffering most from the insurance crisis. The Committee sees no logical reason
for these exclusions.
6.108
The code is subject to review every three years
and a new exposure draft is expected to be released soon.[86] The Committee considers that
the new code should address the above concerns. In particular, the Committee
suggests that definitions in the code be expanded to ensure a more comprehensive
coverage of insurance business. The definition of the business covered should
be broadened to specifically include public liability and professional
indemnity insurance.
6.109
The Law Council of Australia suggested that
insurers ought to put into their voluntary code of practice some obligation to
provide proper notification of substantial increases as well as a possible
obligation not to increase premiums by more than a certain percentage unless
there is a good underwriting reason.[87]
6.110
Actuarial advice provided by Cumpston Sarjeant
Pty Ltd contained more specific suggestions. It recommended that the code
include an objective that would ‘require insurers to provide reasonable premium
stability to existing clients, and to accept new clients at reasonable premiums’.
It further suggested that a new section be inserted to the effect that:
Insurers shall renew the insurance of an existing client, at a
premium not more than 50% higher than the previous premium, unless there is
evidence that the risks under the policy have materially changed, or there has
been significant past misrepresentation.
Insurers shall accept a new client, previously insured by
another insurer, at a premium not more than 100% of the previous premium,
unless there is evidence that the risks under the policy have materially
changed, or there has been significant past misrepresentation.
Insurers shall contribute underwriting and claims data to
statistical schemes intended to provide reasonable claim cost estimates for
different risks.[88]
Committee’s view
6.111
The Committee does not adopt any particular
detailed view on these points. It suggests, however, that the insurance
industry and ASIC use such recommendations as a starting point to review the
code.
Recommendation 15
- The Committee recommends that the General Insurance Code of
Practice be revised so that it provides remedies for community groups and small
businesses that are affected by price exploitation in relation to public
liability or professional indemnity policies.
- The Committee recommends that Insurance Enquiries and
Complaints Ltd submit the revised code for ASIC’s approval under the FSR Act.
Insurance Ombudsman
6.112
Our Community recommended that ‘serious
consideration be given to the appointment of an Independent Insurance Industry
Ombudsman with the power to investigate and decide on cases referred to it.’ It
suggested that such a measure would ‘assist in ensuring that the introduction
of tort reform by States leads to lower premiums.’[89]
Committee’s view
6.113
The Committee believes that the establishment of
an Insurance Ombudsman would add another level of bureaucracy to an already
unclear situation. The Committee has already recommended that the ACCC should
have increased powers to control price exploitation (see paragraph 6.45). This
should include the collection of consumer complaints in regard to price and
coverage. The Committee has also recommended the promotion of the respective
roles of the ACCC and ASIC in the insurance market (see paragraph 6.84). These
measures should significantly improve consumer protection and market integrity
for all consumers.
SENATOR JACINTA COLLINS
Chair
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