Chapter 2 - Nature and Scale of the Problem
Risk to the tax system
2.1
The MMS matter is of major significance in terms
of number of schemes, participants and the risk to the integrity of the tax
system. In its November 2000 submission to the inquiry, the ATO reported that
it had taken action on 231 schemes involving 57,667 participants and claimed
deductions totalling $4.3 billion. An additional 45 schemes involving 8425
participants and totalling $555 million were also under examination.[1] The potential risk to the
revenue is about 40 per cent of the overall claimed deductions of approximately
$4.8 billion.
2.2
The ATO groups ‘mass marketed tax effective
schemes’ into the following three categories:
- round-robin schemes, including non-recourse financing, often in
agriculture, afforestation and franchises;
- certain film schemes, with guaranteed returns that are, in
effect, a return of part of the invested funds; and
- employee benefit arrangements (EBAs).[2]
2.3
In this report the Committee’s focus is on the
first two categories. The evidence to the Committee concentrates overwhelmingly
on the first category of schemes, namely the agribusiness sector (eg,
vineyards, olives and tea tree and timber plantations) and franchise
arrangements, although some participants are involved in a mix of schemes which
include film projects. The Committee intends to address EBAs in its final
report.
2.4
In the ATO’s view, the fundamental compliance
problem or ‘tax mischief’ common to these schemes relates to their financing
as distinct from their commercial nature or business activity. The ATO contends
that in many cases participants’ investments were largely or wholly funded
through tax deductions. Relatively little private capital is said to have been
at risk. As the Commissioner of Taxation stated:
The underlying [business] activity is not itself the issue of
concern here. What is of concern to us [the ATO] in a range of cases are the
financial arrangements associated with the investments. These often have the
effect that the financing of the activity is significantly funded by taxpayers
generally from the tax system.[3]
2.5
In some cases, the tax deductions claimed by
scheme participants often exceeded the amount of money invested; that is, the
schemes were geared in such a way as to generate a ‘tax profit’ for
participants.[4]
2.6
In disallowing participants’ deductions, the ATO
cites a number of defining characteristics found in mass marketed arrangements,
including:
- apart from subscribing to the scheme, participants have no
hands-on involvement and therefore are not carrying on a business;
- financial arrangements involve limited- or non-recourse loans,
often based on round robin arrangements;
- high up-front management fees geared to create inflated tax
deductions;
- participants have little or no practical control over the
scheme’s management;
- limited exposure to risk; and
- in some cases, a guarantee from promoters to reverse the
transaction if claimed tax deductions are not allowed.
2.7
Owing to a combination or all of these factors,
the ATO maintains that the participants invested in mass marketed schemes for
the ‘dominant purpose’ of obtaining a tax benefit, and because of that the
anti-avoidance provisions of Part IVA of the Tax Act apply. By applying Part
IVA the ATO has imposed penalty tax, in addition to disallowing participants’
deductions and levying interest charges dating back to when the participant
claimed their deduction.
2.8
It should be noted that, while the ATO has
applied Part IVA to all the schemes under consideration, the level of penalties
imposed is not uniform but ranges from 50 per cent to 5 per cent, depending on
the level of tax mischief involved. According to the ATO:
Because Part IVA does apply, the penalty provision imposes a
statutory penalty of 50 per cent. We recognise that in most cases that statutory
penalty of 50 per cent would not be appropriate for these taxpayers and we
looked at opportunities of being able to reduce that. The way we did that was
to give them the opportunity to make voluntary disclosures and in some cases we
also exercised the statutory discretion to reduce the penalty to five per cent.
We also invited taxpayers to present their individual circumstances. That may
be relevant in some cases.[5]
2.9
The application of Part IVA is one of the most
contentious issues in the inquiry for several reasons. The first is due to the
penalty charges included in the tax debt many taxpayers face. The second reason
from the participants’ view is the inference under Part IVA that they are ‘tax
cheats’. The Committee examines the ATO’s application of Part IVA in later
sections of the report.
The human and social cost of
the problem
2.10
Based on the revenue and number of participants
involved in mass marketed arrangements, the average tax debt per participant is
over $75,000. While the amount of debt is obviously spread unevenly across
participants, this average figure in its own right indicates the high
individual burden for large numbers of those affected.
2.11
In terms of the magnitude of the human cost at
stake, the Committee heard disturbing evidence of the wider ramifications that
this large-scale debt represents. In brief, on a personal scale the evidence to
the inquiry points to the:
- wipe out of personal and family savings and retirement funds;
- selling off of major assets, particularly homes and in some cases
private vehicles and furniture;
- in some cases, selling of businesses;
- increasing likelihood of widespread bankruptcy among
participants, which in some cases may disqualify people from certain jobs, eg, the police force;
- growing incidence of stress, depression and related illness;
- workplace risks due to the impact on concentration and stress;
- relationship/marriage breakdown and;
- threats of suicide, including anecdotal evidence of some suicide.
2.12
The Committee considers that the above
side-effects are not random and isolated but are endemic and widespread amongst
the affected population. A witness from an accounting firm with 800 clients
caught up in mass marketed arrangements, stated:
These clients ... have now received amended notices of assessment
going back up to six years, leaving them with often massive tax debts, which
they dispute, and a full recourse loan in some cases. So far we are aware of
four suicides directly caused by this situation—thankfully not our clients. Two
of our clients have gone bankrupt and another into part 10 administration.[6]
2.13
Reports of wider social and community
repercussions would tend to support the conclusion that the personal toll of
this problem is commonplace. For instance, the Committee notes the following
report based on survey findings from the Goldfields Community Legal Centre in
Kalgoorlie:
Now I would like to tell you a few stories of the devastation.
In general terms, they refer to financial ruin, failed retirement plans,
insufficient time to recover, given the percentage of people who are over 50 or
even over 45, and the fear they have of having to live on a benefit. They speak
of the loss of esteem, confidence and their friends. They speak of broken
relationships and they speak of the cost of these to them and their families in
human health terms and in monetary terms. They fear the loss of their
homes—more than anything they fear this. Many of them are unable to borrow from
banks because they have insufficient equity. They speak of selling assets to
repay the debt, and within that there are shares, savings, superannuation,
jewellery, family heirlooms, antiques and cars. Often they have downgraded
their homes and their vehicles in order to be able to fulfil the ATO
obligations.[7]
2.14
The scale of the tax debt behind the financial,
human and social costs cited above is symptomatic of several factors. The debt
comprises primary tax (ie, the tax related to the original deductions) and
additional penalty tax and interest charges (as detailed in paragraph 2.7). The
interest component is obviously a function of the time that has passed since
the deduction was claimed and the disallowance notice issued by the ATO.
2.15
The Committee believes that two points are
relevant in this matter. The first is the size of the tax debt, particularly the
high compounding interest component, and the lengthy time lag from when
participants invested in schemes and claimed deductions to when the ATO
eventually moved to disallow those deductions. Although the ATO advised that it
acted within 12 to 18 months to deny deductions claimed in up to 90 per cent of
cases, in some instances the time lag was approximately two to three years, and
in others the delay reached up to six years. The factors behind those delays
are discussed in chapter 4. It should be noted that under the self assessment
tax system the ATO does have the legal right to conduct such reassessments (as
is discussed in the next chapter).
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