Labor members minority report
1. Introduction
Labor members do not support the establishment of the
Inspector-General of Tax on the basis that it does not fulfil its purpose of
being an advocate for tax payers and nor does it have the capacity to
significantly improve tax administration.
The suggestion that the office should be set up regardless
of its deficiencies in order to give the office ‘a chance to succeed’[1]
and ‘hopefully make the position work’[2]
is not considered to be sufficient reason to warrant passage of the Bill.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (ICAA)
submission states that they are concerned that the position:
‘will not have the necessary authority, independence and
resources to make a real difference to the quality of taxation administration
in Australia.’[3]
Labor members believe that whilst improvements in tax
administration are essential, establishing an Inspector-General of Taxation is
not the most effective means to achieve change.
By using the existing structures such as the Taxation
Ombudsman and the Auditor-General as the foundation for identifying systemic
issues and giving these offices the resources they require, tax administration
could be significantly improved.
Labor therefore opposes the Bill.
The Labor members wish to note the following issues in
particular.
2. Failure to fulfil its purpose
Following the Committee’s investigations, it became clear
that the purpose of the Inspector-General of Tax was as an advocate for
taxpayers as well as a source of advice to government.
The Labor members note that during his Second Reading
Speech, Mr Costello noted that the purpose of the Bill is to:
‘provide a new source of independent advice to the government.
The role will act as an advocate for all taxpayers, including Australian
business ........’[4]
The Bill fails to achieve its purpose of being an advocate
for all taxpayers.
The recommendation by the Committee for the Government to
consider including a statement that the Inspector-General’s role is to ‘promote
the advocacy of taxpayer concerns’ is a superficial response to this problem.
As noted by Labor during the debate of this Bill, the lack
of independence and transparency afforded to the Inspector-General renders the
office ineffectual in advocating the needs of all taxpayers.
The problem arises from the structure of the
Inspector-General not how its purpose is defined.
3. Lack of independence
General
The Inspector-General cannot be an effective advocate for
taxpayers as it lacks independence.
This is a fundamental flaw of the Bill.
The role is not independent as:
- The Inspector-General is required to report direct to the
Minister (clause 10).
- The Minister has a discretion as to whether to release the
Inspector-General’s report (clause 11).
- The Minister can set the Inspector-General’s work program by
directing them to conduct a review (clause 8(2)). The Inspector-General will
be required to act on the directions of the Minister as a priority over their
own work program. Given the limited resources available to the
Inspector-General, this is a significant constraint on the independence of the
office.
Reporting to the Minister
The Labor Members are of the
view that to be an effective advocate for taxpayers, the Inspector-General
would need to have the power to review and report on problems in tax
administration including those problems that may cause embarrassment to the
Government.
As the role is currently
drafted, the Treasury Minister has the power to withhold such reports.
This concern was reflected by the ICAA in their submission
which noted that the Minister’s discretion whether to make reports public:
‘could be used inappropriately and limit the transparency of the
Inspector-General’s role. For example, the Minister could decide not to make
public a report by the Inspector-General, to avoid embarrassment to the
Government or the ATO.’[5]
The Business Coalition for Tax Reform noted in their
submission that:
‘..taxpayer confidence in, and the overall effectiveness of, the
Inspector-General will depend critically on the ability of the public to
examine its reports.’[6]
In addition, submissions from the following organisations
stated that the Inspector-General should be able to report publicly: the
Corporate Tax Association (CTA), International Banks and Securities Association
of Australia (IBSA), Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD),
Taxpayers Australia and the National Institute of Accountants.
The Labor Members note that
the Committee recommends that the Inspector-General’s reports are tabled in
Parliament and supports this recommendation.
Power to direct a review
The Labor Members are concerned that the Minister’s power to
direct the Inspector-general to investigate particular issues has the potential
to monopolise the limited resources of the office.
These concerns were raised in various submissions including
the AICD. The AICD submission stated that the Minister’s power to direct the
Inspector-General’s work program:
‘has the potential to overload limited resources and compromise
other independent work that the Inspector-General wishes to undertake.’[7]
The Business Coalition for Tax Reform (BCTR) submission
notes that:
‘A perception of a conflict of interest could arise if the
Minister responsible to the Parliament for the administration of taxation could
influence the reporting of the Inspector-General in this way.’[8]
The Labor members believe that the independence of the
Inspector-General is fundamentally compromised by the Minister’s power to
direct the Inspector-General’s work program.
4. Access to the Inspector-General
The Labor Members also query whether the Inspector-General
would be an advocate for ‘all taxpayers’.
In contrast to the Auditor-General, there is no formal
consultation process to provide taxpayers with an opportunity to access the
Inspector-General.
The lack of a formal consultation mechanism impedes the
general public’s ability to access the Inspector-General.
Following the Committee’s investigations it became clear
that access to the Inspector-General had not been thoroughly considered. The
Bill does not address this issue.
Big business has the resources to advise the
Inspector-General of their concerns whereas small investors, with fewer
resources, have less ability to access the Inspector-General.
In light of the limited resources available to the
Inspector-General, there is the potential for big business to dominate the
Inspector-General’s agenda.
5. Scope of the Inspector-General’s functions
Following the Committee’s investigations it became clear
that the functions of the Inspector-General were seriously limited in scope.
The Labor members support the recommendation that the scope
of the Inspector-General’s functions are widened.
6. Conclusion
In spite of the recommendations of the Committee to improve
the role of the Inspector-General, the capacity of the Inspector-General to
improve tax administration remains fundamentally compromised by:
- the failure of the Inspector-General to be an advocate for all
taxpayers;
- the ability of the Minister to direct the Inspector-General’s
work program;
- the lack of funding; and
- the lack of a mechanism to provide for formal consultation with
the general public.
SENATOR JACINTA COLLINS SENATOR
RUTH WEBBER
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page