D. International Intelligence Oversight Models

International Intelligence Oversight Models

Australia’s Five Eyes partners have a single point of coordination for intelligence communities. The ONI fulfils that function for the NIC, following the recommendation of the IIR. The IIR noted that the United States and United Kingdom strengthened intelligence coordination following attacks in 2001 and 2005 respectively:
The United States and the United Kingdom, in particular, have taken practical steps to build synergies among their agencies in response to the demands of twenty-first century intelligence.1

United States

The United States established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, led by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) after the attacks of 11 September 2001. The DNI is a Cabinet-level appointee responsible for overseeing the activities of a 17 US intelligence agencies, as set out in legislation. The DNI is the principal adviser to the President on intelligence and has some influence over the budget and senior appointments in the intelligence community.
Congressional oversight of intelligence activities in the US is spread over committees in the House of Representatives and Senate. The US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee (HPSCI) on Intelligence oversees intelligence agencies, and 13 majority members (including the Chairman), and 10 minority members. There are 4 subcommittees, which consider:
strategic technologies and advanced research;
counter-terrorism, counterintelligence, and counterproliferation (C3);
intelligence modernisation and readiness; and
defense intelligence and warfighter support.2
The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) provides legislative oversight over US intelligence activities ‘to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States’, and to submit appropriation proposals for legislation to the Senate, and report to the Senate on the activities and programs of intelligence agencies. The SSCI has 15 Senators (8 from the majority party, and 7 from the minority). Members include members of various related committees ‘in order to ensure appropriate coordination with those Committees. The Committee’s staff reviews intelligence reports, budgets, and activities; investigates matters on behalf of the Committee; prepares legislation; and receives briefings.3
Generally, only SSCI members have access to classified intelligence sources and methods, programs and budgets. The President is required to ensure that the SSCI is kept informed of intelligence activities, and intelligence agencies may write to the SSCI of activities and analysis, including covert actions and any significant intelligence failures.4
The SSCI conducts hearings in closed session, although it can meet in open session. Senior officials present evidence and answer questions on agency activities, programs and analysis. Unlike committees in the Australian Parliament, the SSCI writes an annual authorisation bill to authorise funding levels for intelligence activities, and provides legislative provisions that limit or allow intelligence conduct.
The committee also conducts investigations and reviews, considers and recommends outcomes for nominees to serve in intelligence positions which require the Senate’s confirmation, and performs ‘daily oversight’:
The Committee, through its staff, tracks the regular collection and analysis activities of the Intelligence Community, enabling the Committee to engage with the Intelligence Community early on if it becomes aware of an issue. The Committee’s Audit and Oversight staff conducts longer-term oversight projects.5
Oversight of US intelligence agencies is also conducted by a network of Inspectors-General and legal counsels, and the Executive Office of the President including the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community conducts audits, inspections and investigations of ‘cross-cutting programs and activities’. Further oversight is provided by the judiciary:
The federal judiciary examines a wide range of intelligence activities under a number of laws, including the Constitution. Most notably, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court reviews applications for warrants related to the collection of foreign intelligence by the US Government.6

United Kingdom

The UK’s National Security Adviser, in the Cabinet Office, is the coordination point, with the Deputy National Security Adviser responsible for intelligence coordination. The budgets of the three largest intelligence agencies (Security Service, Secret Intelligence Service and Government Communications Headquarters) are managed in the Single Intelligence Account, and has driven shared capabilities. The IIR noted the ‘momentum towards greater integration’ and the passage of the Investigatory Powers Act in 2016, which ‘enhances the common legal regime applicable to the three major intelligence agencies’.7
The UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) has statutory oversight of the UK Intelligence Community, and can examine the expenditure, administration, policy and operations of MI5, MI6, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Defence Intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Organisation, the National Security Secretariat and Homeland Security Group.8 This is in contrast to the Australian PJCIS which can only examine the agencies’ administration and expenditure. The ISC sets its own agenda and forward work program, takes evidence from Ministers, heads of intelligence agencies, senior officials, experts and academics.9
The ISC considers strategic issues in relation to the UK Intelligence Community, for example, the committee may consider issues such as the allocation of resources to terrorism related to Northern Ireland, or the approach to cyber security. The ISC may also undertake reviews into particular matters, including issues of transparency.
Membership of the ISC is drawn from both Houses of Parliament, and consists of 9 members. Members are subject to Section 1(1)(b) of the Official Secrets Act 1989 (UK).
The UK also has an Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO), which provides independent oversight and authorisation of the use of investigatory powers by intelligence agencies, police forces and other public authorities. The IPCO oversees the use of covert investigatory powers by more than 600 public authorities, and works to independently review applications from public authorities to use the most intrusive powers, and check that powers are used in accordance with the law.10

New Zealand

The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau report to a single Minister. The leadership, coordination and performance of NZ intelligence agencies is led by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
A 2016 review concluded that there needed to be a single, integrated and comprehensive Act setting out the constitution of agencies, the authorisation of intelligence and security activities, and oversight. The Intelligence and Security Act 2017 was passed, and sets out a single purpose and shared objectives and functions. The Act also sets out oversight which applies to the agencies’ activities.
New Zealand’s intelligence activities are subject to oversight from a number of bodies, including:
the Commissioners of Intelligence Warrants;
the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security; and
the Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee, which examines the policy, administration and expenditure of intelligence and security agencies.
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service is also subject to oversight of the Auditor-General, Privacy Commissioner, Ombudsman and the judiciary.11

Canada

Canada’s intelligence activities are coordinated by the National Security Advisor in the Privy Council Office, who is supported by a secretariat and intelligence assessment staff.
Canada’s national security accountability framework has undergone significant reform in recent years. The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) was replaced in 2019 by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA). The SIRC had been restricted to reviewing the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and complaints against them. The NSIRA is a body of appointed experts which reports to the Parliament of Canada, and is established by statute to be an independent and external review body. The NSIRA also replaced the former Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner (OCSEC).12
The NSIRA reviews ‘all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary’ as well as investigating public complaints.13
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) was created in 2017, and is made up of members of both Houses of Parliament. All members hold Top Secret security clearances and are permanently bound to secrecy under the Security of Information Act. Members receive classified briefings and materials required to undertake the work of the committee. The NSICOP reports annually to the Prime Minister.14
The NSICOP is a committee of Parliamentarians, rather than a parliamentary committee.

  • 1
    Michael L’Estrange AO, Stephen Merchant PSM, Independent Intelligence Review, June 2017, p. 6.
  • 2
    House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittees, accessed 1 December 2021, https://intelligence.house.gov/subcommittees/.
  • 3
    Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, About the Committee, accessed 26 October 2021, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about.
  • 4
    Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, About the Committee, accessed 26 October 2021, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about.
  • 5
    Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, About the Committee, accessed 26 October 2021, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/about.
  • 6
    C Barker and C Petrie et al, Oversight of intelligence agencies: a comparison of the Five Eyes nations, December 2017, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, p. 2.
  • 7
    Michael L’Estrange AO, Stephen Merchant PSM, Independent Intelligence Review, June 2017, p. 54.
  • 8
    Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Home, accessed 26 October 2021, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/. The ISC was established under the Intelligence Services Act 1994 (UK).
  • 9
    Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Home, accessed 26 October 2021, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/.
  • 10
    Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office, What We Do, accessed 26 October 2021, https://www.ipco.org.uk/what-we-do/.
  • 11
    New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Oversight, accessed 26 October 2021, https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/about-us/oversight/.
  • 12
    National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, What We Do, accessed 26 October 2021, https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/what-we-do.
  • 13
    National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, What We Do, accessed 26 October 2021, https://nsira-ossnr.gc.ca/what-we-do.
  • 14
    National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, About, accessed 29 November 2021, https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/about-a-propos-de-nous-en.html.

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About this inquiry

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has commenced a review into the Intelligence Oversight and Other Legislation Amendment (Integrity Measures) Bill 2020. The bill review was referred to the Committee by the Hon. Christian Porter MP, Attorney-General.



Past Public Hearings

06 May 2021: Canberra