CHAPTER 4
A way forward
4.1
Absent from the Government’s package is any provision of independent
advice resulting from a considered processes involving consultation, evaluation
and analysis. Instead, fee deregulation has been presented as the one and only
'quick fix' solution to a sustainable higher education sector in Australia.
4.2
The Australian higher education sector is not at a tipping point – and
yet, the combination of the Abbott government's budget cuts and the provisions
of this package represent real threats to participation, attainment and the quality
of our current successful system. In the words of Professor Stephen Parker, Vice-Chancellor
of the University of Canberra:
We should not be taking risks with this. In the absence of
evidence, modelling and time for consultation, we should be taking this
carefully. The stakes are very high.[1]
4.3
Fee deregulation places at risk the achievements of previous governments,
including increased resourcing per student place, increased indigenous and
regional student participation, and increases in overall investment in
universities.
4.4
The Government’s package was unexpected. Both the Australian public and
the higher education sector would be better served by a proper, well-informed
debate and a reform process based on clearly articulated goals and how they
will serve the public interest.[2]
Moreover, it is imperative that all Australians have a clear understanding of the
arguments for and against any proposed changes to the higher education system and
the mechanisms by which such changes will be achieved.
False and misleading advertising – a waste of taxpayer dollars
4.5
On 7 December 2014, the Abbott government launched a taxpayer-funded
advertising campaign designed to address supposed misunderstandings about
higher education funding and the changes contained in the HERR bill (and its
defeated predecessor, the HERRA bill). The $14.6 million campaign spans
television, radio, newspaper, digital media, social media and bus shelters.[3]
The purpose-built campaign website features video, infographics and a true or
false quiz.[4]
4.6
The Short-term Interim Guidelines on Information and Advertising
Campaigns by Australian Government Departments and Agencies (June 2014) (the
Guidelines), which were in effect when the Secretary of the Department of
Education certified the campaign as compliant, stipulate that all advertising
campaign materials should be presented in an objective, fair and accessible
manner.[5]
The Guidelines specify that:
[w]here information is presented as a fact, it must be
accurate and verifiable. When making a factual comparison, the material should
not attempt to mislead the recipient about the situation with which the
comparison is made and it should state explicitly the basis for the comparison.[6]
4.7
The Government's advertising campaign presents misleading, unverifiable
figures as fact and offers no information about the basis of its calculations.
Policy experts have questioned the accuracy of the Government's claims, with
Andrew Norton noting that regardless of their veracity, the figures used are
'not particularly meaningful in the first place'.[7]
4.8
The Guidelines require that advertising campaigns be 'instigated on the
basis of a demonstrated need'.[8]
While there has been some attempt to use unverifiable anecdotes and third-party
market research to justify the campaign,[9]
there is no demonstrated need for a wide-scale, multimillion dollar advertising
campaign to promote a bill that has not yet passed the Parliament.
4.9
The campaign does not address the bill's core policy objectives, instead
offering misleading and meaningless assurances to prospective students and the
broader public. It is clear the campaign has been developed not to address
demonstrated need but rather in response to the negative reaction to the
Government's proposed changes from students, education providers and the
Australian public. The campaign's clear political purpose itself breaches the
Guidelines, which require that '[c]ampaign materials must not try to foster a
positive impression of a particular political party or promote party political
interests.'[10]
The current system works
4.10
The committee received overwhelming evidence that the current higher
education system is sustainable and high quality. For example, Mr Ben Phillips
and Professor Parker argue that:
[A]t the moment student contributions are already quite high
in Australia from an OECD perspective. The Australian university system appears
to be working very well: we have 19 universities in the top 500 and on a per
capita basis we are ranked fourth in the world. We are very attractive for
international students, and the international market is very healthy here in
Australia. I guess we are not quite sure what is the problem... That is something
that needs to be explained.[11]
4.11
The Council of Australian Postgraduate Associations (CAPA) also posited
that the current system is workable and would ultimately produce better future
outcomes for the Australian higher education sector.
[D]espite the current system's flaws in terms of the funding
gaps particularly around cases that were involved with the research training
scheme, the changes proposed in the bill before the Senate would only
exacerbate funding gaps in the system and are more likely to cause harm to the
sector over the long term than the current arrangements that the sector is
working within. It is our view that solutions can be found within the current
arrangements that will address gaps in funding, participation and equity issues
and will be far more effective than those currently being proposed by the
government.[12]
4.12
Australia Needs a Brighter Future agreed with the notion that the
current arrangements for the funding of the higher education sector are preferable
to those proposed in the package.
[T]he current funding models are far superior to the proposed
funding models the government has put up. I think the viability of the
government's proposed funding models needs to be contextualised with what is
actually going to happen as result of the government's funding model. It is
important to look at how this will affect students and how it will affect
future students. I do not think the government's proposed model will affect
them in a way that is better than the current structure.[13]
Fee deregulation is unnecessary
4.13
Education policy analyst Professor Louise Watson argued that evidence
obtained in the Higher Education Base Funding Review chaired by Jane
Lomax-Smith, which reported in October 2011, led to the conclusion that
Australian universities were doing very well.[14]
In discussing the fee deregulation proposal, Professor Watson argued that it
was a further impost on the Commonwealth budget and that it would be more unpredictable
than the removal of caps on funded places.[15]
I have always been puzzled as to why fee deregulation was
necessary or deemed necessary. I have never understood the problem it was meant
to fix. From where I stand, it seems like fee deregulation will simply compound
the problems currently facing the government in terms of university financing,
not solve them.[16]
4.14
The National Union of Students (NUS) contended that fee deregulation
would result in decreased opportunities and accessibility and equity for students
and provided evidence before the committee that deregulation, as proposed, will
be unpredictable and unsustainable.
We have not seen enough evidence that this is a good funding
model for universities as well. We do believe that universities have been
underfunded for quite a while. However, as per the Bradley review, there should
be higher funding into universities. The funding model that we have currently
will not stratify universities into such a two-tiered extent that deregulation
would see.[17]
4.15
The National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) noted that 'nobody,
including the government, seems clear as to the rationale or underlying
principles of the proposed policy framework'.[18]
If anything, the
Government's proposals are based on inaccurate, inadequate assumptions about
public funding, student debt and the role of higher education in Australia.
4.16
Blanket
deregulation is a lazy solution to a complex problem; as Andrew Norton
acknowledged, '[f]ee deregulation saves a regulator from the complex task of
determining reasonable costs.'[19]
The opportunity for genuine, long-term reform has been discarded in what
Innovative Research Universities described as a 'shortsighted search for
savings'.[20]
4.17
Submissions
and public comments have exposed that the government’s higher education package
does not enjoy broad-based support. Along with students and staff opinion
against the package, every university submission calls for changes, or delay,
or a new process to be undertaken.
Debt but no degree
4.18
Some time was spent at the public hearings examining issues
around attrition, and non-completion of degrees. Mr Andrew Norton, of the
Grattan Institute explained the attrition rate:
The government gives two attrition rates, one is is the
student enrolled at the same institution the following year, and then there is
the adjusted one, which is are they enrolled anywhere at all in the system. We
usually go with the 'anywhere at all in the system' as the more accurate
figure. That has been trending up a little bit. How this works out in the final
completions is very hard to say because people do take leave from their course
and then go back later on, so simply the fact that they are not anywhere in the
system the year after they started does not mean they will never come back—but
obviously it is a bit of a negative sign.
4.19
The Committee heard from Professor Louise Watson on the concerns
the 2011 Base Funding Review had about retention:
The base-funding review was concerned about retention and
efficiency, even in 2011. It was obvious to us that with the size of the
expansion and the lowering of ATARs that higher attrition was likely to occur,
which was inefficient for the system and a very bad outcome for the students.
We recommended in the base-funding report that performance incentives related
to student completions should be included in the compact negotiations with
higher education institutions. Basically, it should take into account where
students have undertaken their degrees—students do move between universities,
so it would not be fair for the university where they complete their degree to
receive that sort of bonus. We thought it should be included in the compact
negotiations as a performance target and as an incentive for universities to
focus on supporting students through to graduation.
4.20
In evidence before the committee, Jeannie Rae, National President
of the NTEU also expressed similar concerns:
I think that it is a fundamental advance that more students
have enrolled at university, and clearly from more broader backgrounds. What concerns
me greatly is the issues that we are now seeing with attrition and progression.
What happens to them when they are in the university is fundamentally important
and what it is all about.
4.21
Mr David
Phillips suggested that there was some evidence of changes in higher education
provider behaviour:
There is some evidence arising, I think, that institutions
have very rapidly increased their intake of students at the lower ATAR bands—if
we are just looking at year 12 applicants. We know that low-ATAR-entry students
do not complete their courses at the rates of students with higher levels of
ATAR, so it is an important issue. But it is very important to stress that
ATARs are only one measure of entry criteria, and any policy change to the
demand-driven system would need to be reasonably sophisticated to take into
account all of the different types of entry criteria.
4.22
There is some evidence that universities are offering places to
academically low achieving students. In The Australian on 15 January 2015 Julie
Hare wrote:
TWO out of every five students with a tertiary admission rank
of 50 or lower who applied for university last year were offered a place, a
figure that has quadrupled since 2009, when the figure was one in 10.[21]
4.23
It has been noted by many commentators, including the Teacher
Education Ministerial Advisory Group (TEMAG) that judging admissions through
ATARs is a fraught process. Indeed for many universities admission standards
are distorted by what Professor Warren Bebbington has described as an “out-of-control
bonus points system”. Julie Hare and Kylar Loussikian have written that:
Concerned with perceptions of prestige, universities
artificially inflate their ATAR cut-offs, then allow students to “top-up”
inadequate scores with bonus points for anything from going to a certain
school, living in a certain postcode and taking a certain subject, to being an
elite athlete.
Bebbington says the system, originally developed to address
genuine disadvantage, is so rampant that four in five students in South Australia
get into their preferred course on the basis of bonus points, not their ATAR.
And most students, teachers, careers advisers and parents have no idea how to
work out what is going on.[22]
4.24
The article
further reveals that bonuses of up to 25 points are not unheard of, though
bonuses of 10 to 15 points are more common.
4.25
A google
search of “low ATAR score” reveals a range of advice about how a student can
game systems used by universities to boost their ATAR score and the chance of
an offer to a course.
4.26
Many
universities and commentators readily acknowledge the lack of transparency of
the ATAR system, as more and more students are admitted through direct entry
programs. According to Professor Parfitt of the University of Newcastle:
Many of our students, as I said, do not come to us straight
from school. They do not actually come in with the traditional ATAR. They come
through pathways, whether it is through TAFE or through our enabling programs.
4.27
The TEMAG
report, Action Now: Classroom Ready Teachers addresses this issue of
entry standards extensively:
...trends in ATAR cut-offs are difficult to assess. Providers
may publish notional cut-offs but then admit large numbers of applicants
through such techniques as ‘forced offers’ to individual candidates who do not
possess the required ATAR. In this way, providers can publish unrealistic
cut-offs that are met by relatively few applicants and compare favourably with
the cut-offs published by providers who genuinely report the typical lowest
entry score for their initial teacher education programs.
A further complication is the practice of awarding bonus
points, which can boost an applicant’s ATAR to meet the cut-off for entry. Awarding
of bonus points is a longstanding practice and, in the case of bonus points for
studying subjects such as mathematics, science and languages, one that is
generally supported. Other bonuses may relate to disadvantage, place of
residence or other factors. Some bonuses are applied directly by the provider
while others are applied by a state-based tertiary admission centre. The use of
bonus points may not be inherently problematic, but lack of transparency in
their use adds to the confusion about entry standards for initial teacher
education.[23]
4.28
TEMAG
recommended that:
Higher education providers publish all information necessary
to ensure transparent and justifiable selection processes for entry into
initial teacher education programs, including details of Australian Tertiary
Admission Rank bonus schemes, forced offers and number of offers below any
published cut-off.[24]
It is an observation and finding that could easily be
applied to other fields of education.
Committee view
4.29
The committee is of the view that evidence of emerging trends of a slide
in retention, and the lack of transparency in admissions is of concern. The
committee does not accept the argument that Australia needs to choose between
quality and standards on one hand, and access and equity on the other.
Complex changes should not be based on flawed policy
4.30
A number of submitters to the inquiry emphasised the need for stability
in policy settings for universities and students and suggested a longer
timeframe for changes to higher education that are as large as those contained
in the package.[25]
Dr Gwilym Croucher, a higher education policy analyst and researcher, stated:
Predictability for universities in the rules that they face
and the policy settings allows them to plan better and, ultimately, deliver
better quality education for students and for students to benefit. In any
change that happens to higher education—be it the government's current package
or a modified version of that—it is important that the changes are carefully
considered to ensure stability.[26]
4.31
In this context, Dr Croucher emphasised the need for the government to
be explicit about why it is bringing in the package:
History has shown... that anything that adds complexity to the
system can cause unintended consequences and therefore needs a lot of time to
be analysed before it is brought in, if we are to get optimal outcomes. The
government's current package has had nearly 10 months of scrutiny, and if we go
further back, the reforms undertaken by Minister John Dawkins had a green and
white paper process which set up the current system.[27]
4.32
Even Andrew Norton, on whose work the government is basing its inflated
claims of a $1 million lifetime salary premium for graduates, argued that:
Due to its interaction with the HELP loan scheme, fee
deregulation can create significant additional costs. There are also reasonable
concerns that some universities will increase their fees in ways that do not
benefit students. We need a mechanism that limits these downsides of fee
deregulation while still improving on the pricing system we have today.[28]
4.33
While it is true that there have been a number of reviews into the
Australian higher education system, it is not the case that fee deregulation
has been seriously considered. The Kemp-Norton Review of the Demand Driven
System noted it was unable to consider calls for fee deregulation as they were
outside its terms of reference.[29]
4.34
A comprehensive, systematic review of higher education funding occurred
in 2011 through the Base Funding Review chaired by Professor Jane Lomax-Smith.
This review found that the Australian higher education system is
internationally competitive in terms of quality and funding on available
indicators. It recommended a modest increase in funding per place, a two per
cent increase to meet the cost of learning with new technology, addressing
underfunding in specific disciplines, reducing the number of funding clusters,
adjusting public and private contributions and retaining low-SES student
loading of $1,000 per student.
4.35
Professor John Quiggin of the University of Queensland, in a submission
to a previous inquiry has made the point that:
The current university funding situation is unsatisfactory
and inadequate, but is not at a ‘tipping point’ in which radical reform is
necessary to stave off collapse. In the short term, restoration of the funding
policy prior to the 2013 cuts would be sufficient to stabilize the financial
position of the university sector as a whole.[30]
Committee View
4.36
The committee is of the view that there is a case to update the 2011
Base Funding Review in light of the recent growth in student numbers. As
Professor Watson noted:
... there have been budgetary pressures created by lifting the
cap on student places on the recommendation of the Bradley review. The size of
the sector increased enormously and unexpectedly after that policy reform—a 35
per cent increase in commencing students and a 25 per cent increase in total
student load over five years.[31]
4.37
Any such review should include broad, meaningful stakeholder engagements
to rectify what CAPA described as a 'complete lack of consultation with
stakeholders' up to this point.[32]
4.38
It is also important that independent, expert advice be a continuing
feature of any package. Even Universities Australia, while supporting fee
deregulation, recommended the establishment of an independent advisory panel to
assist the Government with implementation and oversight of deregulation.[33]
The Regional Universities Network similarly supported an oversight committee.[34]
Alternatives to deregulation
4.39
Fee deregulation is not the only option for the Australian higher
education system. There are other ideas worthy of consideration – yet the
Abbott government has failed to pursue any of them.
4.40
Some of the options presented include:
-
Maintaining the current system with some updates to reflect the
fiscal situation and expansion of the sector;
-
Maintaining the current system with increased government funding;
-
Maintaining the current system with increased student
contributions;
-
Fee deregulation with loan limits;
-
Fee deregulation with incremental increases in scholarship
contribution; and
-
Fee deregulation with the Chapman-Phillips model of fines or
levies.
4.41
The committee focussed its attention on the incremental increase in
scholarship contribution alternative put forward by the University of
Wollongong and the Chapman-Phillips model.
Incremental increase in scholarship contribution
4.42
The University of Wollongong proposes a progressive alternative to the
flat 20 per cent scholarship fund contribution. Under this model, an initial 10
per cent contribution would apply to annual tuition fees over $10 000. An
additional
10 per cent increment would apply to every $1 000 up to $15 000, and a further
five per cent would apply to every $1 000 thereafter, reaching a maximum of an
80 percent contribution for tuition fees in excess of $20 000.[35]
The table sets out the model's effect on the Commonwealth
Scholarship Fund and the net resources available to a higher education
provider.
Figure 2: The effect of the incremental increase in
scholarship contribution model on the Commonwealth Scholarship Fund and net
resources[36]
4.43
The graph below illustrates the incremental difference in Commonwealth
Scholarship Fund Contribution in relation to annual tuition fees under the
incremental increase in scholarship contribution model.
Figure 3: Annual tuition fee to Commonwealth Scholarship
Fund contribution[37]
4.44
The University of Wollongong argues that this model retains the key
aspects of the Government's changes in a fairer, more moderated format.[38]
The Chapman-Phillips model
4.45
Professor Bruce Chapman and Mr David Phillips presented an alternative
approach to fee deregulation in the Australian higher education sector. Crucial
to the Chapman-Phillips deregulation proposal is the government's ability to
'withhold and/or reduce subsidies to citizens and institutions if their
situations or behaviour warrant diminished support.'[39]
We need to have mechanisms which maintain the capacity of
price discretion but penalise institutions—that is, have some kind of cost if
they are too high.[40]
4.46
Mr Phillips explained to the committee that the Chapman-Phillips model
was developed to allow the government to reduce or remove the 20 per cent
cut in funding for Commonwealth supported places. Mr Phillips explained that:
savings to the budget would be achieved in proportion, as it
were, or in relation to the extent to which fees are increased. That would
reduce or remove the requirement for universities to increase fees just to
maintain their current revenue levels. If you set the thresholds at which the
reduction in funding would cut in at something like the current maximum student
contribution rates, then it would mean that if an institution chose not to
increase its fees it would not be affected by the policy change.[41]
4.47
The Chapman-Phillips proposal received considerable comment throughout
this inquiry, with some commentators likening it to a big new student tax, or a
fine, or a levy.
4.48
The Innovative Research Universities (IRU) suggested that the
Chapman-Phillips model be explored as an alternative proposal to fee
deregulation. IRU described it as a model that would amend the government's
formula to fund universities taking account of the revenue universities
generate from students:
the more they choose to generate revenue from students, the
less need there is to invest government funding in those universities, and that
is what their schema will do. And it starts from the current funding. There is
actually a significant difference between the current system and the proposal
of the government, which would reduce funding up-front by 20 per cent. It
starts back at the basis of the current funding and then says that as and when
universities go beyond that is when government will start to pull back its
funds.[42]
4.49
IRU noted that exploring this option is very complicated:
there are numerous, innumerable and probably infinite ways
you could do it. You can work through those and make some decisions if you want
to pursue that, but that will take some time.[43]
4.50
Professor John Dewar explained further that from IRU's perspective,
despite the potential complexities of the Chapman-Phillips model, it was worthy
of further research because it appears to address the three key criteria for a
solution to Australia's higher education funding issue:
-
sustainability of government support;
-
sustainability of funding to universities; and
-
affordability for students.[44]
4.51
A number of experts in the higher education field also considered the
Chapman-Phillips model and raised the need for further work to be done to
enable proper judgment on the proposal. Dr Gwilym Croucher made the point that:
Where the different threshold amounts are set will have a
dramatic impact on the incentives provided to institutions and hence on the
behaviour of those institutions and the incentives that are therefore provided
to students in terms of what pricing was being given to students with increased
fees... To assess the proposal, we would need to see significantly more detail to
get some understanding of where it might sit. Without that detail, it is very
hard to make a considered judgement on a proposal such as the one being
suggested.[45]
4.52
La Trobe University also highlighted the need for further information on
the proposal, arguing that the 'devil is in the detail' and that the Chapman-Phillips
proposal was not being suggested as a definitive policy:
We think more work needs to be done to work through the
consequences and the risks and benefits associated with each of those,
including the Phillips Chapman proposal. We would prefer out of all of those
options to weigh them up against a set of principles, which includes benefits to
students and the mitigating risks such as price inflation for students.[46]
4.53
The National Tertiary Education Union (NTEU) produced evidence through a
preliminary analysis of the impact:
The proposal would introduce even more distortions into any
already highly complicated funding regime. Chapman’s is a framework with many
moving parts, all of which interact very differently depending what values are
set for threshold fees at which different marginal tax rates are imposed. Three
examples used in Appendix 1 shows that impact of fee increases with a Chapman
tax varies considerably depending existing rates of public subsidy further
complicating the analysis and understanding of the full implications of the
model.[47]
4.54
The NTEU makes the legitimate point that:
Greater complexity means less transparency and greater
opportunities for gaming and manipulation. The best and most transparent way to
avoid excessive fee increases is to keep a cap on the maximum fee Commonwealth
supported students can be charged.[48]
Rushed radical changes are not in the national interest
4.55
It is clear that there are alternatives to fee deregulation. The higher
education sector and the Australian people would be better served by a detailed
examination of the options available.
These options and the interactions between them and existing
arrangements need to be carefully modelled and assessed in terms of their
consequences – intended and unintended – and potential student and provider
response.[49]
4.56
Policy in the higher education and research sectors is complex and
important, and it is evident that there is need for some reform.
But it does not serve Australia’s interests to rush radical
changes to the sector. Nor does it serve Australia’s interests to cut funding,
create large and unfair debt that will never be repaid, or allow wasteful fee
inflation. The arguments in favour of increasing student debt and creating
deregulated markets for fees are far weaker than the government says. Indeed
the government does not seem to have come to terms with some serious inconsistencies
in its arguments.[50]
4.57
The Abbott government's argument that adequate consultation has been
undertaken for this package, and that the Australian public was warned of the associated
Budget measures, does not stack up – especially when compared to the processes
surrounding radical changes to higher education in the past. In fact, there was
no indication by the Abbott government prior to or even immediately after the
2013 election that it was anticipating the biggest shake-up of the higher
education sector in 30 years.
4.58
The Dawkins reforms in the late 1980s were preceded by extensive
consultation and a formal green and white paper process. The Howard
Government’s 2003–04 Budget decisions on higher education reform were informed
by a review of higher education policy. The Crossroads review held 49 forums in
all capital cities between 13 August and 25 September 2002. Seven issues papers
were published and a total of 728 submissions were received. The process was
also supported by a Productivity Commission research report, University Resourcing:
Australia in an international context, released in December 2002, which compared
11 Australian universities with 26 universities from nine other countries.
4.59
There can be no comparison between the level of consultation on previous
successful attempts at
higher education reform and this attempt, because there has been no
consultation. It was put together as part of a budget process, thus was subject
to the confidentiality that budget processes require. Accordingly the package
can only be viewed as a series of budget savings in search of a rationale. The
development of this package has been characterised by the complete lack of
consultation, research and discussion, exacerbated by the government’s wilful
refusal to release its own limited modelling on the impact of its proposals.
Committee view
4.60
The Abbott government's taxpayer-funded higher education advertising
campaign lacks any discernible merit and is a waste of valuable taxpayer funds.
Not only is it in clear breach of the Advertising Campaigns by Australian
Government Departments and Agencies Guidelines – it has also failed to work. It
is obvious that the substance of the package is at the heart of the problem,
and no amount of spin can make it more attractive to the people of Australia.
The committee notes that fee deregulation remains overwhelmingly unpopular.
4.61
The committee received convincing evidence that Australia's world-leading
higher education system works, has proven successful and is not in need of
immediate change. While the committee acknowledges the system is not perfect,
and continual improvement is always needed, fee deregulation is not the best or
only option.
4.62
In addition to the proposals assessed above, the committee notes that a
variety of alternative policies have been put forward to ameliorate the
negative impacts of fee deregulation, including:
-
putting a limit on how much students can borrow through HECS
(Swinburne University),
-
establishing an independent body to monitor aspects of the
system, including fees and advise the government on possible policy responses
(Universities Australia),[51]
-
allowing the Australian Consumer and Competition Committee (ACCC)
to monitor university fees (Group of Eight), and
-
putting restrictions on how universities are allowed to spend fee
revenue (Peter Noonan, Mitchell Institute).
4.63
Some of these alternative policies, like the Chapman-Phillips student
tax proposal, seem to have been formulated on the premise that ‘why make a
policy straightforward and transparent when there is a complex and obscure
alternative available?’ The committee rejects all of these ideas because their
starting point is fundamentally flawed. Deregulation itself is the problem
these proposals seek to solve. The simple solution is not to embark upon fee
deregulation in the first place.
4.64
The committee believes that rushing radical changes to the higher
education sector is particularly dangerous and contrary to the national
interest. The committee urges the government to consider in detail all the
options available to the higher education sector before implementing any large
scale changes. In embarking on any future reforms to the higher education
sector, the committee suggests the government obtain independent advice,
modelling, evaluation of existing arrangements and technical analysis to
produce a detailed proposal upon which the government can then consult,
negotiate and decide.
Recommendation 3
4.65
The committee recommends that the government commission an independent review
to update the 2011 Base Funding review.
4.66
The committee recommends that further efforts at change to higher
education funding and financing involve proper and due process of research,
consultation and discussion.
Senator Sue Lines
Chair
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