1.1
The Australian Greens are astonished that the Majority Committee Report
recommends that the Bill be passed, given the large volume of concerns raised
during the inquiry process and the significant number of recommendations put
forward by submitters and witnesses. The Australian Greens recommend that the
National Disability Insurance Scheme Amendment (Quality and Safeguards
Commission and Other Measures) Bill 2017 (Bill) not be passed until significant
amendments are made to it to address the concerns raised.
1.2
While the Australian Greens strongly support the concept of an
independent statutory authority to ensure that people with a disability are
protected from violence, abuse or neglect and that best practices are followed
by those working with and supporting people with a disability, we are
disappointed that the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) Quality and
Safeguards Commission (Commission) will only have a remit for NDIS participants
(and some other groups such as those over 65 receiving continuity of support),
but not all people with a disability.
1.3
Therese Sands, the Director of Disabled People's Organisations Australia
(DPO Australia), said:
... we note with disappointment that the NDIS Quality and
Safeguards Commission will not provide comprehensive protection against
violence, abuse and neglect for all people with disability across a broad range
of service systems and situations. It will only provide protection to the 10
per cent of people with disability who directly access NDIS supports, and it
will not have a mandate to address individual or systemic issues outside of the
NDIS. This means that the majority of people with disability as well as NDIS
participants, when interfacing or using other service systems, will have
protection only through existing regulatory and policy frameworks that have to
a large extent been shown to provide inadequate protection.[1]
1.4
One of the key recommendations of the Senate Community Affairs
References Committee inquiry on violence, abuse and neglect against people with
disability in institutional and residential settings, including the gender and
age related dimensions, and the particular situation of Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander people with disability, and culturally and linguistically
diverse people with disability was:
Recommendation 2
10.16 The committee recommends the Australian Government
consider the establishment of a national system for reporting and investigating
and eliminating violence, abuse and neglect of people with a disability, which
should, at a minimum:
- be required to work in collaboration with existing state
and territory oversight mechanisms;
- cover all disability workers, organisations and people with
disability, without being restricted to NDIS participants;
- include a mandatory incident reporting scheme; and
- include a national worker registration scheme with
pre-employment screening and an excluded worker register.
10.17 These elements are best implemented through the
establishment of a national, independent, statutory protection watchdog that
has broad functions and powers to protect, investigate and enforce findings
related to situations of violence, abuse and neglect of people with disability.[2]
1.5
The Australian Greens still strongly support this recommendation.
1.6
The headline recommendation
of the Community Affairs inquiry was:
Recommendation 1
10.10 The committee recommends that a Royal Commission into
violence, abuse and neglect of people with disability be called, with terms of
reference to be determined in consultation with people with disability, their
families and supporters, and disability organisations.[3]
1.7
The Australian Greens still strongly support this recommendation. We
took this policy to the last federal election and will continue to advocate for
the Government to implement this recommendation. This Bill does not do away
with the need for a royal commission.
1.8
The Australian Greens also note that there was a large volume of
submissions to this inquiry, many of which proposed a number of recommendations
for strengthening the Bill. We recognise that this is demonstrative of the need
for further consultation on the Bill and its associated instruments. The
Government should not proceed with the Bill until the issues raised in the
submissions and by witnesses are addressed.
1.9
This report outlines a number of the concerns we have with this Bill,
but we acknowledge this report does not address all suggested recommendations
and additions made throughout the inquiry.
Concerns relating to Schedule 1
Significant items in delegated legislation
1.10
The Bill provides the overarching structure for the Commission, but the
rules will provide the operational detail. The Bill contains 23 rule-making
powers. Concerns have been raised that the rules have not yet been released
publicly (some witnesses mentioned having seen drafts of some of these sets of
rules, particularly the Code of Conduct) and regarding the need to allow
sufficient time for consultation to be undertaken with people with disability
and their advocates and their representative organisations.
1.11
It is concerning that a large volume of the operational detail has been
withheld from the legislation and will potentially only be publicly available
following passage of this Bill.
1.12
As Melissa Coad, Executive Projects Coordinator, United Voice said:
... we would like to see this bill contain detail on critical
points to ensure a national framework that is open and transparent and ensures
the integrity of the NDIS.[4]
1.13
Leigh Svendsen, Senior National Industrial Officer, Health Services
Union (National), said:
... I think we worked out that employees are mentioned twice in
the bill and one of those is in a footnote, which is really pretty ridiculous
for something that's then going to, allegedly, provide safeguards and minimum
standards and provide employees with a code of conduct and a practice standard
to which they are supposed to adhere or they'll be blacklisted and can't work
in the sector and therefore would lose their income. That's fairly ridiculous
in a bill like this to actually be indicating that it wants to establish those
standards and not even mention them. We're very critical of the fact that
there's essentially nothing in the bill that gives us any direction around
that, and therefore there will be nothing in the act. I think that allows for
too much latitude.[5]
1.14
Andrew Whitecross, Group Manager, NDIS Market Reform, Department of
Social Services said:
Of these rule-making powers, the following six rules are
essential to the operation of the commission: NDIS practice standards, NDIS
code of conduct, complaints management and resolution rules, incident
management and reportable incident rules, behaviour support rules, and
protection and disclosure of information rules.[6]
1.15
When considering this Bill, the Senate Standing Committee for the
Scrutiny of Bills (Scrutiny Committee) raised concerns regarding the placing of
significant matters in delegated legislation, rather than in this Bill. The
Scrutiny Committee specifically mentioned the Code of Conduct and breach of it
potentially being the subject of significant penalties and was of the view that
its establishment should be included in primary legislation 'unless a sound
justification for its inclusion in delegated legislation has been provided'.[7]
In a subsequent report, the Scrutiny Committee acknowledged the Minister's
response (which is included in part in the Majority Committee Report) regarding
this and other matters relating to this Bill, but reiterated its scrutiny view.[8]
1.16
DPO Australia said in its submission:
Given the importance of the NDIS Rules for effective
implementation of the functions of the NDIS Commission, it is critical that the
development of the NDIS Rules involves engagement and consultation with people
with disability and their representative and advocacy organisations. Such
engagement and consultation reflects the proposed amendments outlined for
section 4(9) in Schedule 2 of the Bill that emphasises the centrality of people
with disability and the need for their inclusion in a "co-design capacity"
(discussed below under Schedule 2).[9]
1.17
The Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS) said:
Depending what category the NDIS rules are classified as
(i.e. Categories A to D) the NDIA may only be required to consult with the
State and Territories (Category D), rather then obtaining agreement from the
majority of jurisdictions (Category C), the particular host jurisdiction
(Category B) or every host jurisdiction (Category A). We believe the NDIS rules
should be open for consultation with the Disability sector, given the impact
these rules will have on the operation of the scheme.[10]
1.18
The Victorian Government said they:
understand that the Commonwealth intends to re-classify a
majority of the rules as Category D, requiring consultation from jurisdictions
and some rules as Category B, which will require agreement from host
jurisdictions. Victoria considers that this is inadequate and strongly believes
that rules that relate to key elements of the Framework should be subject to
agreement from all jurisdictions.[11]
1.19
The Australian Greens acknowledge that there is a need for some
flexibility and responsiveness with arrangements for the Commission; however,
we are also aware that some of the 23 sets of rules are essential to the
Commission's functioning. We want to see these six essential rules released
publicly as a matter of urgency and some of the crucial details from these
rules added to the Bill itself.
1.20
While we understand that the Government is currently consulting on a
number of these sets of rules, the consultation is currently limited to a
select number of organisations as the rules have not yet been publicly
released.
1.21
It is also important to note that the deadline for stakeholder feedback
on these draft rules is not due until the end of November. Consequently, we do
not have a clear picture at this stage of whether there are significant
concerns about the rules being consulted on. As we understand it, the only
deadline that has passed is that for feedback on the NDIS Worker Screening
Consultation Paper.
1.22
The Australian Greens are of the view that there needs to be proper
engagement and consultation on these rules with people with disability, their
advocates and their representative organisations and that the essential rules
should be agreed on.
Independence of the NDIS Quality
and Safeguards Commissioner
1.23
A number of submitters and witnesses raised the issue of the Commission's
independence. There are concerns that the Minister's extensive ability to
direct the NDIS Quality and Safeguards Commissioner (the Commissioner) will
impact on his or her independence.
1.24
The relevant provision in the Bill is the proposed subsection 181K(1),
which states:
The Minister may, by legislative instrument, give directions
to the Commissioner about the performance of his or her functions and the
exercise of his or her powers.
1.25
Subsection (3) states:
The Commissioner must comply with a direction given under
subsection (1).
1.26
It should be noted that the accompanying note under subsection (1) makes
it clear that such directions are not subject to the disallowance provisions in
section 42 of the Legislation Act 2003. This was confirmed by the
Department of Social Services when a number of its officers appeared at the
second hearing of the inquiry.[12]
1.27
Patrick McGee, National Manager, Policy Research Advocacy, Australian
Federation of Disability Organisations (AFDO) said:
We're talking about the most vulnerable
in the community: people who don't have a voice because they have a cognitive
impairment, people who are confined to their beds because they have no
movement, people who are reliant upon others to have the same set of rights as
everybody else in our community—the same set of political and civil rights, and
the same set of economic, cultural and social rights.
When you are reliant on someone else to enact those rights
for you, as many people with disabilities are, then the protections that you
should be afforded need to be of an extra high quality. We're saying that the
quality and safeguards commission framework enables that. But, if you have your
political masters sitting above a commission that is supposed to be able to
protect these people—the most vulnerable in our community—then, in cases where
the issues that the commission comes across may stray into political issues,
there is a concern from the perspective of the AFDO about how these people's
rights will in fact be protected.
I have experience of the Northern Territory, where people
were being detained in jails because that was the easiest function for the
government to respond to those people's circumstances. We were often shut out,
and shut down from talking about that. So we've got to make sure that this
quality and safeguards commission and the commissioner's functions and powers
are completely independent of the minister and that the minister doesn't
actually have oversight of them. That's one very important thing at section
181K of the bill.[13]
1.28
Emma King, Chief Executive Officer, VCOSS, said:
The commission will only be effective in safeguarding the
rights of people with disability if they feel they can trust in it. To generate
that trust, the commission must have strong powers and independence to be able
to act on the complaints and the information it receives. If the commission is
hamstrung in its ability to respond or unable to speak publicly about problems,
it will quickly lose the confidence of people to report abuse or other
deficiencies.[14]
1.29
Therese Sands said:
I will add that, if you take, for example, some of the state
based ombudsmen, they are completely independent and not subject to ministerial
direction. For example, the New South Wales Ombudsman is completely
independent. So some of the functions of the state based ombudsmen will now be
at a national level in this commission. I think there is just general concern
being expressed that that same level of independence not subject to ministerial
direction is not at that level—is not within the proposed NDIS commission.[15]
1.30
The Australian Greens share the concerns raised regarding subsection
181K(1) of the Bill and have concerns that directions made under this
subsection will not be disallowable by the Parliament. The Commissioner needs
to be able to carry out his or her work without fear of interference from the
Minister and/or the Government of the day. Consequently, the Australian Greens
do not support subsection 181K(1) as it stands. The Australian Greens support
the recommendation of AFDO and the Disability Advocacy Network of Australia
(DANA) that 'ministerial control of the Commission should be qualified at
section 181 K so that the Minister's control must be consistent with Vision and
Principles of the National Disability Strategy'.[16]
At the very least the directions made under this subsection should be
disallowable.
Own motion investigation powers
1.31
As outlined in the Majority Committee Report, some submitters are of the
view that the own motion investigation powers of the Commission are unclear and
that it would seem that they are limited to reportable incidents and complaints
received.
1.32
VCOSS said in its submission:
We believe the Commission should have own motion powers to
conduct inquiries and investigate matters without having received a complaint
or serious incident notification. ... These powers should enable the Commission
to investigate systemic issues and cases where there are allegations or
concerns about people with disability experiencing violence, abuse or neglect.[17]
1.33
The Majority Committee Report says:
The Department gave evidence to the Committee assuring that
the Commissioner would have full power to conduct investigations, including
investigations into systemic and individual complaints.[18]
1.34
The Department explained that the Regulatory Powers (Standard Provisions)
Act 2014 applies to this Bill.[19]
1.35
The Australian Greens want to see stronger own motion investigation
powers included in the Bill itself, rather than operate via reference to
another law. We also want to see these own motion powers extend to the National
Disability Insurance Agency and community partners.
Broad discretionary disclosure
powers
1.36
Under the Bill, the Commissioner has discretionary information
disclosure powers.
1.37
The proposed paragraph 67E(1)(a) of the Bill provides the Commissioner
may:
if the Commissioner is satisfied on reasonable grounds that
it is in the public interest to do so in a particular case or class of cases –
disclose information acquired by a person in the performance of his or her
functions or duties or in the exercise of his or her powers under this Act to
such persons and for such purposes as the Commissioner determines[.]
1.38
Proposed subsection 67E(2) then provides:
In disclosing information for the purposes of paragraph
(1)(a) ..., the Commissioner must act in accordance with the National Disability
Insurance Scheme rules made for the purposes of section 67F.
1.39
However, proposed section 67F provides that:
The National Disability Insurance Scheme rules may make
provision for and in relation to the exercise of the Commissioner's power to
disclose information for the purposes of paragraph 67E(1)(a)...
1.40
This means that there is no requirement for rules to be made. Although,
as we understand it, the Government has commenced drafting these rules.
However, a future Government may make a different decision.
1.41
The Scrutiny Committee raised concerns in relation to the extremely
broad nature of the provision of this power. The Scrutiny Committee noted that:
There is no requirement that rules be made in relation to the
Commissioner's power to disclose the information and no information on the face
of the primary legislation as to the circumstances in which the power can be
exercised (other than that the Commissioner must be satisfied that it is in the
public interest to make the disclosure). There is also no requirement that
before disclosing personal information about a person, the Commissioner must
notify the person, give the person a reasonable opportunity to make written
comments on the proposed disclosure and consider any written comments made by
the person.[20]
1.42
A number of submitters also raised concerns about the breadth of this
power. The Health Services Union said in its submission:
As drafted, the provisions in the Bill are so open there is
nothing to preclude the Commissioner making protected information available
generally on the basis that it is in the public interest to do so.[21]
1.43
The Australian Greens share the concerns raised regarding the
discretionary disclosure powers. The protection and disclosure of information
rules are one of the six essential rules and as stated above we want these
essential rules released publicly as a matter of urgency and some of the
crucial details from these rules added to the Bill itself.
Market oversight
1.44
One of the concerns raised through the inquiry was the Commissioner's
conflicting functions of investigating, managing and resolving complaints and
providing NDIS market oversight.
1.45
One of the witnesses to the inquiry, Mary Mallett, Chief Executive
Officer, DANA said:
... there is an inherent tension in the commissioner's core
functions, which are a bit odd. Of the commissioner's core functions, the first
one is about upholding the rights of and promoting all the good stuff—the
health, safety and wellbeing of people with disability. It's all about getting
the whole system to improve. But the last of the commissioner's core functions
is the market oversight. So the same commissioner who is promoting and
protecting the rights of people and safeguarding them also has to monitor the
changes in the market and monitor and mitigate the risks of unplanned service
withdrawal. The commissioner may be responsible for a rural, regional or remote
area where already there aren't enough services being provided.
If you have a service—using a remote area
as an example—where there are lots of complaints coming in about the service
and it's clear they are not providing good service or that there are issues
about their registration maybe, the commissioner has also got to manage the
issue of the risk of that service provider withdrawing and there being no
service provider in the area. It's an odd tension that is consciously in there.
We've talked about it with the DSS quality and safeguarding people at an
earlier stage. It is deliberately in there, but that's a challenge for this
commission to manage. It's one where we would worry about how that's going to
play out.[22]
1.46
Similarly, Mark Farthing, Senior Policy Adviser, Health Services Union
(Victoria No. 2 Branch (HACSU)) said:
The interesting thing we allude to in our written submission
is that the commission has to have regard to the prevalence of market failure.
It is a conflicting relationship. So if it's the only provider in town and it's
done something wrong, the commission can't make a binding direction because if
it makes a binding direction which puts this provider out of business it will
have created market failure and not upheld its quality and safeguarding duties
as well.[23]
1.47
The Australian Greens are concerned that the Commissioner is to provide
NDIS market oversight as one of their core functions, particularly when it may
impinge on their ability to rule on complaints under its complaints function.
Unregistered providers
1.48
Concerns were raised during the inquiry regarding the different
treatment of registered and unregistered providers under the Bill.
1.49
VCOSS said:
the different treatment of registered compared to
non-registered providers may create an uneven playing field and expose
self-managing participants to unscrupulous providers seeking to make easy money
out of the NDIS. It may also place participants at risk of harm. We believe the
processes for using unregistered providers require further consideration and
consultation with the sector and disability community. ... Developing a broad and
clear list of services which cannot be delivered by unregistered providers
could also help to reduce these risks.[24]
1.50
National Disability Services (NDS) said:
[we are] very concerned about the disparate approaches to
quality and safeguarding according to who manages an NDIS participant's
funding. Participants who self-manage their funding (or who have their package
managed by a family member) will be able to purchase supports from unregistered
providers. Unregistered providers will not be audited against quality standards
or have to report serious incidents to the Commission (such as the serious fall
of a participant while showering). Given that the NDIA is promoting
self-management (with the hope that the proportion will reach 40%), this would
expose a significant proportion of NDIS participants to unacceptable risks. It
would also establish a two-tiered market, with one tier more regulated than the
other and bearing higher compliance costs. The tiers would be determined
principally not by the degree of participant vulnerability or the risk profile
of the service type, but by how participants choose to manage their funds.[25]
1.51
The Australian Greens have concerns about how unregistered providers
will be treated under the Bill. We acknowledge the right of people with
disability to individual choice and control, but we want to see a reasonable
balance struck. Accordingly, the Australian Greens want to see worker screening
(discussed below) made compulsory for unregistered providers.
Worker screening
1.52
It was clearly articulated throughout the inquiry that there is a need
for a single, national worker screening process – one that involves positive
screening, rather than negative screening that excludes a worker where harm has
occurred through the use of banning orders.
1.53
Currently, only those involved in direct provision of supports and
services to people with disability will be required to undertake screening.
Responsibility for enacting the screening process will lie with the states and
territories.
1.54
Melissa Coad said:
Worker screening should be national, not merely nationally
consistent. It should provide a national register of screened workers and not a
negative or barred persons list. These, at minimum, should clearly be set out
in the legislation.[26]
1.55
Mark Farthing said:
It's completely left to the practice standards. There's no
reference to it in the bill. It's not going to be a national database of
screened workers. It's going to be nationally consistent standards, with each
state and territory then implementing the scheme from there. That's our understanding,
as we've gone through in our written submissions. There's just very little
detail on it. Given the critical nature of workforce screening as both a
preventative and a corrective measure for dealing with abuse, it really should
be detailed a little bit more in the legislation.[27]
1.56
Leigh Svendsen said:
I would just like to add that we already have a nationally
consistent screening process for aged-care workers which might be seen to be
working relatively well, but for aged-care workers it creates significant
problems, and those problems will only be exacerbated if the same scheme is
rolled out for support workers for disability. If the current scheme is
required in each jurisdiction, apart from the complications about non-sharing
of information and people moving between jurisdictions and there being some
difficulty in relation to that particular issue, the reality is that a worker
has to get a new screen done, a new police check done, for every employer that
they work for.
Most employees in this sector and in aged-care work for
multiple employers. That means they have to do it several times and get several
police checks because it's only relevant to the one that they do for that
particular employer. It's going to be exacerbated because a lot of the workforce
who are likely to be providing NDIS services will also be providing aged-care
services. We will have a double whammy for those people. Therefore, we support
what UV said, and what I think we have said clearly in our submissions and in
other submissions, that it is necessary to go to a national standard screening
process and scheme as opposed to a nationally consistent one because each of
the states and territories have different screening processes and minimums.[28]
1.57
The Health Services Union said in its submission:
As drafted, ... [t]here is no reference to information-sharing
between jurisdictions regarding workforce screening, giving rise to the
possibility that an individual barred from practice in one jurisdiction could
practice in another. In the HSU's submission worker screening must be standard;
held by a third party [government]; provide screening for a person seeking
employment or individual provider registration; should provide for tiered
clearance; and should provide that clearance for whichever employer or provider
relationship the person seeks to access.[29]
1.58
In its submission, VCOSS said:
People at every level of an organisation from the staff
delivering direct services to participants through to management, CEO and Board
Members, can contribute to abuse, neglect and poor practice. If not included in
screening and compliance processes, there is a risk only workers will be
penalised, and managers and executives who were aware of the behaviour will
continue to operate in the same organisation or move to a new organisation.[30]
1.59
The Australian Greens want to see a single, national worker screening
process that has a national database so that records follow individuals across
jurisdictional boundaries. We also want to see the requirement to undertake
screening extended to people in management and executive roles.
Complaints
1.60
Some submitters suggested the Commission should be able to receive and
investigate complaints about the National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA)
and the Local Area Coordinators (LACs).
1.61
As it stands, the Commission will be responsible for receiving,
investigating, managing and resolving complaints about the provision of
supports or services by NDIS providers. Complaints about the NDIA and LACs will
continue to be dealt with through existing channels such as the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.[31]
1.62
In its submission, VCOSS said:
Enabling the Commission to receive and investigate complaints
about the NDIA and NDIA-funded LACs would allow it to more effectively
understand and resolve complaints. It would also make it easier for individuals
and the disability sector to know where to make a complaint.
Overseeing all complaints would better allow the Commission
to understand and address systemic analysis and trends. It would also better
enable the Commission to deliver on one of its core functions "to provide
advice or recommendations to the Agency or the Board in relation to the
performance of the Agency's functions".[32]
1.63
The Public Advocate and Children and Young People Commissioner (PACYPC)
said:
The Bill does not give NDIS QASC authority to investigate
complaints about the NDIA (sections 181E and 73X). This may be problematic, as
the performance of NDIS providers is inextricably linked to decisions by NDIA
about funding allocations and plans. ... The NDIS QASC may find it difficult to
provide oversight of the NDIS system if they are prevented from considering the
full implications of a complaint.[33]
1.64
The Australian Greens agree that the Commissioner should be able to receive
and investigate complaints about the NDIA and the LACs.
Community Visitor Programs
1.65
A number of submitters recommended that Community Visitor Programs or
similar should assist with identifying complaints and subsequently referring
complaints to the Commissioner. Queensland Advocacy Incorporated also suggested
that they should play a role in investigating complaints.[34]
1.66
In this regard, People with Disability Western Australia said:
The introduction of third party mechanisms such as the
community visitor scheme would have far more positive impact on quality and
safeguarding than would an overregulated Code of Conduct standing on its own.
This also provides another person or authority to disclose information to
without fear of retribution from either the person with disability or their
staff.[35]
1.67
The Australian Greens support the suggested involvement of Community
Visitor Programs or similar in identifying and referring complaints.
Procedural Fairness
1.68
The Australian Services Union raised concerns regarding the Bill's
omission of the term procedural fairness in relation to a complaint against or
investigation of a worker.
1.69
Linda White, Assistant National Secretary, Australian Services Union,
said:
... the bill is entirely silent on what workers can expect in the
event that a complaint is made or an investigation is commenced in relation to
their conduct. In our view, at a minimum, the legislation needs to be clear
that workers will be afforded procedural fairness following a complaint or
during an investigation, and it must be a requirement that any investigation is
completed as soon as practicable.[36]
1.70
She further went on to say:
Again,
the way the code of conduct operates, it does seem to suggest that if you do
something wrong, colloquially, then somehow the screening unit will change or
put a note on your file. Again, we think procedural fairness is extremely
important if that is to occur. If it is going to affect your livelihood, you
need to be in a position to be able to address what is put to you or put on
your file in screening.[37]
1.71
The Australian Greens note that because the Code of Conduct is not
contained in this Bill and is yet to be finalised, there is a lack of clarity
about how exactly it will operate in practice.
1.72
The Australian Greens are concerned that there is no explicit mention in
the Bill of procedural fairness and want to see this included.
Oversight of restrictive practices
1.73
Concerns were expressed during the inquiry regarding the limited power
of the Commissioner to reduce and eliminate the use of restrictive practices as
the states and territories will continue to have the power to authorise such
practices in behaviour support plans of people with disability in their
jurisdiction.
1.74
DPO Australia said in its submission:
DPO Australia is very concerned that this oversight function
for the NDIS Commissioner is very weak given that restrictive practices cause
significant breaches of human rights, and can constitute torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. There is a strong relationship
between the use of restrictive practices and other forms of violence, abuse and
neglect against people with disability, which undermines the ability of people
with disability and support workers to recognise violence and respond to it as
a crime.[38]
1.75
They also said:
In addition, if authorisation of behaviour support plans is
to be conducted at the State and Territory level, then there needs to be
agreement at the State and Territory level for nationally consistent regulatory
mechanisms for authorisation of behaviour support plans. The current mechanisms
at State and Territory level are varied and inconsistent, with some consisting
of relatively weak policy functions within government departments and others
having established regulatory bodies and mechanisms.[39]
1.76
Therese Sands gave evidence arguing:
the NDIS Commission should have the strongest powers possible
with regard to the elimination of restrictive practices, including legislative
powers to prohibit certain restrictive practices and impose criminal penalties.[40]
1.77
In its submission, VCOSS referred to Victoria's Disability Act 2006
and the powers conferred on its Senior Practitioner, including its ability to
order a disability service provider to cease or change a practice, procedure or
treatment. It suggested that the NDIS Senior Practitioner should have similar
authority.[41]
1.78
In a similar vein, the Office of the Public Advocate Victoria suggested
that '[i]n time, the model of Victoria's Senior Practitioner should be
implemented across Australia.'[42]
1.79
Whether or not the role of Senior Practitioner would be legislated and
how such a role would interact with its counterparts in other jurisdictions was
raised.
1.80
VCOSS said:
the Bill as it is currently written does not create an Office
of Senior Practitioner... Instead, the Bill establishes ... a behaviour support
function. The explanatory memorandum states it in 'envisaged' ... a national
Senior Practitioner will be responsible for [this] function.[43]
1.81
VCOSS recommended that the functions and powers of the Senior Practitioner
be legislated to ensure that the role of the Commissioner with regards to
restrictive practices is not de-prioritised.[44]
1.82
The Public Advocate and Children and Young People Commissioner for the
Australian Capital Territory said:
Further clarification is required as to the parameters of
this function and how this function will interface and/or work in collaboration
with Offices of the Senior Practitioner that exist in a number of
jurisdictions, which similarly have responsibilities for monitoring restrictive
practices. To avoid confusion, any potential duplication and overlap functions
needs to be avoided and the roles and responsibilities of the NDIS QASC
pertaining to this function need to be clearly articulated.[45]
1.83
The Australian Greens share the concerns raised regarding the relative
weaknesses of oversight function of the Commissioner and agrees that the powers
conferred need to be substantially strengthened. We would like to see the role
of the Senior Practitioner included in the legislation, together with the
crucial details of the behaviour support rules (as outlined above), and how it
will interact with other Offices of the Senior Practitioner spelled out.
Independent advocacy
1.84
A number of submitters and witnesses raised concerns over the lack of
provisions in the Bill relating to independent advocacy, and outlined the
important role independent advocacy plays in supporting people with
disability.
1.85
It was noted that the Quality and Safeguarding Framework itself refers
to the important role of independent advocacy, yet this is not reflected in the
Bill.[46]
1.86
People with Disabilities Western Australia said in its submission:
Advocacy has an important role to develop a person's capacity
to act with informed choice and control. Independent individual advocacy builds
a person's capacity as the advocate is working alongside a person, helping them
to understand their options and ensuring their voice is heard. Advocacy is also
a form of independent monitoring as it raises issues from an individual to a
systemic level to address systemic abuse and discrimination. The ability to
build capacity in terms of knowledge of rights, knowledge of complaints
systems, and confidence in self-advocacy are all areas that will develop
natural safeguards.[47]
1.87
It also said:
There is a concern that the Bill will establish a dual role
for the Commission when handling complaints. The Bill details that Commission
will support people to be heard and provide protections for victimisation
should they make a complaint, there is potential for impartiality to be
compromised if the Commission is both interrogator and supporter. There is a
strong case for independent advocacy to be available to ensure the rights of
people are upheld in an unbiased way.[48]
1.88
DANA and AFDO recommended in its joint submission:
(in accordance with the evidence and widely expressed views
on the importance of advocacy) that the Quality and Safeguards Commission and
Other Measures Bill 2017 ('the Bill') amends the National Disability Insurance
Scheme Act 2013 ('NDIA Act') to include express reference to a person's right
to advocacy and right to have advocates present during Quality and Safeguards
Commission processes, whether the person is a prospective or actual NDIS
participant, and that advocates and advocacy, including systemic advocacy,
should be included in the protections for disclosures of violence, abuse and
neglect.[49]
1.89
DPO Australian said in its submission:
... the Bill does not cover independent advocates who may
disclose information. This is despite the fact that legal action and malice
can, and has been directed at advocates by service providers and / or staff of
services providers that have been the subject of disclosures.
Independent advocates should have the same protections
against disclosure of information as nominees, family members, carers or
significant others of a person with disability.[50]
1.90
The Australian Greens want to see independent advocacy explicitly
provided for in the Bill to ensure people with disability have access to
independent advocates and that independent advocates are accommodated through
the Quality and Safeguards Commission processes. We also want to see
independent advocates named as disclosers on information under section 73ZA of
the Bill.
Concerns with Schedule 2
1.91
Schedule 2 outlines amendments to the National Disability Insurance
Scheme Act 2013 (Act) based on the outcomes of an independent review of the
Act in 2015 by Ernst & Young (Review) before the NDIS had been operating.
1.92
Any amendments to the Act must be closely examined given that this Act
is fundamental to the implementation of human rights for people with
disability. DPO Australia highlights that the Act is 'critical to the
implementation of human rights for people with disability as it gives effect to
Australia's obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD)' and that 'any amendments to the NDIS Act must further
advance the rights of people with disability'. [51]
Decision-making and the Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)
1.93
A recommendation from the Review of the Act was to 'operationalise the
ALRC recommendations relating to the NDIS'.[52]
The EM states that this recommendation has not been implemented in this Bill as
the 'COAG considered that the principles suggested by the ALRC are already
broadly established or reflected in the NDIS framework'.[53]
1.94
DPO Australia says that there has been no formal Australian Government
response to the Australian Law Reform Commission's (ALRC) final report, Equality,
Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Laws.[54]
The ALRC report outlined recommendations to improve the Act's compliance with
article 12 of the CRPD, Equal recognition before the law, starting with
the need to establish national decision-making principles to guide reform.
1.95
The Australian Greens share DPO Australia's concerns that there are
still provisions in the NDIS that are based on substitute decision-making
models and therefore not compliant with the CRPD. DPO Australia notes that:
there
is still a focus on whether a person with disability has capacity to make their
own decisions, rather than on what supports a person with disability needs to
exercise their right to make their own decisions. There is also still a focus
on a 'best interests' approach to decision-making instead of the 'will and
preferences' model for decision-making as articulated in article 12 of the
CRPD.[55]
1.96
It is disappointing that the Government has not strengthened the Act's
compliance with the CRPD as recommended by the ALRC. The Australian Greens
support DPO Australia's recommendations that:
The next review of the NDIS Act should incorporate amendments
that implement the recommendations from the Australian Law Reform Commission's
report, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Law.
The Australian Government should develop a legislative reform
framework that establishes national decision-making principles to guide law and
policy reform in line with the recommendations from the Australian Law Reform
Commission's report, Equality, Capacity and Disability in Commonwealth Law[.][56]
Chronic health conditions
1.97
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, proposed subsection 24(1)(f)
aims to provide 'clarity on how the disability requirements are intended to
operate for people with chronic health conditions.'[57]
1.98
DPO Australia notes that this amendment risks ruling out groups of
people with disability, such as those with chronic health conditions, from the
NDIS:
The proposed amendment means that the determination of
whether a person meets the disability requirement is dependent on whether the
NDIS can provide reasonable or necessary supports, or whether those supports
should be provided through another service system, such as health. This creates
the risk of ruling out groups of people with disability, such as those with chronic
health conditions from the NDIS based on decisions regarding whether the NDIS
can fund supports for people with disability. This is contrary to the object
and principles of the NDIS and is not supported.[58]
1.99
DPO Australia states that 'confusion and uncertainty regarding
eligibility and the provision of reasonable and necessary supports through the
NDIS or other service systems is apparent', but 'is more appropriately dealt
with through clearer guidance to NDIA to staff, people with disability and the community,
and greater transparency and accountability for transfer of services to the
NDIS by States and Territories.'[59]
1.100
Community Mental Health Australia (CMHA)
also raises concerns over the addition of 24(1)(f), noting that
there is a strong correlation between mental health and chronic disease and
that patients with severe mental disorders have a 10-25 year life expectancy
reduction, with the vast majority of deaths related to chronic physical medical
conditions.[60]
1.101
Referring to an exchange between the NDIA and I during a Budget
Estimates hearing on 30 May, CMHA said:
The points made by the NDIA through this exchange note that
with comorbidity, both conditions – i.e. the disability and the chronic illness
or condition – will be considered as part of the disability and considered in
eligibility for the NDIS; and that support would be provided to a person with
mental illness and a chronic illness where the mental illness impacted their
ability to manage the chronic illness.[61]
1.102
CMHA then goes on to say:
There is however a significant lack of clarity around how
co-morbidity fits within the NDIS, given the changes proposed through the Bill.[62]
1.103
The CMHA believes:
There must be ways of providing coordinated support to people
with psychosocial disability and comorbidity, such as chronic illness, who are
NDIS participants without them having to go to more than one service system.
Coordinated, wrap-around support – regardless of what the support needs are –
is the crucial part of a psychosocial approach to addressing mental illness and
this will be lost if people are required to seek help in more than one service
system, many of whom are not able to do this. The Federal Government and the
State and Territory Governments must be able to determine with confidence where
there is service crossover, and come to payment arrangements where that is
required, so that NDIS participants receive the support they need through one
package.[63]
1.104
The Australia Greens agree with both DPO Australia and CMHA that further
examination is required of the interface between disability and chronic disease
before any changes to the Act on this issue are made. Consultation should be
undertaken with people with disability and their representative and advocacy
organisations, and the findings and recommendations of the Productivity
Commission should be taken into account and inform any potential solution.
Centrality of people with
disability and co-design
1.105
The Australian Greens support the intent of the proposed subsection
4(9A), which states that, 'People with disability are central to the National
Disability Insurance Scheme and should be included in a co-design capacity'.
However, DPO Australia notes that there is 'currently no agreed policy on
co-design principles, processes and implementation' and that implementation of
section 4(9A) 'should be supported by a nationally, consistent co-design policy
and guidelines that are developed and agreed with people with disability and
their representative organisations'.[64]
1.106
CMHA also notes that they support the intention of subsection 4(9A), but
that there is 'no agreed process with people with lived experience on how this
should be applied, and the amendments being proposed actually contradict
principles of co-design'.[65]
1.107
The Australian Greens share the concerns of DPO Australia and CMHA. We
are also concerned that this amendment could result in nothing more than
tokenism. Subsection 4(9A) should be supported by a nationally, consistent
co-design policy and guidelines that are developed and agreed with people with
disability and their representative organisations. Consultation also needs to
be undertaken on this amendment.
Intersectionality
1.108
The amendment to Paragraph 5(d) removes the words 'and the gender,' and
replaces it with ', the gender identity, sexual orientation and intersex status'.
The Australian Greens support the intent of this amendment to include reference
to gender identity, sexual orientation, and intersex status. However, DPO
Australia highlights that the terms "gender" and "gender
identity" are not interchangeable, and that removing 'and the gender,'
removes recognition of the specific circumstances women with disability
experience.[66]
The Sex Discrimination Act 1984 covers 'sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity, intersex status...' The Australian Greens support DPO Australia's
recommendation to amend Paragraph 5(d) to state 'the cultural and linguistic
circumstances, and the sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation and
intersex status of people with disability should be taken into account'.[67]
1.109
Section 5(d) of the Act stipulates that 'the cultural and linguistic
circumstances... of people with disability should be taken into account'.
However, DPO Australia raises concerns that this does not cover 'the unique
circumstances of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people with disability'.[68]
The CRPD acknowledges 'the difficult conditions faced by person with
disabilities who are subject to multiple or aggravated forms of discrimination
on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national, ethnic, indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or
other status'.[69]
The Australian Greens support DPO Australia's recommendation to amend Section 5
to include, 'The unique cultural and social factors that concern Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people with disability should be respected and
acknowledged'.
People with disability and
appointments to the NDIA Board
1.110
DPO Australia raises concerns that the proposed amendment to subsection
127(2) of the Act 'confines eligibility for people with disability to be
appointed to the NDIA Board to only one of the areas that qualify for
membership of the NDIA Board',[70]
which is '(a) the provision or use of disability services;'. They highlight
that this amendment 'can be read as limiting eligibility to "the provision
or use of disability services"' and that to 'strengthen recognition that
people with disability should be strongly considered when selecting Board
members', this amendment should apply to (a) – (d) in subsection 127(2).
1.111
The NDIS Civil Society Statement highlights that 'it must not be assumed
that people with disability do not have the significant disability, governance,
financial and industry expertise required' to be eligible for appointment to
the NDIA Board.[71]
1.112
DPO Australia also raises concerns that the term used in the proposed
amendment, "person with lived experience of disability", is being
increasingly used to refer to people who have connections to people with
disability and that any amendments to this section should refer to "persons
with disability".[72]
1.113
The Australian Greens support changing the phrase "a person with
lived experience of disability" to "a person with disability" in
the proposed amendment, and expanding the proposed amendment to include paragraphs
(b) – (d) of subsection 127(2) of the Act.
Change of "review" to "reassessment"
1.114
The Australian Greens share CMHA's concerns regarding the amendments to
change all references of "review" to "reassessment".
1.115
The CMHA has concerns regarding:
the explanatory statement not being clear on the interference
or impact of this. The explanation states it reflects a change in terminology
only and does not change the rights of participants, however, there would be
the same concerns as above regarding interpretation by the NDIA.[73]
1.116
We support CMHA's recommendation that consultation needs to be
undertaken on this amendment.
Inserting "sustainable"
into subsection 4(15)
1.117
The Australian Greens share CMHA's concerns regarding the proposed new
subsection 4(15) and the inclusion of the term "sustainable".
1.118
As CMHA says:
While these amendments would seem appropriate on face value,
the significant issues that are occurring around what is 'reasonable and
necessary' would mean that the addition of further words that focus on
sustainability may cause further complications if the main driver is a cost
factor.[74]
1.119
We support CMHA's recommendation that consultation needs to be
undertaken on this amendment.
Recommendation 1
The Bill not be passed in its current form.
Recommendation 2
The Bill be split into two; Schedule 1 and Schedule
2 should be separate bills.
Further consultation should be carried out on the
amendments contained in Schedule 2 prior to a new bill containing these
measures being introduced.
Any new bill containing the Schedule 2 amendments
should also contain amendments addressing the recommendations made in the
reports of the Joint Standing Committee on the National Disability Insurance
Scheme.
Recommendation 3
Schedule 1
requires amendments addressing the issues raised in these additional comments.
Recommendation 4
The Senate not
proceed with debate on the Schedule 1 amendments until the six essential rules
have been publicly released and all consultation processes regarding these six
rules are complete.
Senator Rachel Siewert
Senator for Western Australia
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