Key issues identified
2.1
Submitters to the inquiry welcomed the Bill and the establishment of the
National Disability Insurance Quality and Safeguards Commission (Commission).[1]
However, submitters raised concerns with aspects of the Bill, including:
-
significant items contained in delegated legislation;
-
the independence and transparency of the Commission;
-
provisions for NDIS provider registration;
-
the role of independent advocacy and inclusivity; and
-
other matters pertaining to the Commission's functions and
administration.
Significant items in delegated legislation
2.2
Submitters to the inquiry commented on the scope and significance of
various instruments which the Bill makes provision for, stating that the detail
of these instruments should be included in the primary legislation. The
Department outlined the NDIS rules in evidence to the Committee:
The bill includes 23 rule-making powers. Of these rule-making
powers, the following six rules are essential to the operation of the
commission: NDIS practice standards, NDIS code of conduct, complaints
management and resolution rules, incident management and reportable incident
rules, behaviour support rules, and protection and disclosure of information
rules.[2]
2.3
Of particular concern to submitters was the lack of detail regarding the
NDIS rules,[3]
the NDIS Practice Standards[4]
and the NDIS Code of Conduct,[5]
which were described as 'critical pathways for delivering quality and
safeguards within a consumer directed scheme.'[6]
2.4
The Minister explained the rationale for including the detail of these
significant rules in instruments, rather than the Bill itself:
Separating the rules from the Bill provides appropriate
flexibility and enables the Commission to be responsive in circumstances where
the NDIS market environment is uncertain and rapidly changing. The NDIS is
still in transition and it is growing and evolving rapidly. Currently the NDIS
involves almost 7,000 providers with about 73,000 workers, supporting about
75,000 participants with approved plans, and in full scheme this is expected to
grow to 13,500-40,000 providers with perhaps 160,000 workers, supporting over
460,000 participants. These providers and workers will include current
disability service providers and new entrants, including a number of emerging
new "digital disrupter" models with "Uber" type service
provision. The rapid change in scale and complexity of the NDIS market means
that unpredictable risks may emerge in the medium term. The Commission will
need to deal promptly with new and emerging areas of risk in the effective
regulation of NDIS providers, both now and into the future. It is therefore
appropriate that these aspects of the scheme be covered by rules that can be
adapted and modified in a timely manner.[7]
NDIS Rules
2.5
As noted above, the Bill sets out the legislative framework within which
the core functions of the Commission will sit, however the NDIS Rules made
under the Act,[8]
will provide 'the detail necessary to support the evolving nature of the
Commission's regulatory activities'.[9]
2.6
Disabled People's Organisation Australia (DPOA) said of the NDIS Rules: '[t]he
effectiveness of the NDIS Commission in protecting people with disability from
violence, abuse and neglect depends heavily on the NDIS Rules...'[10]
The Queensland Office of the Public Advocate commented similarly: '[t]he
success of safeguards in this context will depend heavily upon proper
implementation and administration of the NDIS Rules.'[11]
2.7
The EM discusses the wide-ranging circumstances that the NDIS Rules will
cover, including significant matters such as disclosure provisions and reportable
incidents. The Law Council of Australia expressed their support for the
development of rules regarding the Commissioner's disclosure powers and reportable
incidents, and noted that relevant stakeholders should be consulted on the
development of the rules.[12]
The Victorian Council of Social Services (VCOSS) shared a similar view,
recommending that broad consultation be undertaken with the disability sector regarding
the NDIS Rules.[13]
2.8
The practical need for consultation with the disability sector was
highlighted by Carers Victoria and Queensland, who noted that whilst they
expected further detail was to come in the NDIS rules when developed later,
there was insufficient detail in the Bill to 'make an accurate assessment of
the impact on care relationships.'[14]
2.9
The Committee notes the Department has stated it will continue to consult
on the ongoing development of the NDIS Rules.[15]
Furthermore, in a question on notice, the Department proposed that anyone who
would like to be involved in the consultation
process may contact the Department via: ndisqualitysafeguards@dss.gov.au.[16]
NDIS Practice Standards
2.10
The Committee heard evidence that pointed to the importance of
consultation in the development of the NDIS Practice Standards. Advocacy
organisation JFA Purple Orange, expressed support for the NDIS Practice
Standards 'which will unify, and be a significant improvement on, the varied
current State based systems' but recommended they be developed in consultation
with people living with disability.[17]
The Health Services Union (HSU) raised concerns with the lack of detail around
the NDIS Practice Standards proposed in the Bill, particularly given the
centrality of these to the operation of worker screening.[18]
2.11
VCOSS expressed concern the NDIS Practice Standards would not apply to
unregistered providers.[19]
People with Disabilities WA raised concerns there may be confusion between the
NDIS Practice Standards and the existing National Standards for Disability
Services and stated a need to 'identify the difference in practice to ensure
that providers are not duplicating effort on two separate standards.'[20]
2.12
In its submission to the inquiry, the Department advised that the NDIS
Practice Standards are being developed in consultation with a group of key
stakeholders, including advocates and service providers:
The development of the NDIS Practice Standards is being
overseen by a Technical Reference Group with representation from each of the
states and territories, the Commonwealth Department of Health, the NDIA, and stakeholders
from Disabled People's Organisations Australia, National Disability Services,
Children and Young People with Disability Australia.[21]
2.13
Matters regarding provider registration and workforce screening are
discussed in further detail later in this chapter.
Code of Conduct
2.14
United Voice submitted that while the Bill provides for the creation of
a Code of Conduct, it remains silent on the content of the Code. United Voice expressed
its concerns with the draft Code of Conduct released by the Department included
that it requires providers and workers to meet existing obligations around
quality, but does not address serious workforce issues which put quality
service delivery at risk and ultimately threaten the sustainability of the
NDIS.[22]
2.15
The Australian Services Union (ASU) submitted that the Code of Conduct
should include clear commitments that NDIS workers will be afforded procedural
fairness in the event of a complaint or investigation, and are able to respond
to allegations at an early stage and have access to an internal appeals
process.[23]
2.16
The ACT Public Advocate and Children and Young People Commissioner
(PACYPC) expressed support for the Code of Conduct, and recommended it be
aligned with existing codes and standards 'to ensure providers and workers can
reasonably comply with all their obligations.'[24]
2.17
The Department clarified the Code of Conduct 'will apply to all
providers and workers who are funded under the NDIS, regardless of whether they
are registered, and to persons employed or otherwise engaged by NDIS providers'
and submitted it is a key mechanism for the Commission to oversee and enforce
compliance of providers who engage in unacceptable conduct.[25]
2.18
The Department further submitted that the Code of Conduct would be
drafted based on the public consultation it has already undertaken, with over
100 submissions and 530 survey responses received[26]
as well as additional consultations to occur in October 2017.[27]
Consultation
2.19
In considering the instruments provided for in the Bill, submitters
commented on the proposed classification of those instruments under the Act and
noted that varying the classifications of the instruments affects governments'
obligation to consult on those instruments under the Act.
2.20
Proposed amendments to section 209(8) of the Act provide that the
majority of the NDIS Rules made for the quality and safeguarding purposes under
the Act will be classified as Category D rules.[28]
As observed by Carers Victoria and Carers Queensland, Category D rules require
consultation with states and territories under the Act, but not their
agreement.[29]
2.21
The NDIS Rules which deal with classes of provider registration approved
to provide behavioural support, and the NDIS Practice Standards to the extent they
deal with worker screening, will be classified as Category B rules. The EM
explains the Category B classification has been used for these rules, as
implementation will 'require agreement with a host jurisdiction because they
relate to an area, law or program of a host jurisdiction.'[30]
Some submitters suggested that 'rules which relate to key areas of the
Framework should be subject to agreement from all jurisdictions.'[31]
2.22
Submitters and witnesses have noted that consultation goes to the heart of
inclusivity and stressed the need for ongoing consultation by the Commission
with people with disability and relevant advocacy organisations.[32]
DPOA submitted 'it is critical that the development of the NDIS Rules involves
engagement and consultation with people with disability and their
representative and advocacy organisations.'[33]
2.23
Further to this, Australian Federation of Disability Organisations (AFDO)
and the Disability Advocacy Network of Australia (DANA) recommended the Bill
include a requirement that public consultation be undertaken on any changes to
rules 'to ensure transparency and that people with disability have a voice in
the way in which quality and safeguards should be delivered.'[34]
2.24
The PACYPC recommended that the Commission's operations 'incorporate
regular opportunities for consumer participation and consultation.'[35]
2.25
National Disability Services (NDS) observed that under the NDIS
Framework, states and territories will undertake certain functions, including
worker screening and the approval of restrictive practices. NDS submitted
'state and territory governments have an integral (if reduced) role in
overseeing the delivery of high-quality supports to people with disability'.[36]
2.26
The Department clarified that consultations on a range of matters, such
as the NDIS Rules, will be undertaken and stated 'we are working closely with
state and territory jurisdictions and will involve other key stakeholders in
the development of the key standards and rules that we need to operationalise
the legislation.'[37]
The Department further clarified that consultation on the NDIS Code of Conduct
has already been undertaken with more to occur in October 2017,[38]
and that functions for the Commission to undertake consultation were included
in the Bill.[39]
2.27
Many submitters noted that to date, consultation with people with
disability and relevant advocacy organisations has been an established
methodology in developing the Commission and the establishment of the NDIS
itself.[40]
2.28
Evidence presented by the Department outlined the level of consultations
that have been undertaken to date. In summary, the Department undertook a
public consultation on the Framework in 2015 which:
...ran from February to May and involved public meetings in
capital cities and regional locations, and workshops with specific stakeholder
groups. We received 220 submissions, 585 questionnaire responses resulting in a
consultation report setting out themes.[41]
2.29
The Department told the Committee there was a large degree of agreement
in the consultations, and this is reflected in the key elements of 'a national
independent complaints and reportable incidents function; nationally consistent
quality and assurance and registration, regulation and oversight of restrictive
practices, and national worker screening.'[42]
Independence and transparency of the Commissioner
2.30
Submitters to the inquiry expressed concern regarding the independence
and transparency of the NDIS Commission, in particular: the extent to which the
Commonwealth Minister may issue ministerial directions to the Commission; the
approach to appointing the Commissioner and the reporting obligations of the
Commission.
Ministerial directions—Proposed
section 181K
2.31
Chapter 6A of the Bill contains provisions which establish the Commission,
its functions and administrative arrangements. Proposed subsection 181K(1) of
that chapter makes provision for the Commonwealth Minister to issue directions,
by legislative instrument, to the Commissioner 'about the performance of his or
her functions and exercise of his powers.'[43]
2.32
Proposed subsection 181K(1) was a key focus of submitters' concerns regarding
the independence of the Commissioner. In giving evidence, Ms Therese Sands, Director,
DPOA summarised:
...we're concerned that section 181K(1) allows the Commonwealth
minister to give directions to the NDIS commissioner about his or her
functions, and this could have the effect of constraining or compromising the
independence of the NDIS commissioner...[44]
2.33
Submitters to the inquiry have consistently highlighted the importance
of both the real and apparent independence of the NDIS Commission to provide efficient
quality and safeguarding oversight of the NDIS.[45]
VCOSS submitted to the inquiry: '[c]onfidence in the Commission’s independence
is essential for an effective quality and safeguarding system.' Mr Patrick
McGee, National Manager – Policy, Advocacy and Research, AFDO, also highlighted
this in evidence to the Committee: '[i]ndependence is an inherent mechanism by
which quality and safeguarding for people with disabilities is successful.'[46]
2.34
Queensland Advocacy Incorporated (QAI) noted that while statutory
authorities are frequently utilised to manage sensitive areas of regulation
free from political consideration, recommended that section 181K limit the Minister's
direction powers to 'providing guidance that is consistent with the National
Disability Strategy'.[47]
2.35
The Committee notes that proposed subsection 181K(2) limits the Minister's
directions under proposed subsection 181K(1), so that the Minister may not
issue directions regarding specific individuals, or providers, and must not be
inconsistent with the Act. The Department in its submission reiterates that the
Minister's directions must be of a general nature and fall within the
legislative function of the Commission. In giving evidence to the Committee,
the Department clarified that the Bill's provisions for ministerial direction
are 'a common governance arrangement for Commonwealth independent authorities
and, in our view, is appropriate to scope and role of the Commission'.[48]
Appointment of the Commissioner
2.36
Proposed section 181L of the Bill provides for the Minister to appoint
the Commissioner for a period of three years. The Commissioner may be
reappointed under section 33AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901.
2.37
Some submitters have expressed concern that the appointment provisions
are not satisfactory for ensuring the Commissioner's independence.[49]
2.38
VCOSS expressed concern that the appointment of the Commissioner by the
Minister alone may result in an actual, or apparent, conflict of interest and
recommended that an alternate 'fair and transparent method of appointing the
Commissioner' be adopted.[50]
2.39
The Victorian Office of the Public Advocate (OPA Victoria) expressed a
similar view and recommended that the independence of the Commissioner may be
improved by lengthening the Commissioner's term of appointment to five years.[51]
Ms Colleen Pearce, Public Advocate of Victoria, explained this recommendation
in evidence to the Committee:
If your contract is only for three years, that really limits
what you can achieve. A person in that role can feel more secure if they have a
longer term appointment. Three years seems to me to be particularly short.[52]
2.40
The Committee notes the EM states that the term of appointment for the
Commissioner is 'in keeping with Australian Government Policy on the selection
of statutory office holders working in, or in conjunction with, Australian
Public Service agencies.'[53]
The Committee also notes that under subsection 14(2) of the Public Service
Act 1999 statutory office holders are bound by the APS Code of Conduct, a
provision of which is adherence to the APS Value of impartiality.
Reporting to Parliament
2.41
Submitters proposed that the Commission should report regularly and
directly to Parliament on the Commissioner's statutory functions.[54]
OPA Victoria recommended to the Committee: '[t]he Minister should be required
to table the annual report in each house of the Australian Parliament.'[55]
2.42
The intent of parliamentary reporting requirements was summarised by the
VCOSS:
Requiring the Commission to report directly to Parliament
will increase the transparency and accountability of the Office. Tabling
reports and documents in Parliament will ensure information is available to
members of Parliament as well as the public, and provide a public record of the
Commission's operations and activities, investigations and recommendations.[56]
2.43
The Committee notes that under proposed subsection 181A(3) the
Commission is established as a listed entity under Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). Under section 46
PGPA Act, Commonwealth entities are to prepare and give an annual report to the
respective Minister for presentation to Parliament.
2.44
The Department's submission confirms reporting arrangements will be in
accordance with reporting requirements under the PGPA Act:
The Commission must fulfil the standard reporting obligations
of Commonwealth entities under the Public Governance, Performance and
Accountability Act 2013 (the PGPA Act). This includes the provision of an
annual report, which will be presented by the Minister to Parliament.[57]
Provider registrations
2.45
A key measure in the Bill is to require the Commission to establish and
maintain the NDIS Provider Register, and imposes requirements on those
registered providers.[58]
2.46
NDS expressed concern that self-managing NDIS participants are able to
purchase supports from unregistered providers, who will not be audited against
quality standards or have an obligation to report serious incidents. NDS
submitted 'this would expose a significant proportion of NDIS participants to
unacceptable risks. It would also establish a two-tiered market, with one tier
more regulated than the other and bearing higher compliance costs.'[59]
2.47
The Macular Disease Foundation of Australia raised similar concerns
with the lack of oversight over non-registered providers, and recommended 'further
legislative amendments be made to clarify the process in which the Commission
can direct unregistered providers to adhere to regulatory requirements and
directions.'[60]
The Victorian Council of Social Service also recommended the Commission develop
a broad and clear list of services which cannot be delivered by unregistered
providers.[61]
2.48
The HSU raised a number of concerns that the amendment imposed
requirements on registered providers, such as establishing a complaints
management system, but provided no detail relating to the form and function of
such systems. Overall, the HSU recommended the Bill should provide greater
clarity and detail around these issues.[62]
2.49
In its submission, the Department outlines how the registration scheme
will operate:
A person or organisation that wishes to be registered with
the Commission will undergo an audit against the NDIS Practice Standards, which
will form an NDIS rule. These audits will be conducted by independent
third-party auditors, similar to current arrangements for disability and other
human service providers in some jurisdictions.
The new regulatory requirements for providers and their
workers will be tailored to ensure registration is proportionate to the level
of risk associated with the supports and services provided.[63]
2.50
The Department clarified that only providers who wished to provide
higher-risk supports and services needed to be registered, which was 'intended
to strike the right balance between providing protections for people with
disability and...building NDIS participants’ capacity to make decisions,
including in relation to taking reasonable risks in the pursuit of their
goals.'[64]
Worker screening
2.51
The HSU submitted the current proposal for worker screening was a
'negative licencing scheme' as it focuses only on excluding workers after a
negative incident. Instead the HSU recommended 'the establishment of a national
registration and accreditation scheme for disability workers that is modelled
on the proposed Victorian Disability Workforce Registration and Accreditation
Scheme' which would improve the quality and skills of workers and safety of
participants, assist in improving perceptions of the sector to prospective
workers and assist in developing more articulated career pathways.[65]
2.52
United Voice raised a similar concern that the Bill 'provides for a
nationally consistent approach rather than a single national process, giving
responsibility to States and Territories to enact the screening process.'[66]
United Voice went on to state support for a national pre-employment screening
process for all people working for an NDIS registered provider which should be
more robust than police or criminal background checks alone.[67]
2.53
VCOSS recommended that the worker registration scheme be expanded to
include people in management and executive roles because of the role such
workers have in reporting and investigating concerns and complaints regarding
abuse or poor practices.[68]
2.54
NDS supported the introduction of worker screening, but recommended this
should be supported by a national database to ensure workers found guilty of
unacceptable practices are not able to move across jurisdictions or sectors
without their records following them.[69]
2.55
The Department submitted that the process of worker screening was
intended to 'align as much as possible with the recommendations of the Royal
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse, Working with
Children Checks Report' and that a nationally consistent approach to screening
NDIS workers will be implemented under a combination of Commonwealth and state
and territory legislation and policy, as states and territories will remain
responsible for the operational aspects of worker screening including worker
screening units.[70]
Independent advocacy and inclusivity
2.56
Two key issues raised by many organisations throughout the inquiry
relate to the importance of ensuring the voices of individual persons with
disability remain central to the design and ongoing operations of the
Commission. The first issue raised was the overall inclusivity of the
Commission towards people with disability, and the second issue was the
importance of independent advocacy in ensuring people are able to effectively
represent their own rights and participate in quality and safeguard processes,
especially in the NDIS' marketplace model.
Inclusivity
2.57
Many submitters expressed strong support for the concept of co-design,
to ensure the voices of people with disability are heard in the establishment
and ongoing design of the Commission, and stated their agreement with the
amendment that inserts 'a new general principle into section 4, being that
people with disability are central to the NDIS and should therefore be included
in a co-design capacity.'[71]
However multiple submitters expressed concern that no specific provisions
regarding co-design are included in the Bill.[72]
2.58
Psychiatric Disability Services of Victoria endorsed the new general
principle in Section 4 that promotes the centrality of people with disability
into the NDIS decision-making framework, but raised concerns that 'there is no
agreed process with people with lived experience on how this should be
applied.'[73]
2.59
DPOA also supported the new section 4(9A), but stated 'this amendment
will only have practical effect if it is supported by policy and guidelines
that genuinely articulate what co-design means.'[74]
2.60
Multiple submitters also raised the issue of the accessibility of
information as an inclusivity issue, and recommended the Bill include explicit
requirements on the Commission to provide information in accessible formats,
including Easy Read format.[75]
Independent advocacy
2.61
Independent advocacy, including supported decision-making, was seen by
multiple submitters and witnesses as critical to ensuring that individual
person's with disability were able to effectively participate in the NDIS in general,
and specifically in any negotiations or complaints processes. However,
submitters raised concerns that there are no express provisions in the Bill
which empower the formal function of independent advocacy.[76]
2.62
AFDO and the DANA submitted the success of the Commission's complaints
handling processes, and the NDIS itself, relies on the availability of advocacy
services:
Without advocacy, individualised schemes such as NDIS have
the potential to maintain power imbalances between service providers and people
with disability that existed under block funding. The design of this new system
must take into account that some NDIS participants will require advocacy
support to effectively raise or communicate concerns, resolve issues before
they escalate, or participate meaningfully in complaints resolution processes.[77]
2.63
The OPA Victoria agreed with this view and pointed to the need for
people with cognitive impairment to be supported to use the NDIS consumer
choice model.[78]
2.64
DPOA went further, and submitted the Bill should have included
amendments to the NDIS Act to ensure that decision-making arrangements within
the NDIS Act comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disability.[79]
2.65
The PACYPC outlined similar concerns in its submission, that
'participants with cognitive impairment will need a significant investment in
supports to help build their capacity to actively develop and maintain natural
safeguards as well as participate actively in formal safeguarding processes.'
The PACYPC submitted that this would require both education and appropriate
supports for people with disability, and recommended 'that the developmental
elements of a quality and safeguards framework are specifically articulated as
part of the role of the NDIS QASC.'[80]
The Victorian Council of Social Service (VCOSS) also pointed to the need to
educate people 'in a way they understand, about how to make a complaint and
understanding whistleblower protections.'[81]
2.66
AFDO and DANA submitted that although the role of independent advocacy
has been embedded in Section 4 of the Act, it has not been adequately included
in the provisions of this Bill establishing the Commission. AFDO and DANA
recommended the Bill should include express reference to a person's right to
independent advocacy.[82]
2.67
QAI made a similar recommendation that the Bill should include an
amendment which 'establishes the principle that participants have a right to
and will be referred to advocacy during the making of complaints under the
Quality and Safeguards Framework.'[83]
2.68
The Victorian Advocacy League for Individuals with Disability Inc. pointed
to the inclusion of advocacy within the Framework, but argued there is no
'commitment to ensure that sufficient resources will be provided to resolve the
current and rising unmet need for advocacy.'[84]
Restrictive practice and the role of the Senior Practitioner
2.69
Proposed section 181H makes provisions for the Commission to have a behavioural
support function, which will provide leadership for the reduction and
elimination of restrictive practice by NDIS providers. These provisions enable
the Commission to undertake several functions, including: developing a
competency framework; developing policy and guidance material; providing education
and training; overseeing use through compliance and collecting information; and
undertaking and publishing research.[85]
2.70
Proposed paragraph 73Z(f) includes the unauthorised use of restrictive
practice in the definition of a reportable incident. The NDIS rules will make
provisions for the management of reportable incidents and the administration of
which is a function of the Commissioner under proposed paragraph 181F(e). NDIS
providers are required to comply the NDIS rules regarding reportable incidents
as a condition of their registration under proposed paragraph 73F(2)(h).[86]
2.71
As an additional safeguard under proposed section 73F, AFDO and DANA recommended
the Commissioner should be able to mandate that a person with a disability has
access to an independent advocate to assist them through any processes
associated with a reportable incident.[87]
2.72
As explained in the EM, it is foreseen that the provisions under
proposed section 181H will be managed by the position of Senior Practitioner,
who will have appropriate clinical expertise.[88]
The Department's submission affirms that states and territories would be
responsible for the authorisation of restrictive practices.[89]
2.73
The NDIS Framework proposed that in the legislative framework statutory
powers would be afforded to the NDIS senior practitioner who, amongst other
things, will have 'the power to proactively examine current practice in
behaviour support and the use of restrictive practices.'[90]
VCOSS' submission observes that the Bill has not legislated the role of senior
practitioner—rather, a behavioural report function—and recommends that the
powers and function of the Senior Practitioner be legislated.[91]
VCOSS notes:
[w]ithout legislating the functions and powers of Senior
Practitioner there is a risk the role of building the capacity of providers and
eliminating restrictive practice with be de-prioritised. This may lead to the
Commission's role being consumed by compliance and enforcement activities.[92]
2.74
Submitters to the inquiry expressed disappointment and concern regarding
the scope of the Commission's powers regarding restrictive practices. DPOA
expressed concern that the restrictive practice oversight arrangements under
proposed section 181H are 'very weak given that restrictive practices cause
significant breaches of human rights, and can constitute torture, cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment'.[93]
Ms Sands elaborated on DPOA's view in evidence to the Committee:
[w]e argue that the NDIS commission should have the strongest
powers possible with regard to the elimination of restrictive practices,
including legislative powers to prohibit certain restrictive practices and
impose criminal penalties.[94]
2.75
The OPA Victoria expressed concern that the safeguarding system in the
area of restrictive practice may be compromised by aspirations for national
consistency and suggested that '[i]n time, the model of Victoria's Senior
Practitioner should be implemented across Australia.'[95]
DPOA noted that if authorisation of behaviour supports occurs at the state and
territory, then there should be an agreement for a nationally consistent
mechanism for disability support approvals.[96]
2.76
The PACYPC's submission stated that further clarification of the
Commissioner's behavioural support role was needed, noting that Offices of the Senior
Practitioner exist in several NDIS jurisdictions and it unclear as to how the
Commission would work in collaboration with these entities that have similar
responsibilities in monitoring the use of restrictive practices.[97]
Other submitters suggested a similar need for clarity around the role of the
senior practitioner differentiation from the functions of state and territory
bodies.[98]
2.77
Some submitters are concerned that the reduction and elimination of
restrictive practice may be limited by the availability of NDIS supports and
services, for example for those in who live in rural and regional locations.[99]
2.78
The Committee notes that the Department's submission to the inquiry
covers many of the issues raised by submitters, including those restrictive
practices can represent a breach of human rights. The Department clearly
stated:
For the vast majority of people with behaviours of concern,
it should be possible to eliminate the use of restrictive practices over time
by understanding and responding to the issues underlying the behaviours.[100]
2.79
The Department highlights a number of significant powers in the Bill
which underpin the reduction and elimination of restrictive practices and says
that in combination: 'these powers will greatly enhance national transparency
and control over the use of restrictive practices in the NDIS.'[101]
Own motion investigations
2.80
The NDIS Framework indicates the Commissioner would have the authority
to undertake own motion investigations.[102]
The Framework discusses that the Commissioner may utilise own motion
investigative powers in addressing breaches of the NDIS Code of Conduct.[103]
2.81
Submitters to the inquiry have suggested that the own motion
investigation powers of the Commission are 'unclear in the Bill and appear to
be restricted to being based on actual complaints received.'[104]
2.82
VCOSS suggest that the Bill provides limited investigative powers to the
Commissioner, and notes that Divisions 5 and 6 of the Bill propose that the
NDIS rules determine 'the matters in which the Commissioner may authorise the
inquiry on his or her own initiative.'[105]
VCOSS highlights the Commissioner is empowered to determine whether certain
provisions of Part 3A of the Act have been breached by providers in relation to
civil penalties, or an offence under the Crimes Act 1914 or Criminal
Code as it pertain to Part 3A.[106]
VCOSS recommends the Commission have own motion powers, stating:
[w]e believe the Commission should have own motion powers to
conduct inquiries and investigate matters without having received a complaint
or serious incident notification... These powers should enable the Commission to
investigate systemic issues and cases where there are allegations or concerns
about people with disability experiencing violence, abuse or neglect.[107]
2.83
Other submitters to the inquiry supported, or recommended, the
Commissioner being empowered to undertake own motion investigations.[108]
Mr Mark Farthing, Senior Policy Advisor, HSU noted in evidence to the Committee
the own motion powers currently afforded to the Victorian Disability Services
Commission and said: [i]f own-motion powers weren't provided to the national
complaints commissioner, that would be a diminution of protections for every
Victorian with a disability.[109]
2.84
The Department's submission to the inquiry suggests that Divisions 5 and
6 of the Bill make provision for the Commissioner's own motion investigation
capacity regarding complaints and reportable incidents. Notably, Divisions 5
and 6 of the Bill outline the parameters in which the NDIS Rules may deal with
matters of complaints management and reportable incidents, including own motion
inquiry. The Department gave evidence to the Committee assuring that the
Commissioner would have full power to conduct investigations, including
investigations into systemic and individual complaints. The Department stated:
The bill triggers the operation of the Regulatory Powers
(Standard Provisions) Act 2014, which creates a consistent framework across
Commonwealth bodies for monitoring and investigative powers, use of civil
penalties and infringement notices, acceptance and enforcement of undertakings
and use of injunctions.
Schedule 2—NDIS review
Proposed paragraph 24(1)(f)
2.85
The Bill proposes the addition of paragraph 24(1)(f) to the Act. This paragraph
adds to the list of disability requirements applicable to a prospective NDIS
participant, in particular the support required by a prospective participant:
...must be most appropriately provided
through the NDIS and not more appropriately funded or provided through other
mainstream general systems of service delivery or supports such as health of
education.[110]
2.86
In a late submission, the Tasmanian Government submitted its concern to
the inquiry that paragraph 24(1)(f) 'has the effect of making a person's
eligibility for the NDIS subject to whether they are receiving, or should be
receiving, a service from a system outside the NDIS.'[111]
2.87
At the time of drafting this report, this claim has not been tested with
the Minister or the Department.
Committee view
2.88
The Committee recognises the significant work undertaken in developing
the NDIS Framework, particularly the extensive consultation process and the
consensus reached with state and territory governments.[112]
The Committee agrees with the broad consensus view from people with disability
and civil society on the critical need for change within the existing quality
and safeguards systems and views the NDIS Framework and the derived Bill as an
effective mechanism to help achieve this.
2.89
The Committee notes that the Bill has been developed in consultation
with state and territory government officials and peak bodies representing
people with disability.[113]
However, the Committee heard there are additional concerns from submitters and
witnesses regarding specific elements of the Bill. The key concerns raised by
submitters have been explored in this chapter. The Committee notes the concerns
of some stakeholders regarding the differences between the NDIS framework and
the Bill, but recognises that the provisions of the Bill appear to retain the
integrity and policy intent of the NDIS Framework.
2.90
Many concerns raised by submitters go to the lack of detail contained in
the Bill, particularly around the NDIS Rules. However, the Committee accepts
that the approach taken by the Government, in presenting the rules separately
through delegated legislation for the purposes of consultation and flexibility,
is reasonable. The Committee notes that the Department is continuing to consult
on the development of the NDIS Rules, which are disallowable instruments that
are subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
2.91
The Committee notes the provisions for the proposed establishment of the
Commission appear to be in accordance with that of similar independent Commonwealth
authorities. However the Committee notes that for the Commission to be
effective, it will need to be open to engaging with the processes of other
entities, including disability advocacy programs.
2.92
Similarly, the Commission will need to work in close collaboration with
states and territory governments on matters critical to the Commission's core
functions, such as the reduction and elimination of restrictive practices.
Whilst the Commission has been empowered to provide leadership and oversight of
restrictive practices matters, authorisation for the use of restrictive
practices remains with state and territory governments.[114] An important balance
will need to be struck between the national functions of the Commission and the
authorisation functions of the State and Territories.
2.93
The Committee notes the overall support for the NDIS Framework and notes
the Bill operationalises the Government's quality and safeguarding obligations
under that framework. Greater consistency and national oversight of quality and
safeguarding provisions is a critical priority. The Committee welcomes the
establishment of the NDIS Commission.
Recommendation 1
2.94
The Committee recommends that the Bill be passed.
Senator Slade Brockman
Chair
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