Chapter 2 - Background
Iraq's
payment default
2.1
The committee's reference stems from a debt incurred
when the then Australian Wheat Board (AWB) sold wheat on credit terms to the
Iraqi government.[3] Following the
conflict arising out of Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait
in 1990 and the subsequent imposition of United Nations (UN) economic sanctions
on the Iraqi regime, the Iraqi government defaulted on payments owing to its
creditors. The overwhelming majority of Iraq's
debt to Australia
relates to contracts between AWB and the Iraqi government. A small amount of
debt is owed to other exporters to Iraq.[4]
2.2
The debt relates to wheat sales made over the period
1987-1990, affecting the relevant individual seasons' wheat pools as follows:
- 1987-88:
US$0.36/tonne
- 1988-89: US$3.21/tonne
- 1989-90:
US$4.06/tonne
2.3
The debt outstanding averages out to $2.68 per tonne
for growers that contributed to each of the three seasons' pools.[5]
2.4
In their joint submission to the inquiry, the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Department of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry[6] calculated that
as at 31 December 2004 AWB
Ltd is owed US$1.027 billion by Iraq,
including interest. Of this, US$211.9 million is the uninsured component.[7]
2.5
This chapter will examine the insurance payout and the
Commonwealth ex-gratia payment AWB received following Iraq's
default, as well as the recent agreement between the Paris Club group of
creditor nations to forgive the majority of Iraq's
debt and schedule a timetable for repayments of the remaining debt.
AWB's EFIC Cover
2.6
Throughout the 1987-1990 period, the Australian Wheat
Board operated as a statutory marketing authority, granted sole responsibility
for the marketing and export of Australian wheat under the Wheat Marketing Act 1984 and then the Wheat Marketing Act 1989.[8] This
regulated marketing arrangement is referred to as the single desk system. Today,
the functions of the former AWB are undertaken by AWB Ltd,[9] a publicly listed company with a dual
class share structure that retains grower control. In July 1999, AWB became a
grower owned and controlled corporation, and in 2001 AWB Ltd was publicly
floated with the listing of B-class shares on the Australian stock exchange.[10] In this report, the organisation is
referred to as both AWB and AWB Ltd, depending on the time period being
discussed.
2.7
AWB's sales to higher risk credit markets during the
late 1980's were insured by the Export Finance and Insurance Commission (EFIC)
on their National Insurance Account (NIA). This effectively meant that they
were underwritten by the Australian government when a purchaser of AWB wheat on
credit defaulted on payments.[11]
2.8
Under the NIA arrangement, EFIC undertook to pay out an
agreed percentage of the debt to AWB in the event of a payment default, for
distribution amongst the affected farmers. Depending on market conditions and
the size of particular contracts, this ranged from 70 to 80 per cent of the
value of sales during the relevant period.[12]
Australia's
single desk wheat marketing arrangements dictate that all growers participating
in the relevant seasons' wheat pool were equally affected per tonne of wheat
sold to AWB.
2.9
AWB indicated that NIA cover was necessary as
commercial credit insurance markets could not accommodate their insurance
requirements due to the size of the contracts and the length of payment terms.[13]
2.10
In the years leading up to 1990, the terms of EFIC's
insurance cover were becoming less favourable to AWB. In late 1987 EFIC reduced
its credit insurance cover from 95 per cent to 80 per cent of sales.[14] Insurance premiums over the affected
pool years had also risen, from $10.1 million in 1987-88, to $17.5 million in
1988-89 and $23.3 million in 1989-90.[15]
Nonetheless, AWB still felt the arrangements were commercially beneficial:
They put us through the wringer on an annual basis under the
national interest account and invariably we had to run through the corridors of
Canberra but they supported us at
that time and [we are] very grateful for that support. Without credit cover, we
would not have sold the volumes that we sold to Iraq.[16]
Although the extent of the NIA cover had been reduced, AWB
concluded that the cost of seeking commercial insurance cover for the residual
20 per cent was prohibitive.[17]
2.11
During the 1980's, Iraq
was an important market for Australian wheat growers. AWB informed the committee
that Iraq was
our largest grain customer; approximately twelve per cent of our wheat exports,[18] while DFAT submitted that in the three
affected pool seasons Australia
supplied 35 per cent, 49 per cent and 41 per cent (respectively) of Iraq's
import requirement.[19]
2.12
According to AWB, Iraq's
importance to Australia
was enhanced by weak prices due to high production levels worldwide, the
strength of Australia's
currency and subsidies for US and EU wheat producers.[20] Selling on wheat credit was deemed to
be an essential strategy for accessing the Iraq
market, which in turn required the coverage provided through the NIA. According
to AWB Ltd:
You could not do business with Iraq
at that time unless you could put credit on the table.[21]
2.13
Between February 1991 and December 1992 EFIC paid
growers (via AWB) $US381.2 million, AWB's full entitlement under their
insurance arrangement.[22] This sum
equates to approximately 80 per cent of the value of the contracts Iraq
defaulted on during 1987 to 1990.
2.14
These insurance payments were not distinguished from ordinary
payments to growers from contract sales in AWB's Pool Realisation Statements,
which provide information to growers on AWB's financial activities for each
seasons' pools.
2.15
The uninsurable portion owing to wheat growers,
originally US$98.1 million,[23] is the
debt of interest to the committee.
2.16
During the inquiry, some confusion arose as to the
ownership of Iraq's
debt following their payment default. Under normal insurance arrangements, once
a claim has been paid by the insurer, the insurer then takes ownership of the
debt. However, there was conflicting evidence as to whether EFIC actually took
ownership of the debt at the time they paid out AWB's claim, or at a later
date.
2.17
AWB Ltd maintained that the debt had transferred in
1991, though some administrative tasks may have been incomplete:
[We] assume that paperwork was outstanding as a result of their
wanting to put the debt to the Paris Club. They wanted an extra piece of paper
to demonstrate that they had the debt, but, as far as I was concerned, under
the terms of the insurance policy, which were very clear, when they paid out
the money in 1991 the entire debt went to them.[24]
2.18
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade told the committee
that:
... when the insured portion of the debt was paid, the legal
responsibility for the rest of the money, if you like, was transferred to EFIC.
It was decided before negotiations began in the Paris Club last year to do the
last formality; ... Our understanding is that EFIC thought it would be useful
at that stage formally to assign the rights.[25]
2.19
In correspondence with the committee, EFIC indicated
that under the terms of the insurance policy AWB was required to assign the
debt 'upon request'. This request was not forthcoming when AWB's claim was paid
out, but many years later in 2004. EFIC stated that although the rights and
obligations attached to the debt transferred from AWB to EFIC upon payment of
the claim:
EFIC obtained a legal assignment of the debt in May 2004. The
assignment of the debt was not completed until 2004 because between the payment
of claims in the early 1990s and the fall of the Iraqi Government, sanctions
were in place precluding formal negotiation of recoveries between EFIC and
Iraq. The Deed of Assignment was signed once sanctions were lifted and
recoveries were in prospect through the processes of the Paris Club.[26]
2.20
Consequently, during the period between the payment of
claims (over 1991 and 1992) and the assignment of the debt in 2004, the status
of the Iraq
debt was as follows:
- The rights and obligations attached to the debt
belonged to EFIC;
- In accordance with UN sanctions, EFIC was
precluded from negotiating recovery of the debt during this period; and
- Under AWB's EFIC insurance policy, money
recovered by AWB, 'whether from the buyer or any other source', was to be
remitted to EFIC and then divided in proportion to the loss borne.[27]
2.21
In spite of the information provided by EFIC, the committee
is still unclear as to whether the delay in formally assigning the debt was due
to poor administrative practice or a belief that, until the Paris Club
agreement, AWB (and subsequently AWB Ltd) was better positioned to pursue the
debt in the context of ongoing sanctions, or a combination of both.
2.22
Regardless of the intent, the committee is of the view
that such administrative practices have not assisted in preventing false
expectations to arise, a matter discussed further in Chapter Four.
Commonwealth ex-gratia payment
2.23
Following the imposition of UN sanctions against Iraq
in 1990, wheat shipments already in transit were diverted to alternative
markets. This resulted in AWB incurring financial losses from the forced sale
of goods to lower paying markets and increased shipping costs associated with
diverting the cargo. DFAT submitted that:
The Government agreed that the grains industry should not bear
the full burden of meeting these losses and compensated the exporters for the
losses they incurred in the Iraq
market from the imposition of UN sanctions ... .[28]
2.24
The then AWB received A$31.03 million in compensation
in the period from October 1991 until April 1992.[29] AWB Ltd informed the committee that
the entire sum was distributed to growers.[30]
2.25
On 14 October
1991 the then Minister for Primary Industries and Energy informed
the Parliament that the ex-gratia payments:
... fully meet the Prime Minister's undertaking to the Grains
Council of Australia that the Government would not expect the grains industry
to bear the full burden of the United Nations sanctions on Iraq. All of the
claimants have accepted the payments as full and final settlement with the
Government for their losses.[31]
The Paris Club
Agreement
2.26
In November 2004, the federal government announced that
it would forgive US$22.1 billion of Iraq's
debt (measured from 1 January 2005),
as part of an agreement negotiated between Iraq
and the Paris Club group of creditor nations.[32]
This reflected an international effort to forgive 80 per cent of the US$38.9
billion owed to these countries. Iraq's
debt to Australia
stemmed predominantly from wheat imports (see paragraphs 2.1-2.4).
2.27
The joint submission stated that:
The Australian Government, in consultation with the grains
industry, believes that the interests of wheat growers are best served by
assisting Iraq's
recovery. Relieved of much of its debt, Iraq
has the potential to be a stable and solvent partner for Australia
in the Middle East to enable it to service any remaining
debt and provide a more financially viable export destination.[33]
2.28
Under the Paris Club agreement Iraq
is to start repaying the 20 per cent unforgiven debt from 2011, for government
distribution to the industry and/or growers. In accordance with the proportion
of debt that was uninsured by AWB, AWB Ltd will be entitled to 20 per cent of
this figure. DFAT officers explained the arrangements as follows:
Given that the original exporters as a whole have already
received from taxpayers approximately 80 per cent of the value of their
original contracts, fulfilling commitments under the insurance arrangements,
the Government's view is that they would as a group be entitled to receive just
over 20 per cent of any future recoveries (including in particular 19.9 per
cent to AWB Ltd). The remaining 80 per cent or so of any recoveries would be
retained by the government as a recovery against the taxpayer-funded insurance
payments.[34]
2.29
The committee was advised that the Paris Club agreement
provides for AWB Ltd to receive 34 payments of US$1.2 million plus interest
over seventeen years, totalling approximately US$42 million. Providing Iraq
is able to fulfil its obligations under the agreement these payments will
commence in 2011, with some interest to be paid prior to that date.[35]
2.30
Significantly, debt forgiveness is extended to Iraq
under the Paris Club agreement on the condition that Iraq does not undertake to
repay other creditors on terms more favourable than that agreed to with Paris
Club creditor nations.[36]
2.31
In light of apparent confusion regarding the financial
consequences of the Paris Club decision, the committee reiterates that the
burden of debt forgiveness will be equally shared by AWB Ltd and its insurer,
EFIC. That is, AWB Ltd and EFIC will receive a 20-80 split of monies paid by
Iraq under the agreement, matching on a pro rata basis the financial loss suffered
when Iraq defaulted. This means that growers will receive approximately 20 per
cent of the original 20 per cent debt outstanding following EFIC's payout. In
effect, the government has applied the consequences of the Paris Club decision
equally to the growers (AWB Ltd) and the taxpayers (EFIC), both of whom have
forgone 80 per cent of their Iraq
debt entitlement.
2.32
In evidence to the committee, AWB Ltd confirmed the
extent of their future entitlement:
... if, ultimately, the government is successful in getting
repayment of money from the Iraqis, our portion of that payment will be 20 per
cent of the debt recovered.[37]
2.33
This equitable division will occur despite EFIC legally
owning the debt owed by Iraq.[38]
2.34
In mathematical terms, after AWB's insurance payout in 1991
and 1992 and their prospective repayments under the Paris Club up until 2028,
AWB will have been paid approximately 84 per cent of the value of their defaulted
contracts with Iraq
over the relevant pool years.
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