Chapter 3 - A case for compensation?
3.1
The committee received submissions and heard evidence
from two organisations seeking federal government compensation to wheat growers
for the US$98.1 million uninsured portion of the Iraq
debt.[39] The committee notes that both are
WA-based organisations, although they indicated that they were pursuing
compensation for all affected growers. Despite this, there appears to be a
regional divide over the issue at a representative level. Except for the
Western Australian Farmers' Federation (WAFarmers), all other state farming
organisations represented on the Grains Council of Australia (GCA) have supported
the GCA's position that the government has fully discharged its
responsibilities to wheat growers. WAFarmers disagree with this majority view
and have resigned from the GCA.[40]
Compensation claims
3.2
WAFarmers told the committee that the federal
government should settle the Iraq
debt in 2005/06:
The WAFarmers proposes that the government should settle the
debt due to growers in the 2005/06 financial year. That would bring to an end
the claim growers have over the debt. Administering the debt repayment
agreement would then be a government-to-government matter between future
Australian and Iraqi administrations within the overall Paris Club framework.[41]
3.3
WAFarmers emphasised to the committee that this claim
was for the principal uninsured debt only, offering to forego interest accrued
if prompt settlement of the debt occurs.[42]
They also requested that the government fund the costs associated with
distributing payments to affected growers.[43]
As to this latter claim, the committee notes that AWB would have met the costs
of distributing the funds had Iraq
not defaulted on their payments.
3.4
While not calling for the costs of distributing
payments to be met by government, the Wheat Growers' Association (WGA) also
called for the federal government to meet the US$98.1 million shortfall in
2005/06. In evidence to the committee, they indicated that this could be made
as an advance to AWB Ltd in contemplation of Iraq's
eventual scheduled repayments.
3.5
Such a payment would represent approximately US$56
million in excess of the amount growers will receive under the Paris Club
repayment schedule.
3.6
Throughout the inquiry, all organisations agreed that
EFIC and the government had discharged its legal responsibilities to AWB and
the growers when the insurance payout was made. However, both WAFarmers and the
WGA rejected the assertion that growers had relinquished their claim to the
outstanding amount after receiving payment from EFIC. The basis for this claim is
a moral one: wheat growers had unfairly shouldered the burden of governmental
decisions relating to Iraq's
wheat trade and subsequent debt to AWB.
Moral obligations of government
The Iraq
debt not a commercial default?
3.7
One element of the moral argument for a full payout of Iraq's
uninsured debt is the cause of their default. The basis for this is that an
uninsured loss borne through a creditor's inability to pay differs from a
payment default imposed through political action. The implication is that
growers should not be expected to bear a financial loss created by political decisions;
this responsibility should rest with the taxpayer, upon whose authority such
decisions are taken.
3.8
Therefore, while accepting that no legal obligation
existed, WGA argued that:
When a country goes to war, no one section of the community
should have to suffer the consequences of it. It should be paid by taxpayers.[44]
3.9
They contended that the source of the government's
moral obligation to affected growers is the political, rather than commercial,
aspect of the Iraq
debt:
... it is really not an issue of commercial failure. This
failure has been caused by sanctions being imposed. ... EFIC insurance was
taken out in case of failure to pay, not in case of war.[45]
3.10
The WGA further emphasised the political nature of the
default by stressing Iraq's
willingness to pay:
The Australian wheat industry had been assured repeatedly
throughout the Saddam Hussein
regime that Iraq
had acknowledged the debt and had the capacity to pay, and the only impediment
to making payment was the UN sanctions.[46]
3.11
WAFarmers also argued that the debt was incurred due to
government action and therefore created a moral obligation on the part of the
federal government:
Basically, the cheque was stopped from coming because of the UN
sanctions. The UN sanctions were not something that the Wheat Board or the
farmers at the time would have considered as a commercial risk that they would
have needed to be aware was about to happen or that they should have taken out
extra insurance cover for.
...
The payments were there, ready to come to us, and we were
deprived of them because of the government action.[47]
3.12
AWB Ltd acknowledged the cause of the debt and the
previous reliability of Iraqi credit:
The Iraqis had an impeccable payment record. We were long-term
suppliers of grain on credit to them, and they always paid on time and were
very good on their payment. That was the 1980s and up to the 1990s. As you
know, they seized Kuwait
on 8 August 1990. Sanctions
were imposed. UN sanctions were imposed which effectively froze all their
international assets. They lost access to their oil exports and therefore their
entire mechanism of being able to pay us was frozen. We lost access to the
market in 1990 and we were directed by the government of the day to stop all
trade with Iraq
and divert all shipments on the water to other destinations.[48]
3.13
The committee recognises that despite the Paris Club's
decision to forgive 80 per cent of Iraq's
debt, the country is highly indebted. In this context, it is questionable that
wheat growers could have now been reimbursed, even if the Saddam regime
remained and the sanctions had been lifted.
3.14
The committee also
notes that Australia's
compliance with UN sanctions was not an optional decision for the government at
the time, but an obligation under international law. Regardless of Australia's
willingness to comply with the sanctions, no payment from Iraq
would have been possible. Further, continuing to seek access to the Iraq
market during this time would almost certainly have had negative implications for
Australia's
trade with other nations.
The Paris Club
decision an unfair burden?
3.15
Another aspect of the argument for full compensation is
that growers have involuntarily forgone their capacity to pursue the debt as a
consequence of other government imperatives. Again, this contention by some grower
representatives is based on the view that one sector is unfairly shouldering
the impact of governmental decision-making.
3.16
Central to this view is that affected growers have been
disproportionately impacted by Australia's
participation in the Paris Club agreement. WAFarmers argued that:
... the government have now changed the rules. They have,
thorough the Paris Club, forgiven the debt. They are going to receive the
further 20 per cent, which they say is now worth approximately $212 million
with back-charges. We are only asking for $100 million.[49]
3.17
WAFarmers suggested that EFIC should bear the full
weight of the Paris Club agreement, as it reflected governmental priorities:
Technically, of course, Iraq
still owed the Australian government because the government were the insurance
company. The insurance company probably has a right to go back to the original
debt, which they have. But they have chosen in the world’s interest to forgive
that portion that they paid out to the Australian growers.[50]
3.18
Accordingly, argued WAFarmers, EFIC (as the government
funded insurer) should relinquish a proportion of their entitlement to
repayment to allow growers to be fully compensated. The committee notes that EFIC is, in fact,
entitled to claim all repayments from Iraq,
as the government insurer has legal ownership of the Iraq
debt. As such, WAFarmers' claim that EFIC has forgone 'their' portion, as
opposed to any entitlement to growers, is incorrect.
3.19
AWB Ltd declined to comment on whether a moral
obligation to compensate affected growers existed.[51]
3.20
Debt forgiveness was agreed to by the Grains Council of
Australia (GCA), the organisation representing Australia's
wheat growers.[52] The committee
recognises that some growers may consider the level of consultation they had
with GCA and AWB Ltd over the Paris Club decision to be inadequate. Issues
concerning communication between growers' representatives and affected growers over
Iraq debt
decisions are discussed in Chapter Four.
3.21
Finally, the committee notes that the Paris Club debt
repayment schedule offers scope for a partial debt repayment that may not have
otherwise occurred had Australia
not participated in this forum. As referred to in paragraph 2.30, the Paris
Club agreement dictates that no more favourable debt repayment terms are
available through other agreements. Essentially, it is a compromise that
represents the best possible outcome Australian wheat growers could achieve
without direct federal government compensation.
Financial loss suffered?
3.22
The final aspect of the moral argument for compensation
is that many growers have lost significant amounts of money, diminishing their financial
viability. With respect to this, the committee recognises that growers
contributing to the relevant pools suffered financial losses as a consequence
of Iraq's
default (see paragraph 2.2). WAFarmers suggested to the committee that Western
Australian growers are owed approximately $10,000 each, while 'serious wheat
growers are owed twice or three times that'.[53]
3.23
The committee does not underestimate the impact of the Iraq
debt on some growers. However, the financial losses incurred when Iraq
defaulted on credit payments from 1987-1990 should not be taken in isolation.
The committee is of the view that despite these losses, the federal
government's ex-gratia payment, the insurance arrangements provided by EFIC, the
premiums extracted from the risky Iraq market and an ongoing wheat trade
relationship with Iraq, have probably left Australian growers financially better
off than had there been no trade with Iraq at all.
3.24
In a 1993 memo supplied to the committee by the PGA of
WA, the GCA deemed the government's $31 million ex-gratia compensation payment to
be a successful outcome:
... the bureaucracy, and indeed, some parliamentarians are still
quite amazed at the way in which the Grains Council successfully mounted and
executed its strategy for Federal Government compensation for the losses
incurred in Iraq
to the tune of nearly $33 million. This is an achievement that should not be
understated nor, I suggest, allowed to be forgotten as growers, understandably,
focus on potential losses of Pool equity on account of outstanding Iraqi debts.[54]
3.25
The GCA memo continued:
Indeed, when you consider that the Government will have, in
addition to this compensation, paid out 80% of the total outstanding debt of
some US$483 million (albeit, with the prospect that they too will recover these
monies if the sanctions are lifted and we resume wheat trade with Iraq), it is
fairly dangerous territory to be charging the Government with having not made a
substantial contribution to compensating growers for the losses (and potential)
that they have incurred as a consequence of the United Nations sanctions.[55]
3.26
Indeed, the insurance cover provided by EFIC to AWB
during this period was considered both necessary and beneficial to growers,
despite the fact that it had been reduced from 95 to 80 per cent in 1987 (see
paragraph 2.10).
3.27
AWB informed the committee that selling wheat to the
Iraqi market required credit terms to be offered, which in turn necessitated
NIA cover through EFIC: 'Without credit cover, we would not have sold the
volumes that we sold to Iraq'.[56]
3.28
The PGA of WA argued that the EFIC arrangement was very
lucrative for growers:
... wheat growers were actually getting a pretty favourable deal
from the government as regards the insurance arrangements which facilitated the
wheat board to sell wheat into risky markets. When the creditor actually paid,
the growers collected the premium for the risk and when the credit defaulted
the taxpayers wore the loss.[57]
3.29
In their 1993 memo, the GCA emphasised that the EFIC
insurance cover was potentially seen as a subsidy to wheat growers, and that
public attempts to recover the remaining debt 'could seriously undermine the
nature and coverage of our export credit arrangements'.[58]
3.30
The PGA of WA reiterated this consideration in evidence
to the committee:
The EFIC scheme that was in place at the time was a subsidy for
growers, which was very attractive. It was worth walking away from the Iraqi
debt to keep that EFIC scheme going.[59]
3.31
The WGA denied that the EFIC arrangements represented
special treatment for AWB and growers:
... EFIC insurance is of a character that is specifically to
help Australian exporters into markets where other insurance is not available.
It is not simply a one-off deal for the wheat industry.[60]
3.32
The committee is aware that EFIC's National Interest Account
(NIA) insurance cover was not available for the exclusive benefit of the wheat
industry. However, AWB's insurance cover through EFIC assisted wheat growers
significantly, enabling their sole statutory marketer to access the Iraq
market underwritten by insurance cover not available on commercial terms.
3.33
The attraction of selling wheat into the Iraqi market was
the premium price obtained from selling to that market. While the AWB was reticent
to quantify the premium paid by the Iraqis, and other organisations were unable
to do so, there was a general consensus that sales to Iraq
were made on favourable terms to AWB.
3.34
In evidence to the committee, AWB admitted that selling
to Iraq elicited
a premium:
[Iraq]
was our largest customer at the time. I was happy to put more and more volume
into Iraq
because of their impeccable payment record and the fact that we were getting
good premiums from the market.[61]
3.35
However, the WGA disputed this contention also, citing
market distortions existing at the time:
... Iraq
was a world wheat producer who the US
would not contribute EEP to when purchasing grain from the US.
So the actual price paid on the day for Australian wheat more closely relates
to the world market price rather than to the world's distorted market price when
you have to compete against EEP from the US.[62]
3.36
Regardless of the unfair nature of subsidisation of
wheat exports from other countries, Iraq
was paying a premium price for Australian wheat. If the distorted wheat price
reflects widespread or normal trading conditions, then being able to sell into
a market where these distortions do not exist reflects a premium price.
3.37
In evidence, AWB Ltd confirmed to the committee that
this premium meant that the overall value of the trading relationship was
beneficial to AWB, even taking into account the loss of the uninsured portion.[63]
3.38
The 1993 GCA memorandum quoted extensively by the PGA reflected
this prevailing belief:
... the bottom line is that wheat growers are better off running
the gauntlet of incurring the loss of 20% of the total value of the credit sale
made at a much higher price than would have otherwise been the case had the
sale either been made at a lower cash price or sold into an alternative lower
priced, less cash preferred paying market.[64]
3.39
The committee is of the view that although a debt from Iraq
remains outstanding, the extent of this loss was mitigated by EFIC's $US381.2
million insurance payment made on sales at premium prices.
3.40
Wheat growers affected by Iraq's
default also benefited by having an existing trade relationship that was able
to be maintained and strengthened during the subsequent period. Following the
imposition of United Nations (UN) economic sanctions on Iraq
in 1990, AWB was able to continue to export wheat to Iraq
under the UN Oil for Food (OFF) Program.
3.41
AWB Ltd informed the committee that from 1992-2004 AWB
exported approximately 12.5 million tonnes of wheat into Iraq
under the UN's OFF Program.[65]
3.42
The PGA of WA highlighted the long term benefit
associated with the imposition of UN sanctions:
Australian wheat growers were initially disadvantaged by the
invasion of Iraq
but, subsequently, Australia
was the sole provider of wheat to Iraq
under the food for oil program ... from 1996 so, in fact, the events that led
to this situation occurring ultimately benefited the Australian wheat grower.[66]
3.43
The committee recognises that Australia's
wheat trade under the UN's OFF program was founded on the AWB's trade
undertaken in previous years. Unfortunately, one aspect of those years was Iraq's
default on payments when UN economic sanctions were imposed. Despite this,
growers have benefited from AWB's good trade relationship with Iraq,
despite the debt outstanding from 1987-1990.
3.44
The committee is of the view that any attempt to approximate
the likely wheat sales to Iraq
(and growers' incomes) had UN sanctions not been imposed is highly speculative,
and not useful.
Distributing payments
3.45
The task of distributing payments to growers that
contributed to the wheat pools in the affected seasons will be undertaken by
AWB Ltd. The committee notes that this will be difficult and potentially time
consuming, whether undertaken in the context of a compensation payment, or as
part of Iraq's
rescheduled payments through the Paris Club Agreement. Given the time that has
passed since the debt was incurred, some growers will have moved out of the
industry, some may have restructured their business operations and others will
have passed away. Although most affected growers will be readily identifiable,
a proportion of these will not. Tracking down these growers will potentially
become an expensive administrative burden for AWB Ltd.
3.46
AWB Ltd informed the committee in evidence that they
maintained the records of growers who delivered to the affected pools but had 'not
fully analysed' the costs of the task or how those costs would be disbursed.[67] In their submission they stated that
the 'process could be difficult, potentially costly and time consuming'.[68]
3.47
The WGA suggested that the task would be facilitated by
the growers themselves:
In a season like we have just had, it is not hard to find people
who are owed the money. They put their hands up readily.[69]
3.48
They further stated that many growers were aware of the
amount they were individually owed, and that AWB Ltd had the information
readily available:
Every grower who makes a telephone call to AWB will be faxed the
information within ten minutes.[70]
3.49
The committee is concerned that growers who were not
affected by the Iraqi default will be expected to contribute to the
administrative cost of distributing debt repayments. Accordingly, the committee
urges AWB Ltd to ensure that the cost of distributing these payments is
equitably attributed to those receiving them. The committee is also of the view
that the government should not be required to contribute to this administrative
cost.
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