Chapter 2
The effects of flags of convenience on the
Australian maritime sector
2.1
This chapter discusses areas of concern raised by witnesses and
submitters relating to the effects of the increasing use of flag of convenience
(FOC) vessels and its effects on the Australian employment and labour market,
namely:
-
the challenges of increases in FOC shipping for the local
maritime sector, particularly the competitive advantages enjoyed by FOC vessels
from the lighter tax and regulatory burdens they are subject to;
-
the loss of jobs for local seafarers, the loss of employment
opportunities for young Australians looking for work in the maritime sector,
and the risks coming from the depletion of a skills base in Australian shipping;
-
the subsequent loss of Commonwealth tax revenues from the loss of
Australian jobs in shipping sector; and
-
the loopholes in the temporary shipping licences provisions of
Australian maritime law that encourage the use of FOC ships over
Australian-owned and crewed vessels.
2.2
This chapter also includes a case study of the MV Portland, which
was a vessel owned by Alcoa to freight cargo on a regular route between Kwinana
in Western Australia and the company's smelter in Portland, Victoria. Alcoa's
replacement of the MV Portland with FOC vessels in 2015 exemplifies the
devastating effect increasing use of FOC shipping has had for many local
Australian jobs.
2.3
Lastly, this chapter notes the positive example of cabotage provisions provided
internationally by the US Merchant Marine Act 1920 (the 'Jones Act'),
which protects and assures the integrity of the US shipping industry.
The challenge of FOCs for Australian shipping
2.4
The committee received evidence that argued FOC operators enjoy
significant tax and regulatory advantages that make it very difficult for the Australian
shipping sector to be competitive. This evidence suggested that this has caused
a significant loss of local jobs and employment opportunities, particularly for
young Australians, as well as a potential depletion of the expertise and skills
base needed for a healthy and productive Australian maritime workforce in the
future.
Unfair competitive advantages enjoyed
by FOCs
2.5
The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) outlined how FOC shipping has an
unfair competitive advantage, due to the lighter tax and regulatory burdens it
is subject to in comparison to the local sector:
The international shipping industry... is not paying its fair
share of tax and has no commitment to the security, social and environmental
impact it has on Australia. This creates, basically, unfair competition. How
can an Australian operator operate in an Australian industry with all the
regulatory and legislative requirements [applying to] any Australian industry,
including taxation, when its competitor does not? Our respectful submission
would be, therefore, that flag-of-convenience and international ships are given
a competitive advantage...[1]
2.6
The International Transport Workers' Federation - Australia (ITF
Australia) agreed with this position, and provided a comprehensive account of
the competitive advantages for companies using FOC vessels:
FOCs enable shipowners to minimise their operational costs
by, inter alia, tax avoidance, transfer pricing, trade union avoidance,
recruitment of non-domiciled seafarers and/or passport holders on very low wage
rates, non-payment of welfare and social security contributions for their
crews, using seafarers to handle cargo, and avoidance of strictly applied
safety and environmental standards. As a result, FOC registers enjoy a
competitive advantage over those national registers which operate with high
running costs and are subject to the laws and regulations of properly
established maritime administrations in the flag state.[2]
2.7
Mr Dean Summers, Coordinator, International Transport Workers' Federation
(ITF), gave some examples of how Australian vessels also were liable for not only
higher wage costs for their crews, but also the price of more stringent
security standards:
....flags of convenience are deregulated. They do not pay tax,
they do all the bad things and all of their standards - safety, pollution,
everything else - are a minimum standard. Australians are more expensive
because [they] are better quality seafarers, they are responsible, they have
security. We heard yesterday each Australian ship costs a million dollars to
have a security standard imposed on that ship, so there has been some move to
take that away. The differences are stark.[3]
Job losses from the increasing use
of FOC shipping
2.8
Some evidence noted that increasing use of FOCs has resulted in a
significant loss of Australian jobs over recent decades.[4]
For example, the Australian Institute of Marine and Power Engineers (AIMPE) submitted
that many Australian vessels had been replaced by FOC vessels fulfilling the
same shipping task, but employing overseas workers:
...every time we lose an Australian ship it is because it has
been displaced by a tax-free 'Flag-of-Convenience' ship... employing mostly tax-free
foreign seafarers. In many cases the Australian-owned ship has been withdrawn
from the Australian Flag and the same ship then re-Registered under a
'Flag-of-Convenience', but the ship continues doing exactly the same Australian
Domestic/Coastal trading as it had done before, but with the Australian jobs
gone.[5]
2.9
The Australian Maritime Officers Union noted how maritime job losses are
affecting the current workforce, as well as potential future maritime workers:
We are constantly contacted by members, and non-members, who
recently gained their qualifications who cannot secure any work. They often add
that the majority of those they studied with are in similar positions.
Our older members fear for their industry. They see the short
term opportunism of multinational companies exploiting our natural resources or
facilitating the 99% of Australia’s trade volumes through shipping without
providing opportunities for young Australian workers in our never ending
pursuit of lower costs and greater shareholder returns as perverse.[6]
Loss of skills, lower standards and
the future capacity of Australian seafaring
2.10
The committee received evidence that argued the current seafaring job
losses would translate into a serious depletion of capacity in the Australian
shipping sector in the near future. For example, the MUA highlighted the
importance of fostering the skills base of the current maritime workforce for
our future economic health:
Coastal shipping comes and goes, but it is the only area [of
the local maritime industry] in which we can build our skills. All of those
ships coming into and out of Port Hedland or the Great Barrier Reef need
pilots. A lot of those pilots have to be master mariners. All of those people
checking the regulation and the environment have to be seagoing engineers... How
are we going to regulate our economy with those maritime skills if we have not
got some semblance of an industry that employs Australians.[7]
2.11
Mr Zach Kinzett, a former crew member of the MV Portland
appearing in a private capacity, told the committee that in the maritime sector
there was often an intergenerational transfer of skills, which was being
threatened by job losses:
In a lot of [the] industry you tend to find that sons usually
follow their mother's or father's footsteps and, with that, it breeds a
generation with a skill base. I am the next generation coming through. If you
remove the merchant fleet of Australia you are effectively wiping out
generations of skilled labour. If my kids want to have the opportunity to go to
sea, there might not be an industry there.[8]
2.12
The WWF outlined some of the other ways in which FOC crews could
potentially reduce the standards of shipping in Australian waters:
...[a limited] knowledge of English which results in poor
communications between Australian authorities and ship masters and limited
understanding of the regulatory requirements for shipping in Australian waters;
no access to recent electronic charts that are regularly updated; and limited,
to no experience with Australian coastal conditions thus increasing the risk of
navigational areas resulting in groundings or other shipping incidents.[9]
2.13
Several witnesses also noted the very high standards of Australian
training for maritime workers, which is exemplified by the Integrated Rating
(IR) system. Under the IR system, Australian seafarers must have 16-weeks of
college training and
36-weeks of work on a vessel before becoming fully qualified as an IR. Mr
Summers, from the ITF, stated to the committee that the integrity of the IR
meant:
It is well recognised that the Australian seafarers are the
most highly trained and best skilled in the world. Foreign seafarers on FOC get
the cheapest training available...[10]
2.14
Regarding the training standards of Australian seafarers, the MUA
submitted:
We go far beyond... the Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers—which is the IMO standard. We are of course much
higher than that because, through the marine orders, there is a higher
stringency, a higher training regard. We want to do better than the minimums.
We want to excel because in our view, as a nation, we want to be better than
the minimum at risk mitigation against environmental catastrophe and the
consequential economic flow-on effects.[11]
2.15
The Maritime Engineers Pty Ltd argued that already poor outcomes for the
shipping labour market would be exacerbated by any loosening of the visa
requirements for foreign workers:
Then there is a move to simplify the visa system for foreign
seafarers to work on our coast. This again is an expedient move and shows a
complete lack of confidence in offering seagoing careers for young Australians...
All of these moves, the removal of cabotage, and the entry of
more foreign nationals into what remains of our marine workforce should be a
serious concern to the broader industry...[12]
Depletion of Australian tax
revenues
2.16
Some evidence received by the committee suggested FOC shipping was one
way for multinational companies to reduce their tax burden in Australia.[13]
The MUA estimated that the tax-exempt status of FOCs depletes Commonwealth
revenues by around $9 billion annually:
Australian purchases of foreign shipping services create a
drain of nearly $9 billion annually on our balance of payments [as FOC vessels
do not pay Australian tax]...[14]
2.17
Additionally, the committee heard that the loss of Australian jobs meant
a reduction of Commonwealth income tax receipts and other economic benefits
from workers on Australian ships losing the jobs, and the subsequent effects on
communities that depended upon shipping employment.[15]
Loopholes in Australian temporary shipping licences
2.18
The Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012
(the Act) regulates coastal trade by granting licences that authorise vessels
to carry passengers or cargo between ports in Australia. It has three types of licence
that can be issued for interstate voyages: general, temporary and emergency.[16]
Regarding temporary licences, the Department of Infrastructure and Regional
Development states:
A temporary licence provides access to engage in coastal
trading in Australian waters—this licence is valid for 12 months and is limited
to the voyages authorised by the licence.[17]
2.19
The Fairwork Commission states that ships engaged in coastal shipping on
temporary licences must adhere to Australian employment law and conditions
(including wages) in certain circumstances:
The Fair Work Act applies to ships engaged in coastal trading
(including foreign-flagged ships) if they:
-
are operating under a general,
transitional or emergency licence, or
-
are operating under a temporary
licence and have:
-
made at least 2 other voyages
under either a temporary licence or single voyage permit in the last 12 months,
or
-
held a continuous voyage permit in
the previous 15 months.
(See regulation 1.15 of the Fair Work Regulations 2009.)
The Fair Work Act applies from the day that loading begins
until the day that unloading ends.[18]
2.20
The committee heard that these provisions are being exploited by
companies using FOC ships on permanent domestic routes, and that this can
exacerbate the decline of Australian-flagged shipping and the loss of local
jobs in the maritime sector. In particular, the committee understands that the
provision for Australian wages to be paid on the third and subsequent voyages can
be bypassed by shipowners by having vessels leave Australian waters after the
second voyage under a temporary licence. Alternatively, since temporary licences
are transferrable between vessels, this condition can be circumvented by
transferring the licence to another ship undertaking the same freight task.[19]
Case study: the replacement of Alcoa's MV Portland by FOC vessels
2.21
The recent events involving the MV Portland illustrate many of
the themes relating to employment and FOC shipping that are drawn out in this
chapter so far.
2.22
The MV Portland was a ship built and owned by Alcoa, which routinely
carried alumina from the company's Kwinana plant, in Western Australia, to its
smelters in Portland, Victoria, over 27 years.[20]
The crew of the MV Portland were Australians, as required by the Act's
provisions for regular voyages undertaken on set domestic routes.[21]
2.23
In October 2015 the Commonwealth granted Alcoa a temporary licence
allowing them to engage FOC vessels manned by foreign crews on the
Kwinana-Portland route.[22]
Subsequently, Alcoa notified the crew of the MV Portland that they would
no longer be required from 11 January 2016.[23]
2.24
Some evidence received by the committee suggested that in awarding this
temporary license, the Commonwealth had ignored both the requirements of
Australian maritime law and its usual procedure. Mr Bray, MUA, told the
committee that, since 'The law says that if there is an Australian vessel
available to carry a domestic cargo, the Australian vessel is given the right
to carry that cargo', he thought it was notable that:
...firstly, Alcoa in this particular case were the shipowner.
They had complete control over the asset. They could have determined that that
vessel run for another 12 months, two years or five years, depending on the
cost of the dry dock. They were in complete control and they engineered the
removal of the vessel to apply for the temporary licence....
Secondly, I have held meetings with various shipowners and
operators around the country to ask whether they actually expressed an interest
in an ongoing contract with Alcoa... [and found] There are a number of companies
that did apply and, in particular, one that did not put one business tender in
but put three business tenders in [unsuccessfully].[24]
2.25
The ship's crew staged industrial action protesting the loss of almost
40 jobs and the use of FOC vessels to replace the permanent Kwinana-Portland
run. The basis for this action was explained to the committee by Mr Kinzett:
We have been fighting Alcoa because they sacked nearly 40
Australian seafarers and removed the national-flagged ship from service without
an adequate explanation and contrary to the recent decision by the Australian
parliament. The company is also the long-term recipient of a subsidy from the
Victorian state government that runs into tens of millions of dollars a year.
It may even be $100 million, but no-one knows, as those numbers are not made
public. The work has not dried up. Alcoa intends to continue the trade in
foreign-flagged ships with foreign crews, and it is supported by the Turnbull
government, which wants to open up the Australian coast to cheap, nasty, risky
shipping.[25]
2.26
Following a 60-day dispute, at 1am on 13 January 2016, five members of
the crew undertaking industrial action on board the vessel were forcibly
removed from the ship by 30 security guards working for a private firm.[26]
Following this, a number of foreign seafarers were taken on board to crew the MV
Portland on its voyage to Singapore, where it was later sold.[27]
2.27
Importantly, the committee received evidence that showed that Alcoa
still required ships to operate a regular voyage freighting alumina between
Kwinana and Portland, but that this was now being done using FOC vessels and
exploiting a loophole in Australian maritime law. Ships that have taken over
Alcoa's Kwinana-Portland route have been the Strategic Alliance, a
Singaporean-flagged ship owned by a US-based company, as well as the Greenery
Sea and the Asia Spirit, which are both FOC vessels operated by
foreign crews.[28]
2.28
Mr Bray, MUA, commented on the use of these ships on a regular freight
route that should be subject to the provisions of Australian maritime law:
The fact was that the jobs were not drying up; the trade was
not drying up. The smelter is not closing. They still need ships. They just
made a decision that they were going to use the very flag-of-convenience ships
[that have just been] described to continue that trade and push our members out
of work. We have currently got the cabotage rules in place and we know that the
legislation was challenged last year in the lower house and then it came to the
Senate and was defeated. Those cabotage provisions are there while those laws
exist. The fact is that they are now being ignored.[29]
2.29
Mr Ian Bray, Assistant National Secretary, MUA, estimated the switch to FOC
vessels would save Alcoa $6 million annually.[30]
However, Mr Kinzett commented this cost saving also came with a significant
drop in the quality of the ships undertaking the Kwinana-Portland run:
The MV Portland has been carrying alumina from Alcoa's
Kwinana plant to its smelter in Portland for more than 27 years. This domestic
trade will continue. So far all of the replacement ships used by Alcoa have
been substandard for differing reasons...[31]
2.30
More specifically, the committee heard about serious concerns that the
ITF and MUA had about the serious underpayment of seafarers on the ships that
had replaced the MV Portland.[32]
Mr Kinzett explained that the workers who had replaced the MV Portland
crew were paid very low wages, and thereby saved Alcoa money:
We are angry about the conduct of the United States-based
miner Alcoa and the Turnbull government, which allowed the company to use a
12-month temporary licence to bring in foreign vessels and foreign crews for as
little as $2 an hour.[33]
2.31
Further to this, Mr Summers, ITF, told the committee that some serious
irregularities and potentially corrupt practices had come to light in the ITF's
examination of the financial affairs onboard the Strategic Alliance:
On this ship they had an accounting structure whereby the
captain would pay-off government officials of at least three countries: law
enforcement agencies, port officials and immigration officials. He would send
those receipts back to the company in the United States and they would send
back the money that he used to bribe officials. It is open bribery and it is
not even challenged by the company. They said it was a mistake by one captain.
Since then, we have got rid of that captain and the practice has not occurred
again but it was very, very clearly an open accounting practice.[34]
2.32
Mr Ian Bray, MUA, noted that international crews had far less training
than the MV Portland crew. He noted this was not solely the case for
seafarers on FOC vessels operating the Kwinana-Portland route, but also the foreign
crew brought in to work on the MV Portland following the eviction of the
Australian crew on 13 January 2016, and other ships:
...it is not only about the three vessels that have replaced
the Portland and carry cargoes, and it is not only about the vessel that
is replacing the CSL Melbourne; it is about the crew that came in in the
middle of night and replaced the Australian crew on the MV Portland... We
know that those seafarers could not have had the qualifications that were
required to meet the Minimum Safe Manning Certificate on that vessel. The
Minimum Safe Manning Certificate on that vessel stated quite clearly that this
vessel cannot proceed to sea with fewer than five integrated ratings. We know
that nowhere else in the world, other than New Zealand, issues Integrated
Rating Certificates, so how did they get this qualification or this
recognition?[35]
2.33
The MV Portland case also illustrates the effects of FOC shipping
on the contribution of Australian crews to Commonwealth tax receipts and the
financial wellbeing of their local communities. Mr Kinzett, Private Capacity,
told the committee that:
Ultimately, [the former crew members of the MV Portland]
are just Australian workers in an Australian industry... We have families and
mortgages, we pay tax and we contribute to local businesses....We have been
replaced by exploited foreign crew and the flag of convenience ships owned by
companies that pay no tax and operate out of places such as Liberia, Mongolia
and Panama.[36]
2.34
The MUA mounted a challenge to Alcoa's actions in the MV Portland
case through the Fair Work Commission and the Federal Court system, which were unsuccessful.[37]
The need for more stringent cabotage provisions in Australia
2.35
Some witnesses and submissions highlighted that other nations protect
their domestic shipping more thoroughly than Australia. For example, the MUA
argued:
Countries that do need shipping - like the Philippines,
Japan, China, the US, Australia, Indonesia, Brazil and South America - protect
their domestic shipping because it is an intrinsic part of their domestic
transport infrastructure. It is not a revolutionary concept; it is a process of
governance and understanding... With the enormous needs and the enormous
coastline and the diversity of the Australian economy, it is completely
counterintuitive to remove shipping from the domestic infrastructure pattern.[38]
2.36
The AIMPE agreed with this position:
Most other countries pass laws so that a ship may only
regularly trade in that country’s coastal/domestic shipping industry if the
ship is Registered under that nation’s flag, which makes those ships, seafarers
and companies all subject to that nation’s laws....including tax laws.
Australia’s willingness to Permit
foreign/ 'Flag of Convenience' ships to regularly trade in Australia’s
coastal/domestic shipping industry without requiring the ship to Register in
Australia and thereby submit to Australian sovereignty is highly unusual.
Amongst major shipping nations and [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD] nations Australia already has a more wide-open policy than
any country other than New Zealand.[39]
2.37
The ITF Australia commented that this was particularly important for the
freight of dangerous coastal cargoes such as alumina and ammonium nitrate.[40]
This issue is discussed further in the following chapter of this report.
Cabotage provisions provided by the
US 'Jones Act'
2.38
The committee was interested in cabotage provisions under the US Merchant
Marine Act 1920 (the 'Jones Act'), as it was cited in evidence as an
example of a healthy and sustainable domestic shipping industry. This was due
to the protection it offers US domestic shipping, as well as the way it
strengthens the US national security system and economic interests.
2.39
Rear Admiral Robert Riley, US Navy (Retired) explained the scope of the
Jones Act, particularly the protection it offers US ship operators:
...the Jones Act is cabotage. It applies in the maritime arena
and it can apply in aviation and the like. It simply states that if you are
going to operate a vessel, in the case of the maritime community that operates
from a US port to a US port—and that can be a port up a river, a port in
Alaska, a port in Puerto Rico or a port up or down our coast—that vessel will
be built in the United States, crewed by US licenced and unlicenced mariners
whose course curriculums have been approved by our Coast Guard who works with
our school houses and it is to be owned, at least 75 per cent, by a US company.[41]
2.40
Rear Admiral Reilly went on to explain that approved US-owned merchant
ships could be used by the government to respond to national disasters or
national crises under the Jones Act:
For the Department of Defense, having our merchant maritime
community, which we call the fourth arm of defence, is absolutely critical for
us to respond in terms of national crises and disaster. We have called upon
them time and time again. This is a capability and being that we do not need to
be totally on the US government payroll. This is where we have a mixture of
best business practices that include maintaining military-useful cargo ships in
a reserve capacity parked at piers, in case we need them, with a reduced
operating crew. It includes agreements with 60 of our only 88 Jones Act flagged
US vessels, so that if we need to recall them for active service, for whatever
means, we can do that.[42]
2.41
Rear Admiral Riley commented that the Jones Act assisted the US to
maintain the core competencies and expertise of its maritime workforce:
One of the reasons we support the Jones act is that by having
these 175 ships maintained in the US shipyards from Hawaii to Mobile,
Alabama we retain the core competencies—the welders and electricians. That is
the most dangerous working environment that you can imagine and that is another
area that is regulated. The same applies when you get into things like nuclear
submarines.[43]
2.42
Also discussed was the serious security and economic risks the US would
face without the protections offered by the Jones Act:
Repeal of [the Jones Act], which would allow foreign-built,
foreign-operated, foreign-manned, and foreign-owned vessels to operate on
American waters, would effectively transfer a core American defense industry,
i.e., shipbuilding, overseas to other nations which heavily subsidize their
shipyards and play by their own set of rules.
...Without the Jones Act, the U.S. Coast Guard and other
government entities would face the daunting task of monitoring, regulating, and
overseeing potentially tens of thousands of foreign-controlled, foreign-crewed
vessels in internal U.S. commerce. As a result, America would be more
vulnerable and less secure.[44]
2.43
The ITF commented that the Jones Act recognised the maritime sector's
essential role in US national security, whereas Australia's shipping system
does not:
The Jones Act essentially says that the fourth arm of
defence, the merchant seafarers - and in Australia we are dumping our seafarers
and replacing them with other seafarers from international markets under FOC
ships - are of a value, not just a monetary value but a value in national
security. We know who they are and what they are doing at all times. It is same
in Australia: they are going to know what we are doing because we are going to
be sitting on the unemployment lines while other seafarers are taking our jobs.[45]
2.44
The following chapter of this report discusses the implications of the
increase in FOC shipping for Australia's national and fuel security systems,
and the state of our environment. Furthermore, the following chapter also
discusses some issues relating to seafarers aboard FOC ships, including: their
low wages; poor employment and working conditions; the less stringent training
and safety regimes they are subject to; and the lack of shore-based assistance for
them in Australia.
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