Referral of the inquiry
1.1
On 28 July 2022, the following matters were referred to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee (the committee) for inquiry and report by 10 October 2022:
(a)
the adequacy of Australia 's biosecurity measures and response preparedness, in particular with respect to foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and varroa mite;
(b)
response to and implementation of previous reports into biosecurity; and any related matters.
1.2
On 6 September 2022, the Senate granted an extension of time to report until 20 October 2022, with further extensions then granted to 24 November 2022 and 8 December 2022.
Conduct of the inquiry
1.3
The committee advertised the inquiry on its website and invited submissions from a range of relevant stakeholders, including government agencies, industry, community groups and individuals. Details regarding the inquiry and associated documents are available on the committee's webpage.
1.4
The committee received 104 public submissions, including two confidential submissions, plus one supplementary submission which are listed at Appendix 2 and are published on the committee's website.
10 August 2022 Canberra—a half day hearing for key departments and agencies;
8 September 2022 Canberra—part day hearing for witnesses providing evidence about varroa mite;
11 October 2022 Rockhampton— part day hearing for witnesses providing evidence about FMD;
12 October 2022 Newcastle—part day hearing for witnesses providing evidence about varroa mite and FMD;
13 October 2022 Canberra—full day hearing for witnesses providing evidence about FMD; and
15 November 2022 Canberra—half day hearing for witnesses providing evidence about the biosecurity system, varroa mite and FMD.
1.6
A list of the witnesses who provided evidence at the public hearing is available at Appendix 3.
Acknowledgments
1.7
The committee thanks those individuals and organisations who contributed to this inquiry by preparing written submissions and giving evidence at the public hearing.
References to Hansard
1.8
In this report, references to Committee Hansard are to proof transcripts. Page numbers may vary between proof and official transcripts.
Structure of the report
1.9
This report addresses the committee's terms of reference and comprises six chapters, including this introductory and overview chapter, with the remaining chapters broadly discussing issues along the incursion continuum, moving from offshore to onshore measures as follows:
Chapter 2 Current threats and incursions, FMD, LSD and varroa mite—outlines current threats from FMD and lumpy skin disease (LSD) and details Australia's response to the 2022 varroa mite incursion in New South Wales (NSW). The chapter includes an introduction to the diseases and mites, and discusses risks and impacts for Australia;
Chapter 3 Incursion prevention measures—outlines incursion prevention measures, in particular offshore and at border measures taken to prevent diseases and pests entering Australia;
Chapter 4 On-shore surveillance—discusses on-shore surveillance measures including for animal diseases and in relation to bees and bee pests, including the effectiveness of these measures;
Chapter 5 Incursion preparedness—discusses Australia's preparedness for a disease or pest incursion preparedness, with a particular focus on the implementation of measures aimed at preventing the spread of FMD, LSD and varroa mite;
Chapter 6 Reforming the biosecurity system—outlines previous reviews into Australia's biosecurity system, and the government's response to these reviews and recommendations. Broad issues which cut across the continuum, such as funding and the need for urgency, are also discussed in this chapter.
Key components of Australia's biosecurity system
1.10
Australia's geography and multi-layered biosecurity system has enabled it to remain free of some of the world's most invasive pests and diseases. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute's The Strategist detailed the critical nature of Australia's biosecurity system:
Australia 's biosecurity system protects our economy, our environment and the way of life of all Australians. The consequences of realised biosecurity risks rate as high as those from climate change and geopolitical volatility and could be more disruptive than a global pandemic. Those closest to the biosecurity system believe that it should be classed as part of Australia 's critical infrastructure, a system of national significance.
1.11
Responsibilities for plant and animal biosecurity are shared, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. At the national border they rest with the Commonwealth government, with state and territory governments responsible for biosecurity within their jurisdictions, and preparedness and response measures developed in partnership with industry, producers, research organisations, agricultural and environmental groups, and First Nations communities and individuals.
Commonwealth legislation, policy and frameworks
1.12
DAFF administers the Biosecurity Act 2015 (the Biosecurity Act), Export Control Act 1982, Imported Food Control Act 1992 and various other Acts in order to protect Australia's animal, plant and human health status and to maintain market access for Australian food and other agricultural exports. In its submission, DAFF outlined the premise of the Biosecurity Act:
The Biosecurity Act is based on the premise that federal legislation will regulate goods and conveyances as they enter Australia, to effectively manage biosecurity risk to Australia's ALOP [appropriate level of protection], while also having powers to assess, manage and identify pest or disease incursions within Australian territory.
1.13
The Biosecurity Act defines Australia's ALOP as very low but not zero, with the Beale review (2007) recognising that it is neither possible, nor desirable, to have zero risk.
1.15
The Biosecurity Act and regulations also outline offences and penalties that apply if they are not complied with, with maximum penalties increased in 2021. The department's approach to compliance management is summarised in Figure 1.2, with client behaviour affecting the response. Penalties vary, with DAFF advising that 'penalties for those who do the wrong thing include imprisonment for up to 10 years or a fine of up to $1,110,000 (or $5,550,000 for corporate entities) or both.'
National Biosecurity Strategy
1.16
The National Biosecurity Strategy (NBS), released on 9 August 2022, takes a risk-based approach, and sets out six priority areas for government over the next ten years:
shared biosecurity culture;
highly skilled workforce;
coordinated preparedness and response; and
integration supported by technology, research, and data.
1.17
The NBS will be complemented by a forthcoming implementation plan, and national action plan to ensure accountability.
Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030
1.18
Commonwealth Biosecurity 2030 was released in 2021 and provides a strategic and practical roadmap for protecting Australia's biosecurity across five key areas:
Northern Australia
1.19
The Northern Australia Quarantine Strategy(NAQS) was established in 1989 to provide early warning of incursions and address particular biosecurity risks affecting the region. It has been operated solely by the Australian Government since 2000. Its role is to manage biosecurity border movements, identify unique biosecurity risks and collaborate on surveillance and capacity building in northern Australian and neighbouring countries.
1.20
The Northern Australia Biosecurity Strategy 2030 establishes a framework for jurisdictional collaboration, including with industry and community groups, and aims to minimise biosecurity risks over the next 10 years. In March 2022, the Australian Government approved $38 million to support the strategy.
1.21
The Northern Australia Biosecurity Framework (NABF) encourages collaboration between communities, industries and governments to safeguard biosecurity into the future. It is focussed on developing and sharing information on biosecurity prevention, detection and management. The framework encourages cooperation between governments, industry and research institutions on tropical biosecurity, and the sharing of resources to ensure timely and well-informed decisions about tropical biosecurity.
National Biosecurity Statement
1.22
The National Biosecurity Statement, developed in 2018, outlined a national vision and goals, roles and responsibilities, priorities and principles for managing biosecurity risk.
National Lumpy Skin Action Plan
1.23
On 13 October 2022, the Australian Government released the first national action plan for LSD, including eight objectives and 27 actions aimed at aims to strengthening Australia's ability to prevent, detect, prepare for and respond to any LSD incursion.
International obligations
1.24
Australia has a range of international rights and obligations in relation to biosecurity, which enable it to establish appropriate sanitary and biosecurity measures in relation to:
the international movement of goods;
preventing global disease transmission;
reporting of notifiable diseases;
conservation of biological diversity.
1.25
These activities occur through a range of bodies and instruments including the World Trade Organisation, World Organisation for Animal Health, the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve Arrangement, and the International Plant Protection Convention.
Key bodies
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry
1.26
DAFF has the central role in managing biosecurity, undertaking policy, response, compliance and enforcement, regulatory and operational activities. It works in conjunction with the states, territories and other stakeholders on emergency response planning, coordination, as well as with importers, exporters, travellers, producers, supply chain and logistics businesses, and the community to protect Australia from biosecurity risks. DAFF coordinates with other Federal Government departments to manage Australia's biosecurity risks.
National Biosecurity Committee
1.28
Established by the Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB), the National Biosecurity Committee (NBC) manages a national, strategic approach to biosecurity threats, provides advice to the Agriculture Senior Officials Committee (AGSOC) on national biosecurity issues and progresses the implementation of the IGAB. It is supported by several sub-committees, ongoing expert groups, and short-term, task-specific groups. Outcomes from the NBC also feed into the National Biosecurity Forum, held in conjunction with industry, producers, environmental and community groups.
1.29
Membership comprises senior officials from the Australian Government, state and territory governments, primary industry and/or environment agencies. Animal Health Australia (AHA), Plant Health Australia (PHA), the Australian Local Government Association, and the New Zealand Government may be invited as observers.
Northern Australian Coordination Network
1.30
On 13 October 2022, the Australian and Northern Territory Governments jointly announced the establishment of the Northern Australian Coordination Network. The network aims to bring together the Australian, Northern Territory, Queensland and Western Australian governments, as well as northern livestock industry associations to help manage the threat of LSD and FMD, through improved surveillance and preparedness coordination. It has been established for an initial two-year period and will deliver on-the ground activities in partnership with industry.
Exotic Animal Disease Preparedness Joint Interagency Taskforce
1.31
Announced on 4 August 2022, the taskforce brought together officials from DAFF, Emergency Management Australia, the Australian Defence Force, Australian Border Force (ABF) and AHA, with expertise in biosecurity, animal health, and disaster management to work with states, territories and industry. The taskforce reported to the Minister on 5 September 2022, with further discussion of their findings in Chapter Six. The taskforce has been transitioned into DAFF's Animal Strategy and Coordination branch to support an enduring capacity to respond to an EAD outbreak.
Inspector-General of Biosecurity
1.32
Established under the Biosecurity Act, the Inspector-General of Biosecurity (IGB) has powers to review the performance of functions and exercise of powers by biosecurity officials under the Act. The role is intended to enhance the integrity of Australia's biosecurity systems through independent evaluation and performance review, independent of the Minister and Director of Biosecurity. Its jurisdiction includes 'pre-border (off‑shore), at the border and peri[around]-border' biosecurity issues. It does not extend to post-border issues, which are generally the responsibility of states and territories and other stakeholders, including 'post‑border eradication efforts in response to an incursion'.
1.33
The IGB has made 246 recommendations across 20 reviews to date, with 137 of these actioned and closed and 109 remaining open. Previous reviews and recommendations arising are discussed further in Chapter Six.
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
1.34
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) promotes and protects Australia's international interests, including by collaborating with other governments and bodies, including in Indonesia, to improve food security and safeguard biosecurity, while safeguarding trade and security interests.
1.35
DFAT is assisting with a number of support measures in Indonesia, including in relation to vaccine purchase and distribution and the provision of technical assistance, as well as supporting Australia's biosecurity response.
Department of Home Affairs
1.36
The Department of Home Affairs, including the ABF, is working closely with DAFF to enhance Australia's response preparedness and border measures to minimise the risk of an FMD incursion. While it does not have powers to enforce measures under the Biosecurity Act it works with DAFF to implement biosecurity measures at our international border. This has included enhanced information and expertise sharing, enhanced traveller profiling and risk assessment of travellers, management of priorities and traveller volumes, and increased mail screening.
1.37
The department also participates in a number of whole-of-government response for a to coordinate Australia's response preparedness.
Australian National Audit Office
1.38
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) regularly reviews aspects of Australia's biosecurity system, with DAFF receiving 11 recommendations from two audits since December 2017.
Research organisations
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
1.40
The Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP) is part of the CSIRO. It is a high-containment facility designed to allow scientific research into dangerous infectious agents, undertakes quality-assured diagnostic tests, and issues advice on exotic and emerging disease issues including in relation to effective disease response strategies, and vaccine effectiveness. It supports animal health laboratory capacity in disease detection and control throughout the Asia-Pacific and including Indonesia.
Rural Research and Development Corporations
1.41
There are 15 Rural Research and Development Corporations (RDCs) which help to drive agricultural innovation. They are comprised of both Commonwealth statutory bodies and industry-owned companies. Of relevance to this inquiry are:
Centre for Invasive Species Solutions
1.42
The Centre for Invasive Species Solutions (CISS) commenced as a cooperative research centre in 2005 and now operates as a not-for-profit, member-based organisation, partly funded by government, formed to address the impact of invasive plants and animals across Australia. The Centre's work encompasses research, development and community engagement in biosecurity surveillance, biocontrol and technologies and systems. CISS collaborates with scientists, governments, universities and peak industry, environmental and natural resource management groups.
Tertiary organisations
1.43
A number of tertiary institutions play a significant role in biosecurity research, development and teaching. Of note are:
Charles Sturt University—including the Biosecurity Training Centre based in Wagga Wagga, established in partnership with DAFF. It provides front line biosecurity training for DAFF staff, as well as more specialist training.
University of Melbourne—including the Centre of Excellence for Biosecurity Risk Analysis (CEBRA). It undertakes a variety of research and development, including in the development of risk analysis tools. CEBRA recently facilitated the Structured Expert Judgements (SEJs) for FMD and LSD.
Industry related bodies
1.44
Industry bodies, including peak bodies, across the agricultural, livestock, meat, plant and bee sectors, play a valuable role in Australia's biosecurity system—they publish, in consultation with their members, an array of ambitious and considered strategies and position papers that seek to make a case for reform, action and investment.
Animal Health Australia and Plant Health Australia
1.45
Key players include Animal Health Australia (AHA)and Plant Health Australia (PHA), both of which are not-for-profit companies created to coordinate the government-industry partnership for animal and plant biosecurity in Australia. Their roles are to minimise animal disease and plant pest impacts on Australia, boost industry productivity and profitability and enhance market access.
1.46
Both AHA 's and PHA's memberships include the Australian Government and all state and territory governments. AHA members also include 23 animal industry members. PHA members include 47 plant industry organisations.
1.47
The AHA is funded by DAFF under a pre-agreed formula applicable to all members.
Biosecurity arrangements
Australian Government Crisis Management Framework
1.48
The Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) is part of Australia's national security response. It outlines the Australian Government 's approach to preparing for, responding to and recovering from crises, including guidance on ministerial and officer roles and responsibilities and 'arrangements that link ministerial responsibility to the work of key officials, committees and facilities.'
AUSBIOAGPLAN
Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity
1.50
The Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity (IGAB) sets out commitments for federal and state and territory governments, outlines agreed national goals and objectives, and clarifies roles and responsibilities. The current agreement was signed in 2019 and is due for review in 2024.
Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement
1.51
AHA is the custodian of the Emergency Animal Disease Response Agreement (EADRA) and national coordinator of key government-industry biosecurity partnerships in the area of animal health, producing and inputting into strategies and plans to guide these efforts. The legally binding EADRA outlines industry and government obligations (including cost sharing) in the event of a disease incursion (such as FMD) in Australian animals.
1.52
AHA manages the agreement on behalf of the parties, including conducting training, response debriefs, executing variations and assisting parties to understand their obligations. AHA also verify eligible cost claims for eradication responses under the agreement.
Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed
1.53
PHA is the custodians of the Emergency Plant Pest Response Deed (EPPRD) and national coordinator of key government-industry biosecurity partnerships in the area of plant health, producing and inputting into strategies and plans to guide these efforts. The EPPRD is a legally binding agreement between PHA, the Australian and state and territory governments, and the national plant industry body. The EPPRD outlines cost sharing and other responsibilities in an emergency response.
National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement
1.54
The National Environmental Biosecurity Response Agreement (NEBRA) establishes the national arrangements for responding to an incursion of exotic pests and diseases that impact on the environment and our way of life, including for cost-sharing, to be applied by agreement of the parties where there are no existing arrangements. The NEBRA is an agreement between the Australian Government and all state and territory governments that aims to reduce the impacts of pests and diseases on Australia 's environment and social amenity.
AUSVETPLAN
1.55
AHA manages the development and review of the Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan (AUSVETPLAN) is a national response plan for the management and, where possible, eradication of emergency animal diseases (EAD).
1.56
AUSVETPLAN includes disease specific documents, including for FMD and LSD, and provides operational manuals, resources, and other materials to assist in a response, with scientific, technical and operational advice provided by governments and industry.
1.57
For FMD the nationally agreed approach is one of rapid containment and eradication and includes:
an immediate national livestock standstill for at least 72 hours;
implementation of legislated declared areas and quarantine and movement controls in declared areas to minimise the spread of infection.
1.58
An updated version of the AUSVETPLAN Response Strategy Manual for LSD was published in August 2022.
PLANTPLAN
1.59
Nationally consistent guidelines for managing a response to a plant pest incursion are detailed under the Australian Emergency Plant Pest Response Plan (PLANTPLAN), which has been issued since 8 December 2021 under Schedule 5 of the EPPRD. These guidelines specify actions at a national, state/territory and local government level, describing 'national procedures, management structures and information flow systems'. The PLANTPLAN specifies different stages of a response, and the roles and responsibilities of government and industry at each phase. In addition, it incorporates best practice in Emergency Plant Pest responses using an incident management system and standardised documentation (such as guidelines, job cards, procedures and forms/templates). PHA manages the development and review of the PLANTPLAN.
1.60
Emergency response programs are currently underway for varroa mite in New South Wales, banana freckle in the Northern Territory and exotic fruit fly in Torres Strait and Queensland.
Biosecurity risk
1.61
The National Biosecurity Strategy, along with a number of submitters to the inquiry, highlight the changing or increasing biosecurity risks to Australia posed by:
changing trade and travel patterns;
changing land use and decreasing biodiversity;
major global disruptions;
the increasing presence of significant exotic plant, environment and animal pests and diseases in the region.
1.62
Increasing biosecurity threats and their wider impacts are increasingly recognised through approaches such as 'One Health' which is used to manage and safeguard the health of people, animals, and the environment. This approach integrates public health, veterinary health and environmental sectors, disciplines, and communities across societies to address root causes and create long-term, sustainable solutions, and is particularly relevant to the control of zoonotic diseases.
1.63
The economic value of Australia's biosecurity system is significant. In 2020 it was valued at around $314 billion, with the total flow of benefits from assets vulnerable to biosecurity hazards estimated at $251.5 billion per annum, or A$5.7 trillion over 50 years. In contrast, the absence of a biosecurity system was estimated to result in around $671.9 billion in damages attributable to newly introduced pests and diseases over 50 years. Highlighting the benefits of investment in the system, a robust biosecurity system is estimated to reduce damages due to pests and diseases by close to $345 billion, at a cost of $10.4 billion.
Overview of biosecurity preparedness
1.64
Australia's biosecurity preparedness is multi-layered and incorporates a range of measures:
Pre-border measures—aimed at preventing biosecurity risks from reaching Australia. Measures include prevention, management, and response activities with regional and international partners, risk and intelligence collection, offshore verifications, surveillance and identification, trade and import assessments and controls, inspections, and audits of arrangements for imported goods, financial assistance, expert assistance, capability, and capacity building within the region;
Border measures—risk-based measures conducted at the border to ensure that biosecurity risks are prevented or detected, across the various entry pathways (including passengers, cargo, mail and natural pathways). Activities include: up to date frameworks and procedures, regulatory systems co-designed with industry, upgrading data and information systems, and investing in workforce capability development. It also includes measures such as surveillance and quarantine arrangements, including border controls, profiling, screening and inspection, documentation review, education and awareness, and compliance activities;
Post-border measures—measures aimed at identifying, containing and limiting the impact of biosecurity incursions (e.g. including those that entre via illegal activity or natural pathways). Measures are conducted in partnership with state and territory governments, industry and other stakeholders. Measures include: biosecurity preparedness planning and testing, pest and disease monitoring, surveillance, reporting, incursion response, research and development including into diagnostics, containment and treatments, education and awareness, regulatory and enforcement action, the development of partnerships, and recovery.
1.65
Using the 'Swiss cheese' analogy of biosecurity controls, Figure 1.3 shows how a range of measures work together to reduce the risk of an FMD incursion, and quickly address any entry of the disease.
Emergency response
1.66
In the event of an emergency DAFF would invoke its Incident Management Framework and work to develop a Biosecurity Incident Management System to ensure a nationally coordinated and consistent approach.
1.67
While states and territories have statutory responsibilities for the management of animal diseases and plant pests and diseases within their jurisdiction, the Australian Government would work with the jurisdictions, AHA and PHA, as well as industry to support Australia's preparedness and response.
Other biosecurity issues of concern
1.68
The committee's inquiry was primarily focussed on the immediate threats represented by the varroa mite incursion, and the increased potential for an outbreak of FMD and LSD from Indonesia. However, submissions made to the inquiry addressed several other important biosecurity issues, in particular environmental and aquacultural biosecurity.
1.69
The committee is cognisant of the threats in these areas and acknowledges these issues deserve further scrutiny in the right forum. The committee will continue to scrutinise Australia's biosecurity response through its oversight of DAFF and inquire into matters as referred by the Senate.
Environmental biosecurity
1.70
With the cost of invasive species conservatively estimated at $13 billion per year and the total threat to valued assets of nearly $700 billion over 50 years, it was timely for the Invasive Species Council to draw the committee's attention to the significant environmental biosecurity gap in Australia's biosecurity system. The council noted:
While Australia can be proud of its success in maintaining freedom from many damaging pests of agriculture, contributing to our ongoing profitability and competitiveness as a producer, the same cannot be said about environmental invasive species. The Australian environment has not fared well in contrast, with invasive weeds, forest diseases, insects and feral vertebrates contributing to extinctions and declines of precious biodiversity, and remaining extremely expensive in terms of damage and loss.
1.71
While there has been some progress in environmental biosecurity, it lags behind primary industries considerably. The council called for the consideration of biosecurity as a whole, inclusive of agricultural and environmental biosecurity, an increase in funding, a robust and transparent process for determining environmental biosecurity priorities, further research and development, and improved public reporting.
1.72
CISS also drew attention to the need for increased attention to environmental biosecurity, and the need for an underpinning research and development capability. CISS, WoolProducers Australia, the National Farmers' Federation (NFF) and others drawing attention to the centre's dire funding situation. The NFF noted the valuable work of the centre, advising that it:
provides an innovation pipeline of new biocontrol agents, toxins and detection tools which is vital to putting better and cheaper solutions into the hands of farmers, other land managers and communities. Such advancements can be often deployed at significant scale, making material impacts on feral populations.
Aquaculture biosecurity
1.73
A number of submitters raised concerns about the adequacy of Australia's biosecurity preparedness with particular reference to aquaculture and aquatic animal diseases. They highlighted a number of issues specific to this sector including:
absence of appropriate frameworks and national leadership;
the particular challenges and difficulties associated with eradicating diseases in aquatic environments;
insufficient risk assessment of aquatic animal industries and potentially inadequate importation and decontamination controls;
insufficient testing and compliance assessments of imported fish products; and
lack of research and development.