SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS

REPORT ON THE PRECISION AERIAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (PADS)

SUMMARY & RECOMMENDATIONS

The private company Search and Rescue Pty Ltd (SAR Pty Ltd) specialises in the manufacture of equipment related to marine search and rescue. Mr Laurence Gruzman is Chief Executive Officer and chief pilot; his son Anton is Managing Director.

In the mid-1980s, Mr Gruzman devised an aerial delivery system for marine assistance and rescue called PADS (Precision Aerial Delivery System). Since certificated by CASA in 1988, SAR Pty Ltd has lobbied intensely and extensively to have the system adopted by search and rescue units throughout Australia. Over this period the unit has been modified from the original 'A' version to the current 'E' version.

The PADS system differs from conventional search and rescue delivery systems in that the raft canister is dropped first and the trail line pays out from around the canister. In systems currently used by Airservices Australia, the buoyant line is payed out first, followed by the raft unit. PADS differs also in that the system is dispatched at 100 feet from a plane travelling down-wind, instead of being dropped from a height of at least 200 feet from a plane travelling upwind, as is usually the case.

After dispatch, the fall of the PADS unit is arrested by a static line, and for a few seconds both raft and line remain temporarily connected to the delivery aircraft and are 'towed' by the static line. While this reduces the risk of the raft being blown or washed away from the rescue site, and thus increases the probability that the rescue will be successful, problems have been encountered with recovery of the static line.

PADS has been reviewed by Government instrumentalities on a number of occasions over the last decade and has been repeatedly rejected. While a number of PADS units were purchased by AMSA in 1992 for use by CAA in the delivery of pumps to stricken vessels, those units were removed from the Airservices inventory when problems occurred with their deployment.

In 1994, after persistent lobbying from SAR Pty Ltd, CAA agreed to conduct a tender on SAR aerial delivery systems (the SAREDS project). Comparative evaluation was subcontracted to the RAAF Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) but after problems were encountered with the first dispatch, the ARDU suspended testing and concluded that there were two significant matters which needed to be resolved before any further evaluation be carried out (oscillatory motion of the static line resulting in the drogue impacting on the aircraft control surface and the risk of uncommanded inflation of the liferaft while in the aircraft). PADS failed to win the tender and Airservices continued to use its existing system.

In April 1996, Airservices provided a briefing to the incoming Minister for Transport and Regional Development, The Hon Mr John Sharp, which stated that PADS had failed to win the tender on the grounds of safety, occupational health, economics and performance, and that Airservices' experience with PADS has involved serious incidents, such that both management and staff were unwilling to use it. Despite this advice, and following media allegations in June that Australia's search and rescue system was 'in disarray', the Minister announced that a new evaluation would be carried out.

Following his appointment in July 1996, the new Chairman of Airservices, Mr John Forsyth, was keen to see a speedy resolution to the issue. At the August 1996 Board meeting, at Mr Forsyth's instigation, the Board formally authorised expenditure of up to $1 million on the purchase of alternative equipment for marine rescue (PADS), if that system was found by an evaluation panel to be superior.

On 24 August 1996 the Chairman of the Panel, Mr Frank Young of Navair Pty Ltd, provided an interim letter to Mr Forsyth stating that the SAR Pty Ltd equipment delivery system had been found to be significantly superior to those systems currently used by Airservices Australia. Airservices immediately commenced negotiations to purchase a number of PADS units from SAR Pty Ltd and, after some protracted debate as to the conditions, the contract was finalised on 6 September 1996. It did not include any provision for training or training products.

Training in the use of PADS commenced in early November 1996 under the supervision of Airservices Australia appointee, Mr Frank Young. However, after conflict emerged between SAR Pty Ltd and Airservices as to who held ultimate responsibility, SAR Pty Ltd involvement in training ceased. Mr Gruzman argued that this omission was the sole source of Airservices ensuing problems.

In conjunction with training, Aerospace Technical Services (ATS) was employed to assess the suitability and safety of the equipment by way of photographic recording of the dispatch mechanism and, in particular, the behaviour of the static line. The resultant report noted that of ten deployments, partial equipment failures occurred on six occasions. Two major concerns emerged: breakage of the static line, and touching of the drogue and static line with parts of the aircraft. The ATS report recommended that the equipment be retained on the basis that the system was delivered with a high level of accuracy, but that further development work was needed to reduce the proportion of equipment failures.

ATS was again engaged in January 1997 to carry out further ground and flight testing and again recommended that no further PADS dropping be conducted until the deficiencies were rectified. The report further recommended that CASA certification of the PADS static line be withdrawn and that CASA closely monitor all future PADS development. On 20 February 1997 CASA issued an Airworthiness Directive prohibiting the use of the static line by any agency, in any circumstance, except in the event of an actual emergency.

There now exists a very expensive stalemate and neither party accepts responsibility for the fact that the equipment purchased by Airservices Australia is currently unable to be used - it lies idle in a warehouse in Melbourne.

Prior to the purchase of PADS, during negotiations on the purchasing contract, and later during problems encountered with training, SAR Pty Ltd made repeated attempts to inform and involve the Minister and his staff. In addition, the Chairman of Airservices Australia also sought to involve the Minister. Although it is clear that both the Minister and his Senior Adviser, Mr John Wallis, were well appraised of the difficulties encountered by both parties, particularly during the purchasing negotiations, it also clear that the Minister, in a letter to Mr Anton Gruzman dated 21 November 1996, distanced himself from the conflict.

The series of events that led to the purchase of PADS equipment by Airservices Australia, and subsequent efforts to commission that equipment, reveal a number of areas of concern to the Committee. The first and most central matter is the question of the reliability of the PADS equipment purchased by Airservices Australia.

There is no debate over the issue of accuracy of the PADS system. All parties are in agreement that, when deployed without incident, PADS is significantly more accurate than the rescue delivery systems currently used by Airservices Australia. However, while the manufacturer is adamant that when deployed correctly it is totally reliable, other expert evidence has found the equipment to be unreliable.

It is clear from correspondence tendered by Airservices Australia, and by Mr Gruzman of SAR Pty Ltd, that there has been a long history of disagreement between Airservices Australia and SAR Pty Ltd over PADS, and that the dysfunctional nature of communications between the two parties has contributed to a large extent to the current stalemate.

The precipitous action of the new Chairman of the Airservices Australia Board in instigating an evaluation of search and rescue systems, and his haste in accepting the results of that evaluation, ignored a long history of considered deliberation on the PADS system in that very organisation, and a clear and very recent decision to reject any move to replace or augment the existing system with PADS equipment.

Compounding the action of the Chairman was the fact that the motion passed by the Board of Airservices Australia at its August meeting contained no mechanism for review of that decision, nor included any tendering process. The Committee concludes that in its resolution R 63/96, the Airservices Australia Board acted in an inappropriate manner in delegating decision-making powers to 'an independent panel of experts' (the Evaluation Panel), and in failing to provide for a review mechanism of that Panel's decision. The Committee believes that the Board erred in not following its own stated competitive procurement policy when the decision was taken to purchase the PADS units.

This allowed subsequent actions to be taken with little or no consultation, and at a pace that exceeded normal discretion. The Committee concludes that the Board, and in particular the Chairman, Mr John Forsyth, acted with unreasonable haste in the decision to purchase PADS equipment and to put that equipment into service as soon as possible. The Committee believes that the Chairman's commercial philosophy was inappropriate to his position as Chairman of a government instrumentality the principle responsibility of which is 'the safety of air navigation'.

The Committee concludes that because the Chairman requested from the Board, and received, authorisation to proceed unchecked, he must accept full responsibility for a decision that resulted in the expenditure of over $1 million on equipment that is currently unusable. The Chairman, in making his decision, placed too much emphasis on accuracy of the delivery system and insufficient emphasis on the safety of the crew involved in the delivery.

For these reasons, the Committee concludes that the actions of both the Board and the Chairman were imprudent to the point of negligence.

Despite advice from both Airservices Australia and the Department of Transport and Regional Development that the PADS equipment had been tested on a number of occasions and had repeatedly been found to be unsafe, the Minister directed Airservices Australia to undertake a further assessment of the equipment by conducting a 'fly-off'. However, the Committee has found no evidence to suggest that the Minister, or his office, having made this request, subsequently satisfied themselves that the test was conducted to a standard appropriate for an organisation whose chief statutory responsibility is air safety.

During the evaluation and purchasing process the views of Airservices officers (who suggested that problems associated with PADS should be resolved before purchase), appear to have been largely ignored by the Board and senior management of Airservices Australia. While there was a preparedness among staff to accommodate difficulties already known, it appeared to them that senior management was not committed to solving those problems.

The manner in which training was carried out and, in particular, the decision by Airservices to engage an alternative aviation company to oversee training, to the exclusion of the manufacturer, has been detrimental to the need to have training of CSUs effectively and efficiently carried out. Concerns about training expressed by Airservices Australia officers were also ignored.

The Committee believes that, regardless of the question as to whether the Airservices Australia Board should have purchased PADS equipment, efforts should now be made by Airservices Australia to fully commission that equipment.

The Committee believes that this matter must be urgently resolved. The Committee recommends that if there is no clear evidence of a resolution of the stalemate between Airservices Australia and SAR Pty Ltd in the near future, the Government should appoint an appropriately qualified mediator to fully oversee the commissioning of the PADS equipment purchased by Airservices.

Finally, the Committee is concerned that despite repeated calls by Airservices Australia for the regulatory inadequacies highlighted in the Turtleair Report that were relevant to CASA's operations to be addressed by that organisation, those matters remain unresolved, although the Committee notes that CASA has recently undertaken to address this matter.

While not strictly within the Committee's terms of reference, as a result of evidence given to the Committee relating to inadequacies in the regulatory environment for search and rescue in Australia, the Committee recommends that the Government request CASA to urgently address the problems highlighted in the Turtleair report.