Report
Conduct of the inquiry
1.1
The inquiry is into the Maritime Transport and Offshore
Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures)
Bill 2005. The bill was introduced into the Senate on 23 June 2005, and the inquiry was referred by the
Senate on 10 August on the recommendation of the Selection of Bills Committee.
The Selection of Bills Committee noted as
issues for consideration:
- Whether maritime security guards should need higher training
qualifications as a result of the increased powers they receive in the bill.
- The regulations should clearly specify the reasons why a
person with a MSIC could be denied access to a maritime security zone.
- If a maritime security guard is working on an offshore
facility in Commonwealth waters, there may be a question concerning which state
or territory licence the guard must hold.
- The details of the removal, storage and disposal of vehicles
and vessels.
- Clarification should be sought about that classes of persons
to be exempted from providing reasons for being in a maritime security zone.
1.2
The committee advertised the inquiry in The Australian and invited submissions
from State/Territory governments and peak bodies. The committee received ten
submissions (see Appendix 1) and held one public hearing (see Appendix 2). The
committee thanks submitters and witnesses for their contribution. Submissions
and transcripts of the committee’s hearings are available on the Parliament’s
internet site at www.aph.gov.au
1.3
The committee or its predecessor in the previous
parliament has previously reported on:
- the Maritime Transport Security Bill 2003: this
established the current maritime security framework; and
- the regulatory framework proposed under the Maritime Transport Security Amendment Act
2005. This act extended the Maritime
Transport Security Act 2003 (the principal Act) to apply to offshore oil
and gas facilities, and allows for establishing a system of Maritime Security
Identification Cards (MSICs). It also renamed the principal Act to Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities
Security Act 2003. [1]
The bill
1.4
The bill further develops the new maritime transport
security measures established in the Maritime
Transport Security Act 2003. It is intended to enhance the capacity of
maritime industry participants to deter and deal with unauthorised incursions
into maritime security zones.
1.5
At present maritime security guards may restrain an unauthorised person in a maritime security zone
and detain the person until a law enforcement officer arrives. However, they do
not currently have the power to request identification, ask the person why he
or she is in the zone, or request that the person move on. Neither do they have
the power to remove unauthorised vehicles or vessels. In these circumstances,
they would have to call the police to arrange removal.
1.6
The government
argues that this is not always a quick and convenient solution to removing a
potential threat from a maritime security zone. The Department of Transport and
Regional Services (DOTARS) advised that the bill arises from a review of
maritime security policy by the Secretaries' Committee on National Security.[2]
1.7
The bill gives
maritime security guards additional powers:
- a maritime security guard may request that a
person found within a maritime security zone provide identification and a reason
for being in the zone;
- a maritime security guard may request a person
found in a maritime security zone without authorisation to move out of the
zone, and if that request is not complied with, remove the person from the
zone; and
- a maritime security guard may remove, or have
removed, vehicles and vessels found in maritime security zones without
authorisation.
1.8
Safeguards on the exercise of these powers will be:
- when confronting a person the guard will have to
identify himself or herself, advise the person of his or her authority, and
tell the person that non-compliance is an offence;
- when removing a person from a maritime security
zone a guard may not use greater force or subject the person to greater
indignity than is necessary; and
- in removing a vehicle or vessel, a guard must
not cause unreasonable damage, and must notify the owner.
- The bill also includes a number of miscellaneous
amendments to the act to clarify intent. These were not controversial in this
inquiry and will not be further considered.
Comment of Scrutiny of Bills Committee
1.9
The Senate Standing Committee
for the Scrutiny of Bills has a brief to consider all bills as to whether they
trespass unduly on personal rights and liberties, and related matters. The
Scrutiny of Bills Committee commented:
The Committee notes that these
provisions attempt to strike a balance between competing
interests. Nonetheless, there is a risk that the provisions may be regarded as
trespassing on the personal rights and liberties of people who become
subject to the exercise of the extended powers. In accordance with its practice,
the Committee makes no final determination of
this matter, but leaves for the Senate as a whole the question of whether the
provisions unduly trespass upon personal rights and liberties.[3]
Issues raised in submissions
General comments on the bill
1.10
The committee invited submissions from a broad spectrum
of stakeholders. Submissions mostly approved the concept of the bill. The fact that most organisations which the committee
approached did not submit also suggests that most have no quarrel with the
bill.[4]
1.11
DOTARS advised that the need for the bill was raised 'not only by the interdepartmental committee that met in
regard to the maritime policy review but also by a number of industry
participants who recognised that a gap existed.'[5]
1.12
However the Transport Workers Union argued that it is
not clear the new powers are needed, and 'the legislation may indeed be
counterproductive, leading to an unintended reduction in the numbers of
Maritime Industry Guards':
If MIPs [maritime industry participants] are, as suggested at
the Maritime Security Industry Forum, looking to avoid using these guards with
expanded powers, the suggestion that the expanded powers are needed is called into question.[6]
1.13
DOTARS stressed that giving maritime security guards
move-on powers 'will not relieve the states and territories of their
responsibility for providing policing services within ports.'[7]
1.14
The Maritime Union of Australia pointed out that
details of implementation will be in regulations, and argued that 'it may be
appropriate for the Committee to see the draft
regulations before completing its inquiry'.[8]
1.15
The committee notes that regulations are now under
development and no draft is yet available.[9]
The committee does not think it is satisfactory to ask parliament to approve a
bill like this, which possibly has significant implications for personal rights
and liberties, without having a draft of the regulations which show the details
of the proposed implementation.
1.16
The Transport Workers Union and the Maritime Union of
Australia were unhappy with the level of industry consultation on this bill.
DOTARS advised that 34 organisations
were invited to comment on an exposure draft, and 22 did so. DOTARS described
its consultation process and provided a list of consultation participants,
including 11 port corporations or major companies, 3 industry organisations, 3
industrial organisations, 2 security guard providers, 8 Commonwealth agencies,
and State/Territory police forces. DOTARS intends to form an industry working
group to progress regulations under the bill. DOTARS advised that at an
industry consultation meeting on 19
August 2005, 'a wide range of members of that forum indicated their
interest in participating in the working group.'[10]
1.17
The committee is satisfied with the level of industry
consultation on the bill and trusts that this will continue.
Training of maritime security guards
1.18
A 'maritime security guard' is a person who, among
other things:
- has a current Certificate II in Security
Operations;
- holds a current state or territory licence to
work as a security guard; and
- is on duty at a security regulated port or on a
security regulated ship or offshore facility.[11]
1.19
Thus maritime security guards are defined by their
characteristics. They are employed by maritime industry participants as
required to fulfil obligations under maritime security plans. Maritime security
guards, unlike law enforcement officers, are not individually appointed or
approved by a public authority. This gives particular point to the need for
adequate training of guards.
1.20
Submissions were concerned that maritime security
guards should have training commensurate with their increased powers. For example, the Maritime Union of Australia
said:
Clearly maritime security guards are operating at a different
level of responsibility to say a guard on a gate a factory or outside a shop.
On this basis there must be a requirement for a higher standard of training. [12]
1.21
The Association of Australian Ports and Marine
Authorities (AAPMA) described current common arrangements:
Port authorities and facilities generally employ contractors as
security guards... Not all of those contractors will be specifically “maritime
security guards” but those who are contracted by port authorities to perform
the specific role of MSGs undergo additional training. For instance, the Port
of Melbourne Corporation works
closely with its security guard provider, Chubb, in jointly designing the
specific “Mast” (“maritime security training”) curriculum. MSGs in Victoria
are presently undertaking a skills upgrade. Sydney Ports Corporation has also
worked with its security providers to ensure that the current requirements for
training of MSGs are complied with....
However, it is possible that this level of competency may not be
reflected in some other ports... The quality of that training has been queried by
some of our members. It is certainly
nowhere near the level of that provided to law enforcement officers, yet MSGs
are expected to carry out the duties set out in the Bill. [13]
1.22
Submitters pointed out that there might be special
training needed to move a vehicle or a boat. AAPMA argued that if additional
training was needed, government should meet the cost. AAPMA also commented that
there is a shortage of suitable trained security staff, and a 'further training
requirement might diminish the availability of an already scarce resource.'[14] The NSW Government advised that guards
are likely to need training in areas such as use of force, statement
preparation and giving evidence.[15]
1.23
The Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) argued that a
higher training level should be consistent across jurisdictions to allow for
portability of qualifications. The MUA argued that a maritime security guard
should be a dedicated position, to avoid the situation where guards sourced
from labour hire companies are 'responsible for a council swimming pool one day
and guarding our critical maritime infrastructure on another.'[16] AAPMA said that contract staff undergo
additional training for the specific role of maritime security guards, as noted
at paragraph 1.22.
1.24
DOTARS agreed that guards will require additional
training, and said that training and qualifications of guards will be
considered by a government/industry working group recently established to
progress regulations under the bill. The government is aware of the
desirability of having nationally standardised training requirements. [17]
Powers of maritime security guards
1.25
Submitters raised a number of issues to do with the
powers of maritime security guards.
1.26
AAPMA was concerned about the risk to a single guard
trying to detain an unwilling suspect:
Unlike Police in a range of activities, security staff work in a
one-up capacity. The ability for security staff to actually effect a detention
in a stand alone capacity whist observing appropriate use of force principles
is questionable.[18]
1.27
The committee notes that while the bill gives guards
additional powers, it does not oblige them to use those powers. That would
depend on the circumstances of the case. Nothing in the act or the bill casts a
duty on a guard to put him/herself in a dangerous position. It would be the
duty of the maritime industry participant employing guards to ensure a safe
work arrangement.
1.28
This would of course have implications for training
costs and staff numbers. AAPMA noted that 'higher risk facilities may require
different levels of security guard capability for which higher levels of
training would be required.' DOTARS said
that there tends to be '...one guard on patrol and normally another guard sitting
within radio communication range ... In the event that something is spotted, they
usually radio back and seek further assistance and so on... Those sorts of
arrangements already exist.'[19]
1.29
Some submissions argued that guards should have a
search power, since it could be risky for them to try to detain a suspect
without being able to confirm whether the person is armed. However, AAPMA noted
that some of its members did not agree, arguing that 'a guard may place
him/herself at greater risk than necessary by attempting to search a detained
person.' AAPMA suggested that there should be a search power, but exercising it
should be at the guard's discretion depending on whether it can be done safely.[20]
1.30
On balance the committee does not agree with giving
guards a search power. Considerations are:
-
there is no obligation on guards to put
themselves in a risky position in any case;
- a search power would raise much higher concerns
about the training of guards and the rights and liberties of individuals;
- even if the power was discretionary, as
suggested by AAPMA, it might be seen as putting more responsibility on guards,
and detracting from employers' responsibility to ensure a safe work
arrangement; and
- providing more police-like powers might seem to
be taking over the responsibilities of state/territory police, which is not the
intention.
1.31
AAPMA was concerned about the safety aspects of an
unqualified guard trying to move a vessel.[21]
The provision is that a guard 'may remove, or cause to be removed...' an
unauthorised vehicle or vessel. (s163D(1), 163E(1)). DOTARS advised that an
unqualified guard would have to arrange for the vehicle or vessel to be moved
by someone who is qualified. The point of the provision is that the guard has
authority to do so. Arrangements for storage or disposal of abandoned vehicles
or vessel will be a matter for the regulations. [22] The
NSW Government argued that the bill should provide for 'designated removal areas'
to isolate and make safe suspicious vehicles or vessels.[23]
1.32
P&O Ports saw a problem in that the amendment
restricts guards to removing an intruder only after they have entered a
maritime security zone: 'In effect, a breach of the zone has occurred before
action can be taken.' P&O Ports suggested that guards should have the power
to demand identification of people in the vicinity of the perimeter of a
security zone, and to remove unattended vehicles parked within 50m of a
perimeter.[24]
1.33
The committee does not agree. The concept of a buffer
zone outside a maritime security zone
boundary is too vague. It raises the risk of overzealous guards abusing the
rights of passersby who have every right to be where they are. If a buffer zone
is needed around the actual sensitive facility, it should be inside the secure area.
1.34
The question arose whether guards would have the power
to move on people engaged in industrial action, for example, a stop-work
meeting.[25]
1.35
The operative provision is that guards may move on
people who are in a maritime security zone 'without proper authorisation' (s163B).
This has no reference to their purpose for being in the zone. DOTARS commented:
'As long as that group of people were authorised to be within the security
zone, I would not see a maritime security guard removing them. Whether the
employer withdraws the authorisation to stay in that zone is a separate
question.'[26]
1.36
The committee thinks this is reasonable. The committee
notes that the act protects 'lawful advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial
action that does not compromise maritime security'.[27]
1.37
The NSW Government suggested that the 'request' to
provide information (s163A(1)) should be a standard form of demand covering the
matters in s163A(2). NSW suggested that points for clarification include where
a person could be removed to, whether they would be allowed to leave or would
be handed over to law enforcement officers, and the circumstances in which
police would be notified to attend.[28]
Exemptions from requirement to give reasons for being in a zone
1.38
The bill does not allow any exemptions from the
requirement, when in a maritime security zone, to give identification to a
guard who requests it. However it exempts certain classes of people from having
to state their reason for being in the zone: a maritime security inspector; a
duly authorised officer; a law enforcement officer; a member of the Australian
Defence Force; a person who is authorised by a law of the Commonwealth, state
or territory to enter a maritime security zone; or a person prescribed in the
regulations, would be (s163A).
1.39
DOTARS advised that what other classes of people might
be prescribed in the regulations will be a matter for the working group on
regulations to consider. To date there have been no suggestions.[29]
1.40
The committee has previously noted arguments that the
proposal to exempt emergency services personnel attending emergencies from
holding a Maritime Security Identification Card (MSIC) needs to be framed
broadly enough to allow for handling environmental emergencies such as oil
spills. The committee draws attention again to the need for the MSIC
regulations to address this concern. It appears that this is under
consideration.[30]
1.41
A related matter for regulations under this bill is
whether the classes of people exempt from giving reasons should be the same as
the classes of people exempt from holding MSICs. In principle the two
requirements are separate. There might well be situations when security is
better served if a guard can demand reasons from a person although the person
is not required to hold an MSIC. On the other hand there might be situations
where this interaction impedes the emergency response.
Why a person with an MSIC could be denied access to a security zone
1.42
The committee was asked to consider why a person with
an MSIC could be denied access to a security zone.
1.43
DOTARS explained that the planned MSIC is an identity
card, not an access control card. For unmonitored access to a maritime security
zone, an MSIC will be necessary, but not sufficient. Access would also require
authorisation from the relevant port operator, port facility operator or port
service provider.[31]
Qualifications of guards at offshore facilities
1.44
A maritime security guard must have a current state or
territory licence to work as a security guard. In the case of offshore
facilities, there may be a question which state or territory licence regime
would apply.
1.45
DOTARS explained that all offshore facilities are
within the jurisdiction of one or other state/territory, and that would
determine the relevant licence. Licensing arrangements for guards at offshore
facilities will be addressed in the regulations.[32]
Control of foreign crews
1.46
Submitters were concerned that foreign crews on
legitimate business should not be prevented from transiting secure areas:
In most cases foreign seafarers are required to surrender their
passports to the master of the ship for the duration of their contract, which
could be in excess of 12 months. Often passports are the only form of
photographic identification many seafarers have.
A ridiculous situation could arise whereby a foreign non English
speaking seafarer is removed from a security zone on an Australian wharf and
not permitted to reboard his/her ship. [33]
1.47
Any person requiring unmonitored access to a maritime
security zone will need an MSIC. The effect is that foreign seafarers without
MSICs will need to be monitored. This is a result of the proposed MSIC scheme
and is not changed by the present bill.[34]
DOTARS explained that 'the arrangements for egressing the maritime security
zone—that is, moving from the ship to the gate—are contained within the
security plan.'
They are not rules made up by the security guard. In all
instances that I am aware of, there are arrangements in place to move
seafarers, whether foreign or Australian, from the ship to the gate.[35]
1.48
The committee notes also that the proposed power to
remove a person from a maritime security zone comes into play only if the guard
reasonably suspects that the person is there 'without proper authorisation' (s163B(1)).
It is not a duty or power to remove a person merely because they do not produce identification. Of course
failure to produce identification might contribute to the guard's state of
belief on whether the person is authorised.
Issues for the regulations
1.49
DOTARS accepted that there are significant matters of
detail to be covered in regulations. As noted previously, DOTARS is forming an
industry consultation group to advise. To allow time for this, the bill will
come into force only on proclamation, or after six months.[36]
Other matters
1.50
Submissions and evidence considered some other matters
which are not strictly part of this bill but which follow up the committee's
recent inquiry into draft regulations under the Maritime Transport Security Amendment Act 2005.[37]
1.51
Concerning background checks of MSIC applicants, the
Australian Shipowners Association repeated previous arguments that employers do
not want to receive criminal background information about their employees, and
DOTARS should remain the repository of these reports.[38] DOTARS commented:
At this point the intention is that from 1 January 2007, when the transition arrangement
for existing employees is over, the responsibilities for new employees from
that date forward will be transferred back to the issuing bodies. Industry has
made representations about that. The government is looking at the particular
issue, but no decision has been made by government concerning any other
mechanism at this time.[39]
1.52
The committee repeats its previous comment that the
arguments put by industry on this point are serious considerations, and DOTARS
should start planning for the post-rollout period now.[40]
1.53
There was discussion in evidence of the problems of
controlling foreign flagged ships operating in Australian waters under single
voyage permits or continuous voyage permits. These ships cannot be controlled
by the Maritime Transport and Offshore
Facilities Security Act 2003, and their crews will not be required to hold
MSICs.[41]
1.54
DOTARS commented that:
...our responsibilities are really around the risk profiling of
those foreign vessels and dealing with a foreign vessel when it indicates its
intention to come to an Australian port... there is not an additional check
looking at particular seafarers when considering the approval of a single
voyage permit or a coastal permit, because that has in effect already been done
when the ship came to Australia.[42]
1.55
The committee repeats its previous comment that the
government should refer the matter of introduction of physical screening of
persons entering maritime security zones, including holders and non-holders of
MSICs, to the working group on MSIC regulations. [43]
Committee comment
1.56
The committee accepts the need for the bill. The committee
expects that the relevant regulations will be based on full consultation with
interested parties.
1.57
While the committee has some concerns about the process
(see paragraph 1.16), it supports the passage of the bill. Other comments are
at paragraphs 1.18, 1.31, 1.34, 1.37, 1.41-2, 1.53 and 1.56.
Recommendation
1.58 The committee recommends that the bill be passed.
Senator the Hon.
Bill Heffernan
Chair
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