Chapter 2 - The final IRA on apples from New Zealand
2.1
The final IRA report on the import of apples from New Zealand focuses on
the importation of mature apple fruit, free of trash, either packed or sorted,
and graded bulk fruit from New Zealand. The report contains details and
recommendations in relation to a number of quarantine pests associated with New
Zealand apples. However, the evidence received as part of this inquiry has
focussed primarily on the risk of importing fruit contaminated with fire blight
bacteria.
The role of the IRA in managing the import and spread of fire blight
2.2
The committee sought clarification of the role of the IRA in addressing
the risk of the importation of fruit infected with the fire blight bacteria.
AQIS advised the committee that the purpose of the IRA is to set standards for
the export of apples. Ms Gordon, Executive Manager, AQIS, stated that New
Zealand will need to demonstrate in detail the systems which will be in place
to ensure that these standards will be met.[1]
Ms Gordon told the committee that
It is up to New Zealand to give us a proposal about how they
would implement it. This process would involve not just inspections et cetera
but also registration of their pack houses and orchards, a series of standard
procedures and an administrative management oversighting arrangement.[2]
2.3
The committee notes that the standards established in the IRA require:
- inspection of trees at four to seven weeks after flowering to
detect symptoms of fire blight. The requirement is that there are no symptoms
of the disease present;
- chlorine dip in the packing house to address surface
contamination; and
- application of standard quarantine requirements prior to export,
to limit potential contamination of pallets, packing materials, containers and
ensure the segregation of product destined for export.[3]
2.4
AQIS clarified its role in the monitoring of packaging and
pre-inspection of fruit prior to export. Ms Gordon advised the committee that,
in the first year of trade, AQIS expects that its inspectors will be monitoring
every packing house on a daily basis. AQIS will not necessarily maintain this
level of frequency in subsequent seasons.[4]
2.5
Biosecurity Australia stressed to the committee that because Australia
operates internationally within a free trade regime, import protocols are
developed on the basis of low risk, not no risk. The committee was advised that
in developing phytosanitary measures the guiding principle is that Australia
should seek to impose the least trade restrictive measures.[5]
2.6
Industry representatives expressed concern that the IRA process has
focussed predominantly on the risk of an incursion and contains insufficient
consideration of the economic and social consequences of an incursion for the
Australian apple and pear industry, related industries and those communities
dependent on these industries.[6]
2.7
The committee notes that the IRA is based on an assumption that fruit
infected with fire blight will be imported into Australia from New Zealand and
that the protocol is intended to bring the risk of this down to an acceptable
level. Dr Roberts, Principal Scientist, Biosecurity Australia, advised the
committee that the IRA for apples from New Zealand establishes a performance
standard of 95 per cent confidence that fruit imported from New Zealand is free
of symptoms of fire blight.[7]
Dr Roberts also advised the committee that:
... you cannot categorically, by visual inspection state that the
organism isn't present. You need to distinguish between the organism being
present – and the assumption is that is always present in every orchard – and
symptoms being present; or in other words, the disease being active on the
trees, reproducing, growing, and causing damage.[8]
2.8
Dr Roberts explained that the risk management measures proposed in the
IRA address two risks:
- infection of the calyx of the fruit, which is addressed by the
inspection at four to seven weeks after flowering, which is the key time for
such infection to occur; and
- surface contamination, which is addressed by the chlorine dip in
the packing house.[9]
2.9
The committee sought clarification on the extent to which fire blight
might be imported into Australia under the proposed protocol and the risk that
the disease could establish and spread. Biosecurity Australia confirmed that
fire blight can travel on a mature apple and that chlorine dips are not
effective in killing fire blight in the calyx of the fruit. Biosecurity also
explained that its modelling suggests that a low proportion of apples could be
carrying fire blight bacteria and that there is some risk of contamination but
that there was a low risk of the disease becoming established. However,
Biosecurity agreed that, once established, the risk of spread of the disease is
a very high probability.[10]
The role of the Eminent Scientists Group in the IRA and appeal processes
2.10
In its earlier inquiries, the committee noted concerns regarding the IRA
and appeals processes and made specific recommendations intended to assist an
open and transparent process. The committee also noted the importance of robust
consultation and accountability processes in ensuring that the final IRA has
broad industry and scientific support.
2.11
During the current inquiry, the committee received correspondence and
evidence from industry representatives which indicated a lack of confidence in
the IRA process and the appeal process. The basis for much of this concern
appears to stem from the limited role of the Eminent Scientists Group (ESG) in
the consideration and evaluation of scientific evidence during both the IRA
process and the appeal process.
The IRA process
2.12
Industry representatives expressed concern that the role of the ESG in
the IRA process appears to be limited to reviewing whether Biosecurity Australia
has taken account of stakeholder comments and that it does not extend to a review
of the science upon which the IRA is based.[11]
2.13
Industry representatives also expressed concern that stakeholders had
not been given sufficient information to respond fully to the draft or the
final IRA, and that industry was not satisfied that the risk analysis was based
on sound science.[12]
In particular, Mr John Corboy, Apple and Pear Australia Ltd, observed that
there has been little research undertaken in Australia and overseas on how fire
blight is spread to date.[13]
2.14
The committee sought clarification of the role of the ESG in the IRA process
and in the appeal process. Mr John Cahill, Chief Executive, Biosecurity Australia,
explained that the formal role of the ESG under the current IRA process is to
ensure that stakeholder comments have been properly taken into account.
However, Mr Daryl Quinlivan, Deputy Secretary, DAFF, also explained that the
Director of Quarantine has advised the leader of the ESG that she would welcome
any additional advice that the ESG might wish to provide.[14]
2.15
Mr Quinlivan explained that under changes to the IRA process announced
on 18 October 2006 the role of the ESG would be strengthened and that it would
have a broader remit.
The idea is that the Eminent Scientists Group will have a roving
commission, if you like, on scientific matters. They will be able to accept any
new submissions or consider anything they wish to in the science that has been
used or has not been used in the IRA.[15]
2.16
The committee notes that the IRA for the importation of apples from New
Zealand was not developed under this revised process.
The appeal process
2.17
The committee noted that there appears to be a perception within the
industry that the appeal panel is not independent. Mr Corboy observed that the
members of the appeal panel appear to be either associated with or directly
employed by the department. Mr Tony Russell, Business Manager, Apple and Pear
Australia Ltd, read out the membership of the appeal panel for the benefit of
the committee:
... firstly, the chair of the Quarantine and Exports Advisory
Council; the second person was nominated to be the Commonwealth Chief Plant
Protection Officer but in this instance that individual had a conflict of
interest therefore that person was replaced with the executive director of the
Forest and wood Products R&D Corporation; the third person was an officer
of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; and the fourth member
was another member of the Quarantine and Exports Advisory Council.[16]
2.18
Mr Corboy and Mr Ranford expressed the view that the panel should include
someone independent of Biosecurity Australia and the department, and from outside
of the industry to review the process. They also said that the panel should
include scientists working outside both the industry and the bureaucratic
process to review the science.[17]
2.19
The committee also noted industry concerns that the appeal process is
limited to considering whether there has been any significant deviation from
the process and whether a significant body of scientific evidence has not been
considered. The industry expressed concern that the review process does not
extend to a review of the science upon which the IRA is based.
Our big problem is that the science is very mixed, and we cannot
get a finite answer. We believe that the science that has been adopted on this
is some of the softer science rather than some of the more aggressive science.
That is our view. BA has the reverse view, and our problem is that when you
have an impasse like that there is no umpire.[18]
2.20
Mr Corboy expressed concerns that industry attempts to demonstrate the
limitations of the proposed inspection regime were dismissed on the grounds
that the scientific paper in question was a single piece of science, was not
peer reviewed and had been considered in the IRA.[19]
2.21
The committee noted that the ESG was not necessarily involved in the
consideration of additional scientific material lodged as part of the appeal
process and that the decision to refer such material to the ESG for
consideration rests with the Appeal Panel. Biosecurity Australia undertook to
clarify whether the additional material relating to the fire blight epidemic in
Southwest Michigan as part of the appeals process had been provided to the ESG
for consideration, however, Dr Roberts advised that the material had been
addressed on page 113 of the IRA.
There is a section entitled 'Responding to comments from
stakeholders on risk management for fire blight' A paragraph there says:
"If fire blight was active later in the season perhaps due to the presence
of false blooms ... and/or favourable weather conditions there is a possibility
that the surface of some fruit may be contaminated with E. amylovora. However,
this is addressed by the disinfection treatment."[20]
Industry consultation and the development of a protocol with New Zealand
2.22
The committee noted the view from industry representatives that
stakeholders should have greater involvement in the development of the protocol
with New Zealand, particularly in relation to proposed inspection and audit
procedures. Mr Corboy expressed concern that industry will not be asked to have
input in the development of the protocol with New Zealand. Mr Ashton, Chairman,
Apple and Pear Australia Ltd, indicated that there is a perception within the
industry that the Australian industry is not being given the same level of
information about progress with the protocol that the New Zealand government
are apparently giving the New Zealand industry. [21]
2.23
Industry representatives do not appear to be satisfied that the protocol
being developed will be as strict as those applying to the export of Australian
apples and pears to other countries. Industry expressed concern that the proposed
pre-clearance measures including a single inspection at four to seven weeks
after flowering and surface disinfection via chlorine baths will not provide
adequate protection against the importation of fire blight.[22]
The Australian industry favours a second inspection prior to harvest followed
by fumigation after harvest if there is any doubt regarding the contamination
of the fruit.[23]
The committee also noted evidence regarding the protocol in relation to the
export of apples from Tasmania to China which, despite Tasmania's fire blight
free status, includes three inspections. The committee notes Biosecurity Australia's
advice that it is currently making strong representations to China in relation
to this inspection regime on the grounds that it is not scientifically
justified.[24]
2.24
The committee also noted concerns that the proposed protocol may not be
adequate to prevent the transportation of other pests and diseases such as
wheat bug in packaging or San Jose Scale and that it could compromise Tasmania's
unique export status if it does not include appropriate requirements to deal
with the transhipment of fruit through mainland Australia.[25]
2.25
Biosecurity Australia and AQIS advised the committee that they had
undertaken extensive consultation as part of the IRA process and undertook to
provide the committee with a list of all consultations.[26]
Biosecurity Australia also confirmed that government to government discussions
on technical issues associated with the IRA had taken place on 31 January 2007.[27]
Ms Gordon advised the committee that the details of such discussions, and
related documents, are confidential and will not necessarily be disclosed
directly to industry for comment.[28]
The committee notes that AQIS and Biosecurity Australia have made no commitment
to undertake further industry wide consultation. AQIS advised the committee
that it will seek expert advice on the development of the inspection protocol as
required and on recommendation from Biosecurity Australia.[29]
Conclusion
2.26
The committee notes the limitations of the appeal process and considers
that it is a matter of some concern that additional scientific evidence
presented during that process was not considered by the appeal panel and
appears not to have been referred to the ESG for consideration.
2.27
The committee shares the concerns of industry that the limited role of
the ESG in the current IRA and appeal processes draws into question the extent
to which industry concerns have been adequately addressed. The committee notes
that there is some opportunity for representatives of the industry to inform
the process for the development of the protocol. The committee urges AQIS and
Biosecurity Australia to draw on the practical expertise of the Australian
apple and pear industry in finalising the standard operating procedures that
will underpin the protocol.
2.28
The committee notes that the proposed protocol for the importation of
apples from New Zealand is based on the assumption that fruit contaminated with
fire blight will be imported into Australia. The committee remains to be
convinced that the risk of establishment of the disease after the importation
of contaminated fruit is low to very low. The committee shares industry's
concern that the scientific evidence does not support the conclusion that the
IRA is modelled on an acceptable level of risk. The committee also notes
industry's concern that scientific evidence in relation to the establishment
and spread of fire blight is limited. No specific scientific evidence was
provided to the committee to support a 'low' to 'very low' risk of establishment
of the disease.[30]
2.29
The committee is mindful of the sensitivity of trade issues in the
development of import protocols and associated phytosanitary measures due to Australia's
status as a net exporter. However, the committee is concerned that to impose a protocol
on the industry which assumes that fire blight will be imported into Australia presents
a significant risk of compromising the Australian apple and pear industry's
competitive edge in the international market. The committee considers that this
is a high price for this industry to pay.
2.30
The committee notes that the standard operating procedures currently
being developed by the New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in
consultation with AQIS and Biosecurity Australia are fundamental to the
successful management of the risk of importation, establishment and spread of
fire blight. The committee notes that the operating procedures must be approved
by AQIS before exports of apples from New Zealand can commence.
2.31
It is the committee's expectation that, prior to the final approval of
the standard operating procedures, the committee will be provided with the draft
operating procedures to enable it to consider how the identified risks are to
be addressed in practical terms. It is also the committee's expectation that,
prior to the final approval of the standard operating procedures, the committee
will be provided with details of the scientific evidence and modelling
undertaken as part of the IRA process to determine Biosecurity Australia's
stated 'low' to 'very low' risk of establishment of fire blight.
2.32
The committee proposes to consider this matter further once it has
received the requested material, to satisfy itself whether the operating
procedures appropriately address the risks identified. Importation of apples
from New Zealand should not commence before the committee has completed its
consideration of this matter.
Senator the Hon.
Bill Heffernan
Chair
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