Chapter Four - Administration of Process by Biosecurity Australia
4.1
The preparation of the revised draft IRA was a process
administered by Biosecurity Australia
in conjunction with the Import Risk Analysis Panel. The administrative steps of
the process are set out in Biosecurity Australia's
Handbook (the IRA Handbook).
During the inquiry the Committee heard evidence that levelled a number of
criticisms at the Biosecurity Australia's administration. The criticisms
include poor communication with Australian stakeholders and a lack of
transparency in the process. This chapter examines those criticisms.
Communication
4.2
The IRA Handbook
indicates that Biosecurity Australia "maintains a register of stakeholders
to assist effective consultation and communication."[123] The Handbook continues by describing
stakeholders as "government agencies, individuals, community or industry
groups or organisations, in Australia
or overseas, ..."[124]. Yet
evidence presented to the Committee suggests that both consultation and
communication with two groups of stakeholders – Australian industry groups and
growers – continues to cause concern.
4.3
The Apple and Pear Growers Association of South
Australia indicated that while there had been some improvement in the
communication and consultation process, there was still room for advancement in
a number of areas. They made the following points in relation to the South
Australian industry:
- the focus of communication and transparency
tends to be at the upper levels;
- further consultation needs to occur within
regions (and involve growers); and
- regional issues need to be raised, discussed and
included during the drafting process.[125]
4.4
The Tasmanian Apple and Pear Growers Association
indicated that Tasmanian industry representatives participated in a working
group and provided evidence during the initial stages of the consultation
process. However, their involvement ended completely following Biosecurity Australia's
determination of risk elements, allowing for very little impact on the final outcome.
4.5
The Western Australia Fruit Growers' Association
(WAFGA) made comments in a similar vein. Western
Australia does not have the disease apple scab or the
pest codling moth, as described in paragraph 3.95. The WAFGA argued that
despite apple scab's potentially devastating effect on the Western Australian
apple and pear industry, there had been "improper consultation between
Biosecurity Australia
and the Department of Agriculture in Western Australia".[126] WAFGA stated that:
We have an extremely good team of people in the west who do risk
assessment analyses for different products which come in. Biosecurity Australia
certainly consulted with them on identifying what pests and diseases were
relevant to WA, but they did not consult with them on the actual risks, what
they thought of the risk measures and what kinds of risks were involved.[127]
4.6
In its submission to the inquiry, WAFGA also argued
that the lack of consultation with Western Australian authorities on the issue
of regional risk constituted a breach of the steps contained in the Handbook.[128]
4.7
The Committee requested Biosecurity Australia
to respond to WAFGA's assertions in a question provided on notice following the
30 June 2004 hearing. The
Committee asked:
Question 12
In their submission the Western Australian Fruit Growers' Association
indicate that "they are not aware of Biosecurity Australia
ever consulting with WA over regional risk (likelihoods of entry, establishment
and spread and consequences) issues for apple scab or codling moth" (p 2)
and that this is contrary to indications in the Handbook (p 15). Would you care
to respond?[129]
4.8
In response to what was a very specific question about
consultation with Western Australian authorities regarding regional risk, and
the rules as outlined in the IRA
Handbook, Biosecurity provided the following
answer:
Representatives from the Western Australian Department of
Agriculture were on the provisional technical working group that assisted in
the categorisation of pests including apple scab and codling moth.[130]
4.9
Biosecurity Australia's
answer seemed to indicate that involving the Western Australian Department of
Agriculture in a provisional technical working group (categorising pests of
concern) represents an appropriate level of consultation. The answer also fails
to address the question of why relevant WA agencies were apparently not
consulted on regional risk issues – including the likelihood of entry,
establishment and spread and consequences of regional quarantine pests and
disease – as outlined in the Handbook. The Committee was sufficiently concerned
with Biosecurity Australia's
approach to this issue to ask a further question on notice following the
hearing of 9 February 2005.
4.10
The Committee asked:
Could you indicate to the Committee the consultation you
undertook with the WA Department of Agriculture subsequent to the work done to
categories pests of risk? Did you consult with them on the extent of the risk
to WA or potential risk mitigation strategies that might be implemented? If
not, do you consider this to be a breach of step 10 of the IRA handbook.
4.11
Biosecurity Australia's
answer was more forthcoming:
The Department of Agriculture WA (DAWA) participated as a full
member of the IRA technical working group. Biosecurity Australia
consulted extensively with DAWA on a range of issues, including the extent of
risk to WA, and will continue to do so. Biosecurity Australia
considers that the process used fully complied with the requirements of the IRA
Handbook.
Errors in Revised Draft IRA
4.12
Concerns raised with the Committee about Biosecurity Australia's
communication extended beyond issues related to consultation.
4.13
The Committee was told of industry's specific concerns
about the accuracy of the revised draft IRA document. Apple and Pear Australia
Ltd (APAL) indicated that a number of errors had been identified during an
audit analysis APAL conducted on the revised draft IRA in June 2004. As APAL
proceeded through a quality assurance check using Biosecurity Australia's
model, a number of discrepancies were found between APAL and Biosecurity Australia's
figures.
4.14
Following the discovery of the errors, APAL wrote to
both the then Secretary of the Department of Agriculture Fisheries and
Forestry, Mr Mike
Taylor and the then Director of Biosecurity Australia,
Ms Mary Harwood,
highlighting the errors as a matter of major concern. APAL expressed industry's
disappointment in the response received from Biosecurity Australia
which described the differences in the figures as typographical errors. They
also argued that:
- industry had been attempting to respond to an
inaccurate document for approximately four months;
- for three of those four months, Biosecurity
Australia had been aware of the inaccuracies;
- Biosecurity Australia had not formally notified
stakeholders of the errors;
- most of the errors identified are in the
pathways – one of industry's major areas of concern; and
- the errors discovered in the document present a
procedural fairness issue.[131]
4.15
APAL's level of anger and concern over the
transcription errors was evident in the letter they wrote to the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry, the Hon. Warren Truss, MP. In it they requested that:
- the apple IRA be withdrawn;
- the Minister instigate an independent inquiry
into Biosecurity Australia's actions; and
- compensation be provided for all stakeholders
who prepared their responses using an inaccurate report.[132]
4.16
APAL described Biosecurity Australia's
handling of the issue in the following terms:
After the banana IRA was shown to have problems, Biosecurity Australia
stated in the public arena that those problems did not affect the apple IRA and
that the apple IRA was correct. They found that they had made mistakes but they
did not tell anybody. They did not tell us that we were in fact responding to a
document that had fundamental errors in it. Not only that, but they continued
to distribute documents that they knew were wrong.[133]
4.17
During its hearing on 30 June 2004, the Committee sought to clarify both the
timeline of events and the decisions made in relation to the revised draft IRA.
The Committee did establish that Biosecurity Australia corrected the erroneous data
on the document posted on its website, but continued to distribute hard copy
with the transcription errors (see paragraph 4.24).
4.18
In a subsequent response provided by Biosecurity Australia,
the Committee was informed that Ms Mary
Harwood had advised both the Minister's
office and the Departmental Secretary's office on, or about, 19 March 2004. Both the Secretary and
the Minister were advised that:
... the Risk Assessment Model, and risk assessment conclusions
drawn from the model and contained in the revised Draft Apple Import Risk
Analysis report were correct. She also advised that some data inputs had been
incorrectly transcribed in the printed report but that they made no material
difference to the risk assessment. Accordingly, Biosecurity Australia
had decided that there was no need to issue a correction to the report.[134]
4.19
The Committee was also advised that the then Secretary,
Mr Taylor, supported Ms Harwood's decision, accepting that the transcription
errors did not alter any risk assessments conclusions made in the revised draft
IRA.[135] Such a response appeared to
the growers to belittle their work and resource contribution.
4.20
APAL highlighted the resources the organisation had put
into its response to the revised draft:
Clearly we have spent a great deal of time and effort in
responding to the hard copy version of the revised draft IRA. We have spent
hundreds of thousands of dollars in cold hard cash, and that is not counting
the time and effort that industry people have put into responding to a document
that is wrong and that Biosecurity Australia knew was wrong. That is a major
problem for us.[136]
4.21
In relation to the errors which were characterised as
'typographical' by Biosecurity Australia,
representatives of the Apple and Pear Growers Association of South Australia
made the following comments:
Certainly as an industry we are most concerned – again, not only
at the South Australian level but at a national level. On behalf of our
industry I have committed many hundreds of hours, particularly over the last
120 days, in working on a document that we find has got errors in it.
...
From any industry perspective, we have wasted a lot of time and
effort on a document which Biosecurity Australia travelled the country with
throughout May and early June on a roadshow. They brought copious boxes of
those reports into the state and never was there a point made that, 'There is a
discrepancy between this document we are giving you' – which is basically the
one we have worked on – 'versus what is on the web site.'[137]
4.22
In response to such criticism from the industry, Biosecurity
Australia told
the Committee that:
The errors identified in the printed report are minor and do not
have any significant bearing on the draft conclusions contained in the
published report. The proposed risk management measures bring risk below ALOP
whether the correct on incorrect input data sets are used, and the risk
analysis panel will consider all comment and submissions before finalising a
set of recommendations to Biosecurity Australia.[138]
4.23
The Committee notes the frustration experienced by the
industry in relation to this matter. While it accepts that the errors did not
significantly alter the risk assessments made, it understands the difficulties
that Biosecurity Australia's attitude to information sharing posed. Indeed,
during the inquiry the Committee experienced similar difficulties.
Biosecurity Australia's
evidence
4.24
During its hearing on 30 June 2004, the Committee ascertained that the corrected
tables were loaded on the web site on 31
March 2004. It was also established that Biosecurity Australia was
aware, prior to 31 March, that the hard copy of the document that had been
distributed was inaccurate.
4.25
At the 30 June hearing, the Committee also explored
whether Biosecurity Australia
officers giving evidence to the Committee at the hearing of 31 March 2004 were aware of the errors and, if
so had not taken any opportunity to inform the Committee of these errors. In an
effort to ascertain what happened at the 31 March hearing, the following
exchange took place at the 30 June
2004 hearing:
Senator COLBECK – I
would like to ask a question based on what happened at the hearing on 31 March,
because I asked a question at that hearing about the spreadsheets and about
having them checked by a third party. It was in relation to the 2001 committee
report that recommended exposure of an IRA to a third party. I asked whether
you had had the spreadsheets checked by a third party with respect to the apple
IRA. Your response to me was:
The spreadsheets have
been verified as presenting an accurate electronic transcription of the model
as presented in the printed report.
Ms Harwood – That is absolutely correct. The model is correct. The electronic
transcription of the model is correct. There was, and there is, no error in the
model. The only thing there is is that several input values in the printed
report – data points that are entered into the model – are incorrectly
presented in the printed report. The correct input values are in the PDF filed
on the Web. So the model has been verified both internally and by the RS
statisticians as implementing correctly the model, formulation and syntax as
presented in the written report.
Senator Colbeck – So you are saying that the model as
presented in the printed report is correct?
Ms Harwood – That is correct.
Senator Colbeck – But there are transcription errors
with respect to some of the input data items.
Ms Harwood – Yes. Some input data points in the printed report are printed
wrongly; they have the wrong value there. As I said, there are about 1, 150
data points in the apple report and about 10 of those are not correctly entered
into the printed version of the report.
Senator Ferris – But
when Senator Cherry, I think it was, asked that question of you, Ms Harwood,
you gave really only half the answer, in the sense that you answered the end
point but you did not say what you already knew and that was what you have just
said to us then – that there were some errors. So it meant that when the
growers discovered those errors the whole question of Biosecurity's credibility
was quite rightly questioned. I do not understand why, when you had the
opportunity in response to Senator Cherry's
question to give a full answer, you only gave half the answer. It seems to me
that, as a result of that, you have brought yourself a bucket load of trouble
because your whole credibility is now on the line. If you had answered the
question in the first place as truthfully as you knew, we might not have been
here today asking questions like we are.
Ms Harwood – The question I was asked was: has the model been verified as
correct? I gave a correct answer to that: that the model had been verified.
Senator Ferris – But you could have said 'however'.
We on this Committee already knew that we were into the 'however' on bananas –
Biosecurity, the whole industry all over again, your credibility – and here we
are in the same position again. I just do not think it does Biosecurity any
good with industries.[139]
4.26
The then Acting Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Mr Wonder, was asked to comment on whether
he believed the right course of action had been followed by Biosecurity
Australia "in not advising formally that there was a difference between
the hard copy document, which was publicly distributed, and the material on the
web site which contained the corrected tables?".[140] Mr
Wonder responded by saying that:
... At the time, my understanding is that BA were firmly of the
view – and I understand the position – that they did not have something on
their hands that actually changed in any way the findings of the report. They
were also, as I understand it, of the view that the errors that were there had
not in any sense led to incorrect analysis or incorrect modelling; they had
verified results subsequently. They still obviously felt at the time that they
had a substantive document that was useful and appropriate for responding to as
a draft report. I underline the fact that it was a revised draft. It was not a
final document. I do understand the position and perspective that they took at
that time.
...
... Had we known that the issues that are being discussed here
today might have unfolded the way they have then I accept that we would ask
ourselves whether that was the best way to do it. We would have to reflect on
that. As I say, it is great to be wise in hindsight. I believe that at the time
the analysis was comprehensive. The findings are correct, the IRA panel's
recommendations are unaffected and there is a substantial draft report there
for the community and industry to respond to. We are now in a position where we
still have a viable way forward to go to the final report that is not in any
way, I do not believe, threatened by the events to date.[141]
4.27
The Committee finds this view disturbing. The then
Acting Secretary accepts that Biosecurity Australia is asking stakeholders to
comment and review a document and thereby contribute to the IRA process, but does
not believe that Biosecurity Australia have a responsibility to keep these
organisations and individuals 'in the loop' by ensuring that they are made
aware of any corrections made to the document. The Committee believes that
Biosecurity Australia needs to do more than "reflect" on
"whether that was the best way to do it". Posting corrections on the
web site has been demonstrated to be less than effective in informing all
stakeholders of any changes to IRAs.
Recommendation 4
4.28
The Committee recommends that Biosecurity Australia
review its communication channels with Australian stakeholders and actively
seeks to inform stakeholders of any amendments and other developments.
4.29
The Committee notes that following the February 2005
hearing with Biosecurity Australia,
the responses to the Committee's questions taken on notice were both timelier
and more informative. The Committee is encouraged by this apparent change in
Biosecurity Australia's
attitude and would encourage Biosecurity Australia
to actively seek to mend any credibility difficulties with their Australian
stakeholders.
Open and transparent process
4.30
Compounding Biosecurity Australia's
communication problems is the belief held by many stakeholder organisations
that claims of an open and transparent process has not translated to actions, particularly
in relation to the consultation process.
4.31
The issue of consultation was raised by the Committee's
predecessor during the earlier inquiry into the proposed importation of apples
from New Zealand.
In the 2001 Interim Report, the Committee explored the consultation undertaken
during the risk assessment and made specific recommendations in relation to the
development of guidelines which specify the purpose and method of consultation
to be used during the IRA process. The Committee also recommended the
establishment of a Risk Assessment Committee "to allow for the direct
involvement of domestic stakeholders during the conduct of IRA's."[142]
Biosecurity Australia
- Defensive to criticism
4.32
The then Executive Manager of Biosecurity Australia,
Ms Mary Harwood,
advised the Committee that the purpose of releasing the revised draft IRA was
to draw scientific and technical comment on the regime being proposed. Ms
Harwood told the Committee that the report:
... is open to anyone in the world who wishes to comment on the
science and the way it is brought to bear on judgement of risk and presentation
of quarantine measures.[143]
4.33
However, during the Committee's inquiry it became clear
that industry representatives are concerned about the limited extent to which
Biosecurity Australia has allowed the revised draft IRA document to be open to
public scrutiny and critique.
4.34
The Tasmanian industry was critical of the consultation
process, describing it as having "not been open and transparent
enough."[144]
4.35
APAL described Biosecurity Australia's
level of defensiveness toward the IRA document as 'alarming', and told the
Committee that:
We keep hearing statements like: 'It's the most transparent
process in the world,' and, 'This is an excellent document,' and 'This is a
thorough document,' and so on. I went to three of those meetings and not once
did I hear anyone from Biosecurity Australia
say, 'That is a good point that we need to consider.' All criticisms were
always met with very defensive attitudes.[145]
4.36
These sentiments were echoed by Apple and Pear Growers
Association of South Australia:
I think the point has been made that once a document is put out
and they start to talk about it, Biosecurity become very defensive of the
document and it is very hard then to put the issues into the document.[146]
4.37
A representative of the Queensland Fruit and Vegetable
Growers, Mr Ugo Tomasel also suggested that there was a perception amongst
growers that Biosecurity Australia was disinclined to accept, or even consider,
alternative scientific views.[147] Mr
Tomasel argued that Biosecurity Australia
was defensive of its position and therefore not open to the views of growers:
My interpretation of the attitude is that they believe so
strongly in this document that they never seem to question the possibility that
they have made a mistake in any shape or form. That is another area that
concerns me because we all make mistakes and there are some weaknesses in every
document. Because the disease is such a devastating disease everyone has to be
absolutely sure that everything is done correctly.[148]
4.38
In response to criticisms, representatives of
Biosecurity Australia
told the Committee that there had "been ongoing communication with
stakeholders during the preparation of the revised draft IRA report".[149] The Committee was also told that
regular updates on the progress of the IRA had been provided to industry
representatives, scientists and officials in both Australia
and New Zealand.
Biosecurity Australia
also argued that there had been "a flow of technical information through
the scientific liaison point nominated by Apple and Pear Limited Australia –
APAL".[150]
4.39
Officers representing Biosecurity Australia
were also asked how many of the suggestions or comments made at stakeholder
meetings had fed back to the panel and "caused changes to be made to their
thinking?".[151]
4.40
Ms Harwood
responded by stating:
If there is going to be a change in thinking, that has yet to
happen. The panel does not sit there in Shepparton and think: 'Oh, must rewrite
recommendation.' They take the concern on board and think: 'Oh, that is
something we need to consider,' but they have yet to start the process. What we
also have, if you look at it, is a huge body of comments that arrived,
including 500 pages of technical submission from the industry. The panel's job
is to look at every one of the issues raised in those comments and to deal with
them transparently and openly and come to a final set of recommendations.[152]
4.41
The Committee understands the growers' perception has developed
in the context of assertions made by Biosecurity Australia
about the openness and transparency of the process. Indeed, in undertaking its
inquiry into Biosecurity Australia's
administration of the IRA on Pig Meat, the Committee was informed that "Australia's
IRA process is unusually transparent."[153]
However, the Committee is unconvinced that the importance of transparency may
not apply equally to all aspects of the IRA process. It is noted that in
evidence to the Committee, Biosecurity Australia
applied the notion of transparency to the risk modelling process itself:
The import pathway steps are modelled in a way such that they
are independent and the relational syntax between them in the modelling is very
transparent and clearly defined.[154]
4.42
The Committee accepts Biosecurity Australia's
need to have the IRA Panel
examine the new information before making a comment and that this cannot take
place in the context of a public meeting. However, the Committee believes that
Biosecurity Australia needs to find a way to make public consultation a more
meaningful exchange between itself and growers/producers who attend the public
meetings.
Recommendation 5
4.43
The Committee recommends that Biosecurity Australia reviews
its public consultation programs to provide forums for meaningful exchange between
themselves and stakeholders.
Recommendation 6
4.44
The Committee recommends that Biosecurity Australia reconsiders
the Committee's predecessor's recommendation to develop guidelines which
specify the purpose of the consultation so that all who attend public meetings
have the same understanding of the nature of the outcomes that can be expected.
Availability of evidence
4.45
A further transparency issue emerged during the
inquiry. The Committee heard in evidence that unpublished papers were used as
reference material for the revised draft IRA. Particular reference was made to
a New Zealand
research paper authored by Hale and Clark in 1992.
4.46
APAL argued that while this paper had been used during
the revision of the IRA, a number of people who were preparing submissions in
relation to the revised draft IRA had been unable to obtain copies of the paper
in order to respond to it.[155] It was
further argued that this was not "a good enough level of scientific input
to used in a revised draft IRA."[156]
4.47
In its submission, APAL further stated that Integrated
Fruit Production (IFP) as practiced in New
Zealand, results in increased quarantine
risks. The case for this is suggested by the argument that the practice of IFP
allows previously suppressed secondary pests (such as Apple Leaf Curling Midge)
to increase. APAL indicated that because the industry has been unable to access
the New Zealand Integrated Fruit Production Manual, it has been denied the
opportunity "to offer a full and comprehensive review and report on a
document referenced in the RDIRA and considered an integral part of the
decision making process of the IRAT."[157]
4.48
Acknowledging the issue raised by APAL, the Committee
requested that Biosecurity provide it with copies of both New Zealand's
Integrated Fruit Production Manual, and the paper prepared by Hale and Clark
referred to in the revised draft IRA report.
4.49
The Committee was advised that the Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry of New Zealand (MAFNZ) had informed Biosecurity Australia
that the Integrated Fruit Production Manual is the property of New Zealand
Pipfruit Ltd and that the company did not wish to release the document in its
entirety.[158] Biosecurity also
indicated that it did not have permission from either MAFNZ or PNZ to provide
the Committee with a copy of the Hale and Clark paper for
'external distribution'.[159]
4.50
The Committee is very concerned about the difficulties
being experienced in gaining access to scientific research material. In its
interim report, the Committee's predecessor specifically recommended "that
Biosecurity Australia immediately commission research by the CSIRO, the NZ
Horticulture and Food Research Institute or independent authorities into
whether export-ready apples from New Zealand
can carry viable colonies of Erwinia amylovora
in their core, calyx or flesh".[160]
4.51
Unfortunately, the Committee's recommendation was not
acted upon and Biosecurity Australia
now finds itself in the situation where it is using New
Zealand research, over which it has no
control – either in relation to the research itself or the distribution of
scientific papers.
4.52
The Committee agrees with APAL's argument that
unpublished papers are not of a sufficient standard of scientific input for an
IRA. It is of the opinion that in the interests of transparency, stakeholders
have the right to respond to all scientific research papers used in the
preparation of the draft IRA, and, as such, they should be publicly available
documents. The Committee was prepared to make a recommendation requiring
Biosecurity Australia
only to use research material that was, at a minimum, available to all
stakeholders, but preferably publicly available. It is reassured by the recent
advice from Biosecurity Australia.
This advice indicates that while it "continues to seek permission from the
authors to make these documents publicly available",[161] if it fails to secure such
permission "the documents will not be relied on by the IRA team".[162]
Accountability – the Appeals Process
4.53
One of the best ways to have an open and transparent
process is to have some form of accountability. The IRA process as established
in the Handbook does provide for two specific forms of appeal process; an
appeal to the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry, or an appeal to the Import Risk Analysis Appeal Panel.
IRA Handbook
– appeals process
4.54
The first appeal can be made at the beginning of the
IRA process. Stakeholders may appeal the decision relating to "the
proposed scope and approach of the IRA and the required expertise, including
membership of the IRA team."[163] Any
appeal must be made within 15 days of the publication of the decision, giving
specific reasons. The Deputy Secretary must consider the appeal, make a
determination and notify the appellant with 45 days of the close date for
appeals.
4.55
Stakeholders may also appeal the recommendations in the
final IRA report. Appeals are considered by an independent Import Risk Analysis
Appeal Panel (IRAAP).[164] The appeal
must be lodged within 30 days of the publication of the final report and can be
made on the following basis:
- there was a significant deviation from the
process set out in the Import Risk Analysis Handbook that adversely affected
the interests of a stakeholder; or
- a significant body of scientific information
relevant to the outcome of the IRA was not considered.[165]
4.56
The IRAAP does not consider matters relating to:
- any matters that can be subjected to the first
appeal process;
- the scientific merits of the IRA, other than in
relation to a claim that a significant body of scientific information was not
considered; or
- the merits of risk management recommendations
made by an IRA team or of the risk management conclusions reached by
Biosecurity Australia.[166]
Criticism of the appeals process
4.57
During the inquiry, the limited basis for appealing the
final recommendations in the IRA report was raised as a matter of concern. APAL
questioned why the scientific merit of the IRA should not be appealed:
... we cannot appeal the grounds of the scientific merit of the
revised draft IRA. What that means is that Biosecurity Australia have set
themselves up as the ultimate arbiter in Australia
on the interpretation of various research papers. We are not allowed to appeal
on the grounds that they have misinterpreted, misread or taken into account
inappropriate research material.[167]
4.58
The concern was reiterated in responses APAL provided
to questions taken on notice during the 20
June 2004 hearing:
... At the moment, with no
appeal allowed on their judgement, they are deemed to be the highest authority
in Australia on
matters pertaining to IRAs. This is, in itself, a matter open to debate.
...
Closing down the avenues of appeal denies stakeholders their
natural right to be heard and makes unnamed people with unknown qualifications
and unknown interests ultimate arbiters of the future of the industry.[168]
4.59
It may be that the consultation process will permit
matters such as the use of science and the appropriateness of that science, to
emerge and be discussed. It could be argued that it is at that stage of the
process where such differences can best be explored. However, the Committee has
already examined concerns over the efficacy of the consultation program (see
paragraphs 4.30 to 4.44).
4.60
Further, the Committee heard evidence suggesting that
differing view points were not considered. Mr
Ugo Tomasel,
a fruitgrower from Stanthorpe, Queensland,
indicated that a number of technical experts had found problems with the IRA,
but that they were being ignored:
I will give you an example of what I mean. The Queensland
apple industry commissioned a review of some of the key scientific aspects of
the IRA by two respected and experienced scientists. They have looked at four
research papers that Biosecurity quoted to support cold storage treatment. They
found that only two of these gave any support to their argument, but their real
concern was that they found six other international research papers that said
fire blight survives quite well in cold storage. Why were these six reports not
considered?[169]
4.61
The Committee notes the perception amongst industry
representatives that Biosecurity Australia has been selective in its use of
scientific research material. APAL advised the Committee that while there are
many references in the Handbook to the use of independent reviewers, the
revised draft IRA does not mention that any person outside Biosecurity Australia
or the IRA panel has reviewed the document in any way. APAL would like to see
the document reviewed independently by scientists disinterested in the outcome. [170]
4.62
In relation to the example cited by Mr
Tomasel, the Committee accepts Biosecurity Australia's
assurance provided at the hearing of 9
February 2005:
I guess the response to that is that we are looking at cool
storage and the survival of bacterium on the surface of mature fruit as the
measure.[171]
4.63
On the question of an independent review of the IRA
report the Committee supports the advice by Biosecurity Australia
that the Eminent Scientist Group will "consider the draft Final IRA report
to ensure that stakeholder comments have been properly taken into account".[172]
4.64
The establishment of the Eminent Scientists Group was
one of a number of measures announced by the Minister for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry on 15 July 2004.
The Eminent Scientists Group will independently examine the draft Final IRA reports
prior to their release. The Group will have the following specific functions:
- Review the draft IRA Report prepared by the IRA
Team to ensure that the IRA Team has adequately considered all technical
submissions received from stakeholders during the formal consultation period on
the draft IRA report; and
- Within 60 days of being presented with the draft
Final IRA report, prepare a report to the Director of Animal and Plant
Quarantine on their findings and recommend any action considered necessary to overcome
any identified deficiencies. The Eminent Scientists Group will provide a copy
of the report to the Executive Manager, Biosecurity Australia.[173]
4.65
The Committee hopes that the establishment and work of
this group will allay the growers concerns that the issues they raise will be
considered and appropriately addressed.
4.66
The independence of Biosecurity Australia
has been further strengthened by its establishment as a prescribed agency.
Significantly, as a prescribed agency Biosecurity Australia
will be financially separate from the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry and have a separate outcome statement.[174] However, it remains part of a
Department of State and is "subject to all the usual responsibilities and
accountabilities to Parliament, the Government, Ministers legislation and audit
arrangements etc and any associated directives that would normally arise from
these responsibilities and accountabilities."[175]
4.67
The Minister's announcement noted that the appeals
process will remain unchanged.[176]
Criticism of IRA handbook
4.68
Finally, industry representatives were also critical of
the IRA handbook and the current process for amending its provisions. APAL made
the following comments in relation to the handbook:
... Biosecurity Australia
write the handbook. They write the rules by which we play the game. We are into
another edition of the handbook which is quite different from the original.
Clearly, Biosecurity Australia
did not really like the rules they wrote the first time so they threw them out
and wrote another set. This is an issue for us – it is a problem.[177]
4.69
The Committee notes that the handbook has been reviewed
and updated in the time that the IRA for apples was first commenced. The first
draft IRA for apples was released on 11
October 2000, several days after the establishment of the new
Biosecurity Australia.
The majority of the work for the first IRA had been conducted by AQIS. The new
body revised the IRA process and it was the revised process that was followed
for the apples revised draft IRA. The Committee understands that in straddling
two different processes, the Australian growers unfortunately have been
required to come to terms with two different sets of requirements.
4.70
The Committee notes
that Biosecurity Australia have indicated that following the recent changes in
the IRA process with the announcement of the Eminent Scientist Group and the review
and reissue of current draft IRA reports "Consideration will be given to
amending the IRA Handbook".[178]
However, no timeline has been indicated. The Committee
asks that Biosecurity Australia considers the dislocation that may result to
active IRAs when the guidelines to the process are revised during the conduct
of the process.