Chapter 3
Capacity of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority; and
Incident reporting and immunity (including the Transport Safety
Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
3.1
This chapter discusses a number of terms of reference concerning airline
safety in connection with the capacity of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
and incident reporting and immunity, including the Transport Safety
Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010 (the Bill) (terms of
reference (f), (g), (h) and (i)). The specific terms of reference are:
-
the capacity of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to
appropriately oversee and update safety regulations given the ongoing and rapid
development of new technologies and skills shortages in the aviation sector;
-
the need to provide legislative immunity to pilots and other
flight crew who report on safety matters and whether the United States and
European approaches would be appropriate in the Australian aviation environment;
-
reporting of incidents to aviation authorities by pilots, crew
and operators and the handling of those reports by the authorities, including
the following incidents:
-
the Jetstar incident at Melbourne airport on 21 June 2007, and
-
the Tiger Airways incident, en route from Mackay to Melbourne, on
18 May 2009; and
-
how reporting processes can be strengthened to improve safety and
related training, including consideration of the Transport Safety Investigation
Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010.
The capacity of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to appropriately
oversee and update safety regulations given the ongoing and rapid development
of new technologies and skills shortages in the aviation sector
3.2
The committee received evidence in relation to the capacity of the Civil
Aviation Authority (CASA) to appropriately oversee and update safety
regulations (term of reference (f)), as well as in relation to the regulator's
performance more generally.
Industry skills shortages and CASA
recruitment challenges
3.3
The committee heard that CASA faces a particular challenge in recruiting
appropriately skilled and experienced workers, particularly as it is
effectively required to compete with the aviation industry for the same
workers:
CASA recognises that it faces challenges recruiting
appropriately skilled and qualified people. CASA draws new employees from the
same pool as the rest of the aviation industry, and competition for skilled
aviation professionals is increasing in Australia, as it is elsewhere in the
world. This growth in the industry will result in an increasingly competitive
market for experienced and skilled people, both for the Australian aviation
industry and for CASA alike.[1]
3.4
Accordingly, in terms of future requirements, CASA submitted:
An equally challenging issue for both the industry and CASA
is the limited supply of skilled aviation personnel available in Australia.
While the demand for aviation services has grown rapidly, the number of
qualified and experienced aviation professionals required has not expanded in a
similar manner.[2]
3.5
CASA noted that the significant growth in demand for aviation services
in Australia was driven by such things as the expansion of the offshore oil and
gas and resources industries.[3]
3.6
The Australian and International Pilots Association (AIPA) commented
that the ability of CASA to recruit appropriately qualified personnel was
limited by its ability to match the salaries on offer in the high end of the
private sector:
As a government agency, CASA cannot match salaries offered by
the high end of the private sector. In the flying operations area, salaries are
typically equivalent to a First Officer in a full service airline. Therefore,
it should not be surprising that CASA occasionally has difficulty recruiting
suitably qualified pilots to oversee the industry, particularly as it buys in
new aircraft and equipment and adopts new training procedures.[4]
3.7
AIPA also considered that over recent years CASA personnel had lost
touch with the current standards and skills which the regulator was meant to
oversight:
Over the years, the practice of CASA Flight Operations
personnel undergoing the same training courses and flying the same aircraft as
airline pilots has been curtailed as a cost cutting measure. Fears of conflicts
of interest and “capture” have resulted in CASA staff being distanced from the
operations that they are required to supervise. The focus of previous CASA
regimes on the tactical role of auditing has sacrificed the strategic role of
global industry oversight. Flying recency in an airline environment is now a
thing of the past, as inspectors undergo sporadic simulator exercises with each
other rather than as part of an industry crew undergoing scheduled recurrent training.[5]
3.8
As a consequence, AIPA argued that CASA pilots are 'normally not current
on the aircraft they are supervising and may never have actually flown the real
aircraft', and may not be familiar with the standard operating procedures (SOPs)
of the airline. This meant that:
The CASA pilot is essentially auditing the airline as it
meets its own training program and no longer enjoys any of the professional
credibility that was historically the norm.[6]
Funding and technological change
3.9
In addressing this term of reference, CASA noted that technological
change was a longstanding and consistent feature of the aviation industry:
The aviation industry has always faced the challenge of
dealing with rapid technological change. To suggest that the nature of this
challenge has changed fundamentally in recent years overstates the case. At the
same time, however, CASA acknowledges that the aviation industry is dynamic
and, like many other businesses nowadays, it has to be constantly innovative in
managing a range of issues and pressures.[7]
3.10
CASA noted that it had received additional funding of $89.9 million 'in
recognition of the need to regulate a growing and increasingly complex
industry'.[8]
3.11
AIPA, while acknowledging that funding for CASA was an ongoing issue,
noted its concern in relation to CASA's ability to 'respond to changes in
modern systems and modern aircraft—and indeed in modern business practices'.[9]
Given the increasing technological sophistication of the aviation industry, as
well as the advent of new international and low cost business models, AIPA
commented:
AIPA strongly advocates that a new regulatory perspective
needs to be applied that accounts not only for the sophisticated technologies
of today but also the sophisticated business models that have emerged. We
believe that CASA needs to get involved in some serious risk assessment
activities with industry and Government stakeholders, including the Department
of Infrastructure and Transport (DIT), Department of Education, Employment and
Workplace Relations (DEEWR), ACCC, PC and Department of Immigration and
Citizenship (DIAC) and the new national regulator for the vocational education
and training, the Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA).[10]
3.12
Further:
AIPA believes that budgetary pressures on CASA have led to a
gradual decline in pilot licence, instructor and instrument rating training
standards and inadequate control of aircraft conversion training. While this
decline is slowly being reversed by recent CASA activities, AIPA is not
convinced that CASA has sufficient experienced resources to quickly recover
flight standards.[11]
3.13
AIPA therefore believed that:
Alternative models for supplementing CASA and ATSB staff with
appropriate industry personnel must be explored urgently. AIPA believes that
the costs should primarily be absorbed by operators as a cost of entry to the
industry.[12]
3.14
Specifically, AIPA called for CASA to be:
...funded to directly participate in...[international flight
standards and safety research] as well as to directly participate in safety
research within Australia. CASA needs an equivalent of the FAA Academy that not
only trains CASA staff but, of equal importance, makes the same or equivalent
training available to the industry. AIPA believes that collaborative efforts,
such as industry Quality Assurance staff assisting CASA in audit planning and
analysis or CASA staff providing specialist regulatory training to industry
personnel, can be conducted without conflicts of interest.[13]
3.15
AIPA also believed that the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)
should be able to access industry expertise and resources in the conduct of its
investigations:
AIPA believes that there needs to be a formal system for
multilateral industry assistance to the ATSB to supplement its resources,
particularly in regard to specialist operational and technical knowledge.[14]
3.16
Despite acknowledging the historical challenges and dynamic nature of the
aviation industry, CASA maintained that it 'is well placed to both regulate and
prepare safety legislation for the Australian aviation industry'.[15]
3.17
The Qantas and Jetstar submission stated:
An important aspect of aviation safety is to have an independent,
appropriately funded and adequately resourced regulator. The nature of the
aviation industry means that new aircraft types and technologies are constantly
developing. To ensure that the introduction of new technologies is managed in a
safe and orderly manner it is important that there is a collaborative approach
taken between airlines introducing these new technologies and CASA. There are
many examples of this process working effectively: the introduction of the
Airbus A380 and Required Navigation Performance being two recent examples.[16]
CASA regulatory reforms
3.18
The committee heard that CASA has been undertaking a reform of the civil
aviation regulations which commenced in the 1990s. A number of submitters and
witnesses expressed concern over the length of time taken for this process.
3.19
AIPA, for example, while it acknowledged that CASA was under-resourced
and had made significant recent efforts, noted that the slowness of reform
meant that CASA was working with regulations that are out of date.[17]
AIPA submitted that the current 'rule making' process had become 'cumbersome
and...involved a number of iterations over the years' leading to 'frustration
from industry as significant effort has been applied with apparently little
outcome'.[18]
3.20
Similarly, VIPA pointed to a degree of regulatory ineffectiveness that
has arisen due to the incomplete shift from a prescriptive regulatory
environment under the old regulations to an outcomes based regulatory
environment. The VIPA submission explained:
...in a time of transition in which outcome based management is
desired by CASA without the structural support of the required legislation,
airlines are able to operate in a way in which they can operate outside the
restriction of the current prescriptive and outdated legislation, yet are not
being held accountable to the intent of the draft [Civil Aviation Safety
Regulations (CASRs)] which are yet to be enacted. During this time CASA has
shifted the industry towards the requirement for Safety Management Systems
(SMS). This shift has been taken up by the airlines, however there is little
agreement between the industry and CASA on exactly what a SMS is, and how the
intent is enforceable from a regulatory perspective.[19]
3.21
AIPA was also concerned with aspects of the 'shift to a formal risk
management approach' through the implementation of SMSs. AIPA felt that the
process had been 'inadequately supported in terms of identifying appropriate
training models for operators' staff'. A supplementary submission provided by
AIPA commented:
Operators have not fully committed to widespread risk
management training due to the potential costs of exceeding CASA's
expectations, which at this stage are neither consistent nor well defined.[20]
3.22
AIPA also believed that the SMSs of some operators were not supported by
adequately resourced safety departments, particularly in relation to resources
required to investigate human factor events. The AIPA supplementary submission
stated:
AIPA is not convinced that SMSs should run on a skeleton
full-time staff that is supplemented by line resources when required. That
normally means that operational production is favoured over proper safety
support.[21]
3.23
Given the variability of resourcing of SMSs in the industry, AIPA called
for 'joint CASA/ATSB industry standards for SMS staffing' to be 'established as
a matter of urgency'.[22]
3.24
VIPA noted that the slowness of the regulatory reform process meant that
airlines had 'been effectively self-regulating for a number of years awaiting
the regulatory reform package'. This had 'led to a situation in which there has
been very little effective control over entry and supervision of Australian
airlines'.[23]
3.25
AIPA acknowledged ongoing reform of the regulations, but questioned the
adequacy of current regulations:
AIPA believes that the present rule set and supporting
material is inadequate to ensure long term flight standards resilience.
AIPA supports the current CASA activities in redressing the
issues but is concerned that there is still insufficient attention being given
to the negative aspects of operating highly automated aircraft.
The current regulations reflect a now-outdated approach to
industry practices and business models and are unsuitable as a safety net for
minimum compliance.[24]
3.26
VIPA suggested a number of recommendations going to the performance and
operations of CASA. These included that:
(1) CASA formally conduct an Industry Risk Profile Assessment
for each area of its regulatory responsibility;
(2) CASA establish Industry Risk Management Teams that
include demographically relevant representatives by industry sector, in particular
industrial representative bodies such as AIPA;
...
(13) CASA prepare a public Position Paper on its ability to:
(a) attract, train and retain quality technical personnel;
(b) develop and implement more contemporary and
future-looking regulatory models to protect flight standards; and
(c) adequately protect the public interest through its
supervisory mechanisms;
(14) CASA extend its internal staff training requirements for
inspectors to develop model training and experience requirements for operators'
technical managers; [and]
(15) CASA establish an Industry Training Support Team with
appropriate government funding support to identify and develop industry wide training
material specific to identified high risk issues...[25]
3.27
CASA acknowledged that regulatory reform process had been 'ongoing for
several years', and advised that, along with the new major maintenance
regulations, about half of the proposed new operational and flight crew
licensing CASR parts were drafted and currently undergoing CASA consultation,
to be followed by industry consultation. The drafting of the remainder was expected
to be finalised by June 2011.[26]
3.28
Mr Peter Boyd, Executive Manager, Standards Development and Future Technology,
advised that CASA had taken steps to expedite the regulatory reforms process:
Last year it was recognised that the regulatory reform
program needed a kick along, if you like, in terms of the time frame. In March
2010 we formed a reg reform task force with the Office of Legislative Drafting
and Publishing to do just that. So from March last year our own CASA
instructors that look after the policy aspects of drafting the regulations and
the office’s legal drafters have been housed together in one task force. It has
shown quite significant fruit, if you like, in terms of the speed at which we
are turning out the legislation.[27]
3.29
CASA advises that a 'portion' of recent additional funding (see above)
was to be directed towards supporting the regulatory reform process.
A portion of [the recent] additional funding is going towards
the recruitment of specialist staff for the Standards Development function. The
aviation safety regulations are being re-written and, as mentioned above, the [Civil
Aviation Regulations (CARs) and the Civil Aviation Orders (CAOs)] are being
updated and consolidated in the CASRs and their corresponding...[standards
manuals]. This is a demanding task, and considerable additional specialist
resources are necessary to complete and to then maintain the rule set into the
future.[28]
3.30
AIPA urged that the regulatory reform process be vigorously pursued and
that 'no more delays should be accepted'. However, it warned that 'the cost of
the implementation of the new rules should not be underestimated by
government', and that 'additional funding may be required'.[29]
3.31
AIPA offered a number of recommendations relating to CASA, including
that:
-
the Government review CASA salaries with a view to making them
more attractive to suitably qualified applicants for key operational roles;
-
alternatively, AIPA recommends that the Government and CASA look
at a method of secondment from industry of key operational personnel for a defined
period of time. Properly handled this would ensure that personnel with currency
and expertise are available to CASA;
-
that CASA, in consultation with industry, further review the rule
making for flight standards to ensure its relevance and effectiveness;
-
that the Government fund CASA to keep designated personnel
current with technologies employed by the RPT sector. This may mean embedding
CASA personnel for a period of time in industry or regular training of key CASA
personnel; and
-
that CASA develops internal professional development programs, in
consultation with industry and academia, to ensure that CASA staff are familiar
with and employing current best practice in aviation training, technologies and
systems development.[30]
The need to provide
legislative immunity to pilots and other flight crew who report on safety
matters and whether the United States and European approaches would be
appropriate in the Australian aviation environment; and
Transport Safety
Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
3.32
A number of submitters and witnesses provided evidence in relation to
the question of whether there is a need to provide legislative immunity to
pilots and other flight crew who report on safety matters.
3.33
This question was also central to submissions on the Transport Safety
Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010 (the Bill), which would
make it an offence to impose a penalty on, or deprive of benefit, any person
who reports an accident or incident. The effect of this offence would be to
extend a 'de facto blanket immunity' to reporters of accidents or safety
incidents.[31]
Given the strong connection between the Bill and the issue of legislative
immunity, the Bill in its entirety is considered below.
Legislative immunity versus just
culture principles
3.34
Many submissions which commented on term of reference (g) suggested that
a specific legislative immunity for pilots reporting safety incidents was
unnecessary, given that Australian airlines generally employ 'just culture'
principles in relation to their incident reporting systems and processes.
3.35
The Qantas and Jetstar submission explained that just culture is:
...an approach to safety that has gained considerable
international support. It is made up of two concepts. 'Culture' which is
expressed as 'the way we do things around here' and 'just' which refers to a
fair, consistent and transparent approach. In the context of safety management,
the Just Culture philosophy recognises that mistakes are often a symptom of
systemic issues in the organisation, workplace and the limitations of humans
themselves. Therefore, a Just Culture promotes an atmosphere of openness and
voluntary sharing of information, where staff feel comfortable to admit to
mistakes without fear of reprisal.[32]
3.36
The submission went on to characterise just culture as maintaining a:
...balance between a 'blame free' culture, which complete
legislative immunity would provide, and a 'punitive' culture, which is also
undesirable as it hampers transparent, accurate and prompt reporting.[33]
3.37
This importance of just culture in terms of safety was that it is:
...critical to ensuring prompt and accurate reporting of safety
information', and 'assists in identifying the underlying reasons why a specific
action was taken in a specific context, so that the most appropriate remedial
actions can be taken.[34]
3.38
Qantas and Jetstar submitted that:
...[the] current regulatory framework with respect to reporting
requirements is robust, effective and consistent with international best
practice. The [Qantas] Group believes that the current reporting requirements
advance the principles of Just Culture whilst having sufficient scope to take
punitive and corrective action, where appropriate.[35]
3.39
The Virgin Blue Group (Virgin) submitted that, in light of the
operations of just culture principles, the provision of legislative immunity
would 'not enhance safety':
...the proposed provision of legislative immunity to pilots and
other flight crew who report on safety matters would not enhance safety. Virgin
Blue's approach to safety is based on principles of open reporting and a just
culture, which explicitly avoids the use of Safety Management Systems as a
punitive tool.[36]
3.40
Similarly, Tiger Airways stated that it maintains a safety reporting
system and promotes a 'just safety culture', which extends to the reporting of
incidents to the regulator. However, it noted that, while authorities should
not take action against an individual who makes a report purely on the basis of
that report:[37]
...the pilot carries an obligation to his passengers. The
passengers have a right to expect that if the pilot commits a breach of the law
that the law will be suitably applied and that the pilot should not be a
hallowed individual who in any sense sits above the law. Regulations must strike
a balance between the need to 'learn from the errors of others' that arise from
the frank admission of error (to which it is desirable to apply some level of
immunity...) and the need to ensure that pilots act responsibly in accordance
with the law.[38]
3.41
Regional Express submitted that it did not have any significant issues
with the 'status quo' as it exists in Australia.[39]
3.42
AIPA, however, questioned the extent to which just culture principles
and practices were operating effectively, and maintained that there were
'persistent impediments to establishing a culture of free and open reporting of
aviation safety data'. The AIPA supplementary submission commented:
Historically, aviation personnel are distrustful of
management and cultural shifts in reporting activities are hard won and easily
lost. The required level of transparency requires an overt implementation
program and, in our view, unprecedented levels of access and review. Separately
and perhaps more problematic, there are also entrenched ego and self-esteem
issues at the operating level that are inherently difficult to overcome.
While 'Just Culture' is on everyone’s lips, there is much
anecdotal evidence of inadequate training of managers and many managerial
responses that have created distrust and a fear of retribution where reports
are critical of operator policies and procedures.[40]
Existing protections in relation to
reporting systems
3.43
CASA submitted that the question of whether there is a need to provide
legislative immunity 'depends upon several considerations', including:
- the nature
and substance of the information reported;
- the person
or organisation to whom the information is reported;
- the reason
for reporting the information;
- the
circumstances under which the information is reported; and
- the use to
which the information reported is or may be put.[41]
3.44
In respect of reporting systems or responsibilities administered or
governed by CASA, CASA noted the availability of a confidential telephone 'hot
line' for persons wishing to report aviation related threats to safety. The
confidential basis of the service meant that there was 'no need to provide
protection for [a] person making a report'.[42]
3.45
In relation to the major defect reporting provisions of the CARs, CASA
advised that 'there are no immunity provisions in the civil aviation
legislation expressly protecting persons who make reports'. However, as a
matter of policy, CASA's practice is:
- ...not to disclose
the name of the person submitting a report, or of a person to whom it relates,
unless required to do so by law or unless in either case the person concerned
authorises the disclosure; and
- not to institute
proceedings in respect of unpremeditated or inadvertent breaches of the law
which come to its attention only because they have been reported under the
defect reporting program, except in cases involving a 'dereliction of duty
amounting to gross negligence'.[43]
3.46
In addition, the Aviation Self Reporting Scheme (ASRS), operated by CASA
and the ATSB, offers a limited immunity for holders of civil aviation
authorisations who report specified breaches of the regulations. The CASA
submission explained:
With a receipt issued by the ATSB for the report, the person
may claim a kind of immunity from CASA in relation to the contravention, from
administrative action to vary, suspend or cancel their authorisation, or from
the imposition of an administrative penalty under the infringement notice
scheme. The immunity may only be claimed once every five years.[44]
3.47
In respect of the reporting systems administered or governed by the
ATSB, the ATSB advised that it operates a confidential reporting scheme
established under the Air Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2007,
known as REPCON.[45]
The committee notes that, as with the CASA reporting hot line, there is no need
to provide immunity to people making a confidential report.
3.48
The ATSB also administers a mandatory reporting scheme under the
Transport Safety Investigation Act (the Act). The ATSB submission noted that:
In accordance with the provisions of the Transport Safety
Investigation Act, the disclosure of information from ATSB investigations for
purposes other than addressing identified safety issues within safety systems
is limited – even to CASA – in the interests of preserving the free flow of
information to the ATSB.[46]
3.49
While AIPA acknowledged that there is some indemnity for reporters [of
incidents] in Australia, it argued that it is 'highly specific and largely
unknown'.[47]
3.50
These reporting systems are discussed further below in relation to
reporting of incidents to aviation authorities (term of reference (h)).
European and US approaches
3.51
The ATSB submitted that it is not aware that any other country's mandatory
accident and incident reporting systems [provides a blanket immunity,
particularly such as that] proposed in the Bill.[48]
In the particular case of the US, there was no immunity offered in relation to
the reporting of accidents, incidents and defects; and a relevant EU Directive
in the case of Europe provided that cases of 'gross negligence' should not be
exempted from proceedings arising from the mandatory reporting of
'unpremeditated or inadvertent infringements'.[49]
3.52
With particular reference to CASA, the ATSB noted that CASA's current
approach was already in accordance with EU Directive 2003/42/EC, which relates
to occurrence reporting in civil aviation. The directive requires, inter alia,
that:
- proceedings are not instituted in respect of unpremeditated or
inadvertent infringements of the law only because they have been reported under
a mandatory scheme; and
-
employees who report incidents are not subjected to any prejudice
by their employer.[50]
3.53
CASA's adherence to these principles was evident in the requirement that
the regulator's enforcement decisions 'must be proportional responses to the
identified breaches and the safety risk they give rise to'. In particular:
- CASA's first
priority is to protect the safety of passengers who are least able to control
the aviation related risks to which they are exposed.
- CASA will take
strong action against those who persistently and/or deliberately operate
outside the civil aviation law.
- CASA will seek
to educate and promote training or supervision of those who demonstrate a lack
of proficiency but show a willingness to comply with the civil aviation law.
- where consistent
with the overarching interests of safety, CASA will consider the use of
infringement notices rather than administrative action when dealing with
private pilots who breach the law.[51]
3.54
The ATSB concluded:
In light of CASA's clearly articulated enforcement policy,
every aviation professional should have an expectation that CASA will not use
information from accident and incident reports that it receives via the ATSB to
take enforcement action against individuals in circumstances where they have
shown a willingness and an ability to comply with the requirements of the civil
aviation legislation.[52]
Conformity with international
approaches through Safety Management Systems
3.55
The ATSB observed that airline operators are effectively required to
implement the principles of EU Directive 2003/42/EC with respect to prejudicial
actions against employees who make reports through their safety management
systems (SMSs). The ATSB submission stated:
A fair and open reporting culture is an integral part of an
effective Safety Management System and this includes a clear understanding
amongst all interested parties about confidentiality, reporting requirements,
and individual responsibilities. A clear distinction between what is acceptable
behaviour and what is unacceptable is required, as is the expectation that
people will be treated accordingly.[53]
3.56
Similarly, the CASA submission highlighted the 'principle underpinning
the standards and recommended practices specified in Annex 13 to the Chicago
Convention, 'Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation', to which Australia
is a signatory. This was that:
The protection of safety information from inappropriate use
is essential to ensure its continued availability, since the use of safety
information for other than safety-related purposes may inhibit the future
availability of such information, with an adverse effect on safety.[54]
3.57
CASA observed that 'inappropriate use' extends to the use of safety
information for 'disciplinary, civil, administrative and criminal proceedings
against operational personnel', and asserted that such protection was 'to some
extent...extended, in principle, to employees of organisations required to have
and maintain a SMS, [which includes airline operators].'[55]
3.58
CASA noted that the integrity of an SMS relies on:
...the certainty that information voluntarily provided for the
purpose of identifying and mitigating safety risks, will not be used by an
employer for otherwise disciplinary or punitive purposes.[56]
3.59
CASA pointed to guidance material supporting SMS requirements, which specify
the inclusion of a commitment to an open reporting culture in which there are
'clear boundaries about confidentiality, reporting requirements and individual
responsibilities '.[57]
3.60
CASA stressed that information reported under a SMS could, however, be
used for punitive or disciplinary purposes, or disclosed for the purposes of
civil or criminal proceedings, where the conduct involved was the result of a 'wilful,
reckless or grossly negligent act on the part of the person against whom the
information is used'.[58]
3.61
CASA also stressed that it was proper to use information reported under
a SMS for safety related regulatory purposes. The CASA submission explained:
Such use could involve regulatory action by CASA to vary,
suspend or cancel a person’s civil aviation authorisation where it is
demonstrably unsafe to permit that person to continue to exercise the
privileges of his or her authorisation, or to continue to do so in the absence
of certain limiting conditions calculated to minimise the risks of an accident
or incident.[59]
3.62
The Qantas and Jetstar submission observed that the approach outlined
above 'is not dissimilar to the legislative reporting practices in either the
European Union or the United States'.[60]
It observed:
The European Union and the United States do not offer
absolute immunity to pilots or others who report safely occurrences. Each jurisdiction
precludes or discourages prosecution to an extent but also incorporate behavioural
limitations outside of which prosecution will be permitted.[61]
3.63
The relevant immunity in the EU 'does not exclude the criminal law
entirely and applies only to unpremeditated or inadvertent breaches', while in
the US the immunity excludes information 'concerning criminal offences or
accidents (as opposed to 'incidents').[62]
3.64
AIPA, however, claimed that 'nothing in Australian legislation or
subordinate documents matches either the US or European approaches, [which]
both provide qualified protection for reporters'. AIPA did not believe that current
aviation safety reporting legislation adequately respects the privilege against
self-incrimination that should attend any regulatory scheme that makes
reporting mandatory.[63]
List of reportable accidents and
incidents
3.65
The ATSB noted that, in 2003, Australia moved to a system of
prescriptive mandatory reporting, whereby reportable matters are listed in the
Transport Safety Investigation Regulations (the regulations). This is the same
approach as is taken by the US and European jurisdictions.
3.66
AIPA expressed concern with the prescribed list of reportable events.
The AIPA submission stated:
Perversely, the prescription of mandatory reports in the
Transport Safety Investigation Regulations 2003 allows individuals and
operators to 'opt out' of the intended level of reporting by narrowly
interpreting the clauses of the relevant regulations. AIPA is concerned that
the current prescriptions do not adequately cover automation issues, human
factors events or other emerging risks and that valuable safety data is being
lost.[64]
3.67
Accordingly, AIPA recommended that:
...existing provisions for mandatory reporting be strengthened
with outcomes obligations to supplement existing prescriptions.[65]
3.68
The ATSB noted that it considered that 'further improvements can be made
to clarify the list of reportable matters contained in the [regulations]'.[66]
The ATSB advised that it had therefore initiated a consultation process to
establish 'whether a categorisation system similar to the European model would
assist industry professionals to better identify the matters that need to be
reported'.[67]
Transport Safety Investigation
Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
Establishment of effective immunity
for reporting incidents
3.69
As noted above, the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident
Reports) Bill 2010 (the Bill) would effectively provide a blanket immunity for
reporters of accidents and safety incidents through establishing an offence for
imposing a penalty on, or depriving of benefit, any person who reports an
accident or incident. Clause 19A(2) provides that:
...a person commits an offence if the person inflicts any
penalty upon, or deprives any benefit to, a responsible person with knowledge
of an immediately reportable matter or a routinely reportable matter in respect
of:
(a) the responsible person making any report under this
Division;
(b) the content of any report made by the responsible under
this Division.
3.70
Captain Woodward advised that AIPA supported the Bill on the basis that
it would entrench aspects of a 'just culture' approach to incident reporting.
In particular, AIPA argued that Australia should adopt aspects of the reporting
systems in the UK and the US, where self-reporting of safety incidents is
encouraged through protection from prosecution.[68]
3.71
However, the ATSB submitted that the proposed immunity would be
'dangerous for safety' and 'dangerously counterproductive'.[69]
The ATSB submission observed that the proposed immunity could, by making it an
offence to inflict a penalty or deprive of a benefit a person who reports an
accident or incident, prevent an operator from taking 'essential safety
action'.[70]
CASA, as the regulator, may be able to raise a defence of lawful authority in
order to take necessary safety action; however, this 'may be uncertain'.[71]
3.72
The ATSB submission explained that there are cases where a person's
actions have endangered safety and it is therefore legitimate and necessary for
CASA or an airline operator to take action against that person, such as by
suspending a licence, or suspending that person from operational duties.[72]
The Bill, however, would enable any such person who reported their own actions
to claim the immunity offered by the proposed provision in the Bill. The ATSB
submission explained:
The Bill’s provisions have the potential to endanger safety
by hindering operators taking necessary safety-related action and leaving the situation
unclear about whether the provision is intended to prevent safety action by CASA.
In either circumstance, preventing essential safety action is inappropriate.[73]
3.73
Similarly, AIPA did not believe that the Bill should extend to the
protection of individuals who had committed wilful or negligent acts:
Both the UK and the United States have more complex systems
than we have and arguably they are better developed for safety reporting. The
just culture concept is actually entrenched in [International Civil Aviation
Organization or] ICAO standards and recommended practices. They are actually
moving that way. We would like to see just culture enshrined in Australian
legislation, so we actively support... [the proposed] amendment. One of the
concepts of a just culture is that wilful negligence, disregard for standard
procedures or actually breaking the law is not condoned; it is actually recognised
in the just culture concept that those issues are not meant to protect an
individual who deliberately or flagrantly breaks the law or is actually just
negligent.[74]
3.74
Virgin supported the proposed provision, subject to:
...amendments that protect against the use of immunity for
industrial purposes or to protect against actions that are wilfully reckless,
negligent or non-compliant. We would not wish to see legislation protect those
who would use immunity for a purpose other than enhancing safety [75]
3.75
Further, the ATSB submission noted that the terms 'penalty' and
'benefit' as used in the Bill were ambiguous and could also interfere with the
taking of genuine safety related actions. It explained:
If requiring a crew member to undertake additional training
were to be regarded as a 'penalty', or if suspension from duties pending a necessary
demonstration of proficiency were to be regarded as depriving a person of a 'benefit',
the interests of safety could be unacceptably compromised.[76]
3.76
In light of the issue outlined above, the ATSB concluded that the
offence as proposed in the Bill would provide a blanket immunity that 'would
prevent legitimate safety action being taken when there has been deliberate,
reckless or grossly negligent conduct'.[77]
3.77
CASA warned against developing broadly prescriptive policies or
legislative mechanisms governing the use of safety related information.[78]
Further, CASA noted that it and the ATSB had jointly contributed to working
papers raising these issues in the appropriate ICAO forums, which was to
underpin the formation of a task force to review the standards and recommended
practices in this area (that is, contained in Annex 13 of the Chicago
Convention). Given this, CASA urged the committee 'to refrain from recommending
the further consideration of legislation in this area pending the outcome of
this work'.[79]
3.78
Similarly, while the ATSB offered an alternative wording for a
legislatively prescribed immunity, its preference would be to:
...address legislative protections associated with accident and
incident reporting in the light of imminent developments in this area in the
international aviation community. In this connection, the Committee’s attention
is drawn to the resolution adopted by the 37th Session of the ICAO Assembly in
October 2010, confirming the establishment of a multi-disciplinary task force,
which will inform ICAO’s review of the issues germane to the protection of
those who provide safety-related information, under safety management systems,
to aviation safety regulatory authorities and to accident investigation
agencies. The task force is expected to be established by ICAO in November
2010.[80]
Establishment of offence for
improperly influencing a responsible person in respect of a report
3.79
Clause 19A(1) of the Bill provides:
...a person commits an offence if the person, by any improper means,
attempts to influence a responsible person with knowledge of an immediately reportable
matter or a routinely reportable matter in respect of any report made or required
to be made under this Division.
3.80
The ATSB noted that the explanatory memorandum to the Bill states that
'there are currently no penalties for altered reports being provided to
aviation authorities', and observed that the apparent intent of this clause of
the Bill 'is to ensure accurate reporting'. However, the ATSB noted that the
premise of the proposed offence was 'incorrect', as like offences may be found
in existing legislation. The ATSB explained:
It is already an offence under section 137.1 of the Criminal Code
to supply false or misleading information to the Commonwealth, which includes
the ATSB. The offence in the Criminal Code would apply to circumstances where a
pilot makes a report to the safety department of the airline he or she works
for and the safety department then falsifies the document before giving it to
the ATSB. Further, sections 11.2 and 11.4 of the Criminal Code make it an offence
to aid, abet, counsel, procure or urge a person to submit a false or misleading
report. These offences may adequately cover 'influencing' someone with respect
to their reporting responsibilities.[81]
3.81
In addition, the ATSB was concerned that the clause, as drafted, gave
rise to significant problems of interpretation. It observed that:
...the offence does not require a link between the act of 'influencing'
a person and an improper result in relation to the report. In accordance with clause
19A(1), the ‘influence’ may have resulted in the content of the report being improved
and made more accurate but it could still potentially be an offence. It is also
difficult to distinguish between the physical elements of the offence and the
fault elements that would automatically apply under section 5.6 of the Criminal
Code. These problems could lead to difficulties in enforcing the offence, as
currently drafted.[82]
Reporting of incidents to aviation authorities by pilots, crew and
operators and the handling of those reports by the authorities, including the
following incidents:
(i) the Jetstar incident at Melbourne airport on 21 June 2007, and
(ii) the Tiger Airways
incident, en route from Mackay to Melbourne, on 18 May 2009
Reporting of incidents to aviation authorities
3.82
The committee heard that a number of systems exist which compel or allow
pilots, crew and operations to report incidents to the appropriate aviation
safety authorities. The ATSB observed that the 'inter-relationship of the
different systems is relevant for the purpose of addressing some of the
inferences in the...[inquiry's terms of reference] and the proposed amendments in
the Bill'.[83]
3.83
Both CASA and the ATSB collect accident and incident safety information.
CASA, as the industry regulator, is responsible for 'developing and
promulgating aviation safety standards and monitoring their implementation by
industry'.[84]
The ATSB is an independent Commonwealth Government statutory agency established
under the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act). The ATSB's
primary function is to 'improve safety and public confidence in the aviation,
marine and rail modes of transport through excellence in:
-
independent 'no-blame' investigations of transport accidents and
other safety occurrences;
-
safety data recording, analysis and research; and
-
fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action.[85]
3.84
The committee heard that primary responsibility for receiving and
managing reports concerning matters relating to aviation safety rests with the
ATSB. Given this, CASA relies 'heavily' on the ATSB as a source of information
regarding accidents and incidents, to support CASA regulatory functions of
developing standards and regulations and safety risk management.[86]
Mandatory reporting systems
ATSB
3.85
Part 3 of the TSI Act provides the framework for the ATSB mandatory
reporting system, and requires that responsible persons report immediately
reportable matters (IRMs) (that is, accidents and serious incidents)
and routine reportable matters (RRMs) (that is, incidents).
3.86
The TSI regulations prescribe who are responsible persons.[87]
Responsible persons include, inter alia:
-
a crew member of the aircraft concerned;
-
the owner or operator of the aircraft;
-
a person who is licensed as an aircraft maintenance engineer and does
any work in relation to the aircraft; and
-
a member of the staff of CASA.[88]
3.87
The TSI Regulations also prescribe the types of accidents and incidents
that must be reported, namely IRMs and RRMs.
3.88
A responsible person is required to report to the ATSB IRMs (as soon as
practicable) and RRMs (within 72 hours) that they have knowledge of. However,
they are excused from the requirement to report if they believe on reasonable
grounds that another responsible person will report the matter within the required
timeframe with all the relevant details (if they do not have this belief they
are not excused).[89]
In practice, a pilot who has made a report to the employing airline's safety
department as a requirement of that company's SMS is absolved of the
requirement to report to the ATSB (assuming that he or she reasonably believes
that the operator will pass the report on to the ATSB). The ATSB submission
notes that transport safety legislation allows for operators to develop a
culture of accident and incident reporting within their SMS.[90]
3.89
CASA noted that, in accordance with the provisions of the TSI Act, the
disclosure of information to CASA from ATSB investigations for purposes other
than addressing the safety issues identified is limited 'in the interests of
preserving the free flow of information to the ATSB'.[91]
However, the two bodies were cooperating closely in the development of ICAO
standards to enhance CASA's access to the ATSB's accident and incident
notification system, without 'compromising confidentiality where it is
required'.[92]
Current consultations around potential changes to the list of mandatory
reportable accidents and incidents also offered an opportunity to 'improve
these processes domestically'.[93]
3.90
The committee heard that in Australia Part 3 of the Transport Safety
Investigation Act 2003 (TSI Act) requires 'reportable matters' (as defined
in the regulations) to be reported to the ATSB. The ATSB submission explained:
The mandatory reporting scheme is the ATSB’s prime source of
information for determining whether or not to commence an investigation and is
used to conduct research and analysis. CASA receives weekly updates of accident
and incident reports with personal information being removed where practicable.
De-identified information is also made available to the industry and the
public. This is consistent with the amended Freedom of Information Act 1982
coming into effect on 1 November 2010 which promotes recognition that
information held by the Government is to be managed for public purposes, and is
a national resource.[94]
CASA
3.91
The defect reporting provisions of Part 4B of the CARs require a person
engaged in the maintenance of an Australian aircraft, who becomes aware of a
major defect in the aircraft, to report that defect to CASA, as well as to the
holder of the certificate of registration for the aircraft. It is an offence
for a person to fail to make such a report, however the reporting requirement
does not apply if the person is an employee of the person responsible for
carrying out the maintenance.[95]
3.92
Under the reporting obligations of the defect reporting scheme a person
connected with the operation of, or carrying out of maintenance on, an
Australian aircraft discovers a major defect of a particularly significant kind,
that person is also required under the regulations to report the defect immediately
to CASA, and it is an offence to fail to do so.[96]
3.93
The CASA submission advised that the purpose of these defect reporting
requirements is to:
-
permit timely airworthiness control action in the Australian
aircraft fleet;
-
assist in long term improvement in design, manufacturing and maintenance
standards; and
-
permit the assessment of risk levels in the Australian aircraft
fleet.[97]
Confidential reporting systems
REPCON
3.94
The ATSB advised:
The ATSB operates a confidential reporting scheme that is
established under the Air Navigation (Confidential Reporting) Regulations 2007.
This scheme, known as REPCON, allows anyone to confidentially report a safety
concern to the ATSB. The ATSB fully de-identifies the report (including
information about the reporter and any person referred to in the report),
before passing the details to CASA and publicising any identified safety issues
in industry magazines like Flight Safety Australia. De-identified information
is used by the ATSB for research and analysis.[98]
Aviation Self Reporting System
(ASRS)
3.95
The ASRS is established under division C of the Act and Subpart 13.K of
the CASRs.[99]
As noted above, the ASRS is established under the Act and is administered by
the ATSB and CASA.
3.96
The ASRS provides for holders of civil aviation authorisations, which
includes pilots and other flight crew members, to self-report specified
breaches of CASA's regulations to the ATSB. Specified breaches must not include
conduct that was deliberate or fraudulent, or caused or contributed to an
accident or serious incident; and must not involve a number of regulations
prescribed in CASR 13.325.[100]
3.97
As noted above, the ASRS offers a limited form of immunity from
administrative action or penalty arising from the reported contravention.[101]
Operator accident and incident
reporting systems
3.98
The ATSB advised:
Airline operators are required by CASA Civil Aviation Orders
82.312 and 82.513 to have in place a Safety Management System. An operator’s
Safety Management System must contain hazard identification and risk assessment
and mitigation processes. Accident and incident reports are not the only source
of information for identifying hazards and risks but these reports do form an
integral part of an operator’s database of information. The operator needs to
know first-hand what is occurring within the organisation. The International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) acknowledges the need for this, advising, 'those
who operate the system daily are the ones who are in constant contact with the
hazards, the consequences of which effective safety reporting aims to mitigate'.[102]
3.99
The ATSB noted that the reporting of accidents and incidents by
employees is a 'fundamental part of the development of a good working safety
culture'.[103]
The ATSB submission stated:
The safe functioning of an organisation requires that
employees report internally so that both the employees and the organisation are
risk aware. It is not a good working safety culture if the organisation does
not have the responsibility of receiving and assessing accident and incident
reports and acting on the information. It is also not a good safety culture if
individuals are not encouraged to report accidents and incidents within the organisation.
Practices which encourage a culture of risk awareness must be embedded in the
organisation.[104]
Adequacy of reporting under current
reporting systems
3.100
In terms of compliance with, or level of reporting through, the
mandatory reporting scheme, the ATSB noted that a 2008 audit by ICAO concluded
that Australia's civil aviation legislation addressed the requirements of Annex
13 of Chicago Convention (which relates to aircraft accident investigation).
The ATSB also identified the following indicators in support of ICAO's
conclusion:
-
an increase in reporting since the commencement of the TSI Act
(despite a decrease in the actual number of incidents);
-
identified over-reporting by the airline industry (from 2007-10
duplicate reports ran at 14.12 per cent and non-reportable incidents at 26.88
per cent);[105]
and
-
lack of evidence of operators failing to comply with reporting
obligations.[106]
3.101
The ATSB concluded that these indicators suggest that the airline
industry 'has been cautious about providing as much information as possible...and
that there is not a systemic issue with [the] filtering [of] reports to the
ATSB'.[107]
Data presented in the ATSB submission showed that the 'high capacity air
transport sector [has taken] an even more cautious approach...to reporting than
the industry as a whole'.[108]
3.102
In relation to operator accident and incident reporting schemes, the
ATSB noted that it had not been advised by CASA 'of any significant concerns
regarding the effective operation of an operator's internal reporting system'.[109]
3.103
The CASA submission noted that it 'routinely considers and, where appropriate,
acts on the findings and recommendations made by the ATSB'.[110]
3.104
Virgin submitted:
A regulatory requirement to pass on any reports relevant to
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and the Civil Aviation Safety
Authority (CASA) is already in place. This occurs on a daily basis in the
Virgin Blue Group, with electronic output produced which feeds directly to
these agencies. A mechanism for flight crew to report incidents directly to the
ATSB and CASA also exists.
It is interesting to note that the list of matters classified
as 'immediately reportable' is much broader in Australia than other major
aviation regions, and it is proposed to expand this list. In the consideration
of this by relevant agencies, the Virgin Blue Group would highlight the need to
guard against moving to onerous requirements which have the potential to give
rise to 'reporting fatigue' which may ultimately discourage pilots from
reporting matters.[111]
3.105
The RAAA submitted:
With respect to ATSB accident/incident reporting requirements,
current arrangements are well understood by the industry and there is no
apparent need for change.[112]
3.106
Qantas and Jetstar submitted that the companies generally made
determinations regarding the reportability of incidents 'conservatively, such
that over rather than underreporting is achieved'.[113]
3.107
However, AIPA submitted that it had 'anecdotal evidence' of
underreporting of airline safety incidents in Australia, including incidents
involving 'take-off go-around' selection events (see below) and stick-shaker events.[114]
3.108
With reference to the Jetstar 'go-around' event discussed in the
following paragraphs, AIPA argued that the incident was a demonstration of the
tendency for operators, in determining whether an incident is a reportable
event, to classify incidents as not being reportable. Captain Woodward
commented:
The problem we see with a reportable event list is that there
are always commercial interests in not reporting your dirty washing to the
public because it could be misinterpreted. So having the airline interpret its
own safety reports as to whether they should be reported or not is an issue
because they will reluctantly report items. The list is reasonably clear
though. If you have a ground proximity warning system go off you should report
it.[115]
3.109
AIPA expressed its concern that:
...there does not appear to be a consistent approach from
either ATSB, CASA or operators to the accurate categorisation of events and the
depth of investigation that attaches thereto.
...AIPA believes that CASA must be capable of conducting 'knowledge'
audits based on a consistent standard of operators' SMSs to ensure that proper
categorisation of incidents takes place...
AIPA does not believe ATSB or, to a lesser extent CASA, have
sufficient well-qualified and experienced professionals within their ranks to
meet this particular task. Neither agency can compete financially for expertise
and may never have sufficient resources to meet their workload. We need to be
able to supplement the normal resources in time of need.[116].
3.110
Captain Klouth discussed a number of occasions in which safety reports
were not appropriately submitted to the ATSB because an airline safety
department 'did not consider it met the strict criteria of the immediately
reportable and routinely reportable matters'. To avoid such outcomes, Captain
Klouth called for a legislative requirement that all internal airline safety
reports be submitted to the ATSB for scrutiny:
...[There] should be a legislative requirement that all internal
reports, be they draft or final, be copied and submitted to the ATSB. The ATSB
can then assess the quality of the investigation, for a start, and also assess
whether they need to get involved and investigate further.[117]
3.111
AIPA also favoured strategies for enhancing the distribution of, and
access to, safety related data and information. The AIPA supplementary
submission stated:
...there is significant potential for enhancing safety data
through cooperative arrangements. ATSB should be able to 'data mine' SMS data
that is otherwise not reportable. Operators should share data with other
operators through some form of safety collective type arrangements, subject to
appropriate security and privacy protections.[118]
3.112
In relation to the use of confidential reporting systems, the ATSB noted
that the inquiry had attracted a number of reports of safety related incidents.
Mr Martin Dolan, ATSB Chief Commissioner, commented:
[The ATSB's evidence has drawn attention to]...the confidential
reporting scheme that we administer. That scheme is explicitly designed to deal
with a number of the circumstances that have been referred to this committee
where people feel unable to bring safety matters internally to notice. It is a
scheme that gives pretty much absolute protection of identity to someone who
brings a safety issue to the attention of the ATSB, and we will follow it up
with whichever relevant organisation is necessary. It seems to me we need to do
a better job of publicising the existence of that scheme and the very strong
protection of identity that it gives because it does offer at least one channel
for people to raise those issues.[119]
Jetstar incident (Melbourne
airport, 21 July 2007)
3.113
Term of reference (h) required the committee to consider a specific
incident relating to a 'go-around event' at Melbourne airport in July 2007,
which involved a Jetstar aircraft.
3.114
The ATSB transport safety report AO-2007-044 (the ATSB Jetstar report) provides
the following abstract of the incident:
On 21 July 2007, an Airbus Industrie A320-232 aircraft was
being operated on a scheduled international passenger service between
Christchurch, New Zealand and Melbourne, Australia. At the decision height on
the instrument approach into Melbourne, the crew conducted a missed approach as
they did not have the required visual reference because of fog. The pilot in
command did not perform the go-around procedure correctly [that is, the missed
approach setting had not been correctly selected] and, in the process, the crew
were unaware of the aircraft's current flight mode. The aircraft descended to
within 38 ft of the ground before climbing.
The aircraft operator had changed the standard operating
procedure for a go-around and, as a result, the crew were not prompted to
confirm the aircraft’s flight mode status until a number of other procedure
items had been completed. As a result of the aircraft not initially climbing,
and the crew being distracted by an increased workload and unexpected alerts
and warnings, those items were not completed. The operator had not conducted a
risk analysis of the change to the procedure and did not satisfy the incident
reporting requirements of its safety management system (SMS) or of the Transport
Safety Investigation Act 2003.
As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator changed
its go-around procedure to reflect that of the aircraft manufacturer, and its
SMS to require a formal risk management process in support of any proposal to
change an aircraft operating procedure. In addition, the operator is reviewing
its flight training requirements, has invoked a number of changes to its
document control procedures, and has revised the incident reporting
requirements of its SMS.
In addition to the safety action taken by the aircraft
operator the aircraft manufacturer has, as a result of the occurrence, enhanced
its published go-around procedures to emphasise the critical nature of the
flight crew actions during a go-around.[120]
3.115
In its submission to the inquiry, the ATSB noted that the initial
reporting of the incident as a RRM was done 'in accordance with acceptable
practice'. However, the crew had omitted from that report the fact that the
ground proximity warning had sounded during the incident. Jetstar had not
become aware of this fact until 'almost two weeks' after the incident occurred.[121]
Jetstar did not provide this new information to the ATSB, which found out about
the incident through media reports.[122]
3.116
In relation to the failure of Jetstar to report the incident, the Qantas
and Jetstar submission explained:
Following this incident the pilot in command submitted a
report to Jetstar which was then provided verbatim to the ATSB within the required
72 hour period. Subsequent to submitting the report, an internal Jetstar investigation
of this incident revealed additional information from that provided in the
pilot's initial report [ie that two enhanced ground proximity warning system
(EGPWS) alerts had been triggered during the event]. This additional
information triggered an internal review of missed approach procedures to
improve their effectiveness. [However, the ATSB was not notified of the
additional information relating to the EGPWS alerts].[123]
3.117
The ATSB Jetstar report identified the failure of Jetstar to advise it of
the additional information relating to the EGPWS alerts, and found that Jetstar:
...had not complied with the requirements of its [safety
management system] in relation to the reporting of occurrences and as a result
had not complied with the reporting requirements of the Transport Safety
Investigation Act 2003.
3.118
The ATSB found that there was no evidence that Jetstar's failure to
notify it of the EGPWS alerts was a deliberate act, and concluded that it was
likely that Jetstar considered that it had satisfied its occurrence reporting
obligations under the TSI Act following its first notification of the incident on
26 July 2007. That is, 'Jetstar incorrectly believed that all they were
required to do was to make an initial report, not to communicate its changed
status'.[124]
3.119
This view was supported by Captain Klouth, who maintained that there was
'no deliberate effort to hide this incident'. However, Captain Klouth
identified a lack of resources for investigating the incident as a contributing
factor'.[125]
3.120
Noting the broader context of the immunity proposed by the Bill, the
ATSB commented:
Although both Jetstar and the pilots failed in their
reporting responsibilities, there was no indication that this was the result of
Jetstar ‘influencing’ the pilots or the pilots requiring 'immunity' because
they were concerned about inappropriate 'penalties'. Jetstar took safety action
by amending its reporting procedures to ensure future compliance and the ATSB
reminded Jetstar that the TSI Act makes it an offence for failing to report
matters of which they have knowledge.[126]
3.121
However, the ATSB noted that the TSI Act specifically indicates that, once
a person had knowledge of an immediately reportable or routinely reportable matter,
they must report that matter within the timeframes indicated in the TSI Act (72
hours in this case).[127]
The ATSB Jetstar report stated:
It was only when the ATSB was alerted by media reports of the
potentially serious nature of the occurrence that sufficient information became
available from the aircraft operator on which the ATSB could determine the need
for a formal investigation under the TSI Act. The delay in the initiation of an
ATSB investigation may have the potential to deny opportunities for safety
lessons to be learnt and associated safety action to be taken in a timely
fashion to prevent recurrence.[128]
3.122
The committee notes that, apart from drawing attention to the failure of
Jetstar to report the information relating to the EGPWS alerts, as it was
required to by the TSI Act, the ATSB report identified the (a) change to the
manufacturer's operating procedures and (b) the failure to subject that change
to a risk analysis as being 'significant safety issues'.[129]
3.123
The ATSB Jetstar report also commented, in relation to the failure of
the flight crew to quickly realise that the incorrect flight mode had been
selected:
Neither the [pilot in command's] (PIC's) nor the co-pilot's
training or experience, when coupled with the unexpected distractions and
workload during the event, enabled them to quickly diagnose the situation
during the early part of the first missed approach.[130]
3.124
The report noted that:
Evidence from a range of studies worldwide indicates that
shortcomings in flight crew training associated with the operation of aircraft
automated flight control systems is of ongoing concern. Accidents and incidents
where the flight crew have a poor understanding of the operation of the
automated systems continue to occur.[131]
3.125
Further, the report noted that the pilots' endorsement training and SOP
training had been conducted, respectively, by a third-party training provider
and the aircraft operator, and noted:
The risk with such a separation of training into 'endorsement'
and 'post-endorsement' components, with each being provided by different
organisations, was that techniques or procedures may either be overlooked, or
taught differently by the respective organisations. As a result, trainees could
be required to unlearn some of their newly-acquired knowledge or, when under
pressure, the possibility exists that crews could revert to previously or first-learned
techniques and knowledge.[132]
3.126
On this point, CASA commented:
The ATSB report into the Jetstar incident found that there
was no provision in the current civil aviation legislation in relation to
third-party flight crew training providers. In the event, the ATSB found that
responsibility for training outcomes was unclear. CASA has advised the ATSB
that proposed CASR Part 142, which deals comprehensively with external training
providers, is under review as a matter of priority and has now been progressed
to the Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing. The ATSB reported that
this adequately address[es] the safety issue.[133]
3.127
AIPA submitted that the incident was symptomatic of both declining pilot
skill levels and underreporting of safety incidents in the airline industry:
...it seems to us from a distance it is a skill and/or training
level thing. We believe that it is probably symptomatic of other incidents that
the industry is having. In other words, we think that there is an
underreporting of those sorts of incidents. We have anecdotal evidence from our
members that that type of incident has occurred before on that particular
airline. Certainly in the regional transport sector there have been a number of
incidents, not related to that but other issues.[134]
Tiger Airways incident (en route
from Mackay to Melbourne, 18 May 2009)
3.128
Term of reference (h) required the committee to consider a specific
incident relating to a flight control system event en route from Mackay to
Melbourne in May 2009, which involved a Tiger Airways aircraft.
3.129
ATSB transport safety report AO-2009-021 (the ATSB Tiger report)
provides the following abstract of the incident:
On 18 May 2009, an Airbus Industrie A320-232 aircraft,
registered VH-VNC was on a regular public transport flight from Mackay,
Queensland (Qld) to Melbourne, Victoria when at about 1249 Eastern Standard
Time, the aircraft started to vibrate. Cockpit indications showed that the left
aileron was oscillating. The crew diverted the aircraft to the Gold Coast
Aerodrome, Qld and landed.
The source of the aileron oscillation was an internal fault
in one of the left aileron’s hydraulic servos. The fault was introduced during
manufacture by an incorrect adjustment of the servo, which caused internal wear
in a number of the servo’s hydraulic control components. The aileron servo
manufacturer has incorporated a new method of adjusting the aileron servos
during assembly to minimise the likelihood of a recurrence of the problem.
During the investigation, it was found that an identical
fault had occurred to the same aircraft 8 months prior to this incident. The
previous incident was not reported to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau by
the operator as required by the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003. The
operator has improved the training of its staff and the reportable event
requirements in its safety management system manual in an effort to address the
non-reporting risk.
3.130
The ATSB Tiger report found that Tiger had not complied with the
reporting requirements of the Act , as the aileron problem was a
'routine reportable matter' under regulation 2.4(1) of the Transport Safety
Investigation Regulations, which specify that an aircraft system malfunction
that does not seriously affect the operation of the aircraft is a reportable
matter.
3.131
The ATSB Tiger report commented:
Whereas the nature of the previous incident, and inability at
that time to isolate the fault might have influenced the operator to not report
the incident, the incident was a routine reportable matter in accordance with
the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003.
Although the ATSB may not have investigated the earlier
incident, all reported incidents are entered into the ATSB’s occurrence
database. That data can then be searched to establish safety trends,
potentially contributing to the initiation of a safety issues investigation, or
become part of wider safety research and/or education initiatives.[135]
3.132
Noting the broader context of the inquiry, and particularly the immunity
and offences proposed by the Bill, the ATSB submission to the inquiry stated
that there was no suggestion that the ATSB did not receive a report 'because
certain persons had been 'influenced' or that pilots required an 'immunity' of
the type suggested.[136]
The ATSB considered that it 'appears that Tiger simply (and incorrectly) failed
to assess the first incident as reportable',[137]
and that this error would be taken into account in the event of future breaches
of the Act.
3.133
Tiger Airways confirmed that the failure to report the first incident
was due to a mistaken belief that the incident was not reportable. Captain
Berry advised:
Tiger Airways has an open reporting culture but the ATSB does
rely to a certain extent on operators filtering reports simply to get the
number of reports to a manageable level. It does not want us to report everything
although we would be very willing to do so. It was the judgment of Tiger
Airways of the first of the incidents, which was not reported to the ATSB, that
this matter was nonreportable.[138]
3.134
Captain Berry noted that the reporting of the second incident was based
on the different circumstances on that occasion:
We had two incidents which were related to that particular
problem. The first incident occurred and was not reported. The second incident
occurred several months later and was reported. The distinction between the two
incidents was that the first incident did not lead to an emergency diversion
and the second incident did. So the first incident was not reported but the
second incident was.[139]
3.135
Captain Berry advised that Tiger Airways had accepted the criticism by
the ATSB in relation to the non-reporting of the incident, and had altered its
procedures to ensure that such incidents would be reported in future:
On a weekly basis we review all of the safety reports in a
safety meeting with the airline, which is attended by all of the airline’s
senior executives. We analyse all of the safety reports to ensure that reports
have been properly reported to the authorities.[140]
3.136
AIPA also characterised this event as being symptomatic of a tendency
for operators to underreport safety incidents. In AIPA's view, the incident was
undoubtedly a reportable incident, whereas the operator initially chose not to
report the event.[141]
How reporting processes can be strengthened to improve safety and related
training, including consideration of the Transport Safety Investigation
Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
Transport Safety Investigation
Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010
3.137
Given its connection with the question of immunity for reporters of
aviation accidents and incidents, the Bill is considered in its entirety above
under term of reference (g), relating to the question of legislative immunity.
Other means to strengthen reporting
processes to improve safety and related training
3.138
Other means to strengthen reporting processes are considered throughout
the report where evidence was received in relation to specific issues.
Committee view
The capacity of the Civil Aviation
Safety Authority to appropriately oversee and update safety regulations given
the ongoing and rapid development of new technologies and skills shortages in
the aviation sector;
The need to provide legislative
immunity to pilots and other flight crew who report on safety matters and
whether the United States and European approaches would be appropriate in the
Australian aviation environment;
Reporting of incidents to aviation
authorities by pilots, crew and operators and the handling of those reports by
the authorities, including the following incidents:
(i) the Jetstar incident
at Melbourne airport on 21 June 2007, and
(ii) the Tiger Airways
incident, en route from Mackay to Melbourne, on 18 May 2009; and
How reporting processes can be
strengthened to improve safety and related training, including consideration of
the Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010.
3.139
Terms of reference (f), (g), (h) and (i) required the committee to
consider a broad range of issues concerning airline safety in connection with
the capacity of the CASA and incident reporting and immunity, including the
Transport Safety Investigation Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010 (the
Bill).
3.140
In relation to the capacity of the CASA to appropriately oversee and
update safety regulations (term of reference (f)), the evidence to the inquiry
highlighted the problems arising from CASA's current regulatory reform process,
notably the very long time that the process has been underway. By some
reckonings, this process was commenced over 20 years ago, and there is no doubt
that regulatory reform of the Australian aviation industry has been
characterised by a lack of timeliness.
3.141
The committee wishes to stress that the lack of timeliness in the aviation
regulatory reform process has significantly hampered the committee's work, not
only in relation to the current inquiry but also in relation to previous
inquiries and the committee's examination of the aviation industry through the estimates
process. This is because, with an industry as technologically and commercially complex
as aviation, it is appropriate for the committee to take a strategic or high
level approach, and to generally avoid the making of recommendations that would
second-guess or anticipate the outcomes of the CASA reform process. The ongoing
failure to resolve and implement important reforms has therefore effectively
frustrated the ability of the committee to properly scrutinise aspects of the
industry in which important reforms are constantly said to be pending.
3.142
In addition, the committee notes that the significant delay affecting
the reform process has created frustration within industry, and apparently
contributed to a lack of engagement with, and knowledge of, important suggested
or pending reforms. This is demonstrated by the extent to which many of the
issues raised in the course of the inquiry are to be addressed in proposed new
regulations (CASRs).
3.143
Despite the preceding observations, the committee heard that the CASA
regulatory reform process has been invigorated under the current CASA
management and by additional funding from Government. This should see very
important new regulations—such as those relating to third party training
arrangements discussed in Chapter 2—being implemented in the near future.
3.144
Nevertheless, the committee agrees that the ongoing process of reform
would benefit from clearer industry and public understanding of the reform
priorities and intended timelines.
3.145
Further, the committee believes that the Government should review CASA's
funding to ensure that there is sufficient specific funding to support an
expedited reform process.
Recommendation 10
3.146
The committee recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure and
Transport provide a report to Parliament every six months outlining the
progress of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) regulatory reforms and
specifying reform priorities, consultative processes and implementation targets
for the following 12-month period.
Recommendation 11
3.147
The committee recommends that the Government undertake a review of the
funding to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to ensure that there is
sufficient specific funding to support an expedited regulatory reform process.
3.148
The committee heard that an issue of great significance for CASA's capacity
to fulfil its regulatory functions is its ability to attract appropriately skilled
and qualified personnel, particularly in light of the fact that it competes
with industry for employees. Without the ability to compete with the salaries
on offer in the aviation industry more broadly, or to otherwise access
personnel with high-level and current technical skills and knowledge, there is
a significant risk that the regulator will be under-resourced to effectively oversight
and respond to technological and commercial changes in the aviation sector. Given
this, the committee's view is that the Government should provide CASA with
specific funding to enable it to offer salaries that are competitive with
industry. In addition, or as an alternative, the committee agreed that the
Government should consider implementing formal mechanisms for the sharing of
expertise between industry and CASA.
Recommendation 12
3.149
The committee recommends that, as an ongoing measure, the Government
provide the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) with specific funding to
enable it to offer salaries that are competitive with industry; in addition, or
as an alternative, the Government should consider implementing formal
mechanisms for the sharing of expertise between industry and CASA.
3.150
In relation to the need to provide specific immunity to pilots for the
reporting of safety incidents (term of reference (g)), the committee considered
this issue in conjunction with the Bill, which proposed an effective immunity
through establishing an offence for imposing a penalty on, or depriving of a
benefit, any person who reports an accident or incident.
3.151
The committee heard that a number of mandatory and confidential accident
and incident reporting systems are available for persons wishing to make safety
related reports to CASA and the ATSB. While confidential reporting systems in
most cases negate the need for immunity, the committee heard that information
provided through mandatory reporting to the ATSB is used only for 'no-blame'
investigations, and de-identified when shared with CASA. In addition, the
self-reporting scheme administered jointly by CASA and the ATSB contains a
scheme for limited immunity.
3.152
More broadly, it was argued that the need for express immunity is
negated by the broader principles underpinning mandatory airline Safety
Management Systems (SMSs), which derive from Australia's international
obligations, and require airlines to employ the principles of 'just culture' in
relation to the reporting of accidents and incidents. In simple terms, just
culture principles require that airlines promote an open and blame free
reporting culture.
3.153
On the basis of the existing systems and just culture considerations, a
number of submitters and witnesses argued that the need for legislative
immunity, as proposed by the Bill, was unnecessary.
3.154
However, AIPA argued that the offence proposed by the Bill would
entrench just culture principles, while a modest number of other submitters and
witnesses supported the Bill on the basis that it would 'do no harm'.
3.155
The committee received very little evidence relating to the offence
proposed in the Bill for influencing a person in respect of the making of a
safety report.
3.156
In the case of both proposed offences, there were a number of drafting
or technical concerns identified, that called into question the effect of the
Bill if passed in its current form.
3.157
However, on the basis of the evidence received, the committee did not
consider that there is a necessity for an express legislative immunity for
reporters of accidents or safety related incidents, and therefore for the
effective immunity proposed in the Bill. Further, there was no compelling case
put forward for the proposed offence relating to influencing a person in
respect of a safety report.
Recommendation 13
3.158
The committee recommends that the Transport Safety Investigation
Amendment (Incident Reports) Bill 2010 not be passed.
3.159
The committee intends to further explore the ATSB's interpretation of
these matters at the next opportunity.
3.160
The Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003, Part 3, Division 1
"Compulsory Reporting" Sections 18 and 19 deal only with
"immediately reportable matters" and "routinely reportable
matters".
3.161
The Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 Section 3 defines
both types of matters in terms of the Regulations. Regulations 2.3 and 2.4
provide lists of reportable events. If the matter is not defined on the list,
there is no obligation for it to be reported.
3.162
AIPA recommended in their additional information provided to the
committee to add to both the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 and
the Transport Safety Investigation Regulations a general obligation to
report matters that represent an urgent safety risk that may not be otherwise
picked up by the prescriptive list.
Recommendation 14
3.163
The committee recommends that the current prescriptive approach needs to
be supplemented with a general obligation to report whenever the 'responsible
person' believes that there is an urgent safety risk that must be addressed.
Recommendation 15
3.164
The committee recommends that the Australian Transport and Safety Bureau
(ATSB) review its approach to the investigation and publication of human
factors with a view to achieving a more robust and useful learning tool for the
industry.
Recommendation 16
3.165
The committee recommends that the Australian Transport and Safety Bureau
(ATSB) review existing processes for the categorisation of aviation events to
ensure that miscategorisation is minimised and opportunities for system
improvement are not lost.
Recommendation 17
3.166
The committee recommends that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA),
in concern with Australian Transport and Safety Bureau (ATSB), consider
developing and publishing guidance on model reporting to minimise
understatement of the actual or potential significance of aviation events.
3.167
There is currently no model published by either CASA or the ATSB that
establishes a standard for the content and style of incident reports.
3.168
Both the Jetstar go-around incident report and the Jetstar windshear
incident report do not appear to have attracted an appropriate level of
response from the ATSB at first instance. This appears to be related to the
content of these initial reports.
Recommendation 18
3.169
The committee recommends that Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) require
operators to observe the highest standards of incident reporting from their
personnel and provide appropriate training as part of the safety promotion
function of their SMS.
Recommendation 19
The committee recommends that, in order to enhance 'just culture'
and open reporting of incidents, aviation operators should ensure that their
relevant managers are adequately trained in procedural fairness.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page