6.1
This chapter considers the evidence received during the inquiry regarding areas for further review and reform within AMSA. The creation of the national system for DCVs was initially touted as a means of reducing costs, red tape and improving safety outcomes for the sector. However, as this chapter shows, the overwhelming number of submissions to the inquiry noted that DCV operators face a more complex, costly and burdensome system which has yet to improve safety outcomes.
6.2
Additional evidence received during the inquiry has also brought to the committee's attention a range of other issues and concerns including the importance of better legislated and more enforceable safety management systems, resourcing and staffing issues within AMSA, the implementation of corporate or industrial manslaughter legislation and the production of more detailed safety data.
6.3
In particular, there are a number of concerns around legislative grandfathering arrangements and the negative impact these provisions can have on maritime safety. The grandfathering arrangements in relation to vessel standards and crewing are considered further below.
Grandfathering arrangements
6.4
The previous chapter drew attention to a number of coronial inquests which considered the role of AMSA. Of particular importance were the recommendations of the Coroner in 2018, following the inquest into the deaths of Mr Turner, Mr Carter and Mr Fairley.
6.5
The Coroner in that instance recommended a transitional approach to ending the grandfathering of safety standards for existing vessels, with priority given to compliance with the current safety standards. The committee shares this view, as detailed below.
Marine Order 503 – Certificates of Survey
6.6
Marine Order 503 (Certificates of survey – national law) 2018 (Marine Order 503) prescribes matters for the national law in relation to the application, issue, variation, suspension and revocation of certificates of survey for domestic commercial vessels. It prescribes the standards that apply to a DCV for the issue of a certificate of survey and also prescribes the standards to be met for the survey of a DCV.
6.7
As part of the transition to the new national system, COAG agreed to allow existing vessels in operation as of 1 July 2013 to continue to operate under the design, construction and survey requirements that existed before the introduction of the new national system. The grandfathering arrangements were introduced to save existing vessel operators from having to invest immediately in the cost of bringing their vessels into line with new vessel construction and stability standards.
6.8
In light of the above agreement, under Marine Order 503, different construction and equipment standards are prescribed for 'existing vessels', 'new vessels' and 'transitional vessels'. For existing vessels, with the exception of safety equipment, the construction and equipping standards are generally those that applied to the vessel as at 30 June 2013. Some amendments were made to the Order in 2018, requiring existing vessels to comply with contemporary communication equipment standards in the National Law.
6.9
However, despite these amendments, section 7 of Marine Order 503 still contains significant grandfathering provisions, and provides that the vessel and equipment standards for an existing vessel are:
(a) for arrangement, accommodation and personal safety, watertight and weathertight integrity, construction, fire safety, engineering, stability, equipment (other than the equipment mentioned in paragraph (b) or (c)) and associated systems:
(i) if the vessel operated before 1 July 2013 — the standards that applied to the vessel on 30 June 2013 [emphasis added]
6.10
In addition, there are a number of exemptions which may apply to the Order, including exemptions in relation to periodic survey, equipment certification, compass adjustment, and life jacket lights.
Marine Order 504 – Certificates of operation
6.11
Marine Order 504 (Certifications of operation and operation requirements – national law) 2018 provides requirements for the application, issue, renewal, variation, suspension and revocation of certificates of operation for domestic commercial vessels. A certificate of operation must be held by a person who operates a domestic commercial vessel.
6.12
Section 16 of the Order sets out the meaning of 'existing vessel' for the purpose of the Order, which includes a vessel used in connection with a commercial activity at any time in the two years ending on 30 June 2013. Existing vessels are excluded from the application of certain requirements related to crewing of a DCV.
6.13
Section 6 of Schedule 1 to the Order states that an owner must determine the appropriate crewing for each kind of operation of the vessel by evaluating the risks to safety of the vessel, the environment and all persons on or near the vessel, and the number of crew must be at least equal to the minimum numbers stipulated in section 6(4) of the Schedule.
6.14
Despite this requirement, grandfathering provisions are provided in Schedule 1, section 8 of Marine Order 504 which state the circumstances where 'appropriate crewing need not comply with minimum crewing requirements'. Instead, the Order states that for existing vessels:
(8) The appropriate crewing may be:
(a) the crewing requirements that applied to the vessel on 30 June 2013, if the vessel is an existing vessel [emphasis added].
Views of AMSA
6.15
It is clear that the Marine Orders which were in place at the time of Mr Mills' death, in late 2014, gave effect to grandfathering arrangements which allowed existing vessels, including the Ten-Sixty-Six, to comply with certain state and territory requirements that applied before 1 July 2013.
6.16
Mr Kinley drew attention to the fact that from 1 July 2018, the grandfathering arrangements in relation to some operational safety standards ceased. Thereafter, owners and operators of DCVs had to, as a condition of their certificate of operation, comply with the contemporary safety standards for operations, including headcount requirements, as set out in Marine Order 504.
6.17
Notwithstanding this, grandfathering arrangements were in place regarding the operations of the Ten-Sixty-Six. Mr Kinley reflected on the grandfathering provisions and stated that:
These grandfathering practices, as they were called, from each jurisdiction were agreed to by COAG under the IGA as a pragmatic way to deal with variations and standards that existed across all jurisdictions; however, in AMSA's view, we really need to be prepared to examine some of these grandfather arrangements in the future.
6.18
In its submission to the inquiry, AMSA indicated that it would pursue action to improve safety for high risk vessels that are 'currently operating under 'grandfathering' arrangements'. AMSA informed the committee that it was 'not convinced' that these arrangements, which allow higher risk operations such as passenger charters to operate in accordance with an older and often lower standard, were consistent with contemporary safety expectations. AMSA continued:
For example, some vessels that were constructed in accordance with grandfathered state and territory requirements were known to be 'in survey' with railings at no more than 850 mm when the centre of gravity of an adult male is closer to 1000 mm – meaning the likelihood of overbalancing is increased. The contemporary rail height requirements for a vessel of this kind is 1000 mm.
6.19
In their right of reply to the submission of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA), AMSA further noted that it 'intends to work collaboratively with government and industry to look at options for improving the standards and safety outcomes for grandfathered vessels'. This position was reiterated by the AMSA Board, which noted that 'that the community's expectations is that, when a passenger or a crew member boards a boat, they expect the boat and everything on it to meet contemporary safety standards'.
Submitter views
6.20
A number of submitters raised concerns about the grandfathering arrangements. For example, Maritime Industry Australia Limited (MIAL) noted in its submission that the arrangements under which vessels that were grandfathered as 'existing vessels' apply indefinitely, unless subject to modification, changes in the areas of operation, or changes to the nature of its operation in a way that increases risk. According to MIAL, these arrangements have created an 'incentive for operators to hold on to older vessels with grandfathered status', rather than to upgrade to new, modern vessels that are subject to more stringent rules. It described this incentive as a 'perverse outcome for a regime intended to improve safety across the board'. Furthermore:
Grandfathering also maintains the inconsistencies of the previous state and territory regimes that the National System was aiming to address.
6.21
Pacific Maritime Lawyers and Consultants (PML) also voiced concerns with grandfathering arrangements, expressing the view that:
The grandfathering has been happening in the commercial vessel sector in this country for a very long time. Every time there has been a step forward in terms of the regulatory system—changes in the national standards—then grandfathering existed with the intention of course for these older vessels to be phased out over time and for the new standard to apply to anything that was built after a certain date. I agree that that is a problem. Clearly, there are vessels around where the vessels probably weren't seaworthy, and there are some examples of this that include multiple fatality examples. That's a significant regulatory problem. That regulatory problem is that those vessels deserve additional scrutiny, but they are also very often the vessels that are least resourced. There are reasons why those vessels haven't been replaced. That's a challenge.
6.22
The Tasmanian Seafood Industry Council (TSIC) explained that the difficulties for Tasmanian seafood fishers in understanding the intricacy of the National Law was made more difficult by the complexity of grandfathering clauses and the unknown number of exemptions in place. These factors—coupled with the often inconsistent advice offered by AMSA—had created an 'exceptionally complex and burdensome system, which has lost any common sense approaches to decision making'.
6.23
MIAL concluded, however, that as a result of the commitments made by industry prior to the commencement of the transition, there was little capacity for AMSA as the regulator to alter this approach.
Committee view
6.24
The ongoing issue around grandfathering arrangements is of significant concern to the committee. The implicit inconsistency in the treatment of older vessels should have been largely addressed by the ending of some of these arrangements on 1 July 2018. However, concerns remain around standards for the physical safety of the vessel under Marine Order 503, and the adequacy crewing arrangements under Marine Order 504.
6.25
There also remain concerns over the consistency and application of exemptions, whether the legislation in its current form can accommodate the range and diversity of vessels it is intended to, and the monitoring and enforcement regime in place.
6.26
The committee is cognisant of the scale of applying modern safety standards across the 27 000 or so DCVs, and the committee expects over time the regulatory inconsistencies will dissipate as older vessels go off line, and the majority of DCVs fall under the same safety and operational standards. However the committee is mindful that the legislative and regulatory framework must keep pace with the changing industry, and to this end will be maintaining a watching brief on how he regulatory regime moves forward in ensuring the industry meets contemporary operational safety standards into the future.
Increased red tape, centralisation and complexity
6.27
As noted in previous chapters of this report, AMSA indicated that under the 2013 arrangements whereby states and territories delivered services, 'many of the benefits that a truly national system could deliver are not being realised because service delivery is not centralised'. AMSA further argued that centralised service delivery would 'simplify how the regulatory framework is applied consistently, across Australia'.
6.28
However, the committee received evidence raising a number of concerns with the national system. While many submitters noted the importance of consistent national laws to ensure greater efficiency and safety for the maritime industry and its workers, a number of issues and obstacles were highlighted.
Greater complexity and cost
6.29
A number of submitters suggested that AMSA had not achieved the three main objectives of the national system: reduced costs, reduced red tape and improved safety outcomes. In fact, evidence to the committee suggested that the move to a national system had created 'excessive red tape', raised costs and alienated smaller operators.
6.30
Seafood Industry Victoria held the view that AMSA's delivery of a subsidised national system had not yet passed on any of these three key performance measures. It instead indicated that the proposed costs to Victorian fishing vessels could amount to a total increase of 200 to 500 per cent.
6.31
MIAL highlighted that there were, and continue to be, significant challenges in the transition to the national system which have resulted in legislation which is 'overtly complex and lacking in clarity'. It concluded that in order to create a regulatory regime that is fit for purpose and can achieve its objectives of increased consistency, safety and overall efficiency in the DCV sector, an 'entire rewrite' of the National Law was necessary.
6.32
MIAL acknowledged that the transitional task was significant, for reasons including the fact that an addition 27 000 DCVs came under AMSA's jurisdiction. However, the transitional arrangements required AMSA to bring a diverse range of vessel types, commercial operations and historical regulatory settings under one umbrella, while allowing maritime businesses to continue operating. According to MIAL, this process has:
…resulted in an extremely complex and often ambiguous regulatory landscape…AMSA's remit to interpret and enforce the legislation is made very difficult as a result.
6.33
MIAL further highlighted the diverse range of vessels covered under the National Law, noting that some standards which applied to small tinnies used as workboats in jetty construction, also applied to Sydney harbour ferries. This diversity created its own challenges, as MIAL noted:
To allow for this extreme variation in operation, minimal prescription and many exemptions (currently at 41 in total) to legislation has been necessary, leading to ambiguity and lack of clarity in regulation.
6.34
The International Institute of Marine Surveying (IIMS) concurred with MIAL's view:
The number of standing and ad-hoc exemptions issued to very worthy recipients in our view indicates clearly that the technical standards are out of step with the regulatory requirements of the National Law, and critically into the evolving needs of the domestic vessel fleet. AMSA has full responsibility for this suite of technical standards and whilst industry is evolving and innovating the regulatory settings are not, merely being band-aided.
6.35
Similarly, the TSIC gave evidence that a one size fits all approach to regulation cannot be applied to the Australian DCV fleet given the diversity of vessels, operations and operational environments. It noted that instead of promised reduced costs, reduced red tape and improved safety outcomes, AMSA had delivered a 'more costly and complex system that does not address real safety risk in Tasmania'.
Inadequate resources
6.36
The TSIC also expressed concerns regarding small-scale family‑owned operations and their ability to understand and comply with the complex national system. These concerns were shared by Seafood Industry Victoria, which noted that recent research and engagement with industry, at a national level, has highlighted that there has been a 'complete disengagement by grass roots fishers' from the AMSA national system.
6.37
IIMS provided evidence to indicate that the reform process to a national system was not likely to be realised unless 'significant cultural and leadership change occurs'. In particular, IIMS drew attention to reporting and paperwork requirements, including repeated requests for basic information, which have 'increased massively since 1 July 2018'. The IIMS indicated that over 70 pages of AMSA forms were now required to bring a standard new vessel into operation, as opposed to about a dozen pages under the previous system.
6.38
The MUA noted that given the increased responsibility and oversight of AMSA, its resources and funding 'were not increased sufficiently' to cope with the greater workload. The MUA stated that:
In 2010, AMSA was responsible for regulating less than 100 Regulated Australian Vessels, approximately 4,500 international ship visits, search and rescue, aids to navigation, pollution response and other regulatory functions. On the 1st of July 2013, the Navigation Act came into force with the added responsibility of inspecting and regulating the provisions of the Maritime Labour Convention....On the same day, AMSA also became responsible for the development and enforcement of regulations under the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012. This new responsibility came with it...27,000 vessels and 66,000 seafarers.
6.39
The MUA went on to observe that an increase in both annual and staffing expenses was 'nowhere near commensurate with the additional burden of regulating 20,000-27,000 vessels and crew'. In order to remedy this, the MUA recommended that:
…a review be made of resources available to AMSA, the allocation of those funds within AMSA, and whether further resources need to be allocated to enable AMSA to achieve their stated outcomes to the standard expected of an Australian Safety Authority.
6.40
PML further addressed resourcing concerns, stating that:
…for the first 12 months of the AMSA supervision of the national system [there were]: 3,000 vessel permissions, 4,500 operating permissions, 3,100 exemptions, 10,300 certificates of competency, 9,000 certificates issued, reflecting the new survey regime. There were also 1,500 inspections and 400 SMS verifications.
6.41
On these figures, PML specifically noted the 400 SMS verifications and suggested that:
…if you're only looking at 400 out of tens of thousands of vessels—that's actually where the safety is and that's actually where this incident happened—I suggest that perhaps the allocation of resources needs to be looked at. We're doing the paperwork fine, there are a lot of people on boats with pieces of paper, but perhaps the safety management systems and the way that they're being conducted needs to be looked at.
6.42
In response to the evidence of PML, AMSA noted that:
The reviews of safety management systems, which is part of the permissioning process, is one part of what we do. In the over 5,000 vessels that were inspected, that's all going on board. That's actually looking at their safety management system in practice and how it's operating and looking at how they're using their safety management systems themselves.
Data collection
6.43
Section 10 of the National Law requires the national regulator 'to collect, analyse and disseminate data relating to marine safety'. Several submissions drew attention to a perceived inadequacy in data collection methods by AMSA.
6.44
MIAL stated that the transition to the national system had been made more difficult by the variation in the quality, format and extent of historical data collected by the states and territories, which AMSA was required to obtain and process.
6.45
IIMS was of the view that as the national system started on 1 July 2013, it would be expected that a well-resourced agency would be able to 'capture and discipline this data over the 5-year period to their takeover on 1 July 2018'. By way of example, the IIMS submitted that:
A customer of one of our members stated recently that AMSA rang them and asked for clarification of their fleet composition. The AMSA officer reportedly stated that the Regulator has no records for the 7,000 vessels they believe are in the fleet. Our members regularly come across vessels without AMSA Unique ID or AMSA survey paperwork as well as incorrect information on this paperwork. Some of it is critical to the operators being able to operate safely including such things as stability limitations and justification for physical variations in vessels.
6.46
In addition, the MUA was critical of AMSA's reporting of safety data, stating that AMSA wrote and implemented Marine Orders 'without any systematic data collection, analysis or dissemination of results'. The MUA further criticised AMSA for displaying maritime fatality figures as a raw figure rather than as a ratio per 100 000 (as is common practice with Safe Work Australia).
6.47
The MUA therefore asserted that 'AMSA must significantly improve how it reports fatality data, and ensure it is done consistently and is comparable with Safe Work Australia's reporting'. They further recommended that 'AMSA carry out publication and analysis of statistics on safety and prosecutions in line with the standards set by Safe Work Australia'.
6.48
In their right of reply to the MUA submission, AMSA recognised that:
[The] capture of maritime incident data and reporting can be improved. The limitation is, in part, a result of the inconsistencies in the way data was collected across different jurisdictions before the National System commenced.
6.49
In addition, AMSA noted that it compiles and publishes a summary of serious marine incidents on their website and that it was 'investing in data analysis to learn from and produce better metrics around this data'. AMSA concluded by saying that it:
...would also welcome the opportunity to work with Safe Work Australia, research organisations and other peak bodies, including the MUA, to enhance reporting of marine incidents in the sector.
AMSA's regulatory approach
6.50
PML argued that AMSA's regulatory approach to any difficult situation was not based on consultation, collaboration or proportionality, as set out in its Statement of Regulatory Approach. Instead, PML submitted that AMSA faces 'three stumbling blocks'— being the assessment of true culpability, the unfounded targeting of enforcement efforts and an obstinate legal stance.
Culpability
6.51
PML highlighted the importance of a regulator being able to assess the level of culpability and to attribute that culpability to the correct party. It argued that the process of assessing culpability by AMSA, at least in the regulation of DCVs, was 'immature at best and lacks rigour'.
Targeting of enforcement efforts
6.52
According to PML, once AMSA considers a circumstance or party to be 'bad', it will then focus additional regulatory attention on that party or issue 'with a laser-like focus, and demonstrate a complete lack of the principles of flexibility or cooperation espoused in the aforementioned regulatory statement'. While PML argued that AMSA may not be wrong in its use of powers, it suggested that AMSA's use of discretion and flexibility was applied 'differently depending on who is seeking it'.
Obstinate legal stance
6.53
PML further submitted that when AMSA takes a position in a dispute, it tends to be reluctant to back away from that position, even when it is clear that it is in error. PML noted that in its dealing with other agencies, there is usually a mechanism by which faulty decisions can be brought to the agency's attention to have those decisions reconsidered.
6.54
PML raised a number of concerns with the focus of AMSA and its approach to prosecution. It held the view, based on its experience, that AMSA is less focused on the culpability of various parties than on the prospect of prosecution. It continued:
...AMSA would rather charge a person with minor involvement, with a minor offence to which they will plead guilty, than charge a more centrally-involved person with a more substantial offence which will be contested. Such an outcomes leaves the truly culpable to go free, and contributes absolutely nothing to maritime safety.
6.55
PML noted in their conclusion that AMSA's regulatory approach with respect to DCVs was 'highly bureaucratic, fixed in its views, conservative and risk‑averse'. It further concluded that:
...the AMSA principles of "consultative and collaborative" and being "non‑prescriptive" and taking a "risk-based and proportionate approach" are not applied in practice, and both the maritime industry and the regulatory outcome suffer as a consequence.
Safety concerns
6.56
The IIMS indicated that its 'members have repeatedly expressed deep frustration that efforts to draw AMSA's attention to safety, red tape and other concerns through official channels are constantly rebuffed and rejected'. Additionally:
In some cases, confidential reports have not been appropriately handled which is leading to a marked reluctance for the regulated to share with the Regulator.
6.57
Furthermore, information provided by AMSA staff was 'contradictory and confusing', and was communicated in 'quasi‑legal language' which, in the view of IIMS, was 'presumably intended to protect the individual officers and agency but which in fact frustrates and confuses'. The IIMS additionally noted that the clear message coming back from AMSA was that the regulator 'knows best' and is 'regulating efficiently and effectively with broad stakeholder support'.
6.58
The MUA took the view that AMSA's 'deregulation agenda' was having an impact on maritime safety. The MUA argued that AMSA's strategy to cope with its increased workload was to:
Deregulate safety to reduce the workload of managing a large number of vessels. With the revision of MO 504 on 1 July 2018 AMSA has invented its own process-based safety system, 'outcomes-based safety'. This system hands over self-regulation to individual domestic commercial vessel operators, at the same time that AMSA is aware that significant sectors of this fleet do not have a good safety culture in place.
Safety Management Systems
6.59
PML highlighted the importance of the SMS as 'crucial documents' for DCVs. They noted that the 'mere development of the SMS forces owners and operators to think systematically about risk, safety and how to mitigate the hazards of their vessels and how it is operated'.
6.60
According to PML, the SMS should be the centrepiece of any conversation between owners, masters, crew and AMSA and provide for drills and procedures, the use of equipment, management of safety, the safety of life and prevention of pollution. Ongoing discussions with AMSA and the DCV industry are crucial, because:
[I]n the international context, it is widely understood that an SMS is not intended to be an inflexible rule book that must be slavishly followed, but rather as a breathing and organic document that provides guidance, systems and procedures for marine professions to discharge their responsibilities safely.
6.61
They further stated that, internationally, the use of SMS has become mandatory following investigations into the sinking of the ferry, Herald of Free Enterprise off Zeebrugge in Belgium in 1987, with 193 fatalities. The investigation into the tragedy revealed that the responsible company lacked competent safety management and directions and that it was the 'failure to give clear orders about the duties of the Officers on the Zeebrugge run which contributed so greatly to the causes of the disaster'. As PML indicated in its submission, the investigations found that the sinking of the vessel was more a failure in systems than it was a failure of individual personnel.
6.62
PML noted, however, that AMSA provides little support for the development of an SMS beyond a set of guidelines and templates on its website. It argued the point that if vessel masters and owners had the opportunity to consult with AMSA in relation to their SMS, then not only would a superior SMS result, but AMSA would also be able to make a direct and immediate contribution to safety.
Committee view
Increased red tape, centralisation and complexity
6.63
The evidence received throughout the inquiry has indicated significant issues in the transition to a national system.
6.64
The complexity and diversity of the types of vessels that AMSA is responsible for, as well as the resourcing and administration required to centralise the regulatory system, is, and was always likely to be, a huge challenge. Many submitters, while sympathetic to the challenges, were critical of AMSA's performance to date.
6.65
The committee are cognisant of the challenges AMSA has faced around data collection from state and territory jurisdictions, as well resourcing and time constraints. However, the committee is of the view that AMSA should continually assess whether the legislation is fit for purpose; that its resourcing is adequate to carry out its functions; and whether timelines are reasonable and achievable. If there are issues which cannot be overcome, AMSA should communicate its requirements to government, and not place the burden on the sector to work in a regulatory environment unfit for purpose, or where safety is compromised due to inadequate oversight.
6.66
Despite these expectations on AMSA, it is clear from the evidence considered during this inquiry, and the evidence considered during the numerous coronial inquests, that there are systemic issues with regard to the legislative and regulatory instruments, including the Marine Orders. This is evidenced by the fact that a number of exemptions against the primary legislative instruments have been issued, adding complexity to the technical and regulatory standards.
6.67
Any inadequacies in both the legislative framework and its application and enforcement can have an immediate and detrimental impact on safety. The committee therefore supports an independent review of whether the current marine safety legislation is fit for purpose for DCVs, particularly in light of the shift to the National Law, and the time that has elapsed since its implementation.
6.68
There have also been numerous amendments made to the legislation since its commencement, as well as inquiries and reviews into marine safety, and the committee takes the view that a holistic, independent review of the legislation is warranted. Such as review should consider the evidence received during this inquiry, suggesting that the laws are overly complex and unclear, and should have its primary focus on the improvement of safety for DCVs.
6.69
The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission an independent review of the Marine Safety (Domestic Commercial Vessel) National Law Act 2012 and any associated legislative instruments (such as Marine Orders). The review should consider whether the laws remain fit for purpose and whether they improve marine safety on domestic commercial vessels without being overly burdensome or complex.
AMSA's regulatory approach
6.70
The committee is concerned about the evidence suggesting that AMSA’s general approach to enforcing and upholding its regulatory authority leaves substantial room for improvement.
6.71
While the committee does not wish to critique the internal culture of an organisation, evidence received throughout the inquiry raised serious questions specifically around AMSA’s relations and interactions with its stakeholders. For a regulatory regime to work effectively, a regulator must be seen to be applying its powers in a consistent and appropriate manner, and should be as open and transparent in its decision making as possible. One of the issues specifically concerning the committee are reports of inconsistency in how AMSA enforces regulatory breaches.
6.72
The seemingly haphazard prosecution process in the Mills case is apparently not unique. Disproportionate responses to breaches of law and regulation, inconsistent and untimely investigations, and a lack of transparency in its decision making, have led to legitimate criticism of AMSA's performance and approach.
Minimum requirements and safety management systems
6.73
The evidence before the committee regarding safety management systems suggests that clearer minimum standards for their format and content could be developed. As was noted by PML, it is crucial that there are ongoing discussions between DCV owners and AMSA regarding SMS development, with clear benefits to be had from an ongoing dialogue between the two parties.
6.74
Support for stronger SMS's has also been put forward by the coronial inquests presented earlier in this report, in particular concerning the events around the Sammy Express. In that inquest, it was noted that the vessel's SMS did not ensure that the vessel and its operations were, so far as reasonably practicable, safe.
6.75
The committee encourages AMSA to develop mechanisms and processes that better ensure the implementation of an effective and practical SMS on a DCV. AMSA may also wish to consider whether the National Law could be amended to encourage an SMS that more effectively addresses safety risks, and better compliance with that SMS (for example, by way of a penalty system).
Senator Susan McDonald
Chair