JSF: Too big, too failed
Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the
proper meshing of huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our
peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address, 17 January
1961
The F35 program 'is actually not on a path toward success,
but instead on a path toward failing to deliver the full Block 3F capabilities
for which the Department is paying almost $400 billion.'
Michael Gilmore, US Defence Department's Director of
Operational Testing August 2016
1.1
Defence procurement is often characterised by large numbers and opaque
decision making. Even by these standards, Australia's planned acquisition of 72
F35A Joint Strike Fighters (JSFs) stands out for its cost and time overruns and
lack of a fall-back plan. When even US testing authorities are uncertain
whether the aircraft will be fit for service, the basis for the enthusiasm
shown by Australian Defence officials documented in this report deserves
greater scrutiny.
1.2
The Greens cannot support the majority recommendations in this
report: it seems entirely likely that Australia will eventually be forced
to follow Canada's lead, leave the JSF program and reassess its options rather
than simply insisting that there is no plan B.
1.3
The report makes for compelling reading. In particular, Chapter 3 sets
out the setbacks and challenges that have beset the JSF since its inception,
bringing to light important new breakdowns and challenges in software
integration and information security.
1.4
There are meant to be systems in place to prevent debacles such as this
from occurring.
1.5
In an episode of ABC Radio National's Background Briefing aired in March
2016, retired Air Commodore Garry Bates explains how the objective procurement
process to acquire new aircraft was railroaded:
Garry Bates: Well, at the end of 2001 we'd just reached the
stage of putting out our requests for expressions of interest from the major
aircraft manufacturers around the world. Those letters were signed off by me in
I believe it was November.
Sarah Dingle: Seven expressions of interest in providing the
next fighter jet for Australia came back, and they were locked away unread
until the submission period finished at the end of January 2002. Garry Bates
had left the DMO one month before, but he says those expressions of interest
were never analysed.
Garry Bates: There was no comparative analysis of the
expressions of interest.
Sarah Dingle: How do you know there was no comparative
analysis done of all those responses you received?
Garry Bates: Because I asked and I was told by some of my
former colleagues that no, that did not occur.[1]
1.6
In parallel to this tender process, the United States asked Australia to
sign up to the System Development and Demonstration Phase of the JSF. The
Department of Defence's Capability and Investment Committee considered this
offer and recommended that Australia not join up to the JSF program.
1.7
But, despite a live expression of interest process, and despite an
internal recommendation to the contrary, six months later Australia got in at
the ground level with the JSF in 2002.
1.8
The JSF has since been plagued by a litany of serious problems. The
uncovering of these problems, including by the United States' own Government
Accountability Office, precipitated the Australian Greens moving for the JSF to
be referred for inquiry.
1.9
These issues were covered at length during the course of this inquiry
and are detailed in Chapter 3 of the Chair's report. There is a lot of
conjecture about the seriousness and intransience of these problems,
particularly given the highly technical nature of this issue and the secrecy
surrounding the development of the aircraft. As such, the Chair's report
rightly concludes that it 'cannot draw definitive conclusions' on the
performance capability of the aircraft.
1.10
It is therefore baffling that the Chair's report goes on to state that
it is “satisfied” that the JSF will suit Australia's needs. Given the
operational capability of the aircraft remains unproven, it is simply
impossible to reach this conclusion.
1.11
Inevitably, the problems facing the JSF program have led to delays and
cost-overruns. Defence explains this away with the Orwellian term 're-baselining'
as a substitute for the more cumbersome 'massive cost overruns, delays, fires,
accidents and total loss of confidence.'
1.12
This underscores the fundamental problem with Australia's participation
in the JSF Program. The JSF is 'too big to fail' and the Australian Government
has steadfastly refused to entertain the idea that the aircraft may never be
fit for service. Lockheed Martin profits from the moral hazard and the public
will foot the bill.
1.13
The original target date for the first replacement plane to be operational
was 2012. The expected date for the first operational JSF is now set for 2020.
Australia has already acquired 12 new Boeing EA-18G Growlers to fill the
capability gap. Recommendation 1 of the Chair's report acknowledges that Australia
still faces a capability gap given the problems with the JSF. Within the
paradigm of an obsequious culture, this recommendation is worth acknowledging
for its implicit criticism of Defence and the JSF program.
1.14
However, the fundamental problem remains. Australia should follow the
example set by the Canadian Government and make preparations to withdraw from
the JSF and begin anew a rigorous and objective analysis of the best aircraft
suited to Australia's needs.
Recommendation 1
1.15
The Australian Government cancel its contract to acquire the JSF and
restart an open tender process to acquire new aircraft.
Senator Scott Ludlam
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