Chapter 3
Decision-making process
3.1
Under the terms of reference, the committee is to inquire into the
policy framework, procedures and protocols that govern Australia's decision to
participate in a peacekeeping operation and the consideration given to the conditions
for engagement and withdrawal. In this chapter, the committee examines the
processes involved in deciding whether or not to contribute to a peacekeeping
operation. As a starting point, the committee notes briefly how the complex
nature of today's peacekeeping operations affects the government's
consideration of a proposed mission. It then refers to the arrangements whereby
the international community, through the UN, takes the decision to deploy a
peacekeeping operation. It looks at how the Australian Government responds to a
proposed operation, especially the structures and systems that its agencies use
to consider and consult with each other. It is particularly interested in how
their advice feeds into a whole-of-government deliberation. The committee also
considers the processes involved where the proposed peacekeeping operation has not
been initiated by the UN. It seeks to determine whether the mechanisms for decision-making
are appropriate and effective.
3.2
Given the growing number of peacekeeping operations in the past two
decades, it is likely that Australia will continue to contribute to such
missions. Indeed, the committee found a general consensus that peacekeeping
operations are a permanent and probably increasing part of the international relations
landscape, placing additional responsibilities on Australia and other countries
around the world to participate in UN operations.
3.3
Furthermore, most submitters to the inquiry underscored the importance
of the significant shifts that have occurred in the aims and conduct of peacekeeping
operations and their implications for Australia. They noted that peacekeeping
operations are no longer the domain of the military, and a whole range of
agencies—both government and non-government organisations (NGOs)—now need to
work together as a well integrated team to achieve long-term peace outcomes.[1]
The AFP described emerging practices as follows:
Current crises confronting the world require yet further
consideration of how the international community may respond. The requirement
now is for a more holistic and strategic view that addresses root causes of
conflict and creates road maps for peace, and most importantly provides for the
longer term development of stable societies.[2]
3.4
In deciding to contribute to a peacekeeping operation, Australia faces
the task of achieving this 'more holistic and strategic view' of the proposed
mission. To do so effectively, it must consider many important factors and obtain
advice and guidance from a range of sources within its departments and agencies
and from potential partners in the mission.
Threats to international peace
3.5
The Security Council's consideration of a dispute that threatens to
endanger international peace and security provides an early signal that a UN
peacekeeping operation may be under contemplation. Deliberations in the
Council, statements by member states, the Secretary-General and the reports of
special assessment or fact finding teams indicate the level of support for, and
the likelihood of, a peacekeeping operation and the nature of the mission.
3.6
The Australian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York monitors and
advises the government on developments in the Security Council and of any
anticipated UN decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation.[3]
If a peacekeeping operation is foreshadowed, DFAT convenes, as early as
possible, a meeting of relevant government departments to inform them of the proposed
operation and to canvass preliminary views on Australian involvement.
Involvement of government agencies
3.7
Even before a matter comes before the Security Council, Australian
government agencies, such as Defence, DFAT, AFP, AusAID and various
intelligence agencies have been keeping a watch on developing disputes or
conflicts likely to threaten international peace. For example, a number of
areas within DFAT—International Organisations and Legal Division, the
International Security Division and relevant geographic areas—deal with
peacekeeping and monitor overseas developments and potential 'trouble spots'. Mr Michael
Potts, First Assistant Secretary, DFAT, explained:
...DFAT has an over-the-horizon capability, particularly through
our global affairs branch, which tends to look at particular situations aside
from the day-to-day flow of events. So it tends to look at either a particular
theme or at a particular range of countries to get a sense, looking five to 10
years out, of what the likely outcome is going to be. We have done a
considerable amount of work and that work has also been done with AusAID in terms
of fragile states. It is fair to say that we have got a reasonable sense of
which particular states bear closer examination. What we do not do...is drilling
down to exactly how dire a situation would be, what sort of scenarios are likely
and what sort of force structure would then be required. I think that it is
beyond our remit, but we do have a proactive wish to look out ahead and to see
what countries are likely to give rise to difficult situations which might call
for an emergency response of some sort. AusAID also does it on the humanitarian
side of things.[4]
3.8
AusAID explained the type of research and analysis it conducts that may
eventually feed into the information gathering activities of Australian
agencies in relation to a proposed peacekeeping operation:
We have been doing some work for the last two or three years
around a thing we are calling conflict vulnerability analysis. So it is not
just analysing the conflict; it is trying to look at the vulnerability of some
of our partner countries, but with a specific eye on what that means for the
development program...So, firstly, it is a kind of do-no-harm approach, but also
to do this vulnerability analysis to look at opportunities where we may be able
to enhance a peace outcome or strengthen communities. That has been a process
that we have been undertaking, but it has been very much an iterative, learning
process.[5]
3.9
The Fragile States Unit in AusAID has been set up to look across
interagency operations and planning in fragile states. It works closely with other
government agencies and also draws on sources such as universities and people
on the ground to inform its analysis.[6]
This unit, which has been renamed the Fragile States and Peacebuilding Unit
(FSP), is discussed further in Chapter 13.
3.10
Defence provided some insight into the activities it undertakes to
ensure that it is kept abreast of overseas situations with the potential to
affect Australia's national interests. It works with the intelligence community
and its 'coalition partners' to determine the issues that might arise and how they
might develop over time. It then provides appropriate in-house advice or advice
to government as necessary.[7]
3.11
Lt Gen Ken Gillespie, Vice Chief of the Defence Force, referred to
events leading to the outbreak of violence in Timor-Leste in May 2006 as an
example of this process.[8]
He informed the committee that Defence had been monitoring developments over a
period of time and had become concerned that they were 'spiralling out of hand'.
According to Lt Gen Gillespie, Defence was advising the government about 'the
need for us to adopt a different posture if we were to be prepared for what
might happen at very short notice'.[9]
Committee view
3.12
The committee notes that relevant government agencies monitor and
analyse international developments that have the potential to threaten peace
and stability. This means that they are prepared to offer informed advice to
government should a conflict flare up and precipitate Security Council action.
The committee regards this information gathering and analysis as the foundation
stone upon which to build Australia's capacity to contribute effectively and
promptly to peacekeeping operations.
UN peacekeeping operations
3.13
Once the Security Council has resolved to deploy a peacekeeping
operation and requested assistance, Australia, as a member of the UN, is
required to respond to the decision. Lt Gen Gillespie explained that:
...the UN request is often not generic. It will be germane to a
specific conflict area...the UN will normally phrase in its request the nature of
the task...It might be a demarche that comes down through a mission that goes to
many nations asking for support, or it might be a demarche that is quite specific
in asking Australia to provide some sort of capability.[10]
3.14
He noted that the call for assistance from the Security Council would be
handled in Australia in much the same way that most issues to do with national
security or defence are handled by the government.[11]
Initially, government agencies, including Defence, DFAT, AFP, AusAID and
intelligence agencies, conduct their own fact-finding activities on the proposed
operation and its implications for their portfolio. For instance, Defence looks
at the issues and the intelligence and starts to formulate the advice that it
might provide to assist government in framing its response to the UN request. [12]
3.15
The AFP provided a specific example of the more targeted type of
investigation undertaken after the UN has authorised a peacekeeping operation.
In March 2005, following a formal request from the UN to contribute civilian
police to its mission in Sudan, an AFP assessment team visited Sudan to
'conduct a threat and scoping assessment'.[13]
Interdepartmental consultation and
National Security Committee of Cabinet
3.16
Drawing on their own assessments of the proposed mission, agencies come
together in interdepartmental committees (IDCs) to consider the Security
Council's request. They look at the mission and what it is that Australia is
being asked to do, the chances of success and the duration of the operation.[14]
Agencies also endeavour 'to form a clear understanding of local conditions,
including the degree of local and international acceptance of a peacekeeping
operation'.[15]
3.17
Their information and advice feeds into a bureaucratic committee of
deputy secretaries called a strategic policy coordination group (SPCG). The
core of this group comprises the deputy secretaries from Defence, DFAT, the
Attorney-General’s Department, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
(PM&C) and the Office of National Assessments (ONA). Lt Gen Gillespie noted
that this interdepartmental committee, chaired by the Security Division in PM&C,
meets routinely once a month but that any committee member can draw attention
to a particular issue and call a meeting. Indeed, he noted that 'we can call meetings
twice or three times a week to discuss specific issues'.[16]
He also stated the SPCG expands as needed to include people from organisations
such as AusAID.[17]
3.18
The interdepartmental committee makes recommendations to the National
Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC). This committee, which sets policy and is
chaired by the Prime Minister, sits at the highest level of government. It
meets regularly, there having been times 'when it met on a daily basis'.[18]
3.19
Lt Gen Gillespie explained that layers can be added as required to the
committees all through the process until the NSC makes the decision on Australia's
participation.[19]
He described how a whole-of-government policy develops out of the various consultations
taking place between agencies and results ultimately in the advice provided to
government:
In essence, what you are bringing with each of the committee
processes that you go through is more perspectives, a wider perspective and
experience to the problem set that has been handed to you. The deputy secretaries
in the strategic policy coordination area sometimes bring quite strong
departmental views to the table. From those views, we then know the sorts of
inputs that we need to make to a cabinet submission for NSC consideration. A
department or a couple of departments can have the responsibility of crafting
the cabinet submission that lays out the request and all of the factors that
you might have to consider. Eventually, that cabinet submission is considered
by the National Security Committee of Cabinet and we get a decision one way or
the other on our participation.[20]
3.20
The AFP noted the careful deliberation given to any decision to
participate in a peacekeeping operation and the extensive level of consultation
with other government agencies. Assistant Commissioner Mark Walters explained:
...if a situation required an AFP response, we would obviously
continue engagement with the relevant agencies. The agencies the AFP would
normally be engaged with in these circumstances would be the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence
and AusAID...along with other agencies as required. We would certainly seek
advice, guidance and views from those agencies in formulating an AFP response
to a particular issue. If the decision was that the AFP was not in a position
or was not able to respond or deploy, that could be fed back up through an IDC
process or other mechanisms—perhaps through to Prime Minister and
Cabinet—depending on where the issue was being led from.[21]
3.21
He recalled one occasion when the AFP felt that it 'was not appropriate
under the circumstances to deploy'. In that instance, that advice was provided
to PM&C.[22]
3.22
AusAID contributes to cabinet and ministerial briefings on the
humanitarian dimensions of peacekeeping proposals. Mr Alan March, AusAID, used the
Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), a non-UN mandated peacekeeping
operation, to illustrate the type of contribution that his agency makes to the
decision process:
Initially, we were on the ground, as we tend to be in a lot of
these countries for decades before the crisis and for decades after, so we have
a lot of contextual and systematic knowledge and aid program engagement that we
can make available to whole-of-government colleagues. In that process we were
in a position to provide that information. We provided that directly to our
partners in Foreign Affairs but also through committee discussions on what Australia
might do in the Solomon Islands process.[23]
3.23
The Attorney-General's Department also has an important role in the
decision-making process. It noted that the decision to deploy involves legal
issues under three different jurisdictions—international law, Australian
domestic law and the law of the country in which the operation is taking place.
In close collaboration with legal advisers, policy officers and operational
personnel, the department provides legal advice that may be required for a
peacekeeping operation.[24]
It observed that provision of such advice in the context of deployments presents
particular challenges, for example, 'ensuring that legal advice is provided
with a sound appreciation of the operational constraints and problems facing
deployed personnel'. It argued that for this reason, 'close coordination is
required between policy and operational personnel and legal advisers'.[25]
Consultation with other countries
3.24
The decision-making process also involves discussions with other
countries in order to ascertain their views on the proposed operation. Ms Gillian Bird,
DFAT, noted that consultation would take place through the UN but DFAT would also
ask its posts to talk to their countries of accreditation about relevant issues.
At the same time, Defence or the AFP would consult with their counterparts 'to
find out what their countries might be planning as well for operations'.[26]
3.25
Lt Gen Gillespie explained Australia's
approach toward conversing with other countries on a proposed peacekeeping
mission and Defence's role in these consultations. He used both East Timor and
RAMSI as examples:
The interdepartmental government process will decide on a policy
with, say, Timor of whether we need to reach out to other nations, whether for
the benefit of the mission it is better that it is a coalition force not a
unilateral type force. RAMSI was the same. It needed a broader look than just Australia
and New Zealand. In those processes, the government make a decision that we
will reach out and do that, and we use the diplomatic means that we have at our
disposal through foreign affairs or our defence attachés to engage at that
level.[27]
3.26
He noted further that all Australian diplomatic missions in the region
have defence attachés. Their presence enables Defence, if the government
directs it to do so, to engage with people in the defence diplomacy area. Lt Gen
Gillespie explained further:
The approvals process to go on a mission might be a two-part
approval process through government whereby you go to them and recommend: 'The
way ahead might be a coalition of willing neighbours. Some of the likely
participants might be X. Can we engage with those people and determine whether
they are prepared to do it and what they might be able to do to assist?' Once
we have got all of those bits and pieces together, we can then go back to government
finally and say: 'We've done the engagement you asked us to do. These people
are prepared to do X, Y and Z. Here's a possible way forward. Are you happy to
do that?'[28]
3.27
The consultations that took place before the establishment of the International
Force in East Timor (INTERFET) demonstrated the importance of this type of
diplomacy.[29]
This mission was set up with contingents from Australia, Canada, France, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and the United States,
under the command of Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove. It began
deployment to East Timor from Darwin on 20 September 1999.
3.28
In this particular case, Australia had a key responsibility and role in
garnering international support for a UN mission. The committee has noted in a
previous report the importance of the diplomatic initiatives that took place
during the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Auckland in
September 1999. This meeting provided the ideal forum for Australia to discuss
the serious breakdown in law and order in East Timor and to find common ground on
how to deal with this problem.[30]
At the time, the Minister for Foreign Affairs noted that Australia was able to
use the APEC gathering to very good effect to marshal international support for
a force and 'in getting the international community to put increasing pressure
on Indonesia to allow in that force'.[31]
More recently, the former Prime Minister, John Howard, recalled that the
meeting 'played an important part in galvanising and fashioning the international
response to the independence crisis in East Timor'.[32]
3.29
Where the Australian Government is liaising with other countries about a
proposed peacekeeping operation, strong and friendly relations built on
people-to-people links are more likely to provide an environment conducive to productive
talks and for eliciting support for Australia's position. In a recent report,
the committee considered at length the importance of public diplomacy in
creating an environment in which Australia can influence the views and opinions
of other countries.[33]
This discussion is taken further in Chapter 18.
Timeframe for decision
3.30
The time taken to consider a request to participate in a mission varies
widely and can be an issue in some circumstances. According to Ms Bird, the
pace picks up where events are moving quickly.[34]
The Attorney-General's Department informed the committee that one of the main
challenges it faced in providing advice to government was 'the pressure of time'.
It stated:
The request for a deployment will often, by reason of the events
occurring in the requesting State, demand immediate action, involving the
urgent provision of legal advice and drafting of relevant legal instruments in
coordination with Defence, DFAT and other agencies such as AFP, PM&C and
AusAID.[35]
3.31
For example, Lt Gen Gillespie noted that the situation in Timor-Leste in
2006 'required an immediate response and also necessitated a significant number
of meetings at various levels of officials and senior officials to work out the
dynamics and the response that was required from a number of agencies'. He
observed that:
In other instances there are opportunities to spend more time
planning and working through the issues, and sometimes working groups are established
to look through those.[36]
3.32
Generally, deliberation within the Security Council for a UN-mandated
mission slows the process. Lt Gen Gillespie explained:
We deployed rapidly to Namibia in 1989 at the end of an 11-year
gestation period. With the way the UN Security Council does business and gets consensus
now, generally, despite the urgent nature of the mission that might be
undertaken, you have time built in because of the bureaucracy of the United
Nations itself.[37]
3.33
The UN mission to Darfur provides a recent example of the time that the
UN member states can take to decide to establish a peacekeeping operation.
Darfur
3.34
Sudan's western region of Darfur has a long and complex history of
unrest. Since 2003, the UN has drawn attention to the escalating conflict in Darfur
and, on numerous occasions, has expressed grave concern at the continuing
humanitarian emergency and widespread human rights violations. It has passed
resolutions pressing for an end to the conflict.[38]
In November 2006, consultations between the Secretary-General, the Chairperson
of the African Union (AU) Commission, the Government of Sudan, the five
permanent members of the Security Council, the AU Peace and Security Council
members, the European Union, the League of Arab States and a number of African
countries produced a recommendation that an AU–UN hybrid operation be deployed to
Darfur with the UN providing funding.[39]
3.35
In July 2007, Ms Deborah Stokes, DFAT, informed the committee of the international
effort underway to bring together this operation. She said that there had been
many stages and much work done in New York to arrive at an agreement to put the
mission in place and to achieve a new UN Security Council resolution setting
out how this mission would work and its funding.[40]
On 31 July 2007, the Security Council finally passed resolution 1769
which authorised and mandated the establishment of the African Union–United
Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).[41]
3.36
Numerous witnesses referred to the protracted negotiations and
consultations that finally led to the adoption of Resolution 1769 (see also
discussion at paragraphs 5.21–5.22).
3.37
Having discussed the process leading to the decision to participate in a
mission, the committee now considers its effectiveness.
Effectiveness of decision-making
process
3.38
Lt Gen Gillespie indicated that the process of interdepartmental advice
to government was 'well-practised over the past decade'. He said:
Our organisations are highly experienced at it and it is second
nature to the staff who are involved in the process, so we are quite
comfortable that we have the ability to formulate advice, give it, be heard and
then take the decision of government.[42]
3.39
The AFP endorsed this view about the effectiveness of the
decision-making process. It said that the whole-of-government approach to
determining if and how Australia would respond to a request for assistance 'is
well understood and practiced'. It particularly noted the wide consultation
within and between all relevant departments.[43]
In this regard, AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty noted in 2006 that one of the
strengths of the government had been the creation of the NSC 'where issues such
as the arming of police in offshore deployments can be debated between
officials and the inner Cabinet'.[44]
In his view, this arrangement has been 'a very effective way to deal with
policy making'.[45]
Ms Bird shared the view that the system works well—'both the formal and
informal systems'. She said, 'We have really well-established patterns of
consultation across the bureaucracy'.[46]
Committee view
3.40
The committee notes that the key agencies agree that the decision-making
process related to Australia's response to a UN-proposed peacekeeping operation
is well understood, well practiced and effective. The committee recognises the
contribution that this proven and highly successful consultation mechanism
makes to the effectiveness of Australia's response and endorses its
continuation.
Non-UN peacekeeping operations
3.41
Australia is actively engaged in regional peacekeeping operations. Its
recent contributions to peacekeeping missions to Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon
Islands reflect the importance of regional security to Australia and its
willingness to foster and embrace regional responses to conflict. It is likely
to remain committed to promoting peace and stability in the region.[47]
Indeed, views expressed in submissions and in testimony to the committee
suggested that regional crises requiring some form of intervention will
continue and that Australia will be asked to contribute, or lead
operations—particularly within the South Pacific and South East Asia region.[48]
Furthermore, as with RAMSI, they may not be UN-mandated missions.
3.42
As noted in Chapter 2, the UN Charter recognises the existence of
regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security that are appropriate for
regional action.[49]
Where the proposal for a peacekeeping operation has not come from the UN, the
process in Australia leading to a decision whether or not to contribute is much
the same as that for a UN-initiated deployment.
3.43
As noted earlier, once a regional peacekeeping operation is under
consideration, relevant agencies examine the proposed operation in relation to
their particular responsibilities and expertise and consult and work together
with other agencies in interdepartmental committees to formulate advice to the NSC.
If the mission were of particular significance to Australia, the government may
find itself in a key negotiating role with the host country and other
interested countries in proposing the operation. Should the Australian Government
contemplate taking on a lead role, it would need to devote considerable skill
and resources to liaising with other countries in the region to secure support
and plan, prepare and coordinate efforts for the mission. The diplomatic efforts
on Australia's part to garner support for INTERFET and the government's efforts
to galvanise assistance among the Pacific island states for RAMSI are examples
of successful engagement with regional countries (see paragraphs 3.27, 3.28 and
6.22).
3.44
Although regional missions are allowed under Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter, they do not benefit from the legal authority implicit in a UN-mandated
mission. Thus, no matter how urgent or pressing the need for a peacekeeping
operation, those initiating a regional mission need to take added precautions
to ensure that the operation has the appropriate legal foundations. In Australia,
the absence of a UN mandate means that DFAT and the Attorney-General's
Department, in particular, consider and determine the legal framework for a
proposed regional operation. In the case of the International Stabilisation
Force in East Timor (ISF), an Australian delegation led by Lt Gen Gillespie
travelled to Dili to formulate the terms and conditions of assistance with the
Government of Timor-Leste.[50]
The legal implications of deploying a non-UN peacekeeping operation and the
importance of continuing recognition of the legitimacy of the operation are
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
3.45
Establishing protocols with the UN is also a matter needing close
consideration. While the Security Council encourages regional organisations to
take their role seriously in maintaining peace and security, the UN Charter
requires that it be kept informed of developments. Should Australia participate
in a regional operation, it is important that it ensure that there is effective
communication with the Security Council. For example, before Australia deployed
troops to Timor-Leste as part of the ISF, Australia's mission in New York
informed the UN of the formal request from the Government of Timor-Leste for
military assistance and the Australian Government's agreement.
Conclusion
3.46
The evidence of the government agencies likely to be involved in the
decision to commit to a peacekeeping operation strongly endorsed the interdepartmental
mechanisms now in place. They agreed that the process leading to a decision on Australia's
response to a UN-proposed peacekeeping operation is well understood, well practiced
and effective. The decision-making process for a non-UN mandated peacekeeping
operation is no different. In the case of a regional mission where Australia
has a more direct interest in maintaining peace and stability and is considering
taking a lead role, consultation with other countries in the region assumes
greater significance.
3.47
Although the decision-making process to commit or not commit to a peacekeeping
mission follows a well-established and familiar course, the matters that
agencies, interdepartmental committees and ultimately the government consider
are complex and unique to the proposed mission. Each mission brings its own
challenges and the agencies and government consider each peacekeeping operation
on a case-by-case basis and on its individual merits.[51]
The following chapters look at the key factors that influence the government's
response to a request to contribute to a peacekeeping operation.
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