Chapter 4
Policy frameworks and mandates
4.1
In this chapter, the committee considers the key factors that influence Australia's
decision to contribute to a peacekeeping mission and their implications for
future decisions. The committee starts by looking at the broader context of
Australia's international reputation before considering in greater detail the
importance of Australia's national security interests. It then examines some of
the more practical factors identified as critical to the success of a mission,
such as the adequacy and appropriateness of a mission's mandate, and how they
influence the Australian Government's decision to contribute to that mission.
4.2
In subsequent chapters, the committee continues its consideration of key
factors that influence the decision on a proposed peacekeeping operation,
including the humanitarian imperative, the legal underpinnings of the mission,
the level of force protection and exit strategy.
Australia's foreign policy interests
4.3
The Australian Government recognises that the country's international
reputation is an important factor when deciding to contribute to a peacekeeping
operation.[1]
It has indicated that it is guided by whether an Australian role would advance
the country's national security and global interests.[2]
4.4
DFAT explained the connection between Australia's international
reputation and its participation in a peacekeeping operation. It noted that the
commitment of Australian forces to UN missions enhances Australia's
international reputation and hence increases the country's potential to influence
matters of concern to Australia that are before the international community.
DFAT stated:
Australian participation in peacekeeping operations not in our
immediate region has helped demonstrate our commitment to international peace
and stability and strengthened Australia's credentials as a responsible member
of the international community. Australia's involvement in peacekeeping
operations also increases our ability to influence the broader international
security agenda and enhances our international reputation and credibility. Australia's
substantial involvement in the UN missions in East Timor for example, has
strengthened our ability to influence the UN Security Council on issues which
affect our region. In both multilateral and bilateral fora, DFAT emphasises and
relies upon Australia's excellent reputation as a contributor to, and
participant in, peacekeeping. This track record enables Australia to exert a
(considerable) degree of influence in debates on peacekeeping generally.[3]
4.5
In its submission, the Cyprus High Commission noted the recognition Australia
attracts through its involvement in peacekeeping operations. It acknowledged Australia's
long association with UN missions in Cyprus, stating that its contribution had
been of great value in the peace process and that its continuation was 'greatly
appreciated not only by Cyprus but also by the international community'. It
added:
The fact that it gives Australia an opportunity to play a
constructive role in a European theatre, can also be viewed as a positive
element in its relations with Europe. It also gives Australia the opportunity
to continue its constructive role within the UN framework as a compassionate,
concerned world citizen.[4]
4.6
In their submissions to the inquiry, the governments of Canada and the United
States of America also acknowledged Australia as an important partner in
peacekeeping operations.[5]
Australia's security interests
4.7
The Australian Government has clearly stated that defence of the country
and its direct approaches are Australia's most important long-term strategic
objectives.[6]
It recognises that concerns about protecting Australia's national interests would
heighten if the potential for instability and conflict arose in a neighbouring
country.
4.8
The former Prime Minister, John Howard, underscored the need to become
involved in peacekeeping operations in the region, such as the International
Stabilisation Force (ISF) in Timor-Leste, because 'the world we live in is one
where the problems of weak and fragile states, especially ones on our doorstep,
can very quickly become our problems'.[7]
The current government similarly recognises the link between Australia's commitment
to peacekeeping operations in the immediate region and the country's security
interests. It cited the 'crucial stabilisation and support roles' performed by
the ADF and the AFP in East Timor and Solomon Islands.[8]
Before becoming prime minister, Mr Kevin Rudd, stated that Australia 'must be
prepared to participate in coalitions of allies and friends to secure our
regional interests'.[9]
DFAT also noted that Australia's contribution to peacekeeping is 'more likely
to be substantial when such operations occur in our region'.[10]
4.9
Submitters to the inquiry readily acknowledged the contribution that Australia
has made to peacekeeping operations since its first involvement in 1947.[11]
They also shared the view that Australia should continue to have a significant
role in peacekeeping operations, especially in the region, to promote Australia's
national interests and security.[12]
The Returned and Services League of Australia (RSL) and Austcare were among the
many witnesses who suggested that it is in Australia's national interest to
remain proactive in all aspects of national security including peacekeeping in
all its manifestations.[13]
The RSL said:
Peace keeping is an integral part of Australia's contribution to
the global effort to reduce tension. It is also part of the national
contribution to the work of the United Nations.[14]
4.10
DFAT is primarily responsible for assessing the importance to Australia's
national interests of being involved in a peacekeeping operation.[15]
In consultation with other agencies, it provides advice to the government on this
matter. With Defence, it also considers a proposed operation in light of Australia's
security concerns. The committee notes, however, DFAT's observation on
measuring the advantages that accrue by contributing to a peacekeeping
operation:
The cost-benefit of Australia's participation in peacekeeping
operations is not easy to calculate. The benefits are usually security and
foreign policy related, and difficult to quantify. The costs on the other hand
can be measured easily.[16]
4.11
Without doubt, promoting and maintaining a politically and economically
stable neighbourhood is a top priority for Australia's security and a key
factor influencing the government's attitude to a proposed regional peacekeeping
operation.[17]
Thus, the decision whether or not to participate in a peacekeeping operation is
taken within the broad policy framework of Australia's national interests—how
the operation relates to Australia's foreign policy and security interests and
the likely implications for Australia's international standing.[18]
4.12
Even so, peacekeeping operations can be costly and dangerous undertakings
with the risk of failure a real prospect.[19]
Before committing to an operation, the government must, within the broad policy
framework of Australia's national interests, take account of important
practical considerations. The following section looks firstly at the growing
complexity of peacekeeping operations and the implications that this has for
the decision to contribute to a mission. It acknowledges the vital importance
of a mission's mandate to any consideration given to a proposed peacekeeping
operation.
Mission mandate—the ideal
4.13
A UN resolution establishing a peacekeeping operation contains the
mission's mandate which is the UN's request or direction for action in regard
to the mission. A mandate stipulates the objectives, responsibilities and
functions of the mission and may determine matters such as the duration of the
mission, the size and composition of the deployment. The resolution,
particularly the mandate, is central to any consideration of whether or not to
contribute to the mission.
4.14
As noted in Chapter 2, the growing complexity of peacekeeping operations
and the failures of some operations during the 1990s prompted reviews of UN
missions. A number of major studies have considered and made recommendations on
how to improve the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations. They looked
closely at the drafting, shape and contents of mandates. The Brahimi Report gave
particular attention to the broadening mandates of peacekeeping operations.[20]
4.15
In Australia, commentators and various institutions have also looked
critically at mandates. Three previous parliamentary inquiries considered and
made recommendations related to Australia's decision to participate in peacekeeping
operations and the mandates under which they operate.
4.16
Evidence presented to this committee forms part of this continuing
process of review of peacekeeping operations and builds on the findings of international
studies such as the Brahimi Report and the previous Australian parliamentary inquiries.
Taken collectively, these studies represent a substantial body of analysis on
the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. They highlight the central
importance of a mandate to the success of a peacekeeping operation and identify
what they regard as fundamental elements of a mandate.[21]
In particular, they argue that mandates should have clearly stated and
achievable goals based on an assessment and understanding of risks, including the
worst case scenario. They also recognise that a proposed deployment as detailed
in a mandate should have:
- a proper legal framework or footing with the recognised authority
to deploy the operation;[22]
- adequate resources to meet the objectives—the proposed force to
have the capacity and capability to fulfil its tasks as set out in the mandate,
and sufficient financial resources available to implement the mandate;[23]
and
- a level of commitment that can be sustained in order to achieve
the stated objectives.
Mission mandate—the reality
4.17
The Security Council responded positively to the findings of the Brahimi
Report relating to mandates. For example, in October 2000, it affirmed its
determination to strengthen UN peacekeeping operations by adopting clearly
defined, credible, achievable and appropriate mandates.[24]
4.18
The committee notes, however, that the call is not new for a peacekeeping
mandate to have clearly stated and achievable objectives and to meet other
fundamental requirements such as sustainable commitment and adequate resources.
In 1992, the then Secretary-General of the UN reported that 'the established
principles and practices of peacekeeping have responded to new demands of
recent years, and the basic conditions for success remain unchanged'. He then
identified these basic conditions which included: a clear and practicable
mandate; the cooperation of the Security Council; the readiness of Member States
to contribute the personnel required and adequate financial and logistic
support.[25]
Thus, it would appear that recent reviews, including those of the parliamentary
committees, have tended to repeat, as though newly discovered, the same principles
and key factors identified years earlier as critical to the success of a
mission. Indeed, some of these principles, such as clear objectives, commitment
to the operation and adequate resources and funds, appear self-evident.
4.19
The committee accepts that it is important to recognise these
fundamental requirements for a peacekeeping operation when considering a
proposed mission but, if all has been said before, it is imperative to
understand why these well-established principles do not always translate into
action.
4.20
In 2004, Under-Secretary-General, Dr Shashi Tharoor observed that the UN
was not perfect: that it is 'at its best a mirror of the world'. He added that
it 'reflects our divisions and disagreements as well as our hopes and
convictions'.[26]
The Brahimi Report noted the connection between the compromises required to
reach consensus on a peacekeeping operation and the ambiguity and lack of
specificity in a mandate.[27]
Similarly, the University of Queensland Social Research Centre observed that 'mandates
given for operations are the products of political deliberation and compromise,
and the result is that they are frequently vague'.[28]
Other commentators have likewise referred to political expediency rather than
the adherence to universal principles as factors influencing the shape and
content of mandates.[29]
Clearly, the 1992 statement by the Secretary-General, the findings of a number
of recent reports on the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations and the
evidence before this committee suggest that the lessons from previous
experiences in peacekeeping operations have not always been learnt. The many
reports recite, with minor variations, the familiar list of 'common sense' lessons
that the UN should already know. Sergio Vieira de Mello, former Special
Representative of the Secretary-General and head of the Transitional
Administration in East Timor, remarked in 2000:
To date the UN, like many other large bureaucracies has proved
more adept at repeating mistakes, than at learning lessons.[30]
4.21
The weight of opinion indicates that political compromises in the
Security Council may produce a mandate that does not fully adhere to the
fundamental principles and practices recognised as necessary for a successful
peacekeeping operation. Thus, the Australian Government needs to examine a
peacekeeping operation's mandate carefully to ensure that it meets fundamental
requirements and, if not, whether and under what conditions Australia should
commit personnel to the mission.
Other key factors considered by government
4.22
All relevant government agencies presented evidence on the factors they take
into account when assessing a proposed peacekeeping operation. For example,
DFAT stated categorically that a number of complex considerations inform the decision
to contribute to a peacekeeping operation, including the objectives of the
mission and how effective the mission would be in achieving them.[31]
Resources and commitment to the proposed mission are also considered. DFAT
informed the committee:
One of the primary considerations of the Australian Government
for involvement in peacekeeping operations is whether there is a clear mandate
and achievable goals. For UN operations, consideration is also given to the
prospect for a satisfactory outcome given the UN resource commitment and the
political situation in the country affected.[32]
4.23
Similarly, Defence explained that it considers, and makes its own
independent assessment of, whether the mission can be accomplished within the
time frame and with the available forces. Lt Gen Gillespie noted that if the UN
has not made some details of the operation clear, such as whether they want
peace enforcers not peacemakers, Defence would formulate advice to government
on these matters, including the anticipated time frame for the operation.[33]
This information feeds into the department's advice to government 'about the
likelihood of the UN achieving [the mission's objective] in the timeframe that they
are either saying or have not specifically stated'.[34]
4.24
The 2000 Defence White Paper provides greater detail on the factors that
guide Defence's assessment of whether Australia should commit forces to
operations. These are consistent with the factors identified earlier as
fundamental to the success of a mission, and include:
- the nature and extent of Australia's interests, including
strategic, political, humanitarian and alliance issues;
- whether the mission has a clear mandate, goals and end-point;
- whether the mission's goals are achievable in all the
circumstances and with the resources available;
- the extent of international support for the mission;
- costs of Australian participation, including the effect on the
ADF's capacity to perform other tasks;
- training and other benefits to the ADF;
- consequences for Australia's wider interests and international
relationships.[35]
4.25
Clearly, there is a mix of factors influencing an agency's advice on whether
to commit to, or how best to contribute to, a proposed mission. Agencies consider
these factors concurrently, including the important practical factors of Australia's
capacity or capability to contribute.[36]
The AFP explained:
...once a likely contribution to an operation receives broad
policy support, a thorough initial analysis is necessary against current and
projected commitments. The results of these analyses determine the
preconditions that would make a commitment viable and lead to development of an
operational concept to address government objectives. This process enables the AFP
to articulate to government what is seen as the necessary strategies required
for entry and the steps involved for achievement of success.[37]
4.26
Lt Gen Gillespie outlined how Defence prepares itself to make an
informed assessment of its capability to meet the demands of a proposed peacekeeping
operation. He told the committee that the Chief of the Defence Force is advised
on a weekly basis regarding the capability of the ADF for potential trouble
spots 'if they were to arise in the next month window, two-month window or
six-month window'. Lt Gen Gillespie explained:
...we will be telling...what assets we have got, where they are, how
far away they are from potential flashpoints, how quickly they could be turned
around and whether they are in maintenance...So we have...a process in place where
we can continually advise the government on what we can do in a concurrency
sense and so that we remain postured for eventualities in our region in a
certain time frame.[38]
4.27
He added that sometimes Defence needs to reassess activities 'so that we
know exactly where and what time frame we have available for certain assets'.[39]
According to Lt Gen Gillespie, all three services have 'people prepared and
ready to go at certain levels' of notices to move. He noted that, in Autumn
2006, Defence 'saw the potential for issues' in Timor-Leste, so it brought
additional units to shortened degrees of notice. Their training was increased
and focused on what might come up in order to have troops when the need arose.[40]
4.28
In some cases, Australia does not have the resources or capability that
the UN requests. With regard to sending forces to Darfur in September 2007 and
the practical matter of resources, Mr Paul Foley, DFAT, explained:
The reason Australia is unable, at this time and for this
particular operation, to make a larger contribution is simply the ADF's current
operational commitments across a range of peacekeeping and other operations.[41]
4.29
The government also takes account of the capabilities of participating
members and the readiness, compatibility and complementarity of their forces.[42]
The deployment of the ISF to Timor-Leste in 2006 provides an example of some of
these more pragmatic and technical factors that the government weighed up before
it decided to accept the invitation from the Government of Timor-Leste to
participate in a mission. These factors also shaped the government's decision
on how to structure the operation in order to restore calm to the country.
According to Defence:
ADF troops were not deployed under the UN mission because Australia
believed that an Australian-led international security force (ISF) was best
placed to provide the necessary military support for the UN and the East
Timorese Government to ensure peace and stability.[43]
4.30
It explained that there were a number of advantages associated with
deploying separately as the ISF, which included being a force that was:
- flexible, with organic air mobility which could, at short notice,
be reinforced to meet unexpected circumstances;
- familiar with the environment and the tasks with proven command
and control arrangements; and
- able to focus on security issues which then allowed the UN to
focus its contribution where its expertise is most needed, such as in the area
of nation building. [44]
4.31
It also identified the disadvantages of deploying separately as the ISF,
including that:
- the majority of the operation's costs were incurred by Australia;
and
- the non-UN operational structure was less attractive to some
potential coalition partners.[45]
4.32
The decision to lead the ISF shows that the government considered the
type of mission, the capabilities available and how Australia could best use
its forces to serve the needs of the peacekeeping operation. As well as
matching Australia's capabilities with the circumstances on the ground, Australia
also took account of the financial and political costs associated with the
contribution.
Committee view
4.33
The political compromises made in the Security Council in order to
arrive at a final decision about a peacekeeping operation highlight the need
for Australia to examine an operation's mandate thoroughly. This scrutiny
includes whether the mandate satisfies basic requirements such as having
objectives that are clear and achievable. The expanding scope of mandates, as
discussed in Chapter 2, also requires close consideration from an Australian
perspective particularly to determine what Australian personnel are being asked
to do as part of a peacekeeping coalition. Where Australia takes the lead in
proposing a regional mission, it needs to consider these factors when
consulting and negotiating with the host country and other potential partners
on the terms of the mandate.
4.34
When considering a peacekeeping mandate, the Australian Government has
indicated that it is aware and takes account of these fundamental requirements.
Even so, the committee feels obliged, as have many other previous reviews, to underline,
in the form of a recommendation, the importance of adhering strictly to these
principles.
Recommendation 1
4.35
The committee recommends that, before the Australian Government commits
personnel to a peacekeeping operation, it is satisfied that the mandate has:
- clearly stated and achievable goals based on an assessment and
understanding of risks, including the worst case scenario;
- a level of commitment that can be sustained throughout the
life of the mission in order to achieve the stated objectives; and
- adequate resources to meet the objectives—the proposed force
to have the capacity and capability to fulfil its tasks as set out in the
mandate, and sufficient financial resources available to implement the mandate.
4.36
Furthermore, where Australia is taking a key or lead role in the
proposed mission, the committee recommends that the Government of Australia
ensure the terms of the mandate strictly meet these fundamental requirements.
This should be done in consultation with the host country, the UN and potential
partners.
4.37
The committee makes recommendations regarding a peacekeeping operation's
legal framework, force protection and exit strategy in following chapters.
4.38
The 2000 Defence White Paper sets down clearly the factors Defence
regards as important when considering a proposed peacekeeping operation.
Today's peacekeeping operations, however, involve a number of government
agencies. To date, there is not a policy document presenting a whole-of-government
approach to peacekeeping operations, including the factors that shape the
government's decision on Australia's involvement in such missions. The committee
therefore suggests that a white paper on peacekeeping would bring together in
one document a coherent explanation of the whole-of-government policy on Australia's
participation in peacekeeping operations. The argument for producing such a
major policy document is developed throughout this report leading to a
recommendation at paragraph 24.48.
Conclusion
4.39
The Australian Government recognises that engagement in international
peacekeeping operations is an important means of building Australia's
international reputation as a responsible international citizen and enhancing
the country's national security.[46]
Within this framework of Australia's national interests, there are other
important factors that influence the decision to participate in a proposed
peacekeeping operation.
4.40
The evidence before the committee makes clear that the government
carefully considers many aspects of a proposed peacekeeping operation in order
to ascertain the likelihood of its success and the broader implications for
Australia should it contribute to the mission. The committee has taken this
opportunity to re-state the importance of recognising key 'common sense'
factors critical to the success of an operation. These include the objectives
of the mission, whether they are clearly defined, achievable under the
conditions set down in the mandate, and the extent to which Australia has the
capacity and resources to commit forces.
4.41
The committee notes, however, the growing complexity of peacekeeping
operations, the changing expectations of peacekeeping missions and Australia's
active involvement in non-UN regional operations. In light of these
developments, the committee believes that some matters warrant greater
attention. In the following chapters, the committee examines four additional key
considerations in the decision to commit personnel to a peacekeeping operation—the
humanitarian imperative, the legal framework of the mission, the level of force
protection and, finally, the exit strategy.
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