Chapter 2
Changing nature of peacekeeping operations
2.1
Peacekeeping operations have changed significantly since Australia's
first contribution in 1947 when diplomatic staff were seconded to assist in supervising
a ceasefire between Dutch forces and those of the newly-established Indonesian Republic.[1]
Since then, Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations has been shaped
by changing international circumstances and the increasingly complex nature of
such operations.
2.2
This chapter provides the international context as the basis for
understanding Australia's involvement in peacekeeping operations. The committee
examines the United Nations' (UN) role in maintaining world peace and security
through its engagement in peacekeeping operations. It considers the nature and
conduct of these operations and the effect that the changing international
environment is having on the complexity and scope of missions. The committee looks
at recent trends in the deployment of peacekeepers and prevailing views about
the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. Finally, it considers operations
not initiated by the UN, including regional operations.
UN—maintaining peace
2.3
Under its charter, the UN is charged with maintaining international
peace and security by taking effective collective measures for the prevention
and removal of threats to peace.
2.4
As a universal forum pledged to protect the international community from
war, the UN is recognised world-wide as the pre-eminent body responsible for
peacekeeping. It has conferred on the Security Council, one of its subsidiary
bodies, the primary responsibility for promoting international peace and
security.[2]
In this role, the Security Council encourages hostile parties to a dispute
likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to find
a peaceful resolution. It may also intervene in a dispute, determining when and
where a UN peacekeeping operation should be deployed. Chapters VI and VII of
the UN Charter provide the legal foundations for a UN operation.[3]
Foundations for a peacekeeping
operation
2.5
Traditionally, UN peacekeeping operations were given mandates under
Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Under this chapter, the Security Council may call
on parties to settle their disputes peacefully and may recommend appropriate
procedures with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.[4]
Chapter VI mandates typically involve the use of force only in self-defence,
although at times self-defence has been interpreted broadly to include property
and persons entrusted to the care of the operation, as well as implementation
of the mandate.[5]
2.6
Chapter VII may be invoked where stronger action is required with
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.
In these situations, the Security Council may call upon the members of the UN
to apply measures not involving the use of armed force such as complete or
partial interruption of economic relations, transport routes and means of
communication, or the severance of diplomatic relations. Should the Security Council
determine these measures inadequate, it may consider using military
action—demonstrations, blockades, and other operations by forces of UN member
states. Such operations are particularly serious undertakings, as they allow
for the threat or use of force beyond self-defence and do not require the
consent of the host state. Given the gravity of these peace enforcement
operations, there has been considerable debate as to the circumstances that
warrant such intervention. This debate is considered further in Chapter 5 of
this report.
2.7
Generally, when a dispute or conflict reaches a stage calling for UN intervention,
the Secretary-General issues a report to the Security Council recommending
options. In the case of a peacekeeping operation, the report would make
suggestions regarding its nature, size and the required resources. The Security
Council would then decide whether or not to adopt a resolution based on the
report. To take effect, a resolution of the Security Council requires nine
votes from its 15 members and is subject to veto by any one of its five
permanent members.
2.8
Historically, Chapters VI and VII were used to denote the nature of an
operation—Chapter VI referring to peacekeeping and Chapter VII to peace
enforcement. The changing nature of peacekeeping operations has, however,
blurred the definitions. Ms Gillian Bird, Deputy Secretary, Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), indicated that, 'A lot of peacekeeping now is
what we would call chapter 6½: it is a peacekeeping operation but at least bits
of it have a chapter 7 mandate'.[6]
Changing international environment
2.9
Attempts at collective security and peacekeeping-type activity have developed
over a long period in association with the evolution of modern international
relations.[7]
Inevitably, changing international circumstances, as well as the development of
international law, the growth of satellite-driven international media and
changing public expectations have come together to alter not only the public
perception of international crises but also the nature of peacekeeping
operations.
Peacekeeping operations and the Cold
War
2.10
The structure of the Security Council is very much a product of World
War II. The permanent membership comprises five major powers—China, France, the
Russian Federation (former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), the United
Kingdom and the United States (US)—each with the power of veto. With the
onset of the Cold War after 1945, a political gulf developed between China and
the Soviet Union on one side, and the US, Western Europe and other democratic
states, such as Australia, on the other. As a result of this East–West divide, members
of the Security Council had difficulty reaching agreement which limited the
number and scope of UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations. In 1992, the then
Secretary-General, Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, noted that since 1945 over 100
major conflicts around the world had left some 20 million dead. In his view,
the UN had been rendered powerless to deal with many of these crises 'because
of the vetoes—279 of them—cast in the Security Council, which were a vivid
expression of the divisions of that period'.[8]
2.11
Furthermore, the UN—intended to promote collective security among
nation-states—was not structured to deal with the emerging ethnic and political
tensions within post-colonial states.[9]
2.12
Despite these difficulties, during its early years the UN deployed
military observers to, for example, Indonesia, Kashmir, Korea, Lebanon and Yemen.[10]
It also set up peacekeeping operations such as the United Nations Truce
Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East which commenced in 1948 and
the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which commenced in 1964. Both of
these operations continue today. These so-called traditional peacekeeping missions
typically involved:
- the consent of parties to a conflict as a precondition to
deployment;
- impartiality of the peacekeeping force; and
- no use of force by peacekeepers other than in self-defence.
Peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold
War era
2.13
The end of the Cold War, with its concomitant thawing of relations
between East and West, allowed greater latitude for UN action. In 1992, Dr Boutros-Ghali
reported that the 'immense ideological barrier that for decades gave rise to
distrust and hostility had collapsed' and that the Security Council had emerged
as 'a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for
the preservation of peace'.[11]
Indeed, no longer hamstrung by the US/Soviet rivalry, the Security Council has
deployed an increasing number of peacekeeping operations in recent decades.
Since 1948, there have been 63 UN peacekeeping operations, of which 48 (71 per cent)
were established after 1989.[12]
Intra-state conflict
2.14
The above figures show that the end of the Cold War did not usher in a
period of international peace. It did, however, mark the beginning of a
significant shift in the nature of conflicts which increasingly involved disputes
occurring within states rather than between states. Dr Boutros-Ghali noted this
trend in 1992 when he stated:
...fierce new assertions of nationalism and sovereignty spring up,
and the cohesion of States is threatened by brutal ethnic, religious, social,
cultural or linguistic strife. Social peace is challenged on the one hand by
new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of
terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means.[13]
2.15
Numerous witnesses drew the committee's attention to the effect that
this change in the nature of conflicts was having on the conduct of peacekeeping
operations. The Canadian Government observed that unlike earlier operations, now
there was often no clear peace accord to be monitored, the combatants were not
easy to identify, the contested terrain or issue was not constant and on many occasions
there were no formal armed forces present.[14]
World Vision Australia similarly noted that modern disputes tend to involve
irregular militias engaged in protracted insurgencies rather than regular
armies. It was of the view that these types of conflict—where non-state forces
are often indistinguishable from civilian populations, less disciplined than
regular armies and may not feel bound by peace agreements—may create
significant challenges.[15]
Multidimensional, multifaceted
peacekeeping operations
2.16
In response to these developments, the Security Council has moved away
from the traditional peacekeeping operations that required the deployment of
military observers or small contingents to monitor truce lines or state borders
with the permission of the host country.[16]
Since the 1990s, it has tended to deploy larger and more complex UN
peacekeeping missions, often to help implement comprehensive peace agreements
between protagonists in intra-state disputes. To be successful in its
endeavours, the Security Council has recognised the need to engage a greater
range of skills and personnel to resolve the complexities of modern day
conflicts. Thus, as the objectives of peacekeeping operations started to extend
beyond preserving peace to addressing the 'deepest causes of conflict', the
composition of missions began to involve more and more non-military elements. Indeed,
one of the most notable developments in peacekeeping operations has been their evolution
into multidimensional operations.
2.17
With the expanding scope of peacekeeping operations, the UN has become
increasingly aware of the significance of the different phases of these missions.
In his 1992 report, An Agenda for Peace, Dr Boutros-Ghali used the terms
preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding to define
the actions taken by the UN to prevent, resolve and preserve peace.
2.18
He saw preventative diplomacy as a means of easing tensions before they
resulted in conflict; of creating confidence and building good faith to reduce
the likelihood of disputes between states. On the other hand, in his view, peacemaking
was intended to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means, while
peacekeeping was a means of implementing settlements that had been negotiated
by peacemakers. Under the definition of peacemaking, Dr Boutros-Ghali understood
the Security Council to have the authority, if all peaceful means had failed,
to enforce peace by taking military action to maintain or restore international
peace and security.[17]
Today, however, peacemaking is considered to imply 'diplomatic action to bring
hostile parties to a negotiated agreement' while peace enforcement involves the
use of coercive measures to bring about peace.[18]
2.19
He also added the term post-conflict peacebuilding to the range of
functions because in his view, to be truly successful, peacemaking and peacekeeping
'must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures
which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and
well-being among people'.[19]
He noted that the terms are integrally related:
Just as diplomacy will continue across the span of all
activities...so there may not be a dividing line between peacemaking and
peace-keeping. Peacemaking is often a prelude to peace-keeping—just as the
deployment of a United Nations presence in the field may expand possibilities
for the prevention of conflict, facilitate the work of peacemaking and in many
cases serve as a prerequisite for peace-building.[20]
2.20
Lieutenant General (Retired) John Sanderson, military commander for the
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992–1993), identified
this mission as 'the first truly complex, multifaceted operation of the post-Cold
War era'.[21]
DFAT also considered that UNTAC marked a turning point for UN peacekeeping
operations. It had seven components addressing all the modalities of the peace
agreements, from a ceasefire arrangement to elections to the establishment of a
neutral political environment with a just human rights regime.[22]
The mission was called upon to organise and conduct an election rather than
simply monitor an election taking place. Further, it was heavily involved in
the civil administration of Cambodia and had a supervisory role in a number of
key ministries.[23]
UNTAC is an example of a situation where a peacekeeping operation required an
integrated approach focused not only on bringing an end to hostilities, but
also achieving enduring stability through a long-term coordinated approach
involving a number of government agencies and NGOs.
2.21
Missions such as UNTAC relied on military, police and civilian personnel
including participants from the NGO sector. Indeed, the UN accepts that
humanitarian actors can play a useful role when 'linked and coordinated with
peacemaking, peace-keeping and peace-building'.[24]
Ensuring that the different components of a peacekeeping operation work
together effectively became a major challenge for the UN. Thus, while it was
important for the UN to understand the different roles and aims that existed
across operations and within phases of individual operations, it also needed to
consider peacekeeping operations as an integrated whole.
Brahimi Report
2.22
In 1992, while acknowledging the increased and broadening tasks of
peace-keeping operations, Dr Boutros-Ghali noted that the demands for
peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations would continue 'to challenge the
capacity, the political and financial will and the creativity of the
Secretariat and Member States'.[25]
A number of missions, particularly those conducted in the Balkans during the
1990s, exposed major weaknesses in the ability of the UN to meet the growing
demands of complex peacekeeping operations.[26]
2.23
Prompted by these failures, the then Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan,
convened a high-level panel in 2000 to conduct a thorough review of UN peace
and security activities. Published in August 2000, the so-called Brahimi
Report—named after the chairman of its investigative panel, Lakhdar Brahimi—confirmed
and built on the findings contained in the 1992 An Agenda for Peace.[27]
2.24
The report drew attention to the changing nature of peacekeeping and how
complex peacekeeping operations tended to occur in volatile circumstances with
greater risks and costs than experienced in traditional peacekeeping
operations.[28]
In particular, it noted the intra-state nature of disputes and the dangerous
environment created by 'spoilers' who had reneged on their commitments or
sought in other ways to undermine a peace accord by violence. As examples, the
report cited the activities of groups that had 'challenged peace implementation
in Cambodia, threw Angola, Somalia and Sierra Leone back into civil war, and
orchestrated the murder of 800,000 people in Rwanda'.[29]
It argued:
The United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over
the past decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the
fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping is to
succeed.[30]
2.25
It also noted the key and growing role of peacebuilding in internal conflicts.[31]
The report underlined the importance of a well-integrated mission, with the
various components, military and civilian, complementing each other's
contribution to ensure peace:
In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a
secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment
self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping
forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners.[32]
2.26
To be able to assist communities and nations make the transition from violence
to sustainable peace, the report acknowledged the need for highly trained and
experienced personnel particularly in the area of post-conflict peacebuilding. In
particular, it mentioned the requirement to develop transitional civil
administrations for Kosovo and East Timor and its concern about the
difficulties recruiting experts at short notice.[33]
It stated:
Few staff within the Secretariat, or within United Nations
agencies, funds or programmes possess the technical expertise and experience
required to run a municipality or national ministry.[34]
2.27
The Brahimi Report provided a valuable insight the challenges facing the
UN in deploying a mission. It also critically examined the UN's failings and made
recommendations which included:
United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their
mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending
themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate, with robust
rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace
accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence;
before the Security Council agrees to implement a ceasefire or
peace agreement with a United Nations-led peacekeeping operation, the Council
assure itself that the agreement meets threshold conditions, such as consistency
with international human rights standards and practicability of specified tasks
and timelines; and
a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of
law elements and human rights experts in complex peacekeeping operations to
reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and
improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments.[35]
2.28
The UN responded positively to the report and its findings influenced
the Security Council's approach to the deployment of peacekeeping operations
beyond the year 2000. A DFAT representative commented that the Brahimi Report
was 'quite useful in laying down some real guidelines for the UN on how they
should go forward on peacekeeping'. In her view, its findings have informed
peacekeeping activities in the last seven years or so resulting in more complex
operations being 'much better managed than after that initial post Cold War
success period which...led to some real problems'.[36]
2.29
The trend toward increasingly complex UN peacekeeping missions continued
after 2000 with multidimensional operations encompassing areas such as the rule
of law, civil administration, economic development and human rights.[37]
For example, the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), established under
Chapter VII, reflected the broadening dimension of UN peacekeeping missions.
Under its mandate, adopted in May 2004, ONUB was, inter alia, to ensure
the respect of ceasefire agreements; carry out disarmament and demobilisation;
contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the
provision of humanitarian assistance; contribute to the successful completion
of the electoral process, and protect civilians under imminent threat of
physical violence. It was also to provide advice and assistance to the transitional
government and authorities in their efforts to, among other things, carry out
institutional reforms and, in particular, the training and monitoring of the
police.[38]
In some cases, such as in East Timor and Kosovo, transitional administrations
have been established with operations required to provide 'all the functions
usually associated with statehood'.[39]
2.30
In his 2005 report, In Larger Freedom, the then UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan emphasised the connection between development, human rights and security.
He noted the importance of building long-term stability and resilience within
states:
If States are fragile, the peoples of the world will not enjoy
the security, development and justice that are their right. Therefore, one of
the great challenges of the new millennium is to ensure that all States are
strong enough to meet the many challenges they face.[40]
2.31
Bellamy et al also commented on these multifaceted operations that
combine a robust military force with a significant civilian component and aim to
fundamentally change conflict ridden societies. They stated:
The purpose of the force is not to police a buffer zone while
the belligerents make peace. Rather it is to provide security, often as a
prelude to the creating of an interim UN administration intended to establish a
functioning (liberal democratic) state. This involves an extensive expansion of
peacekeeping functions to include civilian policing, institution building,
infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation.[41]
2.32
The international community has come to expect peacekeeping operations
to reach a stage where, in a secure and stable environment, local authorities assume
the full range of state activities that will enable their country to continue
to build lasting peace. In order to achieve this ultimate objective, the
coordination and cooperation between the different elements of a peacekeeping
operation becomes paramount. The Government of Canada explained:
The concept of an 'integrated mission' was developed to ensure
this close co-ordination, often requiring [a] senior official to be placed in
charge to oversee the complex, multifaceted components of the mission.
'Integrated peace operations' now involve significant political/diplomatic,
human rights, governance, judicial, police and development personnel (and
resources) in addition to the traditional military forces which are mandated to
provide a stable environment.[42]
Regional peacekeeping operations
2.33
Although many of the world's peacekeeping operations have been conducted
under a UN mandate, the UN is not the only initiator of peacekeeping operations.
Regional coalitions, alliances or individual countries can and do conduct peacekeeping
operations under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.[43]
This occurs at the invitation, or with the authority, of the host country,
often when the international community cannot afford to wait for UN approval. In
1992, Dr Boutros-Ghali acknowledged the contribution that regional bodies could
make to peacekeeping operations:
Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to
have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,
but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation
with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council
but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and
democratization in international affairs.[44]
2.34
By sanctioning regional organisations or pivotal states to undertake
peacekeeping operations, the Security Council has facilitated greater
involvement by some key states, allowing them to participate in peacekeeping
without putting their soldiers under UN command. In some cases, a regional
response may be possible where parties to a conflict will not permit UN
involvement, as was the case until recently in the Darfur region of Sudan.[45]
2.35
Currently, there are a number of significant peacekeeping operations being
undertaken by regional organisations. According to the Center on International
Cooperation at New York University, in the 12 months to 30 September 2006, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union and the European
Union had a combined number of 68,000 peacekeepers serving in operations.[46]
This figure rose to 78,000 military and police personnel in the field in 2007.[47]
It should be noted that the Centre includes operations in Afghanistan in its
statistics. According to the Centre, the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) is the largest mission which in 2006 had over 30,000 troops
deployed. It is a UN-authorized operation in Afghanistan and operates under the
auspices of NATO.[48]
2.36
The involvement of regional bodies or coalitions in non-UN mandated
peacekeeping operations seems set to continue. A DFAT representative commented
that the UN, with about 80,000 peacekeepers deployed around the globe, is stretched
and there is a limit to what the UN can be expected to provide, particularly
with regard to troops and police.[49]
She acknowledged that the UN has long encouraged regional groupings and
countries to play more of a role in peacekeeping operations and this was a
trend that would continue.[50]
2.37
Similarly, Associate Professor Elsina Wainwright observed that there are
likely to be difficult situations emerging that are going to require complex
responses. For example, in her view, the call for policing resources was going
to increase and the UN, unable to meet this demand, would increasingly endorse
regional intervention.[51]
Committee view
2.38
Whether peacekeeping operations are UN or non-UN mandated, countries and
agencies involved in such missions continue to deal with difficult situations
requiring a complex, multidimensional response. Individually, and as a
coalition, they are required to meet new challenges.
Conclusion
2.39
This chapter provided an overview of the factors that have influenced and
continue to influence the deployment of peacekeeping operations. These
operations have changed significantly since 1947. Today's international
environment is not only very different from that experienced immediately after
the Second World War and during the Cold War, but it is also more fluid. Peacekeeping
operations are deployed to parts of the world where either the state has
collapsed or, riven by internal strife, is severely debilitated. Traditional
boundaries between warfare and peacekeeping, and between military and civilian
roles, have blurred. Thus, peacekeeping operations have developed into
multidimensional missions focused not only on bringing an end to hostilities
but on resolving the root causes of those hostilities. They are concerned with
implementing a durable, comprehensive strategy aimed at reconstructing or
strengthening the fundamentals of a nation-state—including economic development
and sustainable governance—so as to ensure lasting stability.
2.40
As the short-term and long-term agendas of today's peacekeeping
operations become increasingly interwoven, a larger range of government
agencies and other organisations are required to coordinate and work together
towards sustainable strategic goals. Although the various activities of a peacekeeping
operation—conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding—are
grouped under separate headings, the UN clearly understands that the elements
of peacekeeping operations are not mutually exclusive. It understands that
there is a close interaction and interdependence of the various elements that
occur within the same operation.
2.41
All of these trends have implications for the way the UN and member
states prepare for and coordinate peacekeeping operations into the future.
Countries are being asked to undertake a much broader range of tasks within the
one integrated mission and to meet new challenges, especially in situations
where 'spoilers' seek to undermine the work of the mission.[52]
The increased use of regional arrangements also has implications for
participating countries.
2.42
The changes that have taken place in the nature and scope of peacekeeping
operations have profound implications for Australia as a member state of the UN
and a long-time contributor to peacekeeping missions. They influence Australia's
approach to participating in such missions and its decisions on the composition
and structure of its deployment; the training and preparation of its personnel;
and how it coordinates its effort. The committee now turns to consider Australia's
contribution to peacekeeping operations and starts by looking at the
decision-making process.
Part II
Decision to participate
In this part of the report, the committee looks at Australia's
decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation. It examines the framework
in which this decision is made, including the systems and mechanisms that
government agencies use to consult with each other and to contribute to the
whole-of-government decision-making process.
The committee then looks at the major factors that influence
the decision to participate in a peacekeeping operation, including the
objectives and timeframe of the mission and the nature and level of commitment
to those objectives. It also looks in greater depth at major considerations in
the decision to participate including: the humanitarian imperative to initiate an
operation; the legal aspects of a mission; the rules governing the operation,
especially the use of force; and the exit strategy.
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