ADDENDUM TO THE DISSENTING REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT BILLS BY THE AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS

COMMONWEALTH SERVICES DELIVERY AGENCY BILL 1996
REFORM OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES BILL 1996
REFORM OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS) BILL 1996
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ADDENDUM TO THE DISSENTING REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT BILLS BY THE AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRATS

The Democrats support the Dissenting Report.

However, we wish to make a couple of additional comments about the CES and the need for an independent regulatory authority to oversee the operation of EPEs and to evaluate the success or failure of these reforms.

The CES has served Australia well for over fifty years. It has provided a range of important services to assist unemployed Australians to access appropriate training and to help them to find a job. In the main it has been staffed by dedicated people who have worked hard to help unemployed Australians to enter or re-enter the workforce.

However, the Democrats also believe it is important to recognise that in recent years the task of the CES has become increasingly difficult as Governments have consistently reduced their resource levels. As unemployment in Australia has risen and remained at persistently high levels, a number of employers have reported a mismatch between employment vacancies and the jobseekers who have been referred to them. The Democrats acknowledge that there is some room for improvement and reform within the CES.

The Democrats are very concerned that under the proposed reforms DEETYA will be responsible for overseeing, monitoring and evaluating EPEs and will also have the responsibility for evaluating the success or failure of the overall system. While we recognise that under the proposed reforms DEETYA will be the purchaser as opposed to the provider of employment services, there is clearly some conflict of interest in DEETYA carrying out these additional tasks as well.

As Ms Mullins from Welfare Rights in Sydney explained to the Committee:

The providers will be dealing with DEETYA as the purchasing agency. Say we took this into the normal commercial environment - we used BHP as an example before so let us use it again. Let's say I am a steel purchaser and I enter into a contract with BHP. In that contract I say that, in the times of a dispute about the terms of this agreement, BHP has the right to make the decision abut what is the right decision. In other words, BHP is set up as the arbitrator. That does not make any commercial sense. Why would I agree to that? So I do not understand why providers should be expected to do the same thing with DEETYA. If we are talking about commercial competitive reality, it makes no sense. [94]

In these circumstances, DEETYA is not the appropriate body to carry out the oversight, monitoring and evaluation of these reforms. An independent regulatory authority established along the lines of a reformed ESRA would be in a much better position to carry out the oversight and evaluation of EPEs and these reforms generally. Such an authority would also play an important role in assessing and accrediting organisations which apply to operate as EPEs.

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FOOTNOTES:

[94] Transcript of Evidence, p.15 (Welfare Rights Centre).