3.1
Enabling prosperity and sustainable economic development is the first pillar of the Australian Step-up agenda in the Pacific region. This includes consideration of:
Infrastructure, investment and resources.
3.2
Before considering the above sectors it should be noted that much of the evidence to the inquiry which considered COVID-19 impacts was directly concerned with impacts on economic development. It was noted that many of the gains in this area made prior to 2020 have been seriously compromised by COVID-19 impacts. The Australian Government’s Partnerships for recovery policy document states that the stakes are high to prevent detrimental economic development impacts:
The COVID-19 pandemic represents one of the most profound challenges to economic development and human wellbeing. The initial effects have been felt most heavily in wealthier countries. But the eventual impacts are likely to be most acute across the developing world, including in Australia’s near region.
3.3
The situation threatens to jeopardise progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals. The pandemic has stretched the capacity of wealthier nations to buffer the economic shocks within their own countries, those once best able to support the most vulnerable developing economies.
Trade—PACER Plus
3.4
The Committee heard from Pacific diplomats, Pacific islanders, and those working in diaspora and labour mobility communities about boosting economic growth through streamlining regulatory and administrative processes (e.g. biosecurity approval) for Pacific island trade with Australia.
3.5
Feedback was positive about the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus from Pacific diplomats at the joint Sub-Committee roundtable; however, the Committee received unfavourable comment from some contributors, including the Australian National University (ANU) Development Policy Centre:
…lack of interest in the treaty from the Pacific, which in turn is due to the fact that the Pacific has long had duty-free access to Australia and New Zealand. It is also the case that a traditional trade treaty such as PACER Plus is of little relevance to the Pacific, given its exceptional characteristics as outlined in this submission. One cannot expect Australia to drop PACER Plus, given how much the country has invested in it, but expectations that it will have a meaningful impact should be avoided.
3.6
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) similarly suggested that:
Australia should withdraw from the unbalanced PACER Plus trade agreement. Trade relationships with Pacific countries should be fair and mutually beneficial, and benefit workers in all countries.
3.7
The ANU Development Policy Centre suggested an alternative proposal:
The PACER Plus approach is shallow and broad. An alternative approach to the broader goal of Pacific integration would be deep and narrow. This would involve Australia reaching a bilateral agreement with one or more Pacific island countries. The bilateral agreements would offer Pacific economies greater access to the Australian labour market, and perhaps other benefits (such as participation in various government services, such as meteorological or drug registration). In return, the Pacific economy would have to make various commitments.
3.8
Deeper consideration of trade matters, in particular in relation to PACER Plus, were canvassed in the inquiry into activating greater trade and investment with Pacific island countries; as such these discussions will not be duplicated, however labour mobility provisions arise in discussions relevant to employment later in this chapter.
Trade liberalisation
3.9
The bulk of discussions about market access, trade growth and Australia’s receptiveness to new markets has been extensively considered in the Committee’s activating greater trade and investment inquiry. These comments were also made in the submissions to this inquiry.
3.10
Mr Curtis Tuihalangingie, the Deputy Head of Mission from the Kingdom of Tonga, emphasised the cultural importance of kava to many Pacific islanders and that breaking down trade barriers among other potential stigmas concerning the crop would be much appreciated in the region.
3.11
Her Excellency Ms Hinauri Petana, the High Commissioner of Samoa, similarly raised the issue of trade for the Pacific islanders and how greater efforts to ensure better market access for many of their goods and services would be highly desirable, especially in a post-pandemic economic recovery environment:
Our submission before you sets out some of these challenges, from a huge trade imbalance, our geographic isolation from our main trading partners and the high costs involved, to competition with mass produced goods from other exporting countries in South East Asia and South America, for the same goods that we are able to produce, but in small volumes by comparison.
3.12
Dr Yves Lafoy, the Counsellor and Official Representative of New Caledonia to Australia, also raised greater market access as a potential opportunity for further partnership and collaboration between Australia and the Pacific:
With regard to the second pillar of the Pacific step-up, last year the balance of goods remained largely in Australia’s favour. Trade with Australia remains limited due to difficulties in adapting to the Australian market and its non-tariff barriers. It is therefore essential for New Caledonian companies to capture niche markets, particularly in services that require tropical expertise.
3.13
His Excellency Mr Robert Sisilo, Solomon Islands High Commissioner also sought greater market access, emphasising the broad consensus for such initiatives to take place.
3.14
His Excellency Mr John Ma’o Kali, the Papua New Guinean High Commissioner again raised greater market access as a key economic goal:
We also have some of the best coffee in the world but we can’t find the market in Australia. We find our niche markets in Europe, but it’s difficult to bring it into the Australian market. They tell us that there are biosecurity issues. It’s important that we work together with the institutions here to address those barriers because it’s a wonderful opportunity.
Kava importation
3.15
The Committee received limited input on the use and trade in kava between the Pacific islands and Australia, with the main discussion arising during the Pacific diplomatic roundtable in Canberra on 4 September 2020. The unified focus of these contributions was a call for greater flexibility in Australian import rules, in particular the restricted import volume for personal use, impacting mostly people of Pacific islander background and the inability to commercially import kava.
3.16
The first phase of the Australian Kava Pilot Program commenced in 2019 with the increase in personal use importation from 2 kg to 4 kg. The second phase of the pilot introduced a commercial importation trial which commenced 1 December 2021 and spans up to two years. There is no limit on the amount of kava powder and kava beverages (using cold water only) which may be imported under Phase 2 of the pilot program.
3.17
Mr Curtis Tuihalangingie, Deputy Head of Mission, Kingdom of Tonga, explained the personal use trial had been impacted by pandemic border closures:
The current policy or regulation towards kava only permits an individual coming on a plane to hand carry or check-in four kilos of kava. However, there’s no-one travelling now. …what we can do to loosen the restriction, at least to allow the posting of just one kilo or two kilos of kava for the time being until normal travel is permitted and we can go back.
3.18
As at 1 February 2022, most Pacific island borders remain closed to foreign travel. For example, the Tongan international border remains closed to all but returning Tongan residents and citizens due to COVID-19 restrictions.
3.19
His Excellency, Mr Robert Sisilo, High Commissioner for Solomon Islands, noted more intensive kava cropping was being undertaken in the Solomon Islands to create future economic diversity. Mr Sisilo explained:
Solomon Islands, thanks to COVID-19, has now gone into kava planting big time, especially in the rural areas, where they own about 80 per cent of the land. …That’s why we are very much interested in the outcome of the pilot project on kava.
3.20
The Griffith Asia Institute supported future commercial kava importation but the submission was critical of the duration of the pilot’s second phase, which at the time was set at 12 months:
This is not of sufficient length for producers to establish a viable consumer market. This is particularly the case for producers from Vanuatu, who do not have a ready market in the form of a large diaspora in Australia (as is the case for Fijian, Samoan, and Tongan farmers).
Committee comment
3.21
The Committee acknowledges evidence to the inquiry requesting general trade liberalisation to enable better market access for many Pacific goods and services. It also recognises the traditional role kava beverage plays, including religious, ceremonial, medicinal and social, in the culture of many Pacific island countries, and the impediments to access in Australia.
3.22
The Committee notes that kava has, up until the last decade, been largely only produced in Pacific home gardens for domestic cultural use. However it also recognises that kava exports are a burgeoning infant industry in some Pacific islands, and could provide an economic alternative in tourism dependant Pacific island countries—an industry, the Committee heard, which was decimated by pandemic border closures.
3.23
This topic was explored to its greatest extent during the Pacific diplomatic Heads of Mission roundtable, jointly convened by three of the Sub-Committees undertaking Pacific Step-up focussed inquiries. The Trade Sub-Committee conducted the Committee’s inquiry into activating greater trade and investment with Pacific island countries and considered the relaxation of Australian kava import restrictions in the Committee’s report, One region, one family, one future, tabled in September 2021. The report noted the potential benefits of promoting kava imports, including relationship building, and the Committee recommended that the Australian Government assist:
…interested governments in the Pacific island countries to join Australia’s kava commercial importation pilot and for the pilot to consider the feasibility of classifying kava as a food under a joint food standard of Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ).
3.24
Concerns have been aired regarding potential externalities associated with promoting the cultivation of the kava crop in Pacific islands and potential negative social and health impacts when consumed outside of traditional settings. The Committee notes the pandemic has hindered evaluation of the personal use trial, but considers, on balance, the monitoring and evaluation of the commercial pilot program—which will assess the health, social, cultural and economic effects—will help clarify benefits and downsides of relaxing import restrictions.
Education pathways
3.25
The Australian Government regards improved education and training in the Pacific as conducive to economic growth and the greater interchange of skills and qualifications in the region.
3.26
Alphacrucis College stressed the importance of basic literacy and skills fit for (local) purpose:
Aware of the educational challenges facing the Pacific, DFAT acknowledges that many Pacific students leave school without adequate basic literacy, numeracy and life skills. With the region struggling to improve economic growth in line with population growth, there is an imperative for Pacific Island countries to provide quality education and skills training suited to labour market demands.
3.27
Deficits in school attendance rates have also been reported in the region. This is reflected, for example, in statistics reported by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) under the Kiribati Education Improvement Program (KEIP), which provided $35 million in official development funding between 2011‑2019:
Large proportions of children of relevant school age groups are missing at every level of basic education. Issues include under-enrolment at initial intake into Year 1, an enrolment fluctuation over the primary school years that may indicate a pattern of drop out and return; and low retention up to the end of Junior Secondary School …On average over the past five years, only 78 per cent of the primary age group are enrolled, and only 79 per cent of the primary enrolment survives from Year 1 into [Junior Secondary School].
3.28
The KEIP program also readies school environments for better climate change adaptability and disaster reliance (for example by raising floors and protective seawalls to reduce coastal flooding); building school facilities using sustainable materials, and that children have access to secure freshwater supplies.
3.29
Alphacrucis College also noted that ‘quality education and training are fundamental to boosting the potential of Pacific islander people to contribute to the knowledge and technology driven societies of the future’. School educational outcomes were identified as being linked to quality teaching, with Alphacrucis College recommending:
For teachers to give of their best in the classroom and communities, their teaching conditions would need to be re-evaluated. The Puamau report also identified the need ‘to have newly trained, inexperienced teachers undergo an extensive programme when they join their first school’, and the need for such teachers to receive ongoing professional development to upgrade their knowledge and skills for the rest of their teaching careers. The report recognised the potential for such initiatives to enhance both teaching quality and student learning in Pacific nations.
3.30
The Australia-Pacific BRIDGE School Partnerships Programme, which will expand teacher training, was supported: ‘it will endeavour to support increased use of digital technology to link classrooms with resources and information from around the world’.
3.31
ChildFund Australia attributed much of the recent improvement in early grade literacy outcomes in Papua New Guinea (PNG) to the work of civil society due to the Australian Government switching its funding from ‘top heavy technical advisers in the National Department of Education’ to non-government consortia:
The continuing challenge for NGOs will be to demonstrate that bottom-up reforms can be sustained beyond the period of direct Australian Aid program implementation. There is certainly a present need for [Australian NGOs] to continue to partner with the [National Department of Education], local schools and communities to bring this about. This may, in turn, lead towards strengthening PNG civil society organisations to take a permanent role in supporting and monitoring education service delivery.
3.32
Inquiry submitters acknowledged programs in the Step-up designed to enhance educational opportunities for Pacific islander students, including the Pacific Secondary Scholarships (inaugural year 2020, commencement paused due to pandemic). The Australia Awards (a continuing scholarship program, established in 2007) was also listed as a mechanism to improve science and innovation capability in the region:
Australia is also continuing to support Pacific partners in order to build science and innovation capability and use new technology as drivers of future economic growth and social impact. These initiatives are aimed at complementing Australia’s existing support through the Australia Awards Scholarships, designed to help build national capacity and form an integral part of Australia’s people-to-people links with the South Pacific.
3.33
The ANU Pacific Institute recommended that tertiary scholarship programs and linkages be supported:
We propose that the Australian Government’s higher education policy in relation to the Pacific should have the following aims:
To deepen our academic relationships with the Pacific through supporting our universities to serve as trusted partners and essential resources for all who work with the Pacific, and especially our partners from the Pacific.
To support and extend the current work of our world-leading universities for Pacific research, education, Higher Degree Research (HDR) training, policy and other public engagement.
To grow the number of researchers interested in the Pacific in Australian universities.
To raise the profile of Pacific scholarships in Australia by ensuring that the Australian public deepens their understanding of the Pacific and Australia’s place in the region.
3.34
The New Colombo Plan was also acknowledged as a means of connecting Pacific communities with Australian students through tertiary institutions in 12 Pacific region locations. In a similar vein, the Whitlam Institute recommended that the Australian Government should invest in better Pacific literacy for Australians, and working with diaspora knowledge to inform those working in the region:
Pacific islanders know more about Australia than we do about them. We are in effect stepping up without knowing where we are going. This can be addressed by:
Promoting knowledge of the Pacific, including its languages, in Australian schools and universities and through mainstream media.
Developing a ‘Pacific Capable’ strategy to prepare Australia and Australians to live, work, and socialise with Pacific island people in their own country and in the countries of the region.
Working with Pacific diaspora communities to build the capacity of government departments and agencies, contractors and INGOs that work in the region.
3.35
The Australia Pacific Training Coalition (APTC) is Australia’s Technical and Vocational Education and Training investment in the Pacific region, an initiative announced at the Pacific Islands Forum in 2006 and funded by DFAT and delivered by Queensland TAFE. APTC operates in nine Pacific Island countries: Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu, Tonga and Kiribati, offering Australian qualifications from Certificate II to Diploma level in various vocational areas.
3.36
The APTC program was described by Mr Chris Gardiner, among others, as more than just education—Mr Gardiner proposed the APTC be used as a potential ‘access pathway for work, residency and citizenship in Australia’ as this would allow:
…students in the Pacific to obtain the new visa upon graduation from an APTC linked training course, whilst continuously aligning APTC course offerings with evolving labour market priorities in Australia.
3.37
Similarly, the Development Policy Centre, ANU recommended a strengthened focus on ‘promoting migration opportunities to improve employment outcomes for APTC graduates’, stating:
Recent analysis shows that APTC graduates are increasingly struggling to find employment. Among the roughly half of APTC graduates who do not have a pre-existing employment arrangement to return to, more than one-third are out of work at the time of follow-up tracer surveys, compared to less than 10 per cent at the start of the last decade. The APTC needs to train fewer graduates for domestic markets and more for overseas markets.
3.38
His Excellency Mr John Ma’o Kali, the Papua New Guinean High Commissioner believed opportunities for Australians to teach in PNG will improve education outcomes in PNG and deepen people-to-people links:
…we also ask if there could be Australians coming into Papua New Guinea to, for example, teach English, maths and science—core subjects—and students, under the New Colombo Plan, to come and study in our institutions—to share and study our cultures—not necessarily only in Port Moresby, but also have the same number in the districts, where they can work and live with the people and be part of the community. Those types of exchanges into the future will be good, but COVID of course is a serious challenge.
Employment
3.39
Improved employment pathways were mentioned in evidence as pivotal to achieve sustainable economic development in Pacific island countries (PICs). The diversity and complexities within the region require consideration to tailor education and skills pathways for available employment. Key issues explored in this section include:
The reliance of Pacific island economies on remittance activity;
The role of labour mobility programs; and
Visa arrangements to access Australia.
Pacific local employment
3.40
Most feedback from inquiry participants about employment related to either highly skilled employment pathways (via tertiary education) or the operation of the lower-skilled Pacific labour mobility programs for employment in Australia.
3.41
The Lowy Institute focussed on the significant loss of Pacific island service sector jobs from pre-COVID local employment bases over the last year, which it warned may not return after the pandemic. The submission stated:
While traditional welfare systems are providing some reprieve, it’s a romantic and misplaced notion to think Pacific Islanders can just return to the village and the farm to ride out the storm and just return to their jobs when borders re-open. The reality is that many of the jobs will not be there when borders open if more action is not taken now.
3.42
Further, the Lowy Institute suggested the Australian Government invest in infrastructure to drive economic growth and jobs creation out of the pandemic:
Australia should take the lead in spearheading a large-scale, multi-year ‘recovery package’ focused on public investment – a combination of budget support where appropriate or major works/infrastructure programs elsewhere –financed through concessional lending.
3.43
Proposals to invest in high priority Pacific island infrastructure—particularly in green technology and to enable climate adaptation and disaster resilience—demand local skills to be developed for oversight and maintenance.
3.44
The WASH Reference Group stressed that lack of basic sanitation across the Pacific islands hinders everyday health, hygiene and progress. Investment in these projects would create local jobs and improve community health and wellbeing:
Currently, two-thirds of the region’s population rely on unprotected sources of water and unsanitary means of excreta disposal which pose serious risks to health. Preventable water-borne illnesses and mortality from WASH conditions are higher in Pacific Islands than in neighbouring Asia, particularly among vulnerable population groups, including infants and the elderly.
3.45
Another suggestion by an inquiry participant—either as a stand-alone initiative, or associated with a more holistic proposal for the region—is the creation of an Australian Defence Force (ADF) Pacific Islands Regiment:
I endorse the proposal by Anthony Bergin, supported by the Fijian Defence Minister, to establish a Pacific Islands Regiment in the ADF. The creation of such a regiment would, to a significant degree, be part of geo‑political efforts to build stronger relations between the islands communities from which members of the regiment would be drawn, and Australia.
3.46
World Citizens Association (Australia) likewise advocated for a specific Pacific islands military force to be formed, although they envisioned a localised force unrelated to the ADF:
A land-based security force, perhaps a Pacific Islands Regiment, to carry out peacekeeping duties both within and outside the region, and if necessary to intervene in ‘extra-constitutional crises’ in the region. Interventions by such a force would carry much greater legitimacy than a similar intervention by (say) Australian or New Zealand forces, which are always subject to charges of paternalism or neo-colonialism. It could also provide a significant source of employment for some of the smaller islands.
3.47
The idea appeared to be supported in Vanuatu where survey participants of fieldwork research nominated the desire to see an ‘increased focus on people-to-people links (via ministerial visits, scholarships, military links and sports).
3.48
The above military employment suggestion is mentioned again in chapter 4 regarding Professor John Blaxland’s concept of forming a regional ‘compact of association’ between Australia and four of the more climate and economically vulnerable Pacific island countries.
Reliance of economies on remittances
3.49
One of the most canvassed topics in inquiry evidence—and which dominated feedback at the diplomatic missions roundtable—related to the Pacific labour mobility scheme. As part of PACER Plus this initiative has also been considered in the Committee’s parallel trade and investment inquiry. However, as part of the aid-trade nexus in development assistance, the programs in the scheme are mentioned in this report in relation to the significant contribution to Pacific island remittances.
3.50
An option for Pacific islanders with restricted workplace skill-sets and limited available Pacific local jobs is entry to an Australian (or New Zealand) labour mobility scheme. There are two programs: the Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) and the Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP). These are demand driven schemes where ‘approved employers’ may recruit workers into the schemes from nine participating Pacific island countries, and Timor-Leste.
3.51
The schemes are promoted in island communities in various ways, for example The Whitlam Institute Pacific perspectives research project reported on views in Vanuatu:
Australia’s Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) was presented in the Vanuatu Daily Post as an important opportunity for ni-Vanuatu. A new intake was encouraged to act as ambassadors for their country… and to abstain from alcohol and kava (28 September).
3.52
Remittances have provided some safety-net for Pacific island communities during the pandemic; and the labour programs encourage deeper connections with, and an understanding of, the Australian community.
3.53
The earnings from these employment opportunities in Australia have represented a significant source of remittances to Pacific island countries; with some countries extremely dependent on remittances, which they were well before the pandemic. This is depicted in Figure 3.1 where Tonga appears as the most remittance-dependant nation in the world.
3.54
Save the Children Australia’s submission reflected this reliance:
In addition to the value of tourism, …remittances are a critical source of financial flows into the Pacific, improving the prosperity of the communities they support.
3.55
The value of remittances during the pandemic and their anticipated ongoing importance in a post-pandemic or ‘new normal’ environment is significant. This was recognised in modelling of poverty levels in Pacific island countries (PICs) in the absence of transfers:
Indeed, as Australian National University academic Mr Chris Hoy has recently modelled, the number of people living in poverty in the PICs could increase by 1.2 million or more than 40 per cent ‘in the absence of government or community transfers’.
3.56
The World Bank estimates ‘that due to COVID-19, global remittances are projected to decline by approximately 20 per cent, making this economic shock the largest decline in remittances in recorded history’. This is particularly concerning in countries like Tonga, and to a lesser extent, Samoa.
Perceptions of the Pacific labour mobility programs
3.57
Pacific Australia labour mobility programs were viewed in a generally positive light by the majority of inquiry participants who commented on them, with some suggestions made about improving the schemes to support the welfare of workers and employment benefits and long-term pathways.
3.58
Associate Professor Joanne Wallis wrote: ‘Australia’s efforts to increase labour mobility have been widely welcomed as having potential developmental benefits’. The Australian Fresh Produce Alliance agreed with this.
3.59
Mr Curtis Tuihalangingie, the Deputy Head of Mission from the Kingdom of Tonga detailed how the labour mobility arrangements in place are mutually beneficial for both countries:
I think the [SWP] is a good program for labour mobility. It is the same thing with New Zealand—and we acknowledge that. Looking at the benefits, it is a win-win benefit. It is good for Tonga and good for Australia.
3.60
Her Excellency Hon. Dame Annette King, New Zealand’s High Commissioner to Australia, similarly raised how labour mobility initiatives result in benefits for all parties concerned:
The truth is that it’s of value to our countries as well, because both Australia and New Zealand find it very difficult to recruit people to work, particularly in New Zealand, in our horticulture industries, where New Zealanders just won’t do it. I think there is a similar problem here in Australia.
3.61
The Solomon Islands High Commissioner, His Excellency Mr Robert Sisilo was not only an advocate of the PACER Plus agreement but also detailed the potential alluded to by Mr Chris Gardiner:
PACER Plus is also about labour mobility. Between 2012—that’s when we first started to participate in the [SWP]—and 2018 more than 500 men and women from our country have migrated to Australia to work. Under the Pacific Labour Scheme, launched in 2018, we now have about 80 workers here, including four women who have worked in aged-care homes for three years. They are our first women to be engaged in aged-care facilities in Australia.
3.62
His Excellency, Mr Robert Sisilo explained the plan in the Solomon Islands to greatly increase the number of workers participating in the Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP) and Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS) by 2023:
Our Labour Mobility Strategy 2019-2023 has identified Australia as the market with the highest potential for growth, and by 2023 we plan to have almost 50 per cent of Solomon Islands labour mobility workers in the [SWP] and the [PLS], and the total number of migrant workers to migrate to Australia for work under either the SWP or PLS is projected to grow to 2,600 in 2023. Increasing employment opportunities present enormous opportunities for both countries; addressing labour and skills shortage in Australia while also increasing economic security in households in Solomon Islands.
3.63
The High Commissioner of Samoa, Her Excellency Ms Hinauri Petana, observed that the SWP, which has been in operation since 2012, and the PLS, since 2018, have provided temporary labour opportunities since their implementation:
…we have seen a steady increase in numbers and acknowledge the benefits of these schemes in supporting families and communities back in Samoa, not to mention the positive impact on our foreign exchange, balance of payments and overall liquidity.
Opportunities for improvement
3.64
Her Excellency Ms Hinauri Petana, High Commissioner of Samoa, was quietly optimistic about the Pacific labour mobility programs going forward, despite some reservations:
I do have a lot of good feelings that we are probably going down the right track, in working with your respective departments in charge of the PLS as well as the SWP, to iron out, as it were, some of these issues that have been there for a while.
3.65
Her Excellency Ms Hinauri Petana and His Excellency Mr Samson Vilvil Fare also highlighted calls for broad improvements in aspects of labour mobility programs, key of which include:
Better health services provision for Pacific island employees while in Australia including quality private health cover or access to the Commonwealth of Australia’s Medicare system.
Ability to contribute to superannuation and to access contributions via a pension mechanism.
Collaborative approach to development and implementation of development policies in the region.
Enabling immediate family members to join participants in the workers’ program.
3.66
The High Commissioner of Samoa also explained:
There are still some areas which require further review to ensure worker welfare is consistently addressed under both schemes. They range from accommodation to contractual issues, insurance and access to superannuation. Some of these are under review and there is ongoing discussion with the departments and services responsible…and we look forward to their resolution.
Health cover and access to Medicare
3.67
His Excellency Mr Samson Vilvil Fare, the High Commissioner for the Republic of Vanuatu, noted several other areas which might be improved including Pacific islander workers accessing healthcare while here:
Health insurance is a big issue that our workers face in this country. This is mainly because each labour hire company or employer has a different plan for them and sometimes, when you look at the plans they offer, they are the cheapest plans out there that they offer them. …our workers come to Australia and they work here, but they also pay GST and taxes here in Australia. How about giving them access to Medicare as well so that they can be fully insured?
Superannuation contributions and access
3.68
His Excellency Mr Samson Vilvil Fare, the High Commissioner for the Republic of Vanuatu, also discussed contribution arrangements for superannuation:
Our workers are still having difficulties in having access to their super. This is something that Vanuatu was looking at very closely before COVID. ... We explored the opportunities of probably having our pension fund established in Australia as a super, where our workers can pay their contributions directly into that super. We’ve gone as far as engaging with DFAT; at their end, they were supposed to engage with the tax office and then everything stopped. So we would really like to restart discussions around super, and find out more on how we can address those issues.
3.69
His Excellency Mr John Ma’o Kali, the Papua New Guinean High Commissioner to Australia, suggested that these labour mobility relations are not truly bilateral:
Any arrangement between our countries has to be a two-way thing. ... At the moment, Pacific labour mobility, …seems to be in one direction, where we are supplying to the Australian labour market. But the reverse should also happen, where Australia should supply some expertise into our country to develop the capacity in our countries in order to generate the skills that are needed.
3.70
Similarly, His Excellency Mr Vilvil Fare, High Commissioner of the Republic of Vanuatu suggested greater Pacific involvement when designing potential policies to be implemented in or for the region:
In Vanuatu, we have the feeling that sometimes these policies are done without consultation with us, and then the policies are offered to us on a silver plate for us to digest. … I would really strongly recommend that we look into those policies and try and have this collaboration on how to work and to ensure that the policies around SWP are well understood by both parties so that we don’t infringe on your rights, and you do not infringe on our rights and we don’t step on each other’s toes.
3.71
His Excellency Mr Robert Sisilo, Solomon Islands High Commissioner, also stated, regarding the Pacific labour mobility schemes, that ‘various barriers on both the supply side and the demand side which hinder the participation of potential migrants, especially women and residents of more remote provinces of the Solomon Islands’.
Family accompaniment
3.72
Professor Jane McAdam from the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law raised a family-centric concern:
…we should also allow workers to bring their families with them, especially under the Pacific Labour Scheme, which is a longer temporary scheme. This would match other temporary work visas that allow people to bring their families. We also need to create opportunities for permanent settlement.
3.73
However, some contributors to the inquiry noted social disruption in home countries as a result of the programs:
The current high rates of working age adults spending extended periods away from their partners and children is causing significant social dysfunction in Pacific communities. Increased remittance income is being offset by marriage breakdown, juvenile delinquency and addiction issues.
3.74
Dr Goringe, National Director, UnitingWorld, reiterated this concern as a result of parents working away from their families in these labour mobility programs:
…children who have addiction issues with gambling and porn and alcohol and drugs. When we did the root cause analysis it came up that the fundamental driver of this was this absent group of adults to mentor these children.
3.75
Professor Stephen Howes, from the Development Policy Centre at ANU noted the changing policy status of Pacific labour mobility schemes, and was a supporter:
The Australian Government’s gone from a position of opposing the provision of targeted labour mobility opportunities to a position of actually promoting them, over the last 15 years. I think that has really transformed things. Aid is not the answer for the Pacific, so we shouldn’t be stepping up so much in terms of aid. But, in terms of other instruments, labour mobility is the one that really makes sense for the Pacific.
New Agriculture Visa Scheme
3.76
The Agriculture Visa Program is a new stream of the Temporary Work (International Relations) subclass 403 visa and targets applicants from a small number of South East Asian countries to fill workforces shortages after a market test of Australian resident applicants is conducted.
3.77
The Committee took evidence from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Education, Skills and Employment, and the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment on the new employment mobility visa on 21 October 2021. An updated factsheet on the program containing details about the process and support systems was released by DFAT on 1 February 2022. Information on the intended permanent residency pathways noted in the factsheet will be released in April 2022.
3.78
The Agriculture Visa Scheme is an employer sponsored program administered by DFAT which engages employees from select countries in South East Asia (including Indonesia) and provides for two streams of employment:
A shorter term engagement, up to nine months, is the more seasonal employment stream which requires return to country of origin at the conclusion of nine months; but a visa may remain valid for up to four years, and
A longer term employment engagement for up to four years, only available for full-time work.
3.79
At the Committee’s final hearing on 21 October 2021, Ms Danielle Heinecke, First Assistant Secretary, Labour and Connectivity Division, Office of the Pacific, DFAT explained:
We’re building on the lessons of our Pacific programs, and we note the importance of Pacific primacy in accessing labour mobility opportunities as a central principle which is informing the design of the new agriculture visa. This includes minimum requirements for employers and protection for workers.
The agriculture visa will support a long-term structural shift in our agriculture workforce away from a reliance on working holidaymakers to a dedicated and more reliable workforce. It will provide a basis for the ongoing growth of our primary industries as they strive to reach $100 million by 2030. It will also supplement the success of the Pacific labour mobility initiative.
Streamlining through the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Program
3.80
The Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme (PALM) comprises two streams—a shorter term seasonal option in the Seasonal Worker Programme (SWP); or a longer term stream currently between one to three years, the Pacific Labour Scheme (PLS).
3.81
The PALM scheme allows eligible Australian businesses to hire workers from nine Pacific islands (and Timor-Leste) when there are not enough local workers available to meet demand. The Committee examined the operation of PALM at the 21 October 2021 hearing.
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Through the PALM scheme, eligible businesses can recruit workers for seasonal jobs for up to nine months or for longer-term roles for between one and three years, in unskilled, low-skilled and semi-skilled positions. The scheme helps to fill labour shortages in rural and regional Australia, administered by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The scheme offers:
…employers access to a pool of reliable, productive workers. It also allows Pacific and Timorese workers to take up jobs in Australia, develop their skills and send income home to support their families and communities. From April 2022, the Seasonal Worker Programme and Pacific Labour Scheme will be consolidated, reformed and replaced by a more flexible and efficient single program.
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Ms Danielle Heinecke, First Assistant Secretary, DFAT, explained that the Agriculture Visa Scheme was being designed to maintain the Pacific Labour Scheme as the principal pool of mobile temporary labour in Australia. Ms Heinecke also detailed the Australian Government’s commitment in August 2021 to double the intake of Pacific labour opportunities:
A number of press releases have come out from the government, and all of them refer to Pacific labour remaining the primary scheme. To start with, the numbers at the moment of Pacific workers are around 16,500. We expect, with the government’s commitment, an additional 12,500, noting that 3,200 have already come in, and there will be around 24,000 or 25,000 Pacific workers in Australia by March to June next year.
We expect that the numbers from the Pacific will remain significantly higher. The design is underway at the moment, and there are still a number of settings to agree. But the principle of Pacific primacy is being built into the design.
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From April 2022 the PALM scheme will be streamlined into one program managed by DFAT and will provide greater flexibility, including:
Extended visa validity of up to 4 years, with provision for multiple entry to Australia, providing employers with greater workforce stability and giving workers more time to develop skills, complete qualifications and earn income to send home to their families; [and]
More flexibility for workers to move between employers in response to workforce demands, improving productivity and workers’ earning capacity.
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The program has been redesigned to strengthen the welfare of employee participants, including, amongst other supports:
Improved worker support arrangements, supported by welfare reporting requirements;
Continuing to help workers to better connect with their local communities, including through the Community Connections measure, which is delivered by The Salvation Army;
A 24/7 worker welfare helpline; [and]
Support for the Fair Work Ombudsman to proactively educate and support workers and employers on their rights and obligations under Australian workplace law and investigate when needed.
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Mr Bill Costello, Assistant Secretary, DFAT, explained that Pacific diplomatic heads of missions had been consulted about the streamlined PALM program and design of the new Agriculture Visa Scheme. Mr Costello noted:
I think they are very encouraged by the growth and the reform that are happening on the Pacific Labour Scheme at the moment.
Committee comment
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The Committee recognises that the basic parameters of the Australian Agriculture Visa Scheme appear similar in function to the revised Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme (PALM). Welfare improvements and administration appear similar, as is flexibility for workers to move between employers in response to workforce demands. Plans for pathways to migration will be included in the Agriculture Visa Scheme with detail released in April 2022—the revised PALM Scheme is silent in that regard.
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The Pacific labour mobility schemes are designed to be more meaningful than merely filling workplace gaps in low or semi-skilled jobs. It was specifically designed as a Pacific island initiative under the Step-up approach. The Agriculture Visa scheme is intended to supplement the PALM when demand for local labour outstrips supply. The opportunity for Pacific islanders from nine countries to live and work in the Australian community provides key opportunities for skills transfer, cultural exchange benefits and forging friendships, over and above any direct financial benefits.
3.89
The Committee notes that a number of operational details of the proposed Australian Agriculture Visa Scheme—including protections for workers, bilateral agreements between the Australian Government and South-East Asian countries and Deeds of Agreement between the Australian Government and participating employers—have not yet been finalised. The Committee further notes that there are concerns among some stakeholders that the Agriculture Visa may reduce the attractiveness of the existing Pacific labour mobility programs for Australian employers. Given the importance of the Pacific labour mobility for Australia’s Pacific relationships and for the economic development of Pacific countries, the Committee considers interaction of the two schemes should be monitored to ensure that there are no negative impacts or unintended consequences for the Pacific labour mobility programs.
3.90
The Committee notes the testing of the Australian labour market to meet labour demands is specified in DFAT public information on both programs. However, despite assurances at the October 2021 hearing, the primacy of the PALM scheme over the Agriculture Visa Scheme is not apparent in public information. The Committee stresses the importance of transparency to maintain good faith with Pacific island countries.
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The Committee notes the growing importance of the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme for skills transfer and training and as a source of remittance income, and the support for such programs amongst the Pacific. The Committee recommends the Australian Government:
pursue steps to scale-up the program, better support career development, and provide pathways for permanent residency, akin to those being developed for the Agriculture Visa Scheme; and
explicitly recognise the relationship building and cultural exchange elements of the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility Scheme in its design and promotion.
Visa arrangements
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Pacific islanders can apply for temporary access visas to work in Australia under the Pacific labour mobility schemes (these were temporarily suspended in 2020).
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DFAT and the Department of Home Affairs outlined how, in response to the coronavirus pandemic, they worked together to issue new visas (subclass 408 and subclass 403) to allow workers under Pacific labour mobility schemes (given they are employed in a ‘critical sector’) to remain in Australia for up to a further to 12 months:
This is supporting critical livelihoods and remittances for thousands of Pacific Islanders at a time of economic crisis. This is in a context in which remittance flows are starting to exceed development funding in some countries. This initiative is also helping businesses in regional and rural Australia to maintain services and production in industries such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries and health care.
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Save the Children Australia applauded the Australian Government’s decision to allow Pacific islanders on labour mobility schemes to stay in Australia, working during the pandemic, recommending that ‘this form of trade continue, and we argue that it should further extend this capacity during the crisis’. Their submission claims these extensions ‘ensure a well-regulated labour supply for key industries such as horticulture’ and ‘give Pacific islanders a chance to send money back to their families, supporting children to stay in school and continuing their access to healthcare’.
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Dr Tess Newton Cain stressed that Pacific island countries would welcome a reduction in the bureaucratic red tape involved with visas when attempting to work in Australia:
My sense in talking to Pacific people about this is that they will say, and I think they increasingly say, ‘You can come to our country without a visa. We want to come to your country without a visa.’ I think they could accept that there still has to be a visa process. What they can’t accept is the cost, but, more importantly, the administrative burden that is involved: the amount of information they’re expected to provide, the length of time that it takes and the way they just feel that they’re being messed about.
3.96
Mr Chris Gardiner’s submission provides support for the ideas of Professor Stephen Howes, Development Policy Centre at ANU to introduce a ‘Pacific Integration visa’ which incorporates education, training, employment and locality settlement conditions. He identifies that the greatest economic benefit Australia could provide to the peoples of the Pacific is access to its labour market and suggests allocating visa places within the existing migration cap on the basis of the ‘Pacific family’. Mr Gardiner extends on this proposal by further suggesting:
An ‘access pathway option would be via the [Australia Pacific Training Coalition] allowing graduates to obtain a working visa; while aligning course offerings with evolving labour market priorities in Australia’;
Subject the ‘integration visa’ to a ‘set of employment skills criteria, and accepting Professor Howes’ suggestion to absorb numbers within overall migration intake caps, there should be no cap on intake from the Pacific, providing a massive boost for Pacific communities’; and
Endorsing ‘the proposal by Dr Anthony Bergin which was supported by the Fiji Defence Minister to establish a Pacific Islands Regiment in the Australian Defence Forces (ADF). Access to the Pacific integration visa could be part of that initiative for those who serve in the regiment, and their families’.
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Possible future visa arrangements could include consideration of temporary relocation visas for Pacific islanders following natural disasters and permanent migration as a result of climate change impacts. This is discussed in chapter 4, Shared security and stability. Mr Jonathan Pryke of the Lowy Institute mentioned climate change threats triggering permanent migration:
Much has been written about the benefits of seasonal labour for Australian employers and Pacific communities, including in a recent Kaldor Centre Policy Brief co-authored by myself and Jane McAdam. In the brief we argue that, in addition to the profound economic benefits, permanent migration pathways can act as a critical climate change adaptation policy for the Pacific.
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A discussion regarding climate change triggered migration appears in the last section of chapter 4 (Shared security and stability).
Infrastructure, investment and resources
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As mentioned in chapter 1, the Pacific islands region holds economic potential of varying degrees. Those countries with the most lucrative resource opportunities, particularly those in Melanesia, are expected to face the greatest contestation of resource access and the strategic nurturing of relationships by external parties.
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The most significant natural resources within the Pacific region include:
Minerals, for example, copper and gold in Papua New Guinea (PNG), nickel in New Caledonia;
Oil and gas reserves (primarily PNG, also Solomon Islands);
Logging (PNG and Solomon Islands);
Fisheries (vast maritime exclusive economic zones across the region).
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Pacific island countries face considerable impediments to expanding development, in particular in establishing suitable and adequate energy production facilities and energy distribution infrastructure. This is often a factor of remoteness, topographic hurdles, small scale and the difficulty raising the required capital input. As such, most Pacific island countries require foreign investment to enable significant infrastructure projects to be undertaken.
Unintended consequences of foreign direct investment
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Submitters noted the potentially subversive nature of some sources of foreign direct investment and how it may be harmful to not only the Pacific islands’ development but also Australia’s regional interests, for example Professor Richard Herr and Dr Anthony Bergin wrote:
One area that China may seek to exploit in the region after Covid-19 involves requests for debt forgiveness or restructuring from some debt-ridden island states.
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Dr Shumi Akhtar, Sydney University reinforced this view:
For example, China’s attempt to build military bases around the Pacific Region and also the provision of debt funding to fund major infrastructure projects under their ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ … has surely raised the alarm bells in Canberra. The vast amounts of debt at stake potentially leaves smaller nations vulnerable to China’s demands in the event of a default; which would give China more power and control ‑ this would be a real security threat to Australia and the rest of the Pacific region.
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The Lowy Institute, however, points out that:
Many developing countries urgently require infrastructure investment but struggle to find financing providers, apart from China. Elites can often also use infrastructure projects to cultivate political support, feed patronage networks and obtain ‘kickbacks’. As a consequence, [Belt and Road Initiative] projects’ economic viability is often dubious, and their political, social and environmental implications are negative.
Diverse investment mechanisms
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The Australian Government and other foreign governments with interests in the Pacific region support investment in the region through various facilities, agreements and initiatives.
3.106
The Australian Government’s primary contribution to investment in the region is via two investment initiatives to support economic integration, strengthen economic resilience and unlock new sources of growth:
The Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP), a Pacific-only Step-up initiative which commenced in July 2019; and
The Australian Government’s export credit agency, Export Finance Australia (EFA), which supports worldwide Australian export trade by providing finance to support viable exporters, companies seeking to invest overseas and overseas infrastructure development.
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The Australian Government aims to also facilitate private sector investment mechanisms in the Pacific islands as the region moves out of the pandemic:
Helping the private sector to access capital, and re-establish markets and global value chains, will be vital for our region’s economic recovery, as it will be for Australian businesses who rely on regional supply chains.
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Mr Chris Gardiner stated that while other foreign influences could out-deliver on development assistance and infrastructure provision to Pacific island countries, he noted that Australia needs to reinforce the premier role that ‘brand Australia’ plays in the Pacific:
Australia is the largest provider of development assistance to the region – greater than the US or China—and has now in place significant export and infrastructure financing facilities … to supplement that development assistance.
Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP)
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A funding model like the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) was initially used as the vehicle to fund communications infrastructure upgrades in the Pacific like the Coral Sea Cable System:
…the AIFFP was developed off the back of the successful completion of the Coral Sea Cable System and the Solomon Islands Domestic Network, examples of Australia stepping up in the Pacific. These systems are providing high-quality infrastructure, with both systems available for customer use in PNG and Solomon Islands since early February 2020.
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The AIFFP was supported by the Lowy Institute, stating it provides ‘credible alternative debt financing options’ for eligible high‑cost infrastructure development projects in key areas of energy security, transport, telecommunications and water.
3.111
In June 2020, following the first few months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the AIFFP project was refocussed to specifically consider climate change priorities:
…as we move towards a post-COVID-19 recovery, AIFFP will focus on high-quality, climate resilient infrastructure that maximises local content and promotes local job creation, building local capacity and increasing employment opportunities – it will be an asset for economic recovery in the Pacific and Timor-Leste.
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The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) illustrated some examples of technical expertise in climate resilient infrastructure which Australia has already been providing to the Pacific islands via the AIFFP:
…endorsed ten projects to date in the energy, water (flood alleviation), telecommunications and transport sectors…[including] the Tina River Hydropower Transmission System in the Solomon Islands and the Markham Valley Solar Project in Papua New Guinea.
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The focus of the AIFFP on high-value infrastructure with narrow eligibility criteria was commented on given other existing infrastructure challenges in the region. For example, Mr Tom Muller from WaterAid raised a concern that access to water, sanitation and hygiene may be detrimentally impacted by the large-scale infrastructure developments envisioned by the AIFFP and its renewed post-pandemic efforts:
While the Pacific Step-up, and particularly the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific will direct new investment into large-scale infrastructure, there are significant risks that it will be at the detriment of increasing access to basic levels of water, sanitation and hygiene.
3.114
The WASH Reference Group’s submission lists sanitation concerns to support investment in sanitation assets and structures, listing as concerns:
Large populations in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu still rely on surface water for drinking; and
Access to improved sanitation also varies in the Pacific, with Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu all reporting high levels of open defecation and unimproved sanitation.
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Mr Tom Muller from WaterAid also feared that the Step-up risks overlooking the importance of access to water, sanitation and hygiene:
We would really argue strongly that, as the Australian government thinks about the Pacific Step-up in the longer term, it needs to complement the focus of large scale infrastructure with a more strategic focus on basic-level access to water, sanitation and hygiene. We would also argue that, with regard to the Pacific Step-up and taking a whole-of-government initiative, there is a critical need to focus on government capacity and initiatives.
Financing and grant mix in development support
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Submissions received illustrate how Australia’s provisions of loans should be reconsidered in light of the coronavirus pandemic and its detrimental impact on Pacific island economies and their subsequent ability to repay debts. The International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA), for instance, makes reference to the AIFFP:
The AIFFP was intended as a blended finance initiative, combining grants and loans with varying concessionality. However, as the impacts of COVID-19 begin to be felt by Pacific nations, the Government should re-consider its decision to offer debt-based financing. …Historically, the pressure to service debt repayments has led countries to cut or privatise essential services. …In this context, IWDA recommends the Government prioritise grant based financing for infrastructure.
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The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) similarly expressed how:
Considering the severe economic impacts of the COVID-19 crisis in the Pacific, ACFID has also called upon the Government to enhance the concessionality of AIFFP loans. The repurposing of the $1.5 billion non-concessional loan component of the AIFFP, into either more concessional loans or grants, would help free-up additional resources to fund social infrastructure such as health facilities and support pro-poor economic recovery, without adding substantially to Pacific debt burdens.
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The Australian Council for Trade Unions (ACTU) reaffirmed this sentiment:
The Australian Government should wherever possible provide support to Pacific countries in the form of grants, not loans. Where loans are entered into, these must not be on terms which could compromise the economic and/or political sovereignty of the Pacific neighbour.
3.119
Caritas Tonga and Caritas Australia in their joint submission echoed the ACTU’s recommendation of grants, not loans, for the Pacific to develop climate resilient infrastructure given their contribution to the impacts have been very minimal:
…the Australian Government has so far provided climate finance to the Pacific as grants, not loans. We commend and encourage the government to continue this approach with any new mechanisms such as the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Independent evaluation Pacific, as this approach recognises the principle of climate justice – that our Pacific island neighbours have done very little to contribute to climate change yet are amongst the world’s most affected and vulnerable communities, and should be assisted with grants not loans to adapt to its impacts.
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RESULTS International (Australia) stated that development assistance is welcome providing that for those countries already heavily debt burden that the take-up does not add to the debt. ActionAid reiterated this view:
In light of the increasing risk of debt distress amongst Pacific Island nations resulting from the coronavirus pandemic and the accompanying global economic recession, the Government should reconsider the use of loans (commercial or concessional) through the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, which has the potential to compound economic insecurity in the region.
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Similarly stated by Professor Stephen Howes, Development Policy Centre:
With the debt standstill, or debt forgiveness, countries aren’t going to be allowed to access non-concessional debt, which is mainly what AIFFP is, so I think it needs to be rethought.
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Professor Howes suggested that the focus on non-concessional debt (of which the AIFFP comprises $1.5 billion) was inappropriate at this time:
Although our lending is non-concessional, it’s not that expensive because of current interest rates. So it wouldn’t cost the government that much to actually make it a concessional program.
3.123
The Lowy Institute also suggested changing the current framework of the AIFFP to deal with the severe economic consequences the pandemic has inflicted on Pacific countries, focussing ‘…on public investment in the Pacific through a mixture of grants and concessional lending through the AIFFP’.
3.124
Another proposal made by Mr Jonathan Pryke, Lowy Institute was for Australia to assist Pacific countries by utilising Australia’s access to low-cost financing to reduce their debt burdens from other countries, for example:
Australia should also take advantage of our credit rating and incredibly cheap rates of borrowing to help restructure the debts of more solvent nations like Fiji to reduce their debt servicing burdens at near-zero cost to the Australian taxpayer.
Resources
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Natural resource endowments differ greatly across Pacific island countries, with the most universal being fisheries resources. For example PNG has rich gold and copper resources, and nickel extraction in New Caledonia accounts for 25 per cent of the world’s production; yet mineral resources are scant in other Pacific island countries.
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Mr Pryke praised the natural resource exploitation efforts by some of the Pacific islands but emphasised that these methods were not universally sustainable:
Oil and gas—natural resources are very important for the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. … There are three prospective gas projects in PNG at the moment—P’nyang, Papua LNG and the PNG LNG expansion—which could all have a transformative impact if done correctly. I’m not railing against Exxon here, but I don’t think natural resource exploitation is going to be a panacea for economic development in the Pacific.
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ActionAid detailed the precarious role natural resources play in the economies of Pacific islands:
The extraction of non-renewable resources provides these countries an important but finite source of economic development and government revenues to fund essential public services, such as schools, hospitals and clean water, which are vital to protect against COVID-19 and essential for poverty reduction. In the case of some fossil fuel projects, these governments will be faced with stranded assets in the coming years, so ensuring that benefits flow to those most in need is paramount.
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Mr Pryke did however, note that Pacific island countries are not completely dependent on external assistance nor non-renewable resources—as he highlighted sustainable fisheries success:
In a short period of time, they have increased the revenues that they collect from their fisheries from something like US$60 million to US$600 million in just over a decade. We often think of the Pacific as being helpless and that we need to help them. This is something that they’ve done themselves and they should be really applauded for it. Fisheries governance in the Pacific is quite good.
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Mr Pryke elaborated on the value in the vast maritime exclusive economic zones around these countries (of which Australia has supported the economic security through a variety of Step-up measures):
The Forum Fisheries Agency, with the parties, through a Nauru agreement, have done an incredible job in developing a governance structure that generates one of the most sustainable fisheries left on the planet. Something like 60 per cent of tuna is caught in their [exclusive economic zones], so it’s a very valuable resource.
3.130
The Whitlam Institute research project conducted by Peacifica detailed how there is a strong sense of anxiety in the Fijian community about their reliance on natural resources which they considered to be broadly threatened:
…broader concern about the vulnerability of Fiji’s natural resources, including land, water and products of potential commercial value, that might be under threat from climate change, overdevelopment and foreign ownership.
Committee comment
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The Committee acknowledged the challenges of financing large scale, transformative infrastructure in a developing and remote context, within environments often subject to widespread impacts of natural disasters.
3.132
The funding for major projects of this kind have been recently supported through the AIFFP, a Step-up initiative. However, the Committee recognises that in the COVID-19 recovery phase the Australian Government may need to offer more assistance to Pacific island countries in the form of a greater proportion of grants and loans of a concessional nature for such projects to be feasible.
3.133
The Committee recognises that there are significant differences between the Pacific island countries in the economic development opportunities available from natural resource endowments—lucrative development opportunities are disproportionately located in a few countries and some may not be sustainable in the long term.
3.134
The natural resource all Pacific island countries have in common is access to vast maritime exclusive economic zones. The Committee believes development support in Step-up initiatives which protect fisheries resources is an important factor in the future viability of this sector, protection of the Blue Pacific continent and improved economic stability in the region.