1. Introduction

1.1
Australia has established an enduring relationship with its Pacific near neighbours over many generations. The people of Australia and those of the Pacific island region have a long shared history, ‘common interests and values’,1 and have generally enjoyed peaceful and productive engagement and mutual assistance.
1.2
Pacific island countries place differing weight on aspects of their relationship with Australia. However, during this inquiry the Committee heard that there is a universally positive association with Australia’s status as a reliable first responder after Pacific natural disasters and other difficulties; and there is a recognition that Australia takes a principal role in development partnerships.2
1.3
Some submissions to the inquiry referred to heartbreaking and challenging aspects of a diverse history. A part of the mixed history was noted in the Whitlam Institute research project conducted by Peacifica, Pacific perspectives on the world, February 20203 which reported a sample of Pacific island views on various unprompted topics.
1.4
The exploitive and harsh trade in the human capital of mostly young South Sea Pacific Islanders to labour in Eastern Australia from the late 1840s to Federation, has left deep wounds. Mr Nic Maclellan4 refers to the mass deportation of workers under the Pacific Island Labourers Act 1901, whilst Peacifica5 also raises the negative legacy of minerals extraction and off-shore processing of Australian asylum seekers in the region.

Similar, but not all the same

1.5
Commonalities exist in countries of the region, however there is remarkable diversity between Pacific island nations: they are not a homogenous group. These countries share common ocean identities and the challenges of living in this environment and region.6 While there is unity in the Pacific voices on some matters—for example being perceptive of their greater influence7 in the world—they differ on others.
1.6
Australia has observed, and Pacific islander people have acknowledged, and some have acted on, the parallel rising influence of other nation states in the region in recent years.8 As detailed in the report of the inquiry into Australia’s Defence relationships in the region, the Pacific island region is a contested space.9 Three countries are in the unenviable position of being some of the poorest in the world, yet the Pacific Ocean holds some of the world’s largest maritime exclusive economic zones.10
1.7
Expanding foreign power influence poses potential security and economic threats to the region, as outlined in the Australian Government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, which sets out a framework for Australia’s international engagement.11 The white paper identifies as being of fundamental importance to Australia’s identity and prosperity: ‘an open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region in which the rights of all states are respected, …and to step up support for a more resilient Pacific and Timor Leste’.12
1.8
The overarching cohesion in the Australia-Pacific region relationship hails from ‘decades of sustained engagement and our collective interests in a stable, resilient and prosperous Pacific’.13 These are the tenets of the shared ‘Blue Pacific continent’ concept.14
1.9
Pacific islanders have identified as important elements of foreign relationships: ‘appreciation of culture and diversity, mutual respect, reciprocity and trust’.15 These were reflected in the words of Mr Curtis Tuihalangingie, Deputy Head of Mission, Kingdom of Tonga at the Committee’s diplomatic roundtable hearing held in Canberra in September 2020, describing the relationship between Australia and Pacific island countries:
The Tongan proverb 'pikipiki hama kae vaevae manava' underpins the methods of methodology of our friendship, centring values of relationality, connection and reciprocity. 'Pikipiki hama' means to bind together to the outrigger of a seafaring vessel; 'vaevae' means to share; and 'manava' means breath. It represents working together for a shared purpose and good consequences. Let us be 'pikipiki hama kae vaevae manava' for the benefit of Australia and the Pacific islands—our people and our future.16

Stepping-up engagement in the Pacific island region

1.10
Australia officially strengthened its commitment to the region in November 2018 when the Government’s ‘Step-up’ was released, outlining ‘a new package of security, economic, diplomatic and people to people initiatives’ to ‘build on our strong partnerships in the Pacific’.17 The package amounted to $1.4 billion development assistance to the Pacific in 2019-20.18
1.11
The approach is designed to recognise ‘that closer cooperation among Pacific countries is essential to the region's long-term economic and security prospects’;19 with the bolstered engagement objectives reflecting the ‘Blue Pacific’ aspiration:
We want to work with our Pacific islands partners to build a Pacific region that is secure strategically, stable economically and sovereign politically.20
1.12
The formative initiatives of ‘the Step-up’ included a suite of programs:
Education and employment opportunities;21
Defence and border security measures;22
Disaster assistance and impact mitigation;23 and
Infrastructure and technology.24
1.13
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported qualitative progress on the ‘Step-up’ in the Pacific in its 2020-21 Annual Report:
The Pacific Step‑up remained one of our highest foreign policy priorities, building on strong foundations to support our partners to manage the health and economic impacts of COVID‑19. The department’s Office of the Pacific coordinated whole‑of‑government efforts to strengthen regional engagement, support economic resilience, advance our shared security interests, and deepen community connections. We stood by our Pacific family and strengthened our shared interests in the sovereignty, security and resilience of our region. Our new posts in French Polynesia, Marshall Islands and Niue expanded our diplomatic network to every Pacific Islands Forum country.
The successful restart of Pacific labour programs in September 2020 enabled more than 7 000 Pacific and Timorese workers to arrive in Australia (as at June 2021), bringing the total number of Pacific and Timorese workers in Australia to over 12 000, the largest number of Pacific workers in Australia since the Pacific labour mobility initiatives began.25

COVID-19 impacts

1.14
The Committee took significant evidence about the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Pacific islands.26 As the Lowy Institute reported in December 2020, this region, despite having a record low number of infections reported in the first twelve months of the pandemic27 has been economically hard hit by the crisis owing to ‘its heavy reliance on a few key income sources’.28 This impact has been explored in detail in the report of Trade Sub-Committee on activating greater trade and investment in the Pacific region; with the same data and evidence received and noted from the ANU Development Policy Centre29 and others.
1.15
The implications of the COVID-19 pandemic are serious; it has exacerbated existing challenges30 and highlighted the importance of flexible responses to the impacts of change. It has highlighted the importance of the Step-up initiatives to achieve greater economic sustainability in the region.
1.16
Some countries have been impacted more than others—those heavily dependent on tourism have lost the most—for example, Fiji and Vanuatu.31 However, all have been impacted by border closures and impediments to overseas work opportunities; a significant source of Pacific island remittances.32
1.17
As at February 2022 parts of the Pacific island region remain heavily affected by COVID-19 movement restrictions as the virus spread into parts of the region in 2021, with countries being health affected to various degrees. Papua New Guinea is experiencing its fourth wave with 37 270 cases recorded, with rapid transmission.33 Fiji opened its border on 1 December 2021 and has documented 62 855 cases of transmission since.34 Kirabati’s first passenger plane in many months landed 14 January 2022, bringing its first transmission, and by 31 January it had recorded 460 cases across the sprawling, but tiny archipelago.35 The Solomon Islands has experienced 1 486 cases to date.36
1.18
Tonga, recently affected by the tsunami caused by the eruption of the Hunga Tonga-Hunga Ha'apai undersea volcano, has kept COVID-19 infections at near zero levels and Vanuatu has retained similar success.37 TIME reported that it was an amazing feat that after almost two years of the pandemic, parts of the Pacific islands remained virtually untouched by the virus itself:
Border controls across the Pacific islands have been effective so far. A handful of these nations have been some of the only places on Earth that went almost untouched by the coronavirus. Tuvalu and Nauru still haven’t recorded a single case of COVID.38
1.19
On 29 May 2020 the Australian Government released its $4 billion Partnerships for Recovery package which spans two years starting in 2020-21.39 The package focuses on three key areas: health; stability and economic recovery.
1.20
The Lowy Institute has suggested that to avoid ‘a lost decade of development’ in the Pacific ‘every bit of support from Australia and others, including China’ will be necessary.40 The Lowy Institute has recommended that Australia lead a post-COVID recovery mechanism involving the $2 billion Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP)41 as part of Australia’s revised Step-up.42

Overview of the inquiry

1.21
On 11 February 2020 the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator the Hon. Marise Payne, referred terms for the Committee to inquire into and report on the conditions necessary to strengthen relationships with the countries of the Pacific region to meet current and emerging opportunities and risks facing the region. The Committee then referred the inquiry to the Foreign Affairs and Aid Sub-Committee to undertake.
1.22
The terms of reference asked the Committee to give particular regard to Australia’s Step-up program, which is essentially its development assistance and security support measures in the Pacific islands region.
1.23
The Chair of the Foreign Affairs and Aid Sub-Committee, Mr Dave Sharma MP, announced the Committee’s inquiry in a media alert on 18 February 2020, which highlighted the Committee’s intended approach:
The Committee will be seeking ideas on how Australia can build on the momentum of the Pacific Step-up to increase engagement and linkages with Pacific Island neighbours, in support of our collective interests.43
1.24
The last inquiry undertaken by the Committee into Australia’s development assistance was during the 45th Parliament, the inquiry into Australia’s aid program in the Indo-Pacific, report tabled in April 2019 (four months after the announcement of the ‘Step-up’44 which was therefore not considered in detail).45 The Committee reported with an overview of the Australian aid program in the Pacific, outlined the performance framework and effectiveness of the program and examined the role of the private sector in the aid program in relation to trade (the aid-trade nexus), private sector partnerships and local procurement. An overview of Australia’s base development assistance program, policy and delivery—and the transition of focus to the Indo-Pacific region—is summarised in chapter 2 of the First report: Inquiry into Australia’s aid program in the Indo-Pacific (45th Parliament).46
1.25
The Committee recognises the importance of the Step-up in addressing a diversity of Pacific challenges, however, evidence to the inquiry indicates that outcomes are currently difficult to quantify, largely as a result of the pandemic and the shifting health and economic environment.47
1.26
The Committee has decided to focus on maximising those opportunities which can be practically and feasibly implemented, and those which broaden or deepen existing initiatives; rather than detailing impressions of past initiative components. The Committee recognises the importance of the heightened engagement in the region and that the broad suite of measures within the Step-up highlights differing challenges and opportunities across the region, and the need for the Government’s holistic approach.48
1.27
The Committee has identified opportunities discussed in evidence under key sectors and has expanded on those which it believes can be practically implemented to have tangible outcomes.

Concurrent inquiries with a Pacific focus

1.28
Other JSCFADT inquiries regarding Australia’s links to the Pacific region—through the more specific lenses of Defence and Trade—were undertaken in tandem. The inquiry into activating greater trade and investment with Pacific island countries was overseen by the Trade Sub-Committee while the inquiry into strengthening Australia’s defence relationships with Pacific island nations was overseen by the Defence Sub-Committee. The Committee also sought submissions for an inquiry into the human rights of women and girls in the Pacific during this time.
1.29
The suite of four inquiries, with a focus on Australia-Pacific island relationships, and links, enabled holistic aspects of evidence gathering; noting that this inevitably led to some overlapping evidence. However, the common inquiry ground provided opportunities to efficiently engage with mutually interested parties on more than one inquiry. These efficiencies proved a boon for participants during the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in state and territory movement restrictions and myriad other Committee activity impediments.

Conduct of the inquiry

1.30
The inquiry was advertised on 18 February 2020 and the Sub-Committee invited written submissions addressing the terms of reference to be received by 3 April 2020 (and 17 April for international submissions).
1.31
The World Health Organisation (WHO) announced the spread of the COVID-19 coronavirus infection as a global pandemic on 11 March 2020. As a consequence, and owing to the impact of infections, the economic consequences of community movement restrictions and international border closures, the official submission closing date was extended to the end of June. The extension was designed to allow submitters, in particular those in, or working with Pacific island communities, more time to respond to the developing demands of the pandemic. The Sub-Committee later determined that first time submitters could submit on the basis of request until December 2020.
1.32
The Committee received and published 73 submissions and 7 supplementary submissions, as listed in Appendix A. The Committee also received 7 exhibits which are listed in Appendix B.

Accommodating inquiry work in the global pandemic

1.33
The Foreign Affairs and Aid Sub-Committee undertook inquiry oversight, comprising Members and Senators from five states and the Northern Territory. Members’ movements were variously restricted by COVID-related rules and border closures during the inquiry. As restrictions similarly impacted witness participants, necessary adjustments were made to the inquiry conduct, giving rise to a matrix of remotely facilitated and remotely attended hearings.
1.34
The first of the nine hearings in Canberra commenced in June 2020, a slightly delayed program due to impacts of lockdowns of all but essential services and activity, which commenced in the last week of March, until May 2020.49 Other lengthy lockdowns occurred in various jurisdictions in 2021, and Australian Parliament House closed to the public at the start of August 2021 (sittings) and a lockdown followed in the Australian Capital Territory until mid-October 2021.
1.35
Minimal in-person attendance occurred over the course of public hearings, with remote linkages to witnesses or members employed. Three roundtables were convened with partial in-person attendance (of both witnesses and members) with strict social distancing.
1.36
Two roundtables opened the hearings in June 2020 (one largely with remote witness attendance and the other with remote member attendance). Roundtables are beneficial in enabling participants to reflect on the comments of other witnesses and contribute views contemporaneously; however these benefits were found to be overshadowed when there were numerous remote participants. As such, the Sub-Committee held separate appearance public hearings for the remainder of the schedule.
1.37
Three of the Sub-Committees focussing on the Pacific—Defence, Foreign Affairs and Aid, and the Trade Sub-Committees—also convened a joint roundtable for High Commissioners and Heads of Mission of the Pacific island region diplomatic community (including the New Zealand High Commissioner—and also representatives of the Kiribati Government by teleconference), on 4 September 2020.
1.38
The roundtable proved a valuable and unique feedback opportunity for the participants and Committee members. Witnesses who gave evidence at this and other hearing forums are listed in Appendix C.

Outline of the report

1.39
Chapter 2 records the key themes and framework and outlines opportunities for strengthening relationships in the Pacific region based on aspirations of a successful ‘Blue Pacific continent’, categorised under the broad Step-up objectives of economic prosperity, shared security and stability and improved and deepened people-to-people links. This framework is considered in the context of a busy and contested, non-homogenous space.
1.40
Chapter 3 considers the key objective of promoting economic stability and sustainable prosperity in the Pacific islands. This covers trade, education and employment aspects, including reliance on remittances from Australia—and infrastructure, investment and resources.
1.41
Chapter 4 explores the aspiration of shared regional security and stability, considering climate and disaster resilience, resources and food security, governance and health. In terms of regional shared security a regional ‘future-proofing’ proposal is explored.
1.42
Chapter 5 concludes with the Step-up objective of strengthening peopletopeople links between Australia and Pacific island countries.
1.43
Finally, chapter 6 considers the current framework for quantifiable measurement and evaluation of Australia’s Pacific Step-up.
1.44
Given that the factors affecting opportunities in different Pacific island countries in the region are relatively unique, the report considers those options which are practical to implement and likely to provide the most successful outcomes across the board in the current challenging environment.

  • 1
    Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Submission 52, p. 3.
  • 2
    Peacifica, Pacific perspectives on the world: Listening to Australia’s island neighbours in order to build strong, respectful and sustainable relationships, Whitlam Institute within Western Sydney University, February 2020, p. 24.
  • 3
    Peacifica, Pacific perspectives on the world: Listening to Australia’s island neighbours in order to build strong, respectful and sustainable relationships, Whitlam Institute within Western Sydney University, February 2020, pp. 32-33.
  • 4
    Mr Nic Maclellan, Submission 42, p. 8.
  • 5
    Peacifica, Submission 45, p. 2.
  • 6
    Including scale, geographic remoteness from major markets, narrow economic bases, high costs, dispersed populations and rapidly growing young populations, see DFAT, Submission 52, p. 4.
  • 7
    Peacifica, Pacific perspectives on the world, February 2020, p. 33.
  • 8
    Pacific island nations, most of whom have extremely low national incomes, have been receptive to entering into significant long-term arrangements with other foreign nationals, particularly Chinese entities, to secure infrastructure or employment opportunities. For example, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Papua New Guinea (PNG) Government in November 2020 to enable a Chinese business to establish a ‘$200 million comprehensive multi-functional fishery industrial park’ on Daru Island, Western Province, PNG; Jeffrey Wall, ‘China to build $200 million fishery project on Australia’s doorstep’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) Strategist, 8 December 2020. <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-to-build-200-million-fishery-project-on-australias-doorstep/> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 9
    Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT), Inquiry into Australia's defence relationships with Pacific island nations, April 2021, p. 4.
  • 10
    Development Policy Centre, Australian National University (ANU), Submission 60, p. 2.
  • 11
    Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, November 2017, p. iii-vi.
  • 12
    Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, November 2017, p. 3.
  • 13
    Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Submission 52, p. 3.
  • 14
    The Blue Pacific concept is intended to encourage Pacific Island states to act as a ‘Blue Continent’ based on their ‘shared stewardship of the Pacific Ocean’. See Associate Professor Joanne Wallis, Submission 9, p. 8.
  • 15
    Whitlam Institute within Western Sydney University, Submission 2, p. 1.
  • 16
    Mr Curtis Leonard Tuihalangingie, Deputy Head of Mission, Kingdom of Tonga, Committee Hansard, 4 September 2020, p. 4.
  • 17
    Prime Minister of Australia, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, ‘Strengthening Australia’s Commitment to the Pacific’, Media Release, 8 November 2018. <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/strengthening-australias-commitment-pacific> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 18
    DFAT, 2019-20 Australia Aid Budget Summary: Pacific. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/2019-20-australian-aid-budget-summary-pacific.pdf> viewed 18 February 2022.
  • 19
    DFAT, Strengthening our Pacific Partnerships. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/strengthening-our-pacific-partnerships> viewed 18 February 2022.
  • 20
    Prime Minister of Australia, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, ‘Strengthening Australia’s Commitment to the Pacific’, Media Release, 8 November 2018. <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/strengthening-australias-commitment-pacific> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 21
    Including 1 474 Australia Award Scholarships; 2 430 students studying in the region under the New Colombo Plan since 2014. Given the success of the Seasonal Worker programme in boosting remittances to the region (recorded as $144 million during 2012-2017) expanded labour mobility opportunities are now available for low to semi-skilled workers in the new Pacific Labour Scheme. DFAT, Strengthening our Pacific Partnerships. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Pages/strengthening-our-pacific-partnerships> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 22
    Including 19 new patrol boats with an aerial surveillance program and 11 bilateral police and Defence Partnerships. DFAT, Strengthening our Pacific Partnerships. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Pages/strengthening-our-pacific-partnerships> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 23
    $300 million for climate and disaster resilience over 4 years from 2016. DFAT, Strengthening our Pacific Partnerships, <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Pages/strengthening-our-pacific-partnerships> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 24
    $2 billion allocated for an Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility (AIFFP) for the Pacific and $1.3 billion in high speed internet for PNG and the Solomon Islands. DFAT, Strengthening our Pacific Partnerships. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Pages/strengthening-our-pacific-partnerships> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 25
    DFAT, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Annual Report 2020-21, September 2021, p. 3.
  • 26
    Forty-three submissions discussed the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Pacific island region and it was discussed by all hearing participants. Impacts summarised by DFAT, Submission 52, pp. 5-8.
  • 27
    DFAT, Submission 52, p. 5; with 27 cases reported at 23 June 2020.
  • 28
    Roland Rajah and Alexandre Dayant, Avoiding a Pacific Lost Decade: Financing the Pacific’s COVID-19 Recovery, Policy Brief, Lowy Institute, December 2020, p. 2.
  • 29
    Development Policy Centre, ANU, Submission 60, received 27 July 2020, following 7 months of pandemic-related economic impacts.
  • 30
    Her Excellency Ms Hinauri Petana, High Commissioner, Independent State of Samoa, Committee Hansard, 4 September 2020, p. 6.
  • 31
    Lowy Institute, Submission 69, p. 3; Development Policy Centre, Australian National University (ANU), Submission 60, p. 2.
  • 32
    With Tonga recorded as receiving the highest per capita remittances of any country in the world (2018). Development Policy Centre, ANU, Submission 60, p. 8.
  • 33
    Johns Hopkins University and Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Centre, COVID-19 Dashboard, Papua New Guinea, 2 February 2022. <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html> viewed 2 February 2022.
  • 34
    Johns Hopkins University and Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Centre, COVID-19 Dashboard, Fiji, 2 February 2022. <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html> viewed 2 February 2022.
  • 35
    Amy Gunia, A Covid-Free Pacific nation opened its border a crack. The virus came rushing in, TIME, 31 January 2022.
  • 36
    Johns Hopkins University and Medicine, Coronavirus Resource Centre, COVID-19 Dashboard, Solomon Islands, 2 February 2022. <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html> viewed 2 February 2022.
  • 37
    Amy Gunia, A Covid-Free Pacific nation opened its border a crack. The virus came rushing in, TIME, 31 January 2022.
  • 38
    Amy Gunia, A Covid-Free Pacific nation opened its border a crack. The virus came rushing in, TIME, 31 January 2022.
  • 39
    DFAT, Partnerships for Recovery: Australia’s COVID-19 Development Response. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/aid/partnerships-recovery-australias-covid-19-development-response> viewed 21 February 2021.
  • 40
    Lowy Institute, Submission 69, p. 5.
  • 41
    DFAT, Strengthening our Pacific Partnerships. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/pacific/engagement/Pages/strengthening-our-pacific-partnerships> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 42
    Lowy Institute, Submission 69, p. 5.
  • 43
    JSCFADT, Foreign Affairs and Aid Sub-Committee, Inquiry Media Release, 18 February 2020. <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/House_of_Representatives/About_the_House_News/Media_Releases/Strengthening_Australias_relationships_with_the_Pacific_Islands> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 44
    Prime Minister of Australia, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, ‘Strengthening Australia’s Commitment to the Pacific’, Media Release, 8 November 2018. <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/strengthening-australias-committment-pacific> viewed 25 January 2021.
  • 45
    JSCFADT, First Report: Inquiry into Australia’s Aid program in the Indo-Pacific, April 2019.
  • 46
    JSCFADT, First Report: Inquiry into Australia’s Aid program in the Indo-Pacific, April 2019, pp. 5-22.
  • 47
    DFAT, Submission 52, pp. 7-10, provides a synopsis of (mostly qualitative) outcomes of the implementation.
  • 48
    Noting that the Office of the Pacific, established within DFAT in 2019 has 13 Australian Government agency secondees. This reflects the move in development activity being coordinated and delivered from within the foreign affairs space to other government department areas with more direct delivery. See DFAT, Submission 52, p. 7.
  • 49
    Various dates, jurisdiction dependant.

 |  Contents  |