Chapter 2

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Chapter 2

Issues raised with ASIC

2.1        The committee discussed a number of issues with ASIC at its oversight hearing on 25 November 2009.[1] These included:

Complaints handling

2.2        ASIC's responsibility for regulating corporate behaviour includes taking surveillance, investigative and enforcement action following reports to ASIC of alleged misconduct. The committee's 2009 inquiry into financial products and services raised a number of concerns about ASIC's investigative processes. Claims put to the committee during that inquiry include that ASIC's threshold for investigative action is too high, that surveillance is ineffective and that the organisation resolves issues too slowly.

2.3        The committee was particularly interested in ASIC's process for handling complaints received about misconduct and suspected legislative breaches under ASIC's regulatory control.

2.4        Complaints are received by a variety of mechanisms, including by telephone, by email and by letter. ASIC's call centre at Traralgon handles a total of around 700,000 calls per year.[3] According to Mr D'Aloisio, Chairman of ASIC, the centre staff receive specialised training and support to enable them to respond appropriately to calls:

There is a lot of training. For particular types of complaints they will have issues that they need to handle and they will be trained in how to handle them so that if something comes up on an issue we know there will likely be a lot of complaints about a lot of initial work will be done. They are given briefing notes. They are able to call in from where they are sitting to have a query answered and then go back online to answer the caller. There is a lot of training and development in handling the calls.[4]

2.5        ASIC informed the committee that misconduct and breach reports, or complaints, are addressed by 95 full-time equivalent staff. In 2008-09, ASIC received 15,300 such complaints—up 17 per cent from the previous year. ASIC attributed this increase in complaints to major collapses and the recent market downturn. [5]

2.6         ASIC indicated that it has changed its complaint handling processes in recent times to ensure greater involvement by staff at senior levels:

...we made changes...as part of the restructure to introduce much more direct accountability for the complaints at the very senior levels of the organisation...if a complaint is referred to one of the stakeholder or deterrence teams, it is part of the KPIs of the senior leader of that team to get involved, assess and form a view as to whether or not there could be a smoking gun or an issue that is of broader significance than it might at first seem.

That has added a layer of responsibility at the senior level so that these matters are not pushed down in the order. That system is working well. Our leaders are taking the responsibility for dealing with the more major complaints.[6]

2.7        ASIC told the committee that its service standard is to acknowledge each complaint within one day of receipt and, further, that it has a target of turning around 70 per cent of complaints within 28 days. ASIC indicated that it met this target during the last annual reporting period.[7]

2.8        The committee was interested in whether ASIC tracks complaint statistics or searches for patterns in the complaints received. ASIC told the committee that it relies largely on its analysts to discern patterns:

It is not software that would do it. It is really based on the people doing it and the people in charge of the area looking for those patterns in complaints when they analyse it on keywords.[8]

2.9        The committee also questioned ASIC about how complaints are subsequently followed up in the field, including the numbers and qualifications of field officers, and the processes by which those officers conduct their work. ASIC undertook to provide the committee with information on notice but indicated that, in order to protect ongoing operations and investigations, it might not be appropriate to comment publicly on some processes.

2.10      The additional information provided to the committee about complaint handling processes is presented in Appendix 2 (see responses to Questions on Notice 10 and 11).

Committee view

2.11      The committee remains keen to learn more about ASIC's capacity to receive and resolve complaints, in order to reassure itself that complaints raised by members of the public are being recorded accurately and are being addressed in a timely and appropriate fashion. To this end, the committee will seek to make arrangements to visit ASIC's call centre in Traralgon during the first half of 2010.

2.12      The committee would welcome enhanced public reporting by ASIC, wherever possible, of the steps it has taken to deal with complaints and the resolutions reached. Anecdotal reporting to the committee suggests that a common cause for concern by complainants is that they are not sufficiently advised of the progress or outcome of their complaint. The committee encourages ASIC to do better in this regard, although it does acknowledge ASIC's need to protect the integrity of its investigations and its investigative processes.

2.13      The committee would also appreciate receiving ongoing briefings from ASIC regarding any trends or patterns in complaints received, as this may help to flag regulatory inadequacies or concerns in advance of future corporate collapses. The committee will continue to raise this matter with ASIC at future hearings.

Credit regulation

2.14      ASIC gained a number of additional responsibilities with the 2009 passage through parliament of the national consumer credit reforms, which establish a single, federal regulatory framework for consumer credit. ASIC's responsibilities under the new arrangements include licensing consumer credit providers and being the national regulator of the new code. Licensees will be required to adhere to responsible lending conduct requirements, prohibiting lending that is unsuitable to the consumer's needs and that the consumer does not have the capacity to repay. The commencement of these reforms will be 1 July 2010.

2.15      ASIC described the preparations that have been taking place to ensure ASIC and consumer credit lenders are ready for the new arrangements:

In terms of the credit reform legislation at the moment, our preparatory work on that through the various consultations on what we are doing is really very much about getting registration, getting licensing on foot and waiting for the terms of the legislation to be finalised and then consulting with the market on regulatory guides on these sorts of issues. We have issued a regulatory consultation document, for example, on responsible lending as an initial indicator of what we would be looking at. I think a lot of this work is going to be in the first half of the next financial year.[9]

2.16      The committee was informed that ASIC is 'going to be ready for the changeover' on 1 July 2010:

A lot of the work that we have been doing with our task force that has been established and dedicated to this area has really been to be ready with the licensing and registration requirements. We are also dealing ... very much with the states to ensure that there is a smooth transition from each agency of a state to ASIC. We have put in place a phased recruitment program for some 200 new people.

...

We have concluded...a number of draft regulatory guides that we are publishing progressively, and we will be publishing those from Christmas on, including registration and licensing kits. We are also managing to ensure that we are going to be ready with deterrence actions and complaints handling actions that are going to be needed from 1 July with the people who we are bringing on.[10]

Committee view

2.17      The committee welcomes the new protections that the national consumer credit regulatory framework will bring to consumers and is encouraged by ASIC's statement that it will be ready to manage the framework from 1 July 2010. However, the committee notes that this is a substantial task to add to ASIC's existing workload and will be seeking information and reassurance from ASIC at future oversight hearings about how it is balancing its new responsibilities with its existing responsibilities and ensuring appropriate resource allocation.

PI insurance

2.18      There have been continuing problems with financial services licensees accessing the required level of compulsory professional indemnity (PI) insurance cover. Because of a lack of availability of automatic run-off cover in the market—that is, cover for claims made after the policy has ended, for acts and omissions during the period of cover—ASIC has now removed the requirement to obtain this particular cover.[11]

2.19      Although ASIC recognised the industry's concerns about the availability of PI generally, and acknowledged that they are 'nervous' about the situation, they commented that 'on balance we think it is still working', as well as noting that cover is still available to the threshold set by ASIC:

Our information on the research we have done at the moment is that it is still possible for PI to be obtained by AFS licence holders in basic cover on the limits we have set. We are not seeing a difficulty. We did see a difficulty in relation to not being able to get run-off insurance and we have come in with modifications and we are consulting on modifying that and removing it because there is no point insisting on a requirement that the market will not meet, because the market will not meet it.[12]

2.20      Increases in premiums are not considered justification for making PI cover voluntary:

...there is, no doubt, lifting of premiums to do both with the market and with the issues of increased liability. But we are not at the point where we are going to say to government that we really have to move away from the PI insurance system or make it voluntary. The difficulty with making it voluntary is that clearly if it is voluntary you will get some who will use it and some who will not.[13]

2.21      ASIC did not agree with the suggestion that the increase in the Financial Ombudsman Service compensation limit had caused the tightening of PI insurance availability:

There is no doubt that if you increase the liability, the amount that can be recovered, that must have some impact on premiums, but is it the reason that policies are hard to get? That is not our experience. Our experience is that you can still get PI insurance and that the advisors are still able to get PI insurance. The scheme and the increase from $250,000 or $280,000 I think have not cut in as yet. It will cut in a little bit later and we will monitor it. But at this stage our position would be that that is not the issue you could blame for why the market for PI insurance is tightening.[14]

2.22      The committee was told that the increased compensation limit was justified:

Last year, when we did the consultation on lifting the limit to $280,000, we felt that the $100,000 or $150,000 was just too low, given the nature of the claims that were coming through. We also felt that it seemed unfair, for example, if you had invested $200,000 instead of $100,000 in Westpoint you would be precluded from recovering because you were above the limit. It seemed to us that having a limit of a potential claim of $500,000, of which you could recover $250,000 or $280,000, was a better approach than leaving the limits that were there at that time; and also balancing up the additional cost for the licence holder on that. Clearly there would be a cost associated because you have got to pay out higher limits than you otherwise would.[15]

2.23      ASIC added:

...it does add a cost to the lender because—depending on whether they are insured or not—they are going to pay out a higher amount and if they are going to insure it that may well reflect in their premiums. But I just would not be convinced ... it is the reason why PI insurance may or may not be available to that whole market. There are other considerations that are at play.[16]

Committee view

2.24      The committee continues to hear anecdotes from financial services licence holders that PI insurance cover is becoming difficult, or prohibitively expensive, to obtain. The committee requests that ASIC monitor this situation actively, including by checking the availability of insurance cover in the marketplace from time to time, and report back to the committee at future oversight hearings.

Frozen mortgage funds

2.25      The freeze on redemptions from cash management trusts and mortgage funds continues. As noted in the committee's previous oversight report, ASIC has provided regulatory relief to enable withdrawals from frozen funds on hardship grounds.[17]

2.26      The committee heard that a number of payments had been made under the hardship measures. ASIC stated that 2786 applications had been made, with 2293 of these granted:

...the amount applied for was $99 million. The amount paid out was $58 million and each applicant received somewhere in the order of $6,000 to $264,000.

...

...it is an average of $25,000 per applicant. Interestingly, on those figures, of the 100 per cent of the applications, 82 per cent did receive hardship relief, so you are getting a high rate of those who apply for hardship being met by the trustees as genuine hardship and the amount is paid out.[18]

2.27      ASIC informed the committee that frozen funds still amount to around $17 billion to $20 billion.[19]

2.28      Some redemptions have been possible for fund members in situations where the funds have managed to accumulate and pay out monies on a pro-rata basis.[20] ASIC stated that around $2 billion had been withdrawn by investors through such redemptions, and noted:

...if the market gets confident and retail investors come back to the mortgage trust sector they will provide the necessary additional inflow of funds to enable others to redeem and so on.[21]

2.29      However, the freeze has restricted funds' ability to attract new investment and to return monies to members wishing to exit. There was an acknowledgement that the situation would continue for some time:

When you move into the unlisted areas of mortgage trust, property trust, management investment schemes and so on, the experience of the last couple of years is such that retail investors are going to be quite wary, with or without financial advice, to go back into those areas. It is something that we have to monitor. I think it is important for the markets long term that we have these alternative forms of investment, but it is going to take time for them to come back.[22]

Committee view

2.30      The committee asks that ASIC continue to monitor this situation closely and provide relevant updates at future oversight hearings.

Professional standards board

2.31      The committee's recently tabled report on its 2009 inquiry into financial products and services included a recommendation proposing the establishment of an independent, industry-based professional standards board to oversee nomenclature, competency and conduct standards for financial advisers. The committee proposed that ASIC immediately commence consulting with industry on the scope of this body and how the regulator would work in conjunction with it.[23]

2.32      At the subsequent oversight hearing, ASIC suggested to the committee that the recommendation was a sound idea conceptually but would require further investigation:

We need to look at the feasibility of it, who is going to fund it, the costs, who goes on it, what is the relationship between that board and ASIC’s role. There is a lot of value in the proposal, conceptually it is a very good proposal, but we have to do a lot of work and we have to look at the money side and budgeting, and that is going to take us a bit of time.[24]

2.33      ASIC added:

The key is to come up with a structure and a set of training requirements that are going to be flexible enough to deal with the range of intermediaries that we are talking about. You have your financial planners, mortgage brokers—there are a lot of people to the markets that are subject to training requirements.[25]

Committee view

2.34      As discussed in detail in its report Inquiry into financial products and services in Australia[26], the committee is unanimously and strongly of the view that a professional standards board overseeing conduct standards for financial advisers should be established. This reform would increase professionalism within the industry by ensuring that those wishing to call themselves 'financial advisers' or 'financial planners' would be required to obtain board membership and adhere to its standards. An industry-based, independent professional standards board, working in conjunction with ASIC, would establish, monitor and enforce competency and conduct standards amongst members and have the power to sanction or remove those who do not comply.

2.35      The committee acknowledges that ASIC would need to work closely with a professional standards board to avoid duplication and overlap of their respective oversight functions.

2.36      The committee looks forward to receiving advice from ASIC at a future oversight hearing about how this proposal could be taken forward.

Criticism of ASIC-initiated court actions

2.37      Just prior to the committee's hearing with ASIC, the regulator had been heavily criticised over its handling of the prosecution of One.Tel directors Jodee Rich and Mark Silbermann. ASIC had sought to fine the two and have them banned from running companies, on the basis that they had misled the One.Tel board about the company's true financial position. However, the NSW Supreme Court found against ASIC, stating that ASIC had failed to prove any aspect of its case.   

2.38      ASIC told the committee that it is reviewing the 3000 page judgment and had not yet made a decision on whether to appeal. ASIC could not provide the committee with a definitive answer to the question of the cost of running the case.[27]

2.39      Despite the disappointing result, ASIC suggested that bringing these sorts of cases served an important educational and deterrence role:

...this sort of case brought into focus the duties of directors and officers leading up to a potential insolvency of a company, so it had important public interest aspects.[28]

2.40      Subsequent to the committee's November oversight hearing, ASIC has come in for further criticism of its handling of cases against Mr Andrew Lindberg, former managing director of AWB. Supreme Court Judge Justice Robson described ASIC's attempt to bring a second round of proceedings against Mr Lindberg as 'an abuse of process'.[29]

2.41      In late December 2009, ASIC's proceedings against Fortescue Metals Group Ltd and Andrew Forrest were also dismissed. ASIC has not yet made a decision about whether to appeal. [30]

Committee view

2.42      The committee acknowledges that it is part of ASIC's role to recommend the prosecution of difficult cases and test cases, and that it is not realistic to assume that all such cases will be successful. The committee further acknowledges that the case  against the One.Tel directors has been on foot for some years and that, since those prosecutions were first initiated, ASIC has undergone both significant internal restructuring and changes in leadership. The committee accepts that, faced with a similar situation now, ASIC might take an alternative approach.

2.43      However, the criticism of ASIC's recent approach with regard to the AWB prosecutions suggests to the committee that there is still room for ASIC to improve its processes. The committee requested that ASIC provide additional breakdowns on notice with regard to the success rate of its prosecutions during 2008-09 (see Appendix 2, Questions on Notice 2, 3 and 4) and will continue to discuss this matter with ASIC at future oversight hearings.

2.44      The committee notes ASIC's announcement on 17 December 2009 that it will appeal against both the One.Tel and the AWB findings.[31]

Insolvency matters

2.45      ASIC is responsible for enforcing the provisions of the Corporations Act, including those pertaining to insolvency matters. Under section 206F of the Corporations Act, ASIC may disqualify someone from managing a company if they have been involved in two or more failed companies. ASIC told the committee that:

...in 2008-09, we banned 44 such directors that had appeared in two or more companies under section 206 of the Corporations Act. We are very alive to that issue, stopping the companies from coming back indirectly through bannings, as we did in the Somerville case, and through our surveillance processes undertaken by our insolvency team.[32]

2.46      The committee also heard that ASIC had introduced a 'new electronic tool to sweep its registers to detect director candidates for disqualification under s206F of the Corporations Act'.[33] ASIC commented:

That goes to the issue of where you have been a director of two or more insolvent companies. We are trying to make sure we are getting that information. There is a flag that comes up and says ‘Have a look at this person, they have appeared in more than two, so have a look and see’. And that might then lead to a banning.

2.47      The committee was also interested in ASIC's handling of complaints about the conduct of insolvency practitioners. ASIC stated that it was investigating the extent of problems in this area:

At the moment we are doing an exercise on assessing the significance of complaints that we receive in this area; whether there is a trend or not, or whether they are still quite isolated. They seem to us at the moment to be quite isolated. They do not seem to have a pattern. The commission met yesterday and we looked at a range of new initiatives that we endorsed. This initiative around looking more closely at complaints relating to insolvency practitioners about remuneration, independence and so on is something that we are putting resources into. We will be doing a lot more work on that in the short term.[34]

Committee view

2.48      It is an ongoing concern of the committee that ASIC is, or is seen to be, reactive rather than proactive in enforcing the provisions of the Corporations Act. It is often of little comfort to investors when ASIC takes action after a company collapse; it would be preferable to build regulatory and enforcement systems that aid in preventing collapse in the first place. Therefore, the committee welcomes ASIC's efforts to proactively identify directors who have been involved in multiple company failures for additional scrutiny.

2.49      The committee notes that an inquiry related to insolvency matters is being undertaken by the Senate Economics References Committee. On 25 November 2009 the Senate referred to that committee an inquiry into liquidators and administrators. The Senate Economics Committee will investigate the role of liquidators and administrators, their fees and their practices, and the involvement and activities of ASIC, prior to and following the collapse of a business. The Joint Committee awaits the findings of that inquiry with interest.

 

Mr Bernie Ripoll MP

Chairman

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