Chapter 4 - Consideration of alternative models

Chapter 4Consideration of alternative models

4.1Due to the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, the Australian Government must find a solution to building up the number of readily deployable personnel to assist communities during and after disaster events. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is a valuable resource that can be called upon to assist during a disaster when other resources have been exhausted. However, it is not sustainable to rely on their deployability in the context of a world where more frequent disaster events are commonplace, as their time and resources must be focused on their primary and essential role in defending and protecting Australia’s national security.

4.2This chapter will first discuss the current role of the ADF in responding to natural disasters, before exploring alternative models that could increase Australia’s deployable capacity to respond to natural disasters without relying on the ADF, including international examples.

Role of the Australian Defence Force

4.3The ADF sits within the Department of Defence (Defence) portfolio whose mission and purpose is to defend Australia and its national interests in order to advance Australia’s security and prosperity.[1]

4.4Whilst the ADF’s primary role is to defend Australia, the ADF is able to assist states and territories during the response to and recovery from natural disasters. Defence is tasked to be prepared to provide domestic disaster relief through the Chief of Defence Force Preparedness Directive.[2] The ADF has a range of capabilities and resources that are useful in the natural disaster context, including providing logistics, communications, transport by sea, land and air, as well as the deployment of personnel. Importantly, it must be noted that the ADF does not have the capability nor resources to fight bushfires and is not trained to do so, except in the specific area of naval fires. The ADF provides this support in accordance with the processes outlined in the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) manual.[3]

4.5State and territory governments must request ADF assistance before the Australian Government can authorise ADF deployment, unless where a state or territory government is incapacitated. A request must be made in accordance with the DACC manual and the Australian Government Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN).[4]

4.6The DACC manual outlines the types of assistance Defence can provide and the thresholds to make requests for assistance. The threshold for a request for assistance during or after a significant crisis is where the scale of an emergency or disaster exceeds or exhausts the response capacity and capabilities of a state or territory or where resources cannot be mobilised in sufficient time. Whether a request is authorised will depend on the circumstances of the request and consideration of Defence’s present operational, fiscal and policy setting.[5] Additionally, whether a cost is incurred by a state or territory for DACC assistance will depend on what type of assistance it is categorised as. For example, the categories of local emergency assistance (DACC 1), significant crisis response or relief assistance (DACC 2), and local non-emergency assistance of a minor nature (DACC 4) do not incur costs. However, the significant recovery assistance (DACC 3), significant non-emergency assistance (DACC 5), and support to law enforcement (DACC 6) categories will incur costs unless a waiver is approved.[6]

4.7The COMDISPLAN outlines the coordination arrangements for the provision of non-financial assistance from the Australian Government in the event of a disaster or emergency within Australia or its territories.[7] Before a request is made under COMDISPLAN:

a jurisdiction must have exhausted all government, community, and commercial options to cope with the situation; or

a jurisdiction is unable to mobilise its own resources in time; or

the Australian Government has a capability that the state or territory does not have.[8]

Increased deployment and expectations of the ADF

4.8The domestic operations of the ADF have increased over the past few years in response to natural disasters. Defence submitted:

The use of both full-time and part-time Defence personnel to support the Australian community since 2019 has been at an unprecedented scale, duration and frequency … Since 2019 over 35 100 ADF personnel have deployed in domestic disaster relief operations, some multiple times.[9]

4.9The 2019–20 bushfires, in particular, saw an unprecedented number of ADF personnel and equipment used to support civilian emergency services and was considered the largest ever mobilisation of the ADF in response to a domestic disaster. The ADF received requests for assistance from New South Wales (NSW), Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia (WA), South Australia (SA) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT).[10] Operation Bushfire Assist 2019–20 lasted almost six months, cost approximately $68.6 million[11] and, at its peak, the ADF had tasked around 6 500 personnel, including 3 000 reservists under compulsory call-out orders.[12]

4.10The Reserves are a surge component of the ADF and give the ADF the ability to scale up its forces. This was the first time the ‘Calling out the Reserves’ powers were used for a national disaster under the Defence Act 1903.[13] The effect of the call-out order was that Reserve forces, who usually provide service to the ADF on a voluntary basis, were obliged to provide full-time service for the duration of the call-out order.[14]

4.11Due to the increased frequency of ADF deployments, it has become somewhat of an expectation that the ADF will always provide assistance in responding to natural disasters. This has called into question the sustainability and suitability of the ADF’s role in disaster response, recognising that the ADF’s primary role must be national security.

4.12In its submission, Defence commented on the impact of the increased deployment of the ADF on its capacity to fulfil its operational requirements for its primary mission:

… the increased scope, scale and duration of Australian Defence Force (ADF) commitment to domestic disaster relief has resulted in workforce pressure on both permanent and reserve ADF capacity, which may incur reduced capability within some areas. Increased utilisation of ADF resources during domestic natural disasters has required Defence to reprioritise its workforce to meet Government direction, reducing capacity and opportunity to train, maintain and sustain its workforce to meet the operational requirements of its primary mission.[15]

4.13The Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements recognised the valuable role that the ADF played in response to the 2019–20 bushfires, but highlighted that there was a misconception that the ADF was always readily available and equipped to respond in all aspects. The Royal Commission’s October 2020 report stated:

There appears to be a lack of understanding about the role, capacity and capability of the ADF in relation to natural disasters … Understanding of ADF capabilities and processes needs to be improved to ensure that it is used effectively.

The ADF has finite capacity and capability. The capacity and capability of the ADF to respond to natural disasters can be affected by its commitment to its priorities, both domestic and international.[16]

4.14The President of the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) was of the view that there is an ‘expectation by the community now that the ADF will be there from day one’, so it is important that there be an education campaign ‘to show the community that the states and agencies have the capability to respond, to ensure that the community has confidence in what the states can do’.[17]

4.15The Defence Strategic Review 2023 (DSR)[18] also emphasised that the ADF must be considered a capability of last resort and called upon only once all jurisdictional and commercial capabilities have been exhausted.[19] The DSR asserted that Commonwealth, state and local governments must work in partnership to ensure that the necessary plans, resources and capabilities are in place to deal with all but the most extreme domestic disaster operations.[20]

4.16The Australian Government agreed in-principle with the recommendations of the DSR.[21] Since this agreement, the Australian Government has funded initiatives such as the National Emergency Management Stockpile (NEMS), discussed in chapter 2 of this report, to ‘augment the response support that the ADF provides to states and territories in national emergencies and to help reduces our reliance on the ADF to support domestic response and relief efforts’.[22]

Evidence received about the role of the ADF

4.17Overwhelmingly, those who commented on the role of the ADF expressed appreciation and gratitude for the efforts of the ADF in responding to natural disasters and assisting impacted communities.[23] For example, witnesses provided the following accounts of community responses to the arrival of the ADF following the Fitzroy Crossing floods:

Mr Buffone: I can give you an anecdotal aspect around the importance of how the community feels about the ADF. When I went to Fitzroy Crossing and spoke to the elders recently, their words were—and it was actually quite an emotive statement but really touching: 'When we saw the helicopters land and when we saw the uniforms come out, our hearts warmed and we felt safe’.[26]

Mr Berger: During the recent flooding, the ADF provided not only material support but also a reassuring presence. I will never forget iconic images of Fitzroy Crossing children watching, wide-eyed and full of excitement, the arrival of ADF Chinook helicopters.[27]

4.18A small number of submitters suggested that a dedicated capability within the ADF would be the best approach to resolving the primary and secondary roles of the ADF.[24] For example, the Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ) recognised that the ADF have access to a level of equipment and expertise that is often significantly more advanced than what is available at the local community level, as well as possessing a range of applicable skills and knowledge of how to operate safely in extreme environments, and submitted:

Demand on the ADF will undoubtedly increase with the increasing frequency of natural disasters leading to an increased need for enhanced support to States regarding disaster response and recovery. The Federal Government may well consider the advantages of developing a capability within the ADF specifically focused on disaster response and recovery, particularly the coordination and control of ADF personnel and assets.[25]

4.19On the other hand, the majority of submitters agreed that the deployment of the ADF should complement existing local and state capabilities, rather than being relied upon to respond to civil emergencies.[26] Submitters stated that:

our current expectations of the ADF’s role are both unrealistic and unsustainable;[27]

it is not appropriate for the ADF to be constituted as a standing emergency response agency with specific obligations to respond to civil emergencies;[28]

ADF deployments should be complementary to, but not a replacement for, local response activities but we need to ensure that they are appropriately funded, resourced, and trained;[29]

existing state agencies need additional investment to enhance their operational response capability rather than funding the development of a strengthened civilian response capability in the ADF;[30] and

that calling on the ADF to respond is the most expensive option.[31]

4.20The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Australia submitted that given the increasing need for additional capability to respond to natural disasters, Australia cannot rely on ad hoc assistance from the ADF which may not always be available. The use of the ADF in domestic natural disaster response should be restricted to exceptionally severe situations. Instead, WILPF Australia stated that Australia needs a reliable way of preparing for and responding to disaster events and suggested that the Australian Government establish a fully funded statutory, independent civilian disaster response agency with well-trained staff that draws on existing agencies and services.[32]

4.21The Tweed Shire Council praised the effectiveness of the ADF’s assistance to communities during disasters, but accepted that:

… the response model incorporating the ADF to initially provide surge capacity is likely untenable into the future, and we need to develop an alternative model. In looking to address an alternative model, I believe identifying the desirable characteristics that the ADF bring, along with some of the challenges communities face in working with out-of-area assistance, will assist us to develop a model—or models, as I do not believe that one size will fit all. A model needs to be embedded within our local and/or regional area, be flexible, be practised, and have ongoing resources and funding to ensure the sustainability of the program.[33]

4.22Similarly, Sandpiper Australia, a charity supporting rural doctors, argued that:

… an established network of rural responders across each State and Territory provides a ready-made disaster response network and is inherently more robust, immediate and able to respond to local needs than relying on an ADF response alone.[34]

4.23The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) stated that it is looking at the sustainability of the current disaster response model and how those arrangements can be supplemented and enhanced to reduce some of the pressure and demand on the ADF. NEMA acknowledged that although the ADF will remain a critical part of Australia’s disaster response architecture:

… it's important that we set that up and build capabilities that not only support states when they reach those thresholds but also prepare us for a catastrophic event that we might not even imagine right now—in particular, when we have consecutive, concurrent and compounding events. Think about the scenarios that we see: quite often it's not a single event but multiple events that are happening, and we've seen that through this [2023] season …

What we do need to do, though, is have a look at how we make sure that we fully utilise all capabilities across civil society but then have a surge capability such that the Commonwealth can actually fill any gaps should that occur. That can be through a Commonwealth capability or even reaching into international partners to support us. So, it's this sort of escalating and scalable system.[35]

Committee view

4.24The committee commends ADF personnel for their extraordinary efforts in supporting communities in response to natural disasters and wishes to highlight how valued their contributions are.

4.25However, the committee agrees with the findings of the Defence Strategic Review and the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements that the primary role of the ADF is to protect Australia’s national interest and to defend Australia, therefore the ADF should only be called upon as a last resort to respond to natural disasters when all other capabilities have been exhausted.

4.26The committee believes that the Commonwealth’s capabilities and national capacity must be enhanced to ensure Australia is prepared to face the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters due to climate change and to reduce its reliance on the ADF in times of disaster.

4.27It is apparent to the committee that alternative models need to be explored to bolster Australia’s capacity to respond to natural disasters without relying on the ADF.

4.28The remainder of the chapter will canvass evidence of alternative models for disaster response and recovery that could be considered by the Australian Government, including international examples.

Alternative models

4.29This section explores non-military alternative models at the national level that could relieve the ADF from the increasing pressure to respond to natural disasters in Australia, including the already established Disaster Relief Australia (DRA) and proposals for a National Guard.

Disaster Relief Australia

4.30One model, worthy of considering how it could be scaled up, is already operational in Australia and providing an alternative disaster relief capability to the ADF—DRA.

4.31DRA was founded in 2016 and brings together the skills and experience of military veterans with emergency services specialists to rapidly deploy disaster relief teams in Australia following natural disasters, providing veterans a model of continued service to the nation. DRA’s model of deploying veterans and first responders in disaster recovery provides a flexible mechanism by which the latent talent of Australia’s veterans can be harnessed and repurposed to support and mobilise communities impacted by disasters. It also provides veterans with a ‘renewed sense of purpose and identity, which has positive mental health benefits’.[36]

4.32Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO of DRA and ex- firefighter and soldier, stated that the organisation is made up of about 75 to 80 per cent of veterans who are ‘incredibly well skilled and suited to the disaster recovery environment’ and the other 20 to 25 per cent are emergency services workers and volunteers. Mr Evans added that the application of military methodology and know-how to disaster resilience is proving to be a very powerful tool.[37] An additional benefit of having a workforce made up of emergency services personnel and veterans is that these groups ‘speak the language’ of the State Emergency Services (SES), Rural Fire Service (RFS), Country Fire Authority (CFA) and ADF which helps with the effective coordination and integration of DRA staff on the ground. Mr Evans gave the following example:

… if we have liaison officers on the ground working with the local council authorities who are getting an ADF element, local councils generally have no idea of what the ADF is. For example, if they're getting a combat engineer regiment, they don't know what that is. We can provide them assistance and explain, 'That regiment can do just about anything,' and they'll say, 'Right—fantastic.' So it allows the ADF to come in faster and hit the ground running. I saw a case in Queensland where a company of 8/9 RAR [(Royal Australian Regiment)] turned up at the local council and were sent home because there was no work for them to do. There was plenty of work; the council just didn't know what a company of 8/9 RAR was. It was a massive waste of resources, whereas we could have assisted them ... [and] if we're ahead of the ADF we can let them know what they're coming into so they know what to bring and we can let the local councils know what is coming.[38]

4.33DRA states that it aims to be the ‘force of choice’ in disaster recovery, reducing demand on the ADF. DRA described its capabilities as matching that of an ADF deployment at DACC Level 3, that is, recovery from a civil emergency or disaster which is not directly related to the saving of life or property but involves longer term significant recovery activity. Their capabilities include:

general duties disaster recovery work;

incident management;

damage and impact assessment;

aerial damage assessment and mapping;

debris management and access restoration;

logistics management and aid delivery;

spontaneous volunteer management;

work order management;

expedient home repairs; and

building community resilience.[39]

4.34Mr Evans explained DRA has adopted a flexible model where volunteers can ‘join DRA today and deploy tomorrow’, recognising that many of their volunteers come from a military background with skills and experience, negating the requirement for additional training. Mr Evans also noted that the majority of recovery tasks they undertake are actually quite low skilled, as opposed to what a response agency might need to do which requires a higher level of skilled training. Whilst some level of screening and training is required for spontaneous volunteers, Mr Evans stated:

We have found we need to be very careful of locking volunteers into a trade model where they need to complete X number of courses to be able to deploy onto the ground … every time you introduce a data point on their sign-up form or a training qualification, you introduce an attrition rate.

This is one of the things, as you well know, Chair, that upsets veterans: the lack of recognition of skill and experience. So we don't turn up and say: 'We're going to put you through a whole heap of training for things that you already know how to do’. We will use your existing skills base and then upskill you where we need to. That's been incredibly successful. We find that if we can empower people like that and get out of their way, that we lead the field in so many different areas because of it.[40]

4.35Additionally, DRA claims that it offers a solution to some of the problems outlined in chapter 3 about spontaneous volunteers, stating that veterans:

… are inherently leadership trained and have proven to be adept at leading spontaneous volunteers, corporations and community groups, including volunteer emergency services organisations, in disaster recovery.[41]

4.36As of March 2023, DRA has been involved in 56 recovery missions, deploying around 4 500 volunteers since early 2017.[42] DRA deploys at the request of local or state government agencies, integrating with local government disaster recovery centres.[43] Mr Evans explained that DRA usually deploys in a platoon of about 25 to 30 people who are on the ground for seven days before rotating them out with another platoon, this will occur for approximately six to ten weeks, or until DRA’s funding or volunteers are exhausted.[44]

4.37DRA also has arrangements and relationships with other non-government organisations, with the ability to operate independently or as a part of an integrated taskforce.[45] However, Mr Evans emphasised the importance of joint planning for disaster preparedness, response and recovery, stating that NEMA is best placed to take on the role of joint planning and coordination from the national level to ensure that different organisations from across the preparedness, response and recovery stages are engaged in the necessary sequence to respond effectively to a disaster event—‘like you would a military mission’.[46] Mr Evans explained that there is currently no department or agency that plays this kind of role, but noted that:

… the National Emergency Management Agency have a joint planning tool that they've developed and are just going to start rolling out. We'd identified this as a gap and were going to move to a joint planning model as well. But it's much better done by NEMA; it'll just be a question of how much of each jurisdiction takes it up. It gives you a common framework for planning, it gives you a common operating language and it would be a very, very valuable tool depending on how many people take it up and in which jurisdiction.[47]

4.38The Australian Government committed $38.3 million over four years from 2022–2023 to DRA to support the recruitment, deployment, equipment, and training of an additional 5 200 DRA volunteers.[48]

4.39DRA made the following recommendations in its submission:

(a)upon successful completion of the current pilot project, the Australian Government expand funding for DRA beyond 2026;

(b)incorporate DRA into the Joint Transition Authority’s Strategic Plan for transitioning ADF members to continue to serve the nation;

(c)governments provide paid volunteer leave for public servants to deploy with DRA;

(d)the ADF consider engagement with volunteer organisations such as DRA as part of its transition program; and

(e)incorporate DRA into national and state-based disaster relief and emergency management legislation, emergency plans and arrangements.[49]

A National Guard

4.40When referring the inquiry, the Chair of the committee, Senator Jacqui Lambie, proposed the establishment of a National Guard—a domestic arm made up of young Australians not working or studying to help the ADF meet the requirements of non-traditional missions such as assisting with natural disasters.[50]

4.41The committee received little evidence during the inquiry on the prospect of a National Guard, although often referred to by other names such as National Service, Home Guard or Civilian Corps.

4.42For example, Mr Ian Symons, who served in CFA Victoria for 35 years, submitted:

More frequent events indicate a need for a new approach through establishment of either a [United States (US)] style Home Guard or a form of National Service that might be para-military in style but directed at community preparedness and response during major emergencies … something akin to the US Home Guard that could employ a paid training scheme and an expectation of continued service of some type, similar to the Defence Reserves, as a way of supplementing emergency response resources. Of course there would be extensive establishment, administrative and operational costs associated with setting up such an organisation.[51]

4.43Without mentioning a National Guard specifically, Defence stated in its submission:

The establishment of a scalable and deployable civil contingency workforce to support national crisis response and recovery could provide an alternative option to utilising the ADF workforce by increasing the threshold for requests. This could reduce operational tempo, training disruption and relieve workforce concurrency pressure, delivering an increase in workforce availability and corresponding maintenance of ADF capability for employment in its primary role.[52]

4.44Mr Neil Smail, a retired Commonwealth public servant and diplomat, proposed a similar concept to a National Guard, which he called the Volunteer Disaster Corps in recognition of the Volunteer Defence Corps which was used during World War Two for ‘enrolled men [sic] otherwise unable to join the regular services to undertake “home guard” duties’. Mr Smail recognised the need for a secondary responder organisation that sits between emergency services, including the SES, and recovery services, generally run by state, territory and local governments—a role usually taken on by the ADF.[53]

4.45Mr Smail proposed that the new service would be a Federal Government program, with the Minister for Home Affairs as the responsible minister, designed to have trained and equipped volunteers based in cities and towns across Australia, able to provide immediate assistance post-disaster. Whilst the service should be volunteer-driven, paid staff managing administration would be positioned at the local level, possibly local government staff paid by federal funding to the local council. Higher level management would be within the federal agency, but also positioned locally.[54]

4.46Members of the service would commit to attending training and skills exercises, with possible links to TAFE. The Volunteer Disaster Corps would provide:

… for example, water treatment equipment, large generators, flood-lighting, rough territory transport, foodstuff and medical supplies delivery, radio communications and urgent "make safe" engineering. Skills obtained by volunteers would be recognised by documented certification, useful when applying for paid employment. It would be funded by all levels of government but with close, formal links to local councils.[55]

4.47Mr Smail suggested that vehicles and equipment be positioned at local government facilities, such as secure yards, which could be loaned or leased to the new service. Additionally, instead of the ADF disposing of useful equipment—such as Unimogs (all terrain off-road vehicle), bobcats or mobile cranes—through private auction sales, these could be transferred to or purchased by the new service.[56]

4.48Another idea was proposed by Mr Raymond Whitehead, who previously served in the Army and Defence. He asserted that the major reason the ADF is called upon to aid communities is generally for its specialist equipment and logistics, suggesting the establishment of a national Australian Disaster Response Force (ADRF).[57]

4.49In this proposal, Mr Whitehead submitted that veterans would make up the force given they possess a lot of the specialist skills needed to do this type of work. Additionally, he stated ‘it would make economic sense to have it [co-located] and administered under the Defence portfolio to take advantage of shared services and capability acquisition’.[58]

4.50Mr Whitehead outlined two main roles for his ADRF proposal:

first, to provide heavy logistic and tactical support to local frontline services, including such things as: communications and IT support, medical support through deployable hospitals, heavy logistics support. It would also have access to equipment such as helicopters of different sizes, specialist observation and situational awareness aircraft, a fleet of transport planes, and tactical and strategic water bombers; and

second, to have an international deployment capability for disaster recovery—principally for the South Pacific, but deployable to anywhere in the world. The international role would include an enhanced maritime search, rescue, and recovery role. The force would also maintain a fleet of vessels to provide aid and blue water search and rescue.[59]

4.51Mr Whitehead recognised that this was a major initiative but expressed that costs would be minimised by co-locating it within Defence to take advantage of the existing Defence estate, Defence and civil procurement, vacant infrastructure, and so on. Mr Whitehead noted that this ‘would also require very strong ministerial oversight to keep the Defence hierarchy under control and not cost shift’.[60]

International examples

4.52Countries around the world employ different models utilising civil and military resources to support national responses to significant disasters. This section will discuss a few international examples that could be considered or adapted for the Australian context.

United States

4.53The US civil contingency model is threefold, comprising the National Guard[61], Surge Capacity Force (SCF)[62] and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Reservists.[63] The National Guard partners with FEMA during crises, and the SCF supplements FEMA if the capacity is exceeded.

4.54The National Guard is the primary combat reserve of the US Army and Air Force that serves both community and country by conducting overseas combat missions and counterdrug efforts, but also responds to domestic emergencies. The National Guard collaborates with and supports civilian authorities and traditional first responders in responding to disasters, strengthening and expanding the local disaster response capability when overwhelmed. The US President or any state governor can call on the National Guard for assistance.[64]

4.55The National Guard comprises volunteers who agree to ‘activations’, which can involve fulltime service in a voluntary or involuntary capacity. Its personnel generally ‘cannot opt out of involuntary action. This is because the military has ordered’ personnel to active service. The National Guard involves initial training of eight to 12 weeks (depending on civilian work commitments and military training requirements), monthly drills for 48 periods per year (i.e. one weekend a month), and annual training for two weeks a year.[65] The US has 54 separate National Guard organisations for each state, of which 53 operate as state or territorial organisations (the Washington DC National Guard remains federal) and are controlled by the governor, unless control passes to the US President.[66]

4.56According to the US Department of Defense, there are more than 300 000 National Guard troops that are trained and ready to assist in disaster response, including evacuations, communications, delivering supplies and maintaining order. In addition to the peoplepower, the National Guard also deploys equipment such as helicopters, boats and high-water vehicles.[67]

4.57The SCF was established in 2006 following devastating effects of Hurricane Katrina, a Category 5 hurricane that caused over 1 000 fatalities and damages estimated at US$161 billion, particularly in New Orleans. The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorised to activate SCF to change the federal response to a catastrophic disaster, and federal employees will be deployed to help support response and recovery efforts.[68]

4.58FEMA Reservists are a temporary, on-call paid workforce that may be deployed depending on the needs of the disaster and the position of the reservist. Reservist employees are hired from diverse backgrounds and career paths to meet operational needs including emergency management, IT, logistics, human resources, environmental protection, analytics, external affairs, grants management, engineering, customer service, and more. The reservist program is divided into 23 different cadres organised by operational responsibilities with each cadre having various positions, from specialist to leadership level that each play vital roles in supporting disaster operations. Reservists are often deployed at short notice and are usually deployed for a period of 30 days.[69]

4.59There are also a number of incentives for signing up as a FEMA Reservist including: a limited time offer of a US$500–$2 500 signing bonus under certain circumstances; health benefits; paid work travel and accommodation; and annual merit-based increases based on performance. FEMA Reservists are also covered by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, protecting them from discrimination and providing job protections when they are deployed to disasters, emergencies, and critical trainings on behalf of FEMA.[70]

4.60Mr Greg Fisk from British Maritime Technology was supportive of the US model and its potential application in Australia, stating at a committee hearing:

If you look at the National Guard model in the United States, it is a federally funded program, but it sits within the states. The National Guard can be called out by the governor of the states, the equivalent of our premiers. So, it's very much a local support mechanism that's federally funded and it's very much an intergovernmental cooperation scheme where the feds front most of the money but the benefits are happening and the ability to influence the agenda is happening at the state level. That's very attractive to me in the context of being able to have something that's sort of bottom up but paid from the top down.[71]

4.61Our Future Northern Rivers & Lismore Citizens Flood Review Group submitted that the coordinated approach of the US FEMA framework would ‘be of great benefit to the nation’ in dealing with natural disasters, stating that there is no need to re-invent the wheel.[72]

Denmark

4.62Denmark has a conscription-based military national service requiring men aged from 18 years to complete four to 12 months of training and may be called on for military service. However, because enough men choose to serve voluntarily, a lottery system means that not all men have to serve. Women have been permitted to serve military service on a voluntary basis since 1998, however Denmark has recently announced it plans to implement conscription for women as well.[73] There is also an option to serve conscription in a non-military position instead, such as at the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). DEMA is an agency under the Ministry of Defence that works to prepare society for, prevent and respond to major accidents and disasters.[74]

4.63According to the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs):

The DEMA heads Denmark’s national emergency service, which consists of five national emergency centres with permanent employees, conscripts and volunteers, as well as a Volunteer Centre. The Emergency Centres can also assist the local emergency services, the police and other authorities at larger or longer-term instances in Denmark where there is an eminent need for additional personnel or special equipment.[75]

4.64Each of the national fire and rescue centres is manned by approximately 26 officers, 60 specially trained conscripts and 40–100 volunteers. While there are approximately 200 officers and 400 constricts available nationwide at any time, DEMA is able to rapidly upgrade this capacity with up to 1 150 conscripts, officers and volunteers in case of major incidents.[76]

4.65DEMA states that conscripts are ‘the backbone of DEMA's operations’. In the nine months of service, they are trained in:

firefighting;

advanced First Aid;

urban search and rescue training;

response and basic training for accidents involving hazardous chemicals and CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence) incidents;

physical training; and

rescue service.[77]

4.66DEMA notes that most conscripts obtain a special driver’s license during their training and once training is complete, individuals are qualified as a trained rescue specialist.[78]

Germany

4.67Germany’s military, Bundeswehr, offers a civil contingency capability for disaster response and recovery through a volunteer national service program called ‘Your year for Germany’. The German Defence Minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, stated that the program was established after seeing ‘that there were young people who were interested in joining the Bundeswehr but didn't want to tie themselves down’. When the program launched in 2021, it received 9 000 applications for the 1 000 spots available.[79]

4.68Home Affairs submitted that:

This program is targeted at young citizens, with volunteers trained to support the country during natural disaster or health crises. Volunteers spend a year in the ‘Bundeswehr’ (military service), but after six months of service will practice ‘homeland protection’ and participate in crisis operations. The program complements Germany’s existing civil service program (‘Voluntary Social Year’), where citizens can volunteer for training and work in social institutions including aged care and hospitals.[80]

4.69According to the Bundeswehr:

Having received their assignment-related training, [volunteers] are employed as designated reservists in the region where their roots lie and where they are well connected.[81]

4.70The Bundeswehr also has a Territorial Reserve which serves Germany in its home region and are responsible for homeland security tasks, including disaster relief specialists networked at the local level who can provide support to civilian organisations during disaster events. Reservists are under the command and control of the regional territorial commands.[82]

New Zealand

4.71Similar to Australia’s NEMA, New Zealand has a National Emergency Management Agency (NZ NEMA) which provides leadership and coordination across NZ’s emergency management system. Depending on the emergency, NZ NEMA leads or supports the response and recovery. It works with central and local government, communities, iwi[83], and business to make sure responses to and recoveries from emergencies are effective and integrated.[84]

4.72NZ NEMA encourages people to volunteer through their local civil defence organisation, which are operated by local councils. NZ NEMA provides a volunteer coordination role through its Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) which is delivered through a lattice of partnerships: local councils, emergency services, community agencies and the wider community. CDEM provides guidance for volunteer coordination including on preparation, community engagement, and flexibility and collaboration, as well as training programs and other useful materials such as checklists, task descriptions, resources and fact sheets.[85]

4.73On the other hand, unlike Australia, NZ NEMA operates an Emergency Management Assistance Team (NZ EMAT) which:

… is a deployable capability within the emergency management system. EMAT was established in response to recommendations to create a 'fly-in team' to enhance responses to natural disasters and other emergencies.

EMAT's purpose is to provide specialist capability enhancement to assist and support affected regions and their Incident Management Teams to manage an emergency. EMAT helps ensure that New Zealanders receive a consistent level of support in any emergency, wherever and whenever it happens.

EMAT consists of 46 specialist Emergency Managers with a mix of attributes, skills and experience to go wherever required, without delay, to work with and support local, regional or national teams as they manage emergencies. EMAT members are able to operate fully self-sufficiently for the duration of their deployment.[86]

4.74The EMAT cadre is drawn from personnel working in a wide range of qualifying agencies, including central and local government agencies, the emergency services and NZ Defence Force (NZDF). These personnel have significant experience in crisis response and emergency management in a range of settings in NZ and overseas.[87]

4.75NZ EMAT has 50 mobile Deployable Coordination Centres (DCC) which can be requested to support a lead agency that requires additional coordination facilities at a local or regional level. DCC Caches are located in strategic locations around NZ and can be rapidly deployed. The DCC are maintained by Fire and Emergency New Zealand Urban Search and Rescue. Each DCC is a 20ft ‘high top’ side-opening shipping container that holds a wide range of equipment to establish a fully equipped 50-person coordination centre. The shipping container is also equipped with lights and power outlets, and serves as a responder briefing and equipment maintenance area.[88]

4.76Also similar to Australia’s model, the NZDF can be engaged under the Defence Act 1990 to perform any public service or aid a civil power in a time of emergency by deploying at short notice manage wild fires, search and rescue, and related operational outputs. National level support from the NZDF during an emergency is requested through the National Controller via a NZDF Liaison Officer. The degree of support and the tasks to be conducted will be agreed between the Controller and the NZDF and should be in the form of a general task or a desired effect rather than a specific resource or capability.[89]

Committee view

4.77The committee notes the Australian Government’s ongoing partnership with DRA, including its investment of $38.3 million in DRA to provide relief and recovery support to Australian communities and lessen our reliance on the ADF during disasters.

4.78The committee commends DRA on its leadership and efforts to create an alternative disaster response model to take some pressure off the ADF and to mobilise and coordinate skilled volunteers to assist communities to recover from natural disasters. The committee sees this model as scalable and would like to see the Australian Government provide DRA with additional support to expand its operations beyond the $38.3 million in funding provided over four years from 2022–2023.

Recommendation 9

4.79The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider how it can further support Disaster Relief Australia, and other similar organisations, not only with funding beyond 2026, but also how the Australian Government can further incorporate Disaster Relief Australia into its national disaster response arrangements and boost its numbers through partnerships with the Australian Defence Force and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs.

4.80The committee received minimal commentary on the prospect of establishing a National Guard in Australia and believes that further investigation is warranted, including into the suitability of international examples of national civil emergency services, such as those explored in this chapter, in the Australian context.

4.81Nevertheless, the committee is of the view that the Australian Government should, as a matter of priority, consider ways to incentivise young Australians to volunteer in disaster response and recovery efforts to support communities across Australia.

Recommendation 10

4.82The committee recommends that the Australian Government consider ways to incentivise young Australians to participate in volunteer organisations that provide support for disaster response and recovery.

Senator Jacqui Lambie

Chair

Jacqui Lambie Network

Senator for Tasmania

Footnotes

[1]Department of Defence (Defence), ‘Defence mission’ (accessed 28 May 2024).

[2]Defence, Submission 25, p. 2.

[3]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 188.

[4]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 194.

[5]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, pp. 194–196; Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual (DACC manual), 21 December 2023, p. 14.

[6]Defence, Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Policy, 31 August 2021, pp. 7–12.

[7]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 194.

[9]Defence, Submission 25, p. 3.

[10]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 189.

[11]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 200.

[12]Nicole Brangwin and David Watt, ‘The state of Australia’s defence: a quick guide’, Parliamentary Library research paper series 2022–23, 27 July 2022, pp. 11–12.

[13]Defence Act 1903, Division 3 of Part III, subsection 28.

[14]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, pp. 190–191.

[15]Defence, Submission 25, p. 2.

[16]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, pp. 186 & 189.

[17]Ms Carlene York, President, Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC), Committee Hansard, 19 April 2023, p. 14.

[18]Note: the Defence Strategic Review (DSR) assesses the current strategic environment facing Australia and makes recommendations about how Australia can adapt to the new strategic reality by reassessing its defence capability priorities and processes.

[19]Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review 2023, p. 41.

[20]Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review 2023, p. 41.

[21]Australian Government, Defence Strategic Review 2023, pp. 109–110.

[22]National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), ‘Budget 2024–25 Factsheet: National Emergency Management Stockpile Capability’, p. 2 (accessed 5 June 2024).

[23]See, for example: Mr Chuck Berger, Chief Executive Officer, Kimberly Development Commission, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2023, p. 26; Councillor Linda Scott, President, Australian Local Government Association, Committee Hansard, 13 April 2023, p. 19; Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ), Submission 20, p. 7; Mr Joe Buffone, Deputy Coordinator-General, Emergency Management and Response, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 1.

[26]Mr Joe Buffone, Deputy Coordinator-General, Emergency Management and Response, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 1.

[27]Mr Chuck Berger, Chief Executive Officer, Kimberley Development Commission, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2023, p. 26.

[24]See, for example: LGAQ, Submission 20, pp. 9–10; Police Association Victoria, Submission 11, pp. 2–6.

[25]LGAQ, Submission 20, pp. 9–10.

[26]See, for example: LGAQ, Submission 20, p. 4; AFAC, Submission 72, p. 7; United Professional Firefighters Union of WA, Submission 93, p. 5; Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Submission 94, p. 1.

[27]Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Submission 94, p. 1.

[28]AFAC, Submission 72, p. 7.

[29]LGAQ, Submission 20, p. 4

[30]NSW Rural Fire Service - answer to questions on notice from a public hearing, 13 April 2023, Sydney, pp. 2–3.

[31]Australian Red Cross, Submission 56, p. 3.

[32]Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) Australia, Submission 114, p. 3.

[33]Ms Doreen Harwood, Enterprise Risk and Emergency Management Officer and Local Emergency Management Officer, Tweed Shire Council, Committee Hansard, 29 June 2023, p. 2.

[34]Sandpiper Australia, Submission 140, p. 7.

[35]Mr Joe Buffone, Deputy Coordinator-General, Emergency Management and Response, NEMA, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, pp. 2 & 6.

[36]Disaster Relief Australia (DRA), Submission 27, pp. 1, 3 & 5.

[37]Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO, Disaster Relief Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 35.

[38]Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO, Disaster Relief Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 38.

[39]DRA, Submission 27, pp. 2–3.

[40]Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO, Disaster Relief Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, pp. 36 & 42.

[41]DRA, Submission 27, p. 4.

[42]Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO, Disaster Relief Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 35.

[43]DRA, Submission 27, p. 1.

[44]Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO, Disaster Relief Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 41.

[45]DRA, Submission 27, p. 1.

[46]Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO, Disaster Relief Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, pp. 37–38.

[47]Mr Geoffrey Evans, CEO, Disaster Relief Australia, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 38.

[48]DRA, Submission 27, p. 3; NEMA, ‘Disaster Relief Australia’ (accessed 2 July 2024).

[49]DRA, Submission 27, p. 6.

[50]Select Committee on Australia’s Disaster Resilience—appointment, Senate Official Hansard, 27 October 2022, p. 1778.

[51]Mr Ian Symons, Submission 118, p. 2.

[52]Department of Defence (Defence), Submission 25, p. 5.

[53]Mr Neil Smail, Submission 136, p. 1.

[54]Mr Neil Smail, Submission 136, pp. 2–3.

[55]Mr Neil Smail, Submission 136, p. 2.

[56]Mr Neil Smail, Submission 136, p. 2.

[57]Mr Raymond Whitehead, Submission 141, pp. 1–3.

[58]Mr Raymond Whitehead, Submission 141, pp. 1–3.

[59]Mr Raymond Whitehead, Submission 141, p. 1.

[60]Mr Raymond Whitehead, Submission 141, p. 2.

[61]US National Guard website (accessed 3 July 2024).

[62]US Department of Homeland Security, ‘Surge Capacity Force’ (accessed 12 June 2024).

[63]US Government Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘Reservists (On-Call)’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[64]Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs), Submission 80, p. 5; Virginia Commonwealth University, ‘The role of the National Guard in disaster response’, 12 May 2021 (accessed 3 July 2024).

[65]US National Guard website (accessed 3 July 2024); Military One Source, ‘Joining the Military as a Reservist: Eligibility, Obligation and Benefits’, 1 February 2024 (accessed 3 July 2024).

[66]Congressional Research Service, ‘Defense Primer: Reserve Forces’, 11 June 2024 (accessed 3 July 2024).

[67]US Department of Defense, ‘We prepare. You should too.’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[68]US Department of Homeland Security, ‘Surge Capacity Force’ (accessed 12 June 2024).

[69]US Government Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘Reservists (On-Call)’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[70]US Government Federal Emergency Management Agency, ‘Reservists (On-Call)’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[71]Mr Greg Fisk, Senior Principal Consultant and Global Lead, Climate Risk and Resilience, British Maritime Technology, Committee Hansard, 22 September 2023, p. 4.

[72]Future Northern Rivers & Lismore Citizens Flood Review Group, Submission 124, p. 7.

[73]Miranda Bryant, ‘Denmark plans to conscript women for military service for first time’, the Guardian, 14 March 2024 (accessed 3 July 2024).

[74]See: Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) website (accessed 12 June 2024).

[75]Home Affairs, Submission 80, p. 5.

[76]DEMA, ‘Response to accidents and disasters’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[77]DEMA, ‘Response to accidents and disasters’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[78]DEMA, ‘Become a conscript’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[79]Alex Berry, ‘Germany launches new army volunteer scheme’, 4 June 2021 (accessed 3 July 2024).

[80]Home Affairs, Submission 80, p. 5.

[81]Bundeswehr, ‘Territorial Reserve’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[82]Bundeswehr, ‘Territorial Reserve’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[83]Note: iwi are kinship groups in New Zealand Māori society.

[84]New Zealand National Emergency Management Agency (NZ NEMA), ‘About: National Emergency Management Agency’ (accessed 3 July 2024).

[85]NZ NEMA, ‘Volunteer coordination in CDEM’ (accessed 3 July 2024).