Chapter 2 - Responding to natural disasters

Chapter 2Responding to natural disasters

2.1Australia’s experience of natural disasters is changing rapidly with the increasing scale, scope and duration of disaster response requirements because of the effects of climate change. This is creating significant challenges for governments by stretching the planning, resources and partnerships needed to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters.

2.2This chapter discusses the challenges facing Australia’s preparedness for natural disasters and the suitability of the response and recovery frameworks in place. This chapter first defines and discusses disaster resilience, before outlining the current disaster response arrangements of Australian governments and the key challenges raised by submitters and witnesses.

What is disaster resilience?

2.3The United Nations (UN) Office for Disaster Risk Reduction defines disaster resilience as:

The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate, adapt to, transform and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions through risk management.[1]

2.4Natural hazards include bushfires, floods, cyclones, storms, heatwaves, earthquakes and tsunamis. These trigger disasters when they impact what people value. According to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) disaster risk is the ‘potential loss of life, injury, or destroyed or damaged assets that could occur to a system, society or a community’. Climate change is an underlying driver of disaster risk as it alters the frequency and intensity of natural hazards, affecting vulnerability to natural hazards, and changing exposure patterns.[2]

2.5The UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (the Sendai Framework), which has been adopted by Australia, recognises the importance of not only managing disasters, but managing disaster risk. The Sendai Framework outlines four global priorities for action to reduce disaster risk:

(a)understanding disaster risk;

(b)strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk;

(c)investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience; and

(d)enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response, and to ‘Build Back Better’ in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.[3]

2.6According to the CSIRO, the concept of building back better to enhance resilience requires consideration of how and where we build, and the pursuit of ongoing improvements in the standard and design of the built environment and critical infrastructure. This includes embedding disaster resilience explicitly in ‘planning, agricultural and urban land use, and zoning and investment decisions, to avoid unnecessary exposure to the new hazards resulting from the impact of climate change’.[4]

2.7Additionally, the CSIRO recognised that communities play an essential role in building resilience, stating that governments must provide communities with ‘the appropriate support to understand and reduce risks within their influence and control’. This includes providing ‘targeted investment in community education and engagement activities’ so that people feel empowered to make informed decisions about their safety.[5]

2.8According to Australia’s National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, the common characteristics of disaster resilience communities, individuals and organisations include that they function well under stress, are successful at adaptation, are self-reliant, and have social capacity. More specifically, a disaster resilient community is one where:

people understand the risks that may affect them and others in their community: they have comprehensive local information about hazards and risks, including who is exposed and who is most vulnerable, and they take action to prepare for disasters and are adaptive and flexible to respond appropriately during emergencies;

people have taken steps to anticipate disasters and to protect themselves, their assets and their livelihoods, including their homes and possessions, cultural heritage and economic capital, therefore minimising physical, economic and social losses. They have committed the necessary resources and are capable of organising themselves before, during and after disasters which helps to restore social, institutional and economic activity;

people work together with local leaders using their knowledge and resources to prepare for and deal with disasters, drawing upon personal and community strengths, and existing community networks and structures;

strong social networks offer support to individuals and families in a time of crisis;

people work in partnership with emergency services, their local authorities and other relevant organisations before, during and after emergencies. These relationships ensure community resilience activities are informed by local knowledge, can be undertaken safely, and complement the work of emergency service agencies;

emergency management plans are resilience-based, to build disaster resilience within communities over time. Communities, governments and other organisations take resilience outcomes into account when considering and developing core services, products and policies. They are adaptive and flexible to respond appropriately in disasters;

the emergency management volunteer sector is strong;

businesses and other service providers undertake wide-reaching business continuity planning that links with their security and emergency management arrangements;

land use planning systems and building control arrangements reduce, as far as is practicable, community exposure to unreasonable risks from known hazards, and suitable arrangements are implemented to protect life and property; and

following a disaster, a satisfactory range of functioning is restored quickly. People understand the mechanisms and processes through which recovery assistance may be made available and they appreciate that support is designed to be offered, in the first instance, to the most vulnerable community members.[6]

Australia’s disaster resilience

2.9The Australian Government recognises that disaster resilience is critical to Australia’s continued wellbeing and prosperity, and that disaster resilience diminishes as disaster risk, and the potential impacts, grows.[7] Indeed, the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience pointed out that ‘for every one dollar invested in resilience before a disaster, we can save between $3 and $8 in recovery’.[8]

2.10The Australian Government’s National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (NDRRF), a framework co-designed with representatives from all levels of government and business and community sectors, outlined the need for a coordinated effort to reduce the impact of disasters and improve disaster resilience:

Disaster resilience and risk reduction is a shared responsibility, but often not equally shared. While individuals and communities have their roles to play, they do not control many of the levers needed to reduce some disaster risks. Governments and industry in particular must take coordinated action to reduce disaster risks within their control to limit adverse impacts on communities. More than ever, limiting the impact of disasters now and in the future requires a coordinated effort across and within many areas including land use planning, infrastructure, emergency management, social policy, agriculture, education, health, community development, energy and the environment.[9]

2.11Despite this acknowledgement from the Australian Government, some submitters and witnesses still believed that governments could have a greater focus on building resilience in Australia.[10]

2.12The Minderoo Foundation, for example, stated ‘the national spend for resilience is inadequate and there is an overemphasis on response, recovery and relief, at the expense of resilience’.[11] The Minderoo Foundation submitted that 97 per cent of government funding is currently spent on response and recovery, with only three per cent spent on preparedness before a disaster to build resilience. It recommended that this amount increase from three to 30 per cent by 2025.[12]

2.13Similarly, the National Insurance Brokers Association (NIBA) agreed that governments had neglected spending on pre-event mitigation and focused too much on post-event recovery. NIBA referred to a 2014 Productivity Commission report stating that governments ‘over-invest in post-disaster reconstruction and under-invest in mitigation that would limit the impact of natural disasters in the first place’. NIBA submitted that ‘more can and must be done to ensure our communities and homes are resilient in the face of natural disasters’.[13]

Disaster resilience and Indigenous communities

2.14Indigenous communities are often disproportionately impacted by natural disasters and exposed to unique risks which presents challenges for developing disaster resilience, particularly for remote Indigenous communities. These communities often already experience high levels of social, health and economic disadvantage and poor infrastructure, and these challenges are being exacerbated by climate change.[14]

2.15Deloitte submitted:

We know that First Nations communities are beyond resilient. However, these communities lack representation in disaster prediction and resilience efforts. Local and state resilience plans do not integrate nor value the knowledge that First Nations people hold about land management and disaster mitigation. Importantly, many existing plans and approaches ignore the fundamental element of trust that First Nations organisations and communities rely on and can bring in situations involving natural disasters. There is an opportunity to widen the focus and prioritise community-led resilience options and ideas.[15]

2.16Building disaster resilience in Indigenous communities involves supporting opportunities to collaborate, share knowledge, and empowering cultural stewardship.[16] Involving groups such as Traditional Owner and Aboriginal organisations and Indigenous ranger groups is important as these groups are well-placed in terms of their location, resources, local knowledge, cultural understanding, language and networks.[17]

2.17National Indigenous Disaster Resilience, a research program at Monash University, submitted that there is a need for greater attention to address the disproportionate impacts that disasters have on Indigenous people across Australia and recommended that the Australian Government:

invest in a workforce of Indigenous Disaster Resilience practitioners;

develop and implement an Indigenous Disaster Resilience Framework;

create an Indigenous Disaster Resilience Unit in NEMA;

amend the Disaster Ready Fund (DRF)[18] to enable self-determination and create opportunities for Indigenous communities and organisations; and

create an Indigenous Coordinator General position within NEMA.[19]

Committee view

2.18The committee acknowledges the importance of mitigating disaster risk and strengthening Australia’s disaster resilience, particularly in recognition that climate change is altering Australia’s experience of natural disasters by exacerbating the scale, scope, duration and succession of natural disasters occurring across the country. As reflected in the evidence, the committee is of the view that there should be a greater focus on preparedness, mitigation and resilience, shifting the balance from response and recovery.

2.19The committee believes that a key approach to building resilience involves working with the natural environment instead of attempting to control or work against it, particularly when it comes to rebuilding after a disaster and the need to build back better. This involves a collaborative approach to integrating natural environment considerations into infrastructure planning and development to enhance sustainability and resilience.

2.20Presently, under the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA)—the framework used to provide funding to states and territories to share the financial burden of responding to a natural disaster—the Australian Government provides funds for the restoration of an essential public asset only to its pre-disaster function, however rebuilding infrastructure to its original specifications will not improve resilience. The committee is of the view that the DRFA guidelines should be amended to ensure that funding arrangements support the principle of building betterment into recovery and reconstruction, ensuring that this type of funding is available across all jurisdictions.

2.21The committee notes that an independent review of disaster funding arrangements was undertaken (the Colvin Review) with a final report to be provided to the Government in April 2024. However, at the time of writing, the report had not been publicly released.

Recommendation 1

2.22The committee recommends that the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements and relevant guidelines be amended to enable funds to be distributed for the purpose of building betterment into recovery and reconstruction, ensuring that this funding is available to all jurisdictions.

2.23The committee recognises that the disadvantage and social challenges experienced by Indigenous communities are exacerbated by climate change and that Indigenous communities, particularly remote communities, face unique challenges when it comes to mitigating risk and building disaster resilience. The committee is of the view that governments and organisations need to work with Indigenous communities to ensure that their voices are being heard and respected, noting that Indigenous knowledge of Country is invaluable in understanding local environments. Indigenous liaison officers, for example, are key contacts who can effectively communicate the needs of a particular community during a disaster. Governments must nurture Indigenous-led strategies that build the resilience of people and Country, including for land use planning, bushfire and flood mitigation, risk management, training and education, health, and emergency planning.

Australia’s disaster response arrangements

2.24Under Australia’s constitutional arrangements, state and territory governments have primary responsibility for emergency management. However, natural disasters do not adhere to state or territory borders and are often more widespread or exceed the capability of a single state or territory. Australia’s disaster response arrangements therefore aim to bring together the efforts of all levels of government, non-government organisations, businesses, communities, and individuals to deliver coordinated emergency management.[20]

National frameworks and strategies

2.25Australia has several frameworks and strategies that guide the national arrangements across all phases of natural disaster management. These national frameworks are developed by consensus and endorsed by the federal and each state and territory government—usually through forums such as the National Cabinet and its associated Ministerial Council for Emergency Management. These national frameworks and strategies can be broadly categorised as follows:

Frameworks and strategies focused on national approaches to mitigating and adapting to disaster risk and improving resilience, now and into the future, include: the NDRRF;[21] the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience;[22] the National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy;[23] and the Sendai Framework.[24]

A national approach to enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and recovery through the Australian Disaster Preparedness Framework.[25]

National funding frameworks, including the DRFA[26] through which the federal government provides funding to states and territories to share the financial burden of responding to a natural disaster, and the DRF which is a federal government initiative providing funding to support projects that address the physical and social impacts of disasters on communities.[27]

2.26Additionally, the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF) is the overarching policy for coordinated, whole-of-government crisis management. It describes the standing arrangements for the Australian Government’s response to all crises, including natural disasters. The whole-of-government arrangements provide for situational awareness, advice and data to support decision-making, communication strategies and strategic coordination.[28]

2.27There are two key mechanisms that facilitate whole-of-government coordination in response to or recovery from domestic crises including:

the Australian Government Crisis and Recovery Committee which is the primary mechanism that brings together relevant Australian Government Agency representatives; and

the National Coordination Mechanism which brings together relevant Australian Government, state and territory government and private sector representatives for coordination, communication and collaboration.[29]

Role of the federal government

2.28The federal government provides support to states and territories when coordinated assistance is requested, such as when the nature of the disaster has, or is expected to, exceed the sovereign capacities of the state or territory, or when the disaster affects multiple jurisdictions. This includes the allocation of resources, including from the Department of Defence (Defence). The federal government also works with states, territories, industry and the public to build national resilience against future hazards, particularly those with national consequences.[30]

2.29It is the federal government’s role to identify national priorities for the mitigation of emergencies, in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders. Additionally, the federal government provides support for emergency risk assessment and mitigation measures, in conjunction with state, territory and local governments.[31]

2.30A key agency is NEMA which was established in September 2022 to provide a more coordinated approach to preparing for and responding to disasters. NEMA provides national leadership by maintaining crisis and response plans that can support state and territory governments responding to an emergency. NEMA also provides end-to-end oversight of risk reduction, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.[32]

2.31Another crucial role of the federal government is the provision of financial assistance, not only to eligible Australian residents who are adversely affected by a disaster, but also through cost sharing arrangements with states and territories to alleviate the financial burden associated with the provision of emergency relief and recovery services and activities.[33] The federal government has also committed to investing $200 million per year on disaster prevention and resilience initiatives through the DRF, investing in projects such as improvements to flood levees, sea walls, cyclone shelters, evacuations centres, fire breaks and telecommunications.[34]

2.32The federal government also plays a central role in communication and information sharing, including through:

public information, such as public safety broadcasts;

vital public warnings for severe weather, bushfires, floods and tsunamis; and

information services such as meteorological, hydrological, geophysical and other geodata services that inform and underpin the management of emergencies.[35]

2.33Under the National Emergency Declaration Act 2020 the Governor-General may, on the advice of the Prime Minister, declare a national emergency if that emergency escalates to a level of national significance. Declaration of a national emergency triggers a number of statutory powers available to the federal government, including: the power to suspend, vary or substitute ‘red tape’ requirements, where doing so would be of benefit to the public or a section of the public; the power to require Australian Government entities to report on stockpiles during a national emergency; and the streamlining of statutory tests to exercise national emergency laws.[36]

2.34In 2023, the Australian Government established the National Emergency Management Stockpile (NEMS) to provide rapid access to readily deployable critical emergency management goods and services to augment Australian Defence Force (ADF)[37], and state and territory emergency response and immediate relief capabilities. The NEMS was first used in January 2024 following ex-Tropical Cyclone Jasper in Far North Queensland to provide temporary worker accommodation for those helping to clean up and rebuild.[38]

2.35The NEMS is comprised of three parts:

(a)a NEMS Standing Offer Panel with service categories for goods, logistics and specialist services, which authorised state and territory government agencies can also access;

(b)a national stockpile of Australian Government-owned re-deployable assets and single-use seasonal consumables, managed under NEMA contracts with industry. This includes self-sustaining emergency shelter camps, water desalination and purification systems and high output power generation; and

(c)strategic partnerships and Memoranda of Understanding with other Australian Government humanitarian and crisis response capabilities.[39]

2.36The Australian Government stated that the NEMS Standing Offer Panel is intended to ‘make it easier to source critical goods and services in preparation for and during an emergency’ by providing a continuous and reliable stockpile of essential goods and services. Furthermore, the panel ‘will ensure goods and services are available at competitive price points with shorter procurement lead-times’ and will also be ‘open to state and territory governments to procure goods and services in preparation for disasters’.[40]

2.37In the 2024–25 Budget, the Australian Government has allocated almost $27 million over the next three years to further invest in the NEMS national capability.[41]

State and territory responsibilities

2.38As noted above, state and territory governments have primary responsibility for emergency management within their jurisdictions and are responsible for protecting life, property and environment. This is managed through the development of emergency management plans and arrangements, and includes areas of responsibility such as:

aligning jurisdictional emergency arrangements to national frameworks;

developing, implementing and ensuring compliance with comprehensive emergency mitigation policies and strategies in all relevant areas of government activity, including land use planning, infrastructure provision and building standards compliance;

building and promoting resilience, including through emergency awareness and education programs;

ensuring warning systems are in place and are effective;

ensuring arrangements for coordinating the allocation of resources and capabilities are in place and acted upon;

ensuring that arrangements for evacuation, refuge and relief are in place;

maintaining adequate levels of capability, including appropriately equipped and trained career and volunteer emergency response and recovery personnel; and

ensuring post-emergency assessment and debrief, analysis and lessons management processes are undertaken.[42]

2.39Each state and territory government has slightly different disaster governance and crisis management arrangements, which integrate and implement the national frameworks and strategies differently. Most state and territory governments have a ministerial level committee responsible for emergency management. These ministerial committees enable elected government officials to make strategic, and sometimes operational, decisions about the management of natural disaster risk. They allow ministers to provide strategic policy oversight of measures to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from national emergencies.[43]

2.40These bodies are typically supported by a strategic policy and/or operational decision-making committee, which, in most instances, is referred to as an ‘emergency management committee’. These committees are often the principal bodies that allow state and territory governments to consider planning, investment and policy frameworks for natural disasters. Their membership often comprises all emergency chiefs, all government departments, and representatives, such as representatives of local government associations. These committees are also often responsible for the development and implementation of jurisdictions’ emergency management plans and/or frameworks.[44]

Local government responsibilities

2.41Unsurprisingly, communities are often the ones who are the first responders at natural disasters. Local governments play an important role in emergency management, particularly because of their local knowledge and relationships with community networks.

2.42Primarily, the responsibilities of local governments in emergency management operate in partnership with their respective state and territory governments to contribute to the safety and wellbeing of their communities.[45] The roles and responsibilities of local governments are similar to state and territory governments, but have a particular focus on their local communities, including:

representing community interests in emergency management to other spheres of government and contributing to decision-making processes before, during and after emergencies;

ensuring all requisite local emergency planning and preparedness measures are undertaken and that plans are exercised on a regular basis;

ensuring an adequate local emergency response and recovery capability is in place, including resources for local volunteers;

ensuring appropriate local resources and arrangements are in place to provide emergency relief and recovery services to communities;

continuing to provide services to their municipalities (such as waste collection, pollution control, water provision, wastewater treatment and stormwater drainage) during emergencies; and

participating in post-emergency assessment, debrief analysis and lessons management.[46]

Key challenges

2.43The committee received evidence that there are a number of areas where the current disaster preparedness and response arrangements could be improved, including support for local communities, funding for local councils, issues with coordination and communication, and funding for not-for-profits and the community services sector.

Empowering local communities

2.44Evidence received by the committee indicated that local communities felt that state and federal governments sometimes overlook the value of local capacity and knowledge when responding to natural disasters and building disaster resilience.[47]

2.45The Australian Red Cross submitted:

Communities know their strengths and needs better than anyone else. They are best placed to develop meaningful solutions for strengthening resilience locally. With the right skills, resources, and support, they can better withstand shocks, solve problems collectively and emerge stronger after disasters.We believe it is important to acknowledge that the current model is not fit for purpose, and we ask the committee to recommend a model that empowers communities to take collective, local action.[48]

2.46Dr Margaret Moreton, Executive Director at the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, warned that we need to think carefully about the help we provide communities, stating that ‘communities unfortunately often describe the help they receive as the second disaster’.[49] For example, the committee heard evidence from the Byron Shire[50] Mayor, Mr Michael Lyon, who reflected on the experience of the community during and following the 2022 floods:

If the rain fell again, hammering relentlessly for days, just like in 2022, and we were to have the same catastrophic event unfold, many of the same responses would likely repeat in Byron Shire. Ill-equipped evacuation centres would be stood up on sites, but local people in our hinterland and other areas wouldn't be able to access them. Community members would perform rescues, putting their and others' lives at risk to take families off roofs and out of landslips … The lead agency, the [New South Wales (NSW)] Department of Communities and Justice, may arrive days late and under resourced. As the waters recede, community members will rally at halls, ready to support each other, but find a gap in the system with no organisation in place to deliver vital coordination, training, insurance or risk management … Just like before, the community will look to each other and to us, the local council. Gaps will be filled by the community. The community will be the first responders, risk assessors, technical specialists and volunteer coordinators bearing the brunt and holding the risk.[51]

2.47Mr Lyon emphasised the need for state and federal governments to support local councils to work with their communities to build resilience and undertake essential preparation that enables communities to act effectively and safely ‘when, not if, the system fails’. Mr Lyon explained that local councils are doing their absolute best, they just need support to build regional disaster response models that are fit-for-purpose and tailored to the specific circumstances of the community. He stated: ‘we can't do it without a meaningful commitment from state and federal governments to deliver real, on-the-ground outcomes for local people’.[52]

2.48Dr Moreton agreed that communities have great capacity and strength, they just need a hand:

Local people know one another, and they know their local history and context better than any outsider can ever do. They know who's vulnerable, they know who needs help and they know who has capacity. Local Indigenous community groups know the land, know the stories and know the environment. Local organisations like fire brigades, local SES, neighbourhood houses and community services are the lifeblood of any community, and they know one another very well. Communities where these networks are strong and those community groups work together recover after an event much more quickly and with much more connection and much more enduring support.[53]

2.49Similarly, Mr Geoff Davis, Councillor of the Shire of Derby-West Kimberly in Western Australia, explained that there needs to be better governance mechanisms that allow local governments to have self-determination and to draw upon their own wisdom:

At the moment, local government, federal government, and state government always arbiter from outside. The capacity for us as a community to have leaders who can come together and sit down with the three tiers of government to make good decisions, have good input and review the impact of what we're being funded for needs to happen.[54]

2.50Townsville Councillor Jenny Hill agreed that as the level of government that is closest to the community, local councils have a unique understanding of the specific needs and challenges faced by their community, as well as having a range of services and infrastructure that can be mobilised in the event of a disaster, enabling them to respond quickly and effectively. In the case of Queensland, Councillor Hill highlighted a model that she believes works whereby the local level pushes up (rather than the federal level pushing down) through local management disaster groups which manage potential vulnerabilities and implement coordinated and effective strategies to respond to disasters. These groups are locally led, have primary responsibility for managing disasters in their local government area, and are structured with key personnel from local government agencies. Councillor Hill explained that these arrangements are unique to Queensland and should be considered for other states and territories.[55]

2.51Mr Christopher Barnes, Manager of Emergency Management and Public Safety at the City of Moreton Bay, also discussed the benefit of the Queensland model, explaining that with permanent staff, they are able to:

… engage local communities—specifically some of the communities that are more isolated and vulnerable in our region—to establish willing community volunteers who are known in the community and are able to deliver to those individual community members basic training in Queensland disaster management arrangements, how to establish an evacuation centre or a community hub to be able to actually have that community interface at the point of impact. The benefit of having those community disaster management teams is that they know each other—first name terms, or at least they know who lives around the corner or down that street, which has been flooded. They have their finger on the pulse, and that allows as to establish a baseline of capability at the community coalface to these disaster events, and it also means that, when we are in the response phase, we are able to tap into that network directly, when we have got the relevant communications to those communities, to actually understand what is happening … [A]ctually having the ability to reach directly into those communities with known and trusted community members has been a real key line of action for us in order to develop resilience within communities. It is certainly a scheme that we have been able to cascade to our partner local governments and highlight, and it has been subject to some good interest from other local governments as a model to take forward.[56]

Funding arrangements for local councils

2.52Overwhelmingly, local governments expressed a desire for greater cooperation, communication and integration, the removal of red tape, and more targeted funding to better coordinate disaster preparedness and response.[57] Some of the key issues and challenges described by councils are highlighted in this section, followed by some recommendations from the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA).

2.53The Kyogle Council, a local government council in the Northern Rivers region of New South Wales (NSW), described some of the problems they have experienced in engaging with the current disaster funding arrangements:

The [DRFA] arrangements were made with absolute good intent and they are essential to the recovery and rebuilding of these communities. But their implementation is seriously hindered by systemic structural issues. There are massive delays, bottlenecks, duplication of effort and effort in the wrong areas—really a system that's completely focused on dollars rather than people at the end of the day, and that's sad. As bureaucrats it's especially sad for us because we're the ones that are expected to work our way through those systems, work together with other tiers of government and get outcomes for our communities, but we are really struggling. It is really challenging to do that within the environment that's created at the moment between the three tiers of government.[58]

2.54Councillor Steve Krieg, Mayor of the Lismore City Council, highlighted the challenge of getting access to funding for important infrastructure projects at the local level because of how the funding arrangements are structured:

We've got projects like our main road into Nimbin, the second biggest town in our [local government area (LGA)], with a massive land slip; it's a $20 million to $30 million fix. The model at the moment is that the council bankrolls it and then the government says: 'Send the receipt in and we'll pay you back.' The total budget for our council is $200 million. We cannot carry that sort of debt … We need to do better in releasing the funds, when they're required, to get on with these fixes.[59]

2.55The President of the Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley agreed that the structure of the DRFA causes problems for local governments, particularly the auditing process:

… as a local government, we take on the risk. We have to provide an audit of our assets before and after an event; then we get an infrastructure auditor to agree the difference and the costs of that. We then get approval. We may need to audit again, once or twice. The amount of auditing that goes on is ridiculous … By the time you get to about your second or third audit, to get permission to do the works, you're well into the dry season … You can't mobilise late in the dry season.[60]

2.56The Tweed Shire Council, a local government council located in the Northern Rivers region of NSW, also discussed the challenges of navigating the bureaucracy as a local council, highlighting that the grants process is burdensome because councils are often dealing with ‘multiple grants with multiple criteria, [and] multiple ways to acquit’.[61]

2.57For the Barcoo Shire Council, a local government council located in Central West Queensland, a significant problem was that local governments are responsible for assets they own but cannot operate without permission from the state. Mr Michael Lollback, CEO of Baroo Shire Council, explained:

… every year that I do a budget, I start with a massive level of depreciation on assets that [the] council has no real use for but owns … We have very little say on what equipment arrives. There have been instances in the past where flood boats have arrived in local government areas without any consultation with the local government, only to have them put onto that local government's books to be maintained, fuelled and depreciated … I had a request made to me recently during the flooding of Cooper Creek: would I release the [state emergency service (SES)] flood boat to be able to go down there to transport some provisions from one side of the river to the other. Officially, whilst I own the boat, I have no permission to do that. I then had to go through the bureaucratic processes of going back to [Queensland Fire and Emergency Services] to say, 'Can I get permission for the boat that is on my books and under my ownership to be able to be used for a community move in the local area as a result of flooding?' … [T]hat highlights the complexity of council being afforded ownership of what is primarily an operational asset at a state level.[62]

2.58One of the key issues identified by the City of Hobart in Tasmania was that the current funding arrangements favour disaster recovery rather than disaster prevention which is a problem because local government often cannot afford build disaster resilience into their infrastructure without the assistance of other levels of government. Mr Geoffrey Lang, Municipal Emergency Management Coordinator at the City of Hobart, gave the following example:

… our city's critical stormwater infrastructure, some of which dates back to colonial times, needs investment to build our flood resistance. The ratepayer base of a small capital city such as Hobart cannot improve this type of infrastructure for disaster resilience on our own. As Hobart and the nation face increasing risk of more frequent and more intense natural disasters, it is critical that more investment is directed at building disaster resilience.[63]

2.59As the representative body for local governments, the ALGA advocated for more targeted funding assistance for local councils, stating that ‘without additional funding and support, councils are simply not able to rebuild … or adequately prepare for future disasters’:

For many years we've been calling for targeted funding assistance to enable councils to undertake mitigation activities to prepare our communities for the more severe and intense disasters that we know are coming due to dangerous climate change. Our smaller regional and remote councils in particular urgently need additional funding to rebuild their communities and to increase community resilience to future disasters. Smaller councils have least access to local rate revenue, rely heavily on federal funding for financial viability and are often the least able to provide the co-contributions that disaster recovery funding weights heavily.

There is a mismatch between the amount of local government infrastructure exposed to climate change risk and the resources that local governments have to carry out effective adaptation to manage these risks. Councils look after one-third of all public assets in Australia—around $530 billion, including roads, bridges, buildings, land, machinery and equipment—but we collect only about 3.5 per cent of the total Australian tax take, via rates. The remaining 96.5 per cent of all taxes are collected by state and federal governments.[64]

2.60The ALGA outlined four key recommendations to assist councils to better prepare for disaster events:

(a)a new targeted mitigation fund for local governments to build infrastructure to a more resilient standard, calling for $250 million per year over four years;

(b)Commonwealth funding of $5.7 million over three years to increase local government preparedness for disasters across the country, establishing a network of funded offices across state and territory local government associations and at the ALGA to work with councils to identify risks and to increase preparedness at the local government level across the country;

(c)state and territory governments to fully implement recommendation 11.1 of the Royal Commission into the National Natural Disaster Arrangements[65] which recommends jurisdictions assist councils with capacity and resources to undertake the tasks that are delegated to them; and

(d)that building back better be a core value and overriding principle of the DRFA with the disaster recovery funding arrangements to build betterment into every recovery and reconstruction.[66]

Issues with coordination and communication

2.61Submitters and witnesses raised issues with the lack of coordination and communication between both government and non-government agencies and services which resulted in confusion, duplication of efforts and other inefficiencies.[67]

2.62The CEO of the Business Council of Australia (BCA) purported that coordination could be a lot better, particularly between the business community, charities and government, stating that, otherwise, ‘people are confused about their roles and responsibilities’, there will be double ups of donations and assistance, and the ‘community and people who need assistance are not clear about where they can get it from’. BCA underscored that ‘[d]isasters are not a time for competition; they’re a time for collaboration’.[68]

2.63Disaster Relief Australia (DRA) submitted that there is a need for an increased level of national coordination to ensure that the work being undertaken by many organisations across Australia is coordinated, noting that disaster management arrangements are currently fragmented across jurisdictions, particularly during the recovery phase. For example, systems used in local disaster recovery centres frequently do not communicate with their state level counterparts. DRA recommended:

Tools such as the National Emergency Management Agency’s Crisis Appreciation and Strategic Planning process provide an opportunity for a common planning model and a common language if adopted broadly. This would see agencies come together in the planning phase of an operation to ensure the efficient allocation and sequencing of resources.

Similarly, strengthening data aggregation to provide a common operating picture provides an opportunity for increased collaboration and more efficient allocation of resources.[69]

2.64The Sydney Environment Institute has been conducting research on self-organising systems to minimise future disaster risk by investigating major disaster events such as the 2019–20 Black Summer bushfires and 2021–2023 East Coast floods which identified a number of issues with the coordination of disaster response arrangements. Their preliminary findings suggest that:

… in many cases, the ability of formal disaster-response agencies to coordinate with communities and other institutions brokedown as they approached constraints on available labour power, equipment, fuel, and other essential resources.

The breakdown in the coordination of formal disaster response and recovery mechanisms inhibited both the efficient allocation of existing state-controlled resources and the effective utilisation of community efforts. The failure of physical infrastructure–including roads, telecommunication, and electricity networks – exacerbated these institutional failures.

Participants in our research have explained that the disintegration of formal disaster-response systems as well as existing gaps in those systems shifted the financial, psychosocial, and ecological burdens of fires and floods onto informal networks and individuals.[70]

2.65The Sydney Environment Institute made the following recommendations to improve coordination and communication based on their preliminary findings:

governments should consider how the integration of community knowledge, networks, and strategies may improve the efficacy of conventional disaster response and recovery strategies including firefighting, sandbagging, evacuations, the distribution of supplies, etc. The committee should consider policies that recognise and integrate the efforts and aspirations of communities in a participatory, transparent, and democratic way;

the committee may consider policies that foster participatory negotiation processes communities and governments. To improve the interface between informal and formal disaster response and recovery efforts, governments should focus on local decision-making processes rather than prescriptive outcomes;

additional financial and administrative support (for example regulatory changes) may enable communities to deepen the intracommunity networks that disseminate information, share responsibilities, and coordinate resources during natural disasters; and

formal agencies should recognise the experiences of community members who understand the relationship between local ecological factors and disaster events.[71]

2.66In addition to advocating for greater coordination with government and non-government organisations, BCA also raised that it is difficult to obtain accurate, reliable, and timely information about the impact to small businesses when a disaster occurs to identify who needs assistance—which is compounded by the lack of coordination. The BCA recommended that NEMA play a greater role in the coordination of disaster-relief charities, as well as in the dissemination of data to charities during the emergency and recovery-phases of a natural disaster.[72]

2.67The Minderoo Foundation also discussed the need for access to more timely and accurate information, particularly on the state of community needs and disaster risk to enable volunteer and not-for-profit groups to coordinate and organise their services in a more targeted manner, ultimately helping communities to access the right support faster.[73]

2.68Furthermore, the Minderoo Foundation identified that there is no national asset register containing information to identify critical infrastructure and services—such as emergency accommodation, volunteers, mental health first aid—that are available for communities to access when disasters happen.[74] The Minderoo Foundation recommended that a national asset register be established to improve the mobilisation of resources into communities in need immediately after a disaster event.[75]

Communication in relation to floods

2.69One particular area that was raised as a concern for many communities was access to accurate and timely communication about flood warnings. This appeared to be predominantly an issue caused by aging and inadequate infrastructure.

2.70Councillor Krieg from the Lismore City Council described how inaccurate the Bureau of Meteorology (the Bureau) flood warnings were during the 2022 Lismore floods, noting that:

As for how the system was so badly inaccurate, I couldn't answer. I have heard some of our river gauges and flood warning systems have been broken since the 1974 flood and never repaired. Some of our rain gauges have been overgrown with camphor laurel trees so that they're not giving accurate information. The data matching doesn't line up with one gauge to another gauge. If you want to see a broken system, look at the Wilsons River catchment.[76]

2.71Mr Eber Butron, Chief Community Officer at Lismore City Council added:

At a broad level, what's critical in relation to flood response is the information that the emergency operations centre has. My understanding is that each local government has its flood mapping, and they don't necessarily respond and talk to each other and may use different methodologies in relation to their flood mapping.[77]

2.72Reflecting on the Lismore floods, Deloitte identified a number of issues with the coordination of the disaster response, including that there was:

an uncoordinated, under-resourced and extremely delayed response from federal, state and local governments during and in the immediate aftermath of the flood events; and

an overwhelming lack of coordination between government agencies, civil volunteer groups, community organisations and volunteers during and in the immediate aftermath of the disaster events.[78]

2.73The Minderoo Foundation agreed that there is a need for clearer flood warnings and warning systems that are well understood by the community.[79]

2.74The Bureau explained some of the challenges it faces in providing accurate and timely flood warning information to communities:

… Australia has a very complex set of arrangements with respect to the flood warning network. Flood warning infrastructure varies enormously across the states. In the last budget the Australian government allocated a quantum of funding for the bureau to address some of the deficiencies that exist in the current network—primarily, two things …

Firstly the network itself, which is enormous, is quite antiquated in many parts of the country. By 'antiquated' I mean there are a mixture of both automatic and manual observing stations. A lot of flood height data, for example, in this country is still taken by people going out during the flood and measuring the height of a river or a stream or whatever on a stick, effectively. Obviously, that has all sorts of safety and other implications, and also is a problem for us because sometimes those volunteers can't actually get to those observing systems themselves. So there's an issue around the network itself in terms of having up-to-date technology. But also, and most importantly, the bureau only owns a very small part of that network, and so, although we're responsible for issuing flood forecasts and warnings, we don't have responsibility or accountability and control over the quality and quantity of the data that we receive to the extent that we would like.[80]

2.75Furthermore, the Bureau outlined a significant government-funded project that was currently underway to upgrade flood warning infrastructure across Australia, stating:

… the government in the previous budget took a very significant initiative, which was to commence a program to upgrade the network and also, with the agreement of the states, start a program of transition whereby flood warning infrastructure, which is both river gauges and rainfall stations, would transition to ownership and maintenance by the bureau. It's a huge job. There are many thousands of bits of kit in the field. We're starting in Queensland because that's where we feel the risk is most significant, although there's risk right across the country, and over the next 10 years we will be implementing a program of upgrading the network and assuming ownership of the network into the bureau.

The program is proceeding on track. This first year has been about planning, recruitment of staff—because it's a huge job—and starting the process of agreeing arrangements for cost sharing with the states around ongoing maintenance, which was also part of the decision. We're well advanced in all of that. We're on schedule. We expect to start pouring concrete—works commence—in July [2024]. That will be in Queensland.[81]

2.76The Bureau added that NEMA has also provided funding to upgrade flood infrastructure with some of that funding is going to the high-priority area of the Northern Rivers. It was noted that the Bureau is also prioritising some of its own departmental capital budget to help with the upgrade.[82]

Funding for not-for-profits and community services

2.77A number of submitters advocated for greater levels of funding for not-for-profits and the community services sector in light of the increased demand for their services in the wake of more frequent and severe disaster events.[83]

2.78The Foundation for Rural & Regional Renewal (FRRR) expressed the view that community organisations play a vital, but often ‘under-appreciated, and under-funded role in both preparedness for, and recovery from natural disasters’.[84]

2.79GIVIT, a not-for-profit that manages offers of donated goods, services, volunteers and funds in response to natural disasters, highlighted that the role the sector plays takes pressure off the government:

The not-for-profit sector has a pivotal role to play, particularly at the community and individual level, in providing material emergency aid such as food, clothing, and household essentials. By allowing the charity sector to manage donations in an effective, transparent and coordinated manner, the drain on government resources at local, state and federal levels is significantly reduced…[85]

2.80The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) submitted that Australia has entered an era of concurrent, consecutive and compounding disasters and severe weather which has led to the increased reliance by governments on the ability of community organisations to help people and communities impacted by disasters. Therefore, ACOSS is of the view that ‘this requires a rethink of how to invest in the community sector to be able to meet the demand caused by such disasters’.[86]

2.81In a 2021 Australian community sector survey, ACOSS found that only 35 per cent of respondents agreed that funding appropriately supported them to address emergencies, such as bushfires, in their local communities. Furthermore, many reported that government tends to rely on short-term funding arrangements that do not provide sufficient certainty for organisations to plan their workloads and effectively manage workforces.[87]

2.82ACOSS was critical of the Australian Government’s funding arrangements stating that the DRF lacked a focus on community organisations and their role in disaster response, recovery and resilience. ACOSS recommended that the Australian Government:

(a)create a permanent enabling fund, the Community Sector Disaster Resilience Fund, to complement or be integrated with the DRF to strengthen the sector’s preparedness and capability to respond to disasters;

(b)create a permeant flexible contingency fund, the Community Sector Disaster Contingency Fund, to allow service providers to access additional funds to rapidly respond to specific disaster incidents; and

(c)fund the sector to strengthen its disaster management tools and practices, providing training to organisations to conduct risk assessments and develop disaster management and service continuity plans.[88]

2.83Similarly, the FRRR called for:

simple access to financial resourcing for community organisations that is agile, flexible, and while framed in broad national policy parameters, is locally determined. Such funding should recognise the unique role community organisations play in both preparedness and recovery, as needs evolve; and

specific consideration and investment for remote, rural and regional communities where geographic isolation amplifies the complexity of disasters.[89]

Committee view

2.84The committee welcomes the establishment of the NEMS as a means to support the rapid deployment of critical emergency management goods and services, such as emergency shelter, power, and potable water, taking some of the burden off the ADF. The committee acknowledges that the Australian Government has allocated further funding for the NEMS in the 2024–25 Budget. However, the committee is of the view that this national capability can be expanded to improve the logistics stores in each state and territory to further lift the burden off the ADF and to ensure prompt and effective assistance to disaster-affected communities across the nation. The committee would also like to see the establishment of a national asset register to improve the efficiency of the deployment of resources in the aftermath of a disaster.

Recommendation 2

2.85The committee recommends that the Australian Government establish a national asset register to improve the efficiency of the deployment of resources in the aftermath of a disaster. The Government should consider whether it is feasible to include not only federal and state government assets, but also suitable local community, private sector and non-government organisation assets.

2.86The committee recognises the financial impact that the increasing number and intensity of disasters are having on local governments. The funding models are complex and there is a need for greater flexibility and better funding transitions once programs end to ensure the sustainability of the models going forward. It is apparent to the committee that the Australian Government must optimise disaster funding arrangements so that they remain scalable, sustainable, effective, equitable, transparent and accessible into the future. It was clear to the committee that local governments are experiencing challenges with the current funding arrangements, particularly in their ability to finance infrastructure repairs up-front.

Recommendation 3

2.87The committee recommends that the Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements be amended to set aside a proportion of funding to be offered to local governments up-front to help facilitate disaster recovery and resilience to ensure councils do not always have to bear the burden of financing repairs up-front.

2.88To better support and empower local communities from the bottom up, governments must focus on working collaboratively within Australia’s federation. Instead of attempting to control from the federal level, the strengths of local communities need to be recognised and leveraged as they are often the best positioned to understand and address their unique needs. The Australian Government should aim to provide wrap-around support services that empower states and territories to represent their communities effectively. For example, by funding organisations who provide local councils with training in emergency planning and coordination, risk management, and so on. By fostering cooperation and enhancing support for local initiatives, a more resilient and responsive system that meets the needs of all Australians can be achieved. This bottom-up approach will ensure that communities have the autonomy and resources necessary to thrive.

2.89The committee encourages the Australian Government to continue working with local governments, states and territories to enhance capabilities and preparedness across society, further strengthening resilience, response and recovery arrangements.

2.90The Australian Government should work with states, territories and local governments to conduct a review of all emergency evacuation centres to identify any gaps and areas of need. The Australian Government could also consider utilising the collection of this information to create and maintain a publicly accessible map of emergency evacuation centres across Australia so that all stakeholders are aware of the closest evacuation centre in the area in an emergency.

2.91The committee’s view that the Australian Government should encourage and support states and territories to produce timely post-disaster reports, reviews or investigations following a natural disaster. The committee notes that despite the significant impact of events like the floods in Fitzroy Crossing, no review was conducted. Encouraging a thorough investigation process post-disaster will provide invaluable insights into the event's causes, response effectiveness, and areas for improvement. This is essential for enhancing disaster preparedness, response, and resilience in the future.

2.92Based on the evidence presented to the committee, it is clear there are ongoing issues with coordination and communication in disaster response and recovery. The committee sees this is a crucial element to improving the effectiveness and efficiency of Australia’s disaster response framework. Many of these issues may be an unfortunate product of Australia’s federal system of government and come down to the way in which the roles and responsibilities for disaster preparedness, response and recovery are structured. The committee believes that the Australian Government must continue to focus on and improve on its critical role in coordination and collaboration across all levels of government and sectors to address the concerns raised throughout this inquiry.

2.93Additionally, the committee heard evidence that there have been issues with coordination and communication particularly during flood events. The committee considers that flood warning systems could be improved to ensure consistent and enhanced monitoring, with data that can be effectively communicated to higher authorities and integrated into broader emergency response frameworks. The committee encourages the Australian Government to support the maintenance and expansion of its flood gauges through continued investment in disaster-prone areas to enhance centralised monitoring, assessing and early warning capabilities. Given the challenges faced by local councils, which often lack functional rain gauges and fail to regularly maintain or check them, federal support is essential for ensuring comprehensive flood monitoring.

2.94The committee believes there is scope for the Australian Government to consider how it can enhance engagement to draw on local knowledge for flood prevention and recovery by developing and implementing further strategies and mechanisms for local input. This could involve establishing community forums, conducting consultations, and incorporating traditional and Indigenous knowledge into flood management plans.

2.95The committee wishes to highlight the substantial role played by the not-for-profit and community services sector in disaster preparedness, response and recovery—their efforts and dedication to improving the lives of families and communities in the most detrimental times is commended and applauded. The committee acknowledges that the pressure on the resources, staff and volunteers of these organisations has increased substantially as concurrent, consecutive and compounding disasters become more commonplace. It is apparent to the committee that the Australian Government must ensure that the not-for-profit and community services sector feel adequately resourced and supported to meet the new levels of demand caused by these disasters. To do so requires sufficient funding certainty for these organisations to appropriately plan their workloads and effectively manage their workforces.

2.96The next chapter will consider the decline in volunteerism in Australia and what that means for Australia’s disaster resilience, before exploring ways to incentivise Australians to join civil and volunteer groups, not-for-profit organisations and state-based services to increase the numbers of those willing to assist their fellow Australians in times of crisis.

Footnotes

[1]United Nations (UN) Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, ‘Sendai Framework terminology on disaster risk reduction: resilience’ (accessed 3 June 2024).

[2]National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework, 2018, p. 7.

[8]Dr Margaret Moreton, Executive Director, Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Committee Hansard, 14 March 2023, p. 8. See, also: National Insurance Brokers Association (NIBA), Submission 60, p. 2.

[10]See, for example: National Farmers’ Federation, Submission 18, p. 2; St Vincent de Paul Society, Submission 37, p. 2; Habitat for Humanity Australia, Submission 44, p. 1; GIVIT, Submission 51, p. 2; Foundation for Rural & Regional Renewal (FRRR), Submission 54, p. 6; Kyogle Council, Submission 58, p. 2; NIBA, Submission 60, p. 2; Minderoo Foundation, Submission 69, p. 1; Mr Adrian Turner, Director, Minderoo Foundation Fire and Flood Resilience, Committee Hansard, 18 May 2023, p. 2.

[11]Mr Adrian Turner, Director, Minderoo Foundation Fire and Flood Resilience, Committee Hansard, 18 May 2023, p. 2.

[12]Minderoo Foundation, Submission 69, p. 1.

[13]NIBA, Submission 60, pp. 2 & 5.

[14]See, for example: Northern Land Council, Submission 77, pp. 1–4; Ms Prue Jenkins, Chief Executive Officer, Wunan Foundation, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2023, pp. 21–25; Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS), Submission 31, p. 3; National Indigenous Disaster Resilience (NIDR), Submission 168, pp. 1–9.

[15]Deloitte, Submission 63, p. 3.

[16]See, for example: Deloitte, Submission 63, pp. 1, 3–4; Northern Land Council, Submission 77, p. 6; Indigenous Reference Group, Submission 116, pp. 4–6; Oliver Costello, Submission 127, p. 5.

[17]See, for example: Northern Land Council, Submission 77, pp. 4–7; Indigenous Reference Group, Submission 116, p. 5; Mr Chuck Berger, Chief Executive Officer, Kimberly Development Commission, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2023, p. 26; Ms Sarah Parriman, Deputy Chief Officer, Kimberley Land Council, Committee Hansard, 17 May 2023, p. 24.

[18]Note: the Disaster Ready Fund (DRF) is a federal government initiative providing funding to support projects that address the physical and social impacts of disasters on communities.

[19]NIDR, Submission 168, pp. 1–9.

[20]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. ix.

[23]Department of Climate Change, Energy, the Environment and Water (DCCEEW), National Climate Resilience and Adaptation Strategy 2021–2025, October 2021.

[24]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015.

[25]Department of Home Affairs, Australian Disaster Preparedness Framework, October 2018.

[26]NEMA, ‘Disaster Recovery Funding Arrangements (DRFA)’ (accessed 4 July 2024).

[27]Department of Finance, ‘Disaster Ready Fund’ (accessed 14 June 2024).

[28]Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, September 2023.

[29]Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, September 2023, pp. 31–32.

[30]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 5.

[31]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 5.

[32]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 6; NEMA, Submission 82, p. 3.

[33]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 5.

[34]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 6.

[35]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 5.

[36]Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government Crisis Management Framework, September 2023, p. 35.

[37]Note: the role of the ADF is discussed in chapter 4 of this report.

[40]NEMA, ‘Growing Australia’s disaster stockpile’, media release (accessed 5 June 2024).

[42]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 5.

[43]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 76.

[44]Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements, Report, 28 October 2020, p. 76.

[45]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 4.

[46]Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Australian Emergency Management Arrangements, 2023, p. 4.

[47]See, for example: Mr Joe Ross, private capacity, Committee Hansard, 16 May 2023, p. 14; Councillor Steve Krieg, Mayor, Lismore City Council, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2023, p. 4; Minderoo Foundation, Submission 69, p. 1; Mr Jelenko Dragisic, Submission 167, p. 7.

[48]Australian Red Cross, Supplementary Submission 56, p. 7. Note: the Australian Red Cross provides a RediCommunities program which empowers communities to develop a disaster resilience action plan as well as ongoing support to implement the plan, with a focus on localised, community owned initiatives. See: Australian Red Cross, Supplementary Submission 56, p. 8.

[49]Dr Margaret Moreton, Executive Director, Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2023, p. 8.

[50]Note: the Byron Shire is a local government area located in the Northern Rivers region of New South Wales (NSW).

[51]Mr Michael Lyon, Byron Shire Mayor, Byron Shire Council, Committee Hansard, 27 June 2023, p. 8.

[52]Mr Michael Lyon, Byron Shire Mayor, Byron Shire Council, Committee Hansard, 27 June 2023, pp. 8–9.

[53]Dr Margaret Moreton, Executive Director, Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, Committee Hansard, 15 March 2023, pp. 8–9.

[54]Mr Geoff Davis, Councillor, Shire of Derby-West Kimberley, Committee Hansard, 16 May 2023, p. 12.

[55]Councillor Jenny Hill, Mayor, Townsville City Council, Committee Hansard, 21 September 2023, pp. 1–3. For more information on Queensland disaster management arrangements, including local disaster management groups, see Queensland Government, The Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery Disaster Management Guideline, 2 March 2023 (accessed 11 June 2024).

[56]Mr Christopher Barnes, Manager, Emergency Management and Public Safety, City of Moreton Bay, Committee Hansard, 22 September 2023, p. 17.

[57]See, for example: Mr David Menzel, President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2023, pp. 11–20; Ms Amanda Dexter, Chief Executive Officer, and Mr Wayne Neate, Director, Technical and Development Services, Shire of Derby-West Kimberly, Committee Hansard, 16 May 2023, pp. 3–4; Mr Michael Lyon, Byron Shire Mayor, Byron Shire Council, Committee Hansard, 27 June 2023, p. 8; Mr Graeme Kelly, General Secretary, and Mr David Ross Crawford, Delegate, United Services Union, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2023, pp. 20–24; Councillor Steve Krieg, Mayor, Lismore City Council, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2023, pp. 2–3.

[58]Mr Graham Kennett, General Manager, Kyogle Council, Committee Hansard, 29 June 2023, p. 3.

[59]Councillor Steve Krieg, Mayor, Lismore City Council, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2023, p. 2.

[60]Mr David Menzel, President, Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, Committee Hansard, 15 May 2023, p. 16.

[61]Mr Troy Green, General Manager, Tweed Shire Council, Committee Hansard, 29 June 2023, p. 4.

[62]Mr Michael Lollback, Chief Executive Officer, Baroo Shire Council, Committee Hansard, 12 April 2023, p. 5. See, also: Councillor Linda Scott, President, Australian Local Government Association (ALGA), Committee Hansard, 13 April 2023, p. 24.

[63]Mr Geoffrey Lang, Municipal Emergency Management Coordinator, City of Hobart, Committee Hansard, 20 April 2023, p. 2.

[64]Councillor Linda Scott, President, ALGA, Committee Hansard, 13 April 2023, p. 19.

[65]Note: the Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster Arrangements was established in February 2020 in response to the extreme bushfire season of 2019–20. The report can be found here.

[66]Councillor Linda Scott, President, ALGA, Committee Hansard, 13 April 2023, pp. 19–20.

[67]See, for example: Disaster Relief Australia (DRA), Submission 27, p. 5; Deloitte, Submission 63, p. 2 Business Council of Australia (BCA), Submission 85, pp. 1–2; Ms Jennifer Westacott AO, Chief Executive Officer, BCA, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2023, p. 19; Sydney Environment Institute, Submission 110, p. 19.

[68]Ms Jennifer Westacott AO, Chief Executive Officer, BCA, Committee Hansard, 19 April 2023, pp. 19–20.

[69]DRA, Submission 27, p. 5.

[70]Sydney Environment Institute, Submission 110, pp. 20–23.

[71]Sydney Environment Institute, Submission 110, pp. 20–23.

[72]BCA, Submission 85, pp. 1–2.

[73]Minderoo Foundation, Submission 69, p. 2.

[74]Minderoo Foundation, Submission 69, p. 2.

[75]Mr Adrian Turner, Director, Minderoo Foundation Fire and Flood Resilience, Committee Hansard, 18 May 2023, p. 2.

[76]Councillor Steve Krieg, Lismore City Council, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2023, pp. 6–7.

[77]Mr Eber Butron, Chief Community Officer, Lismore City Council, Committee Hansard, 28 June 2023, p. 7.

[78]Deloitte, Submission 63, p. 2.

[79]Mr Adrian Turner, Director, Minderoo Foundation Fire and Flood Resilience, Committee Hansard, 18 May 2023, p. 6.

[80]Dr Andrew Johnson, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Meteorology, Bureau of Meteorology, Committee Hansard, 1 March 2024, pp. 1–2.

[81]Dr Andrew Johnson, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Meteorology, Bureau of Meteorology, Committee Hansard, 1 March 2024, p. 2.

[82]Dr Andrew Johnson, Chief Executive Officer and Director of Meteorology, Bureau of Meteorology, Committee Hansard, 1 March 2024, p. 2.

[83]See, for example: UNICEF, Submission 52, pp. 1–11; FRRR, Submission 54, pp. 1–9; Australian Red Cross, Submission 56, p. 4; Foodbank Australia, Submission 86, pp. 16–17.

[84]FRRR, Submission 54, p. 2.

[85]GIVIT, Submission 51, pp. 1–2.

[86]ACOSS, Submission 31, p. 2.

[87]ACOSS, Submission 31, p. 3.

[88]ACOSS, Submission 31, pp. 4–5.

[89]FRRR, Submission 54, p. 9.